Emergency powers and parliamentary government in Malaysia: Constitutionalism in a new democracy by Das, Cyrus Vimalakumar
EMERGENCY POWERS AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA: - 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A NEW DEMOCRACY 
A Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
by 
CyruS-Vimalakumar Das - 
Department of Law, Brunei University 
July 1994 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a situational study of the use and exercise of emergency 
powers in Malaysia, undertaken from the perspective of the principles 
underlying the Malaysian Constitution. The primary focus and 
perspective are Malaysian, and I use comparative materials where I 
consider they may help to Illuminate that perspective and the way In 
which emergency powers have been used. 
A unique situation has been created whereby the Malaysian Government 
has the option of taking measures under one or other of two legal 
regimes. The thesis, therefore, examines the development of this parallel 
government system. it includes discussion of the considerations that 
animated writing reserve powers into the Malaysian Constitution and the 
near Institutional isation of the state of emergency In Malaysia, using this 
historical background to focus on the role of the judiciary In crisis 
situations, the incorporation of certain traditional elements of Malay 
society into the Constitution, and the existence of racial 'bargaining' In 
developing the Constitution. 
The thesis then examines the distinct legal order created by a state of 
i' 
emergency, within the context of the reality of the Malaysian polity. 
Hence, there is an examination of the four actual instances when an 
emergency was proclaimed in the country. 
An examination is also undertaken of the various amendments made to 
Article 150 over the years which has reduced much of the safeguards 
originally built Into'the provision. This examination suggests that Article 
150 In Its present form, is debilltative of parliamentary government 
largely because of the dual system of law-making created by a state of 
emergency. 
The thesis therefore provides an 'insight Into the working of a, major 
constitutional democracy seeking to reconcile the need to maintain 
emergency powers and reallse the objective of a parliamentary system 
envisaged by Its Federal Constitution. 
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EMERGENCY POWERS AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN A NEW DEMOCRACY 
PREFACE 
This proposes to be a study of constitutionalism in a newly emergent 
democracy. Malaysia attained independence in 1957, and after 30 years retains 
many of the vestiges of a Westminster-style democracy. In this respect it 
compares well with many of the other countries in the south and south east 
Asian region that began as democracies,, after discarding the , colonial yoke, 
but are now under some form of totalitarian government or other. 
The Malaysian experience is in many ways an unique one. It is a nation 
that has struggled to maintain the features of democracy in spite of several 
challenges to the fabric of its society. The multi-racial, multi-religious and 
multi-cultural composition of its peoples has probably presented the greatest 
challenge to the retention of a viable democracy in Malaysia. , 
A prominent-feature of constitutional life during this period has been 
the frequent invocation and use by the Government of its emergency - powers 
under the Constitution. The resort to a state of emergency has been proferred 
by the Executive as the reason for the survival of democracy in the ', country. 
Thus, the Proclamation of Emergency, made on 15 May 1969 continues unabated to 
this day, and the country is for all legal purposes still under a- state of 
emergency. , This unique state of affairs bears living proof of C. K. Allen's 
prescient observation in his "Law And Orders", that emergency government once 
taken root is a tough plant to uproot., 
The resort to crisis powers and the continuous state of the Emergency 
nevertheless presents a profound challenge to constitutionalism in the 
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country. The ability of the Executive Government to invoke and perpetuate a 
state of emergency without any independent check raises obvious questions as 
to whether the original objective behind the creation of'this power has now 
been discarded. Moreover, and probably more importantly, the legal regime 
created by a state of emergency enhances executive power and provides for 
executive law-making under the rubric of emergency legislation. This has 
resulted in two parallel legal regimes subsisting in Malaysia; one, the 
parliamentary system with a cabinet which is answerable to an elected 
Parliament, and the other, the emergency regime where the Government may at 
its option invoke its emergency powers and undertake action without reference 
to Parliament. The significance of this emergency power may not be fully 
appreciated unless one realises also that emergency laws, whether enacted by 
Parliament or as Executive legislation, overrides the Constitution and may not 
be invalidated on account of being inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
eclipse of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, which is a cornerstone of 
the Malaysian constitution, in the face of emergency laws, graphically 
illustrates the import of a continuous state of emergency in the country. 
An attempt is made in this study to examine these questions in some 
detail and review their impact on the state of constitutional democracy in 
Malaysia. The study is made, as it must, in the historical context of Malay 
society and early constitutional systems in Malaya. 
I have considered at the outset the jurisprudential underpinning to the 
exercise of crisis powers, and sought to analyse first its treatment by the 
common law. The present day exercise of emergency'powers, including its use in 
Malaysia, should be compared with the original jurisprudential basis for the 
existence of this power. Part I of the study deals with this and examines how 
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the power of the royal prerogative to handle a crisis was translated into the 
written constitutions of many of the countries of the new Commonwealth, 
including Malaysia. There is also an analysis of the -problems posed by 
constitutional breakdowns in the new democracies. often this has called for 
emergency action under circumstances which are de hors the written 
constitution resulting in a state of martial law. An interesting feature of 
this development, as will be seen in the study, is the legitimating process by 
which legal recognition of some form or the other is given to the new 
constitutional order and the role played by the courts in this regard. 
Part II deals with the historical evolvement of the emergency power in 
Malaysia. An understanding of how and why emergency powers are exercised by 
the Government would not be possible without comprehending the unique milieu 
in which the Malaysian Constitution was founded. The incorporation of certain 
traditional features of Malay heirachial rule into the Westminster framework 
and the principal features of the Constitution, namely, Parliamentary 
government, the role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) and the doctrine 
of constitutional supremacy are discussed to provide an understanding of the 
impact and change to government that is brought about by the, declaration of an 
emergency. 
The four instances when an emergency was declared in Malaysia are 
discussed in Part III. In two instances, it was declared to cover 
territorially a particular State only, and in two other instances it. was 
proclaimed to cover the whole of Malaysia. A judicial observation was made 
once that nearly every consideration arising from the Constitution may be 
considered to be political (see Dixon J. in Melbourne Corporation v. 
Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLV 31,82). That observation probably sees its 
greatest truth in the invocation and exercise of crisis powers, especially 
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when it is utilised not to deal with a natural calamity, but to ostensibly 
avert a threat to the public order or security of the nation. An examination 
of the actual instances when the Government invoked its 6mergency power, and 
the reasons for the same, is indispensable for an inquiry into whether the 
provision is a safety valve or an escape channel for political expediency. Any 
discussion of the scope, efficacy or adequacy of the emergency power or 
suggestions for future safeguards would otherwise take place only in a vacuum. 
Part IV attempts a detailed legal analysis of the nature and scope of 
the emergency power. The discussion begins with an examination of the features 
of Article 150 dealing with the circumstances when the emergency power may be 
invoked, and the important question of the duration and tenure of a state of 
emergency. In this context, there is also an analysis of the judicial role in 
emergency situations, namely, as to whether the proclamation and continuance 
of a state of emergency is justiciable before the courts. I 
Emergency government' is characterised by the plenitude of emergency 
measures and legislation that is brought forth to deal with the so-called 
crisis. Malaysia is no exception. The 21 months of rule under a Director of 
Operations, and the National operations Council, after the Emergency was 
declared on 15 May 1969, is discussed in some detail as providing the best 
example of an emergency-type government established in the country. The review 
ends with a consideration of the present weaknesses and inadequacies in 
Article 150, and the need for the provision of future safeguards to ensure 
that Article 150 does not become a route for the dilution of constitutionalism 
in the country. 
In doing this study I have attempted solicitously to identify and locate 
events, examples and case-precedents from third world countries. The 
yardsticks of the developed democracies would not be a suitable measure of the 
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causes and effect of crisis government, which is today largely (albeit, not 
exclusively) a third world phenomenon. This is significant in evaluating 
generally the attitude of the courts to the threat to constitutional 
safeguards and liberties that accompany the declaration of an emergency. The 
analysis is in some ways a comparative study of'judicial attitudes of the 
third world courts towards a common problem. Precedents are drawn and 
discussed from the stronger democracies of India and the Caribbean Island 
nations, and from the African countries of Nigeria and Uganda where crisis 
government is endemic, as also from the new Pacific Island nations where 
democracy is still at the experimental stage. This comparative evaluation 
hopefully presents a better understanding of the growth of democratic values 
and principles in Malaysia itself. 
Constitutionalism is a hope and a challenge to the Malaysian democratic 
polity. The pivotal question is whether the nation could do away with the 
crutch of emergency powers and a continued state of emergency. It is hoped 
that this study could contribute in some small measure towards a better 
understanding of the use and exercise of this awesome power and of its 
strengths and weaknesses. 
vi 
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PART I 
THE DOCTRINE OF EMERGENCY POWERS 
CHAPTER 1 
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE 
Tni-rneilirfinn - 
Emergency governments have existed from the earliest of times. Crisis 
government was recognised in early Rome to cope with an invasion or 
conspiracy. 1 The Roman city-state made provision in its constitution to 
suspend the elaborate structure of government and nominate a single person, 
usually a general, to take control of affairs during a crisis. 2 of equal 
interest is the observation that once in power the dictators seldom gave up 
office. 3 They perpetuated emergency rule and made it a way of life. 
1. R. M. MacIver, The-Web Of Government (Revised Edition 1965. The Free 
Press. Macmillan PublishiiTg--Co. Inc. New York) p. 170. 
2. Ibid. The need for crisis government was underscored by Machiavelli who 
reportedly said " ... those republics which in time of danger cannot 
resort to a dictatorship will generally be ruined when grave emergencies 
occur": quoted in Anthony Matthews, Freedom, State Security & The Rule 
of Law. (Juta & Co. Johannesburgh, 19_86ýy at p. 192. 
3. MacIver, Ibid. As the learned author records: "Only Cincinnatus, returned 
to his plow". The contemporary historian Barbara W. Tuchman gives 
another noteworthy example, of the 6th century B. C. ruler of Athens, 
Solon, who called to save the state from economic ruin and social 
unrest, introduced a series of reforms, and after exacting an oath from 
the Athenian Council to maintain his reforms for ten years, sailed away 
to voluntary exile for that period to avoid endless petitions for 
modifications to the reforms: see The March Of Folly: From Troy To 
Vietnam (Abacus Books, London, 1985T-at pp. 18-19. For an account of 
Fo--dern-day dictators refusing to give up office and holding power with 
apparent support of their people through the medium of populism, see 
Barry Rubin, Modern Dictators: Third World Coup-Makers, Strongmen And 
Populist Tyrants (Meridian, New York, 1987. ) 
2 
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The problem is by no means the disease of a bye-gone era. The 
International Commission of Jurists reported in a recent study that the 
exercise of emergency powers by national governments has-become a problem of 
global importance. 4 Equally disturbing is the tendency to make states of 
emergency perpetual. The Report also noted that in recent times a considerable 
part of humanity has been living under a state of emergency and that too 
accompanied often by grave violations of human rights. 5 The conclusion is 
inescapable that in many countries the resort to crisis government is a 
constitutional pretense to exercise unchecked and uncanalised power. The 
problem is particularly acute in the third world countries where the potential 
for instability and civil disorder is greatest. In these countries the basic 
question always is whether adequate safeguards can be built into the system to 
prevent misuse of authority and the excuse of a facile resort to emergency 
rule. 1, ý 
It may be noted that a state of emergency is, as much a1egal-problem as 
it is a political, and social one. It raises grave questions regarding the 
status of constitutionalism in the country concerned. 6 A state of emergency 
could arise as a result of a constitutional upheaval like a revolution or. a 
4. States of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights. (A Study Prepared By 
T7he -International commission of Jurists, Geneva, March 1983) at p. 413. 
5. Ibid. See Introduction by Niall MacDermot, Secretary-General -of -the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and also at p. 413. 
6. Constitutionalism has been defined by Professor S. A. De Smith as "the 
principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by 
rules; rules which determine the validity of legislative and executive 
action by prescribing the procedure according to which it must be 
performed or by delimiting its permissible content": S. A. De ýSmith, 
Constitutionalism In The Commonwealth Today, (1962) 4 Malaya Law Review 
205. 
3 
coup dletat. In that event, the emergency arises de hors the terms of the 
governing constitutional instrument and raises questions immediately as to the 
continued validity of the existing constitution and the legitimacy of the 
revolutionary government which has supplanted it. 7 Even in cases where 
emergency powers are constitutionalised, 8 its invocation and exercise could 
raise difficult legal questions. For example, the proclamation of an emergency 
may be challenged as being in fraudem legis9 or that the emergency legislation 
are ultra vires the Constitution. 10 These cases demonstrate that emergency 
situations present a myriad of legal problems, often of a complex nature, as 
will be seen in the discussion that follows. 
Emergency Situations 
Emergencies may arise under a number of circumstances. They,, are not 
necessarily political because natural catastrophies could produce-emergency 
conditions as well. In Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor, Lord Dunedin, attempted a 
definition in understandably broad terms when he called an emergency "a state 
7. For example, a succession of army take-overs in Pakistan since 
independence in 1949 has led to its courts evolving an impressive 
jurisprudence on the law pertaining to revolutions and constitutional 
breakdowns generally: see cases like State v. Dosso PLD 1958 SC 533: 
Asma Jilani v. Government of Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139. 
8. The term "constitutionlizing emergency powers" is defined as the 
prescription by law of the range of authority available to the executive 
and the relationships between the executive, the legislative and the 
courts in time of emergency: See Cornelius P. Cotter. 
Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers, The British Experience (1953) 
Stanfora L. Review 382. 
9. For eg. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1970] AC 379; 
(1968] 2 MLJ 238, dealing with the bona fide of the Government of 
Malaysia's advise to the King that grounds existed for declaring a state 
of emergency in the East Malaysian State of Sarawak. 
10. Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458; [1979] 1 MIJ 50; a 
Malaysian case where the Privy Council struck down emergency legislation 
made by the King after Parliament had convened. 
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of matters calling for drastic action". 11 The purpose of emergency powers is 
obvious. It is to forestall any threat to the stability of the nation. It is 
commonly believed that there are six main types of emergencies, namely, war, 
economic recession, natural, disaster, secession, insurrection and 
subversion. 12 Except for an emergency created by war, the other instances are 
generally classified as internal emergencies, and in respect of them, one 
talks of the exercise of peacetime emergency powers. 
However it is war-time emergency measures that have done much to shape 
and influence the present day approach to emergency powers. 13 War presents the 
clearest example of the type of threat to the safety of the nation that causes 
every other consideration to be subordinated. Thus the war effort by a nation 
and its people draws many casualties, chief of which is freedom and liberty. 14 
The obligation of a government to safeguard the integrity of the nation is 
often irreconcilable with certain freedoms exercisable by its citizens. This 
conflict has produced a plethora of court decisions from several jurisdictions 
born out of war time cases. The cases show a remarkable consistency in 
approach. With rare exceptions, the courts have voted in favour of the 
executive's war power. 
11. AIR 1931 PC 111 at pp. 111-112. 
12. See Michael P. O'Boyle, Emergency Situation And The Protection of Human 
Rights; A Model Deroga n Provision For A Northern Ireland Bill Of 
Rights (1977) Vol. 28 N. I. L. Q. 160 at p. 161, and Herbert Marx, The 
Emergency Power And Civil Liberties In Canada (1970) Vol. 16 McGill I; -. J-. 
39 at p. 42. 
13. David Bonner, Emergency Powers In Peacetime, London (Sweet & Maxwell), 
1985 at p. 2. 
14. See for example, per Lord Macmillan in the well-known English case of 
Liversiqge v. Anderson (1941] 3 AER 338 at 366: 11(I)n a time of 
emergency, when the life of the whole nation is at stake, it may well be 
that a regulation for the defence of the realm may quite properly have a 
5 
A good starting point is the juridical stand that the executive is the 
best judge of the requirements of the nation's safety., In an oft quoted 
passage of his judgment in The Zamora, 15 Lord Parker C. J. *said: 
"Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole 16 judges of what the national security requires". 
In an Australian case, 17 decided at about the same time, the court 
declared that it must be left to the wisdom of the Parliament and the 
Executive as to the appropriate war measures to implement because "they alone 
have the information, the knowledge and the experience and also, by the 
constitution, the authority to judge the situation and lead the nation to the 
desired end". 18 Likewise in the United States, in Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 19 concerning the internment of Japanese - Americans as a war-time 
preventive measure, the Supreme Court said 11 ... it is enough that circumstances 
contd... 
14. meaning which, because of its drastic invasion of the liberty of the 
subject, the courts would be slow to attribute to a peacetime measure". 
From across the Atlantic we have the dictum of Holmes J. in Moyers v. 
Peabody 212 U. S. 78 [1909] at p. 85: "When it comes to a decision by the 
Head of State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of 
the individual must yield to what he deems the necessities of the 
moment. Public danger warrant the substitution of executive powers for 
the judicial process". For a comprehensive discussion of the balance 
struck between national security and civil liberties in the United 
States, see (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review on The National Security 
Interest And Civil Liberties at p. 1130 et. seq. 
15. [1916] 2 AC 77. 
26. Ibid at p. 107. See also Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor (1931] 58 IA 169. 
The continued acceptance of this principle is seen by its adoption by 
the Malaysian Supreme Court recently in a preventive detention case, 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MIJ 29 at p. 31. 
17. Farey v. Burvett [1916] 21 CIR 433. 
18. Ibid at p. 45 5-56, per Isaacs J. 
19.320 U. S. 87 [1943]. 
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within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining 
the national defence afforded a rational basis for the decision which they 
made". 
The rationale for the war-power was given by Williams J. in the 
Australian case of Adelaide, Company of Jehovah Witnesses Inc. v. The 
Commonwealth20 in simple terms: 
"Because war promotes abnormal conditions, abnormal means are, required 21 to cope with them". 
In a later case22 he elaborated on this theme: 
"The paramount consideration is that the Commonwealth is undergoing the 
dangers of a world war and that when a nation is in peril, applying the 
maxim salus populi suprema lez, the courts may concede to the Parliament 
and the Executive which it controls a wide latitude to dete§mine what 
legislation is required to protect the safety of the realm". 2 
A strong jurisprudence has thus developed that when the nation's safety 
is in peril a rigid adherence to constitutional rules and liberty becomes 
inappropriate. one of the American founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, gave 
the early thinking on this matter: 
"To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, would 
be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those 
who are enjoying them with us, thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the 
means". 24 
20. [1943] 67 CLR 116.1 
21. Ibid at p. 161. 
22. The Victorian Chamber of Hanufacturers v. The Commonwealth [1943] 67 CLR 
347. 
23. Ibid at p. 400. 
24. From his "Writings" (Washington Ed. ) pp. 542-45: quoted in Ajay Dixit v. 
State of U. P. AIR 1985 SC 13 at p. 20. See also the statement attributed 
to President Lincoln in a letter to Hodges, April 4,1864: "Was it 
possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? ": quoted 
in foot-note (4) p. 1 of Cotter's, Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers, 
supra, note 8. 
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However,, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 25 the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that the President as Commander-in-Chief had implied 
unlimited power to 'take whatever measures necessary - forý the war effort, 
including the seizure of a steel mill by executive order. This case was 
decided in the wake of the Korean War and is considered a constitutional land 
mark affirming the supremacy of the rule of law 'under, the American 
Constitution. Delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Black said: 
"The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the 
aggregate of his powers under the Constitution ..... Even though "theatre 
of war" be an expanding concept, we-cannot with faithfulness to our 
constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private 
property in order to keep labour disputes from stopping production. This 
is a job for the nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities... 
...... In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be 
a lawmaker ..... The Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about 
who shall make laws which the President shall execute". 26 
In a separate concurring opinion Mr. , Justice'' Douglas remarked: "while 
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the 
27 exercise of power". In like vein, "dealing with emergency legislation as 
opposed to emergency powers, viscount Simon remarked in the Privy Council case 
of, Attorney General Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation: 28 
25.343 U. S. 579 [1951]. For a first person account of the case, see William 
H. Harboughý Lawyer's Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis (New York, 
O. U. P. 1973) pp. 462 et. seq., and William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme 
Court, How It Was, How It IS (New York, William Morrow 1987) p. 41 
et. seq. 
26. Ibid at p. 586. 
27. Ibid at p. 704. See also Home Building & Loan Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 
U. S. 398,425 [1934], a case decided during the depression in the United 
States. 
28. [1946] AC 193 at p. 206. 
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"True it is that an emergency may be the occasion which calls for the 
legislation, but it is the nature of the legislation itself, and not the 
existence of emergency, that must determine whether it is valid or not". 
These cases demonstrate a preparedness by the courts in-spite of the grave 
emergency created by a war to ensure that war-time measures are kept within 
constitutional limits. 
Nevertheless, the basic premise remains that the courts will not review 
the choice of measures taken by the executive on behalf of the war effort. The 
courts have invariably deferred to the executive's discretion in these 
matters. The rationale is simple that it is futile to talk of individual or 
group rights when the very existence of society or a way of life is 
threatened. It formed the basis for, the decision of the High 'Court of 
Australia in the case of The Adelaide Society of Jehovah Witnesses Inc. v. The 
Commonwealth. 29 The case concerned a challenge to a proscriptive order made by 
the Government against a religious group called the Jehovah Witnesses. This 
group renounced the bearing of arms and campaigned against conscription during 
the war. The group argued that its religious freedom was violated. In 
repelling the challenge, Latham Ci said: 
11 ..... the ýprotection of any form of liberty as a social right within a 
society. necessarily involves the continued existence of that society as 
a society. Ot erwise the protection of liberty would be meaningless and 
ineffective". 
ýO 
Likewise, in the wartime case of Jones v. Opelika, the United States Supreme 
Court observed that fundamental freedoms "are not absolute to be exercised 
independently of other cherished privileges protected by ' the ' same organic 
29. Supra, note 20. 
30. Ibid at p. 131. 
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instrument ..... without which the constitutional guarantee of civil liberties 
would be a mockery". 31 
One juristic method has been to read the written constitution flexibly 
so as to give the Executive a wide latitude in prosecuting the war. This is 
evident in Isaacs J. 's judgment in Farey v. Burvett: 32 
"The Constitution, so I view it, is not so impotent a document as to 
fail at the very moment when the whole existence of the nation it is 
designed to serve is imperilled". 
In one case the court went as far as to say it would even countenance 
33 executive dictatorship. In Yasny et al v. Lapointe, a Canadian court was 
considering a challenge to a ministerial order prohibiting the publication of 
a newspaper in the Russian language as subverting the war effort. In 
dismissing the challenge the court said: 
"In times of peace the civil rights of the people, the liberty of the 
subject, the rights of free speech, and the freedom of the press, are 
entrusted to the courts. In wartime this may be changed. Parliament may 
take from the courts their judicial discretion and substitute for it the 
autocracy of bureaucrats". 3 
The thinking was encapsulated graphically by Scrutton L. J. in his judgment in 
Ronnfeldt v. Phillips35 decided during the First World War: 
"It had been said that a war could not*be conducted on the principles of 
the Sermon on the Mount. It might also be said that a war would not be 
carried on according to the principles of Magna Carta". 
However, the notion that the fighting of a war becomes a licence for 
government lawlessness must quickly be dispelled. This is seen from the 
31.316 U. S. 584 [1942] at p. 593. 
32. Supra, n. 16 at p. 451. 
33. [19401 3 DIR 204. 
34. Ibid at p. 205. 
35. [1918] 35 TLR 46 at p. 47. 
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eventual fate that befell the majority opinions in the celebrated case of 
Liversidge v. Anderson36 and the reinstatement of Lord Atkin's dissent as 
expressing the correct law. 37 The approach of the majority was embodied in 
these words of Lord MacMillan: 
.... in a time of emergency, when the life-of the whole nation 
is at 
stake, it may well be that a regulation for the defence of the realm may 
quite properly have a meaning which, because of its drastic invasion of 
the liberty of th3, subject, the courts will be slow to attribute to a 
peacetime measure. 
In contrast, Lord Atkin spoke these words which were to enjoy vindication in 
posterity: 
"In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may 
be changed but they speak the same language in war as in peace". 39 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the war-power rationale has been extended 
to every emergency faced by a nation regardless of the source of the threat. 
This is because war-time cases are decided when the judges are under a 
subconscious pressure not to stultify the war effort by their decisions. It is 
doubtful therefore if these cases could stand as general precedents for all 
times. Lord Diplock implicitly recognised that war-hysteria had made the 
36. [1941] 3 AER 338. For an interesting account of behind-the-scene 
happenings before judgment was delivered by the House of Lords in the 
case, and Lord Maugham's public outcry after reading Lord Atkin's 
dissent, see RFV Heuston: Liversidge v. Anderson in Retrospect (1970) 86 
LQR66, and Geoffrey Lewis, Lord Atkin (Butterworths) 1983 pp. 132 et. 
seq. 
37. In Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 at p. 65 Lord Reid referred to 
Liversidge as a "very peculiar decision". The denou6ment came in IRC v. 
Rossminstex* [1980] AC 953: "For my part I think the time has come to 
acknowledge openly that the majority of this House in Liversidge v. 
Andez-son were expediently, and at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong 
and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin was right", per Lord Diplock at 
p. 1101D. 
38. Supra, note 14 at p. 366C. 
39. Ibid at p. 361C. 
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majority,, in Liversidge v. Anderson "excusably" go wrong. 40 In the United 
States, early-after the Second World War, Mr. Justice Jackson of the Supreme 
Court warned that war-time decisions were unsuitable for general application: 
"No one will question that this (war) power is the most dangerous one to 
free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked 
in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration of 
constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of 
patriotic fervour that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it 
is interpreted ýy the Judges under the influence of the same passions 
and pressures". 41 
Nevertheless, these principles have been applied without modification to 
justify peacetime emergency measures. There are various methods by which 
governments deal with peacetime emergency situations. They range from the 
French "6tat de sAge" which is a constitutionally recognised form of 
emergency government, to military administrations in the form of martial 
law. 42 The common denominator running through the various forms of emergency 
government is the reposing of near totalitarian power in the hands of the 
Executive. With this comes the attendant danger of abuse and misuse of the 
newly acquired power. In the result, in many countries there is resort to 
emergency rule to prop up an unpopular government or for no reason other than 
for the government to have unchecked power. 43 In third world countries, where 
40. See supra, note 36. 
41. Woods v. Killer Company 333 U. S. 138 [1947] at p. 146. See also Turner 
J. in the New Zealand case of Reade v. Smith [1959] NZIR 996 at 1000: 
"Cases dealing with war regulations promulgated in times of great 
national danger must, in my opinion, be carefully examined before being 
used too hastily as a touchstone for the validity of regulations made 
under more normal conditions". 
42. See Marx, op. cit., p. 42; Michael P. O'Boyle, op. cit., p. 162. 
43. See generally the Report of the International Commission of Jurists, 
supra, note 4. 
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the rule of law is not firmly entrenched, the continuance of emergency 
government long after the danger has abated is not uncommon. A written 
constitution is never regarded as an impediment to achieve the ulterior 
political 'objective behind a state of emergency. A keen writer on African 
constitutional development observed generally on this phenomena: 
"In the Third World, constitutions are seen not as the protectors of 
human rights but as instruments for legitimising the exercise of 
arbitrary power. The kind of constitutional law that most people 
understand in the Third World is the law that allows the government to 
impose unreasonable laws, to arrestýand detain persons whose guilt is 
often highly suspect, to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement, 
association and speech, and to do whatever the whims of political 
leaders dictate. Ultimately, constitutional law in the Third World is 
the obstacle that revolutionaries and military 'coup dletat find to be 
an easy target and the removal of which introduces even more stringent 
measures. It may be argued therefore that in the Third World, 
constitutional law has no more validity or sanctity than what is often 
accorded to notions of democracy, the rule of law and 44 constitutionalism". 
Whether the cause for a state of emergency is real or specious, the juridical 
basis for its proclamation at common or general law is invariably grounded in 
the doctrine of state necessity as will be seen in the ensuing discussion. 
It is reported that during the American Civil War, Lincoln broke laws, 
violated the Constitution, usurped arbitrary powers, and trampled individual 
liberties. His justification was necessity. 45 His explanation was: 
"My oath to preserve the Constitution imposed on me the duty of 
preserving by every indispensable means that government ..... By general law, life and limb must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated 
to save a life, but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt 
44. George W. Kanyeihaýba, Constitutional obligation , In . Developinc countries, in Essays On Thi-R-World Perspectives In Jurisprudence, Ed. 
Marasinghe & Conklin (Malayan Law Journal) 1984,29 at pp. 36-37. 
45. See Richard Nixon, Leaders'(Warner Books Inc. New York 1982) at p. 326. 
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that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by 
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through 
the preservation of the nation". 46 
Necessity is essentially a political concept used -to justify extra- 
constitutional conduct and clothe it with some legal basis. It bears out 
Chitty's statement that "necessity knows no lawn47 and Bracton's maxim that 
"necessity makes lawful that which is unlawful". 48 
The principle of necessity is now a recognised part of constitutional 
jurisprudence and has come a long way since its first rejection by Lord Camden 
C. J. in Entick v. Carrington [1765] 19 St Tr 1030 at 1073 in the famous line: 
"(W)ith respect to the argument of State Necessity... the common law does not 
understand that kind of reasoning". The Latin maxims, salus populi est supre- 
ma lex (the safety of the people is the supreme law) and salus republicae est 
suprema lex (safety of the State is the supreme law), lie at the heart of the 
doctrine of necessity. Broom explains the maxims as based "on the implied 
agreement of every member of society that his own individual welfare shall, in 
cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, 
liberty, and life shall, under certain circumstances be placed in jeopardy or 
even sacrificed for the public good". 49 
46. Ibid. 
47. Chitty, author of the classic book "Prerogatives of the Crown" (1820): 
quoted in the Pakistan case of In Re Special Reference PLD 1955 SC 435 
at p. 485. 
48. NQuvad alias non est lisitux necessitas lisitux pacitl: quoted in S. A. 
De Smith "Constitutional Lawyers In Revolutionary situations" (1968) 7 
W. Ontario L. R. 93 at p. 97. 
49. Broom's Legal, Maxims 9th Edn. 1924, at p. l. 
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Defending The Realm And The Royal Prerogative 
Early English constitutional law recognised the concept of msuprema 
potestas", that is, that the defence of the realm is entrusted to the Crown 
embodied in the person of His Majesty. It was explained by Avory J. in In Re A 
Petition Of Right: 50 
11 ..... (T)he authorities appear to establish that by the constitution the defence of the realm is entrusted to the Crown, that the law has 
entrusted the person of His Majesty with the care of this defence, that 
in this business of defence the "suprema potestasm is inherent in His 
Majesty as part of his Crown and kingly dignity, that in times of war or 
invasion the maxim Nsalus populi suprema, lezff must prevail, and that in 
these times of war not only His Majesty but likewise every man that hath 
power in his hands, may take the goods of any within the realm, pull 
down their houses or burn their corn to cut off victuals from the enemy, 
and do all other things that conduce to the safety to the kingdom 
without respect had to any man's property". 51 
The royal prerogative, as it is known, is accepted as part of the common 
law of England. 52 Dicey has defined it as "the residue of discretionary or 
arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of 
53 the Crown". The prerogative was judicially considered in some early cases. 
Almost all of them concerned the taking of private property without 
compensation by the Crown in the defence of the realm. 54 In this, the De 
50. [1915] 3 K. B. 649. 
51. At pp. 651-652. See also Lord Dunedin in Attorney Ceneral v. De Keyser's 
Royal Hotel [1920] AC 508 at p. 524: 11 ... the King, as suprema potestas 
endowed with the right and duty of protecting the Realm, is for the 
purpose of the defence of the realm in times of danger entitled to take 
any man's property.... ". 
52. Per Lord Cozen-Hardy M. R. in In Re A Petition of Right (C ourt of 
Appeal), supra, note 50 at p. 659. 
53. See RFV Heuston, Essays In Constitutional Law 2nd Edn. (Stevens) 
- 
1964 p. 
58. See also B. S. Mardesinis, The Royal'Fr erogative Re-visited (1973) 
Camb. L. J. 287. 
54. R V. Hampden [1637] 3 Howell's State Trials , 825 (the Ship Money case); The King's Prerogative in Salt , petre (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 12. 
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Keyser case55 in the House of Lords is the most significant of its kind this 
century. It was there held that the royal prerogative could not be invoked to 
justify - seizure of private property in the face of a statute providing for 
taking with compensation. In his speech, Lord Moulton discussed the royal 
prerogative from its early times: 
11 ..... one must consider the nature and extent of the so -calle& Royal Prerogative in the matter of taking or occupying land for the better 
defence of the realm. I have no doubt that in early days, when the war 
was carried on in a simpler fashion and on a smaller scale than in the 
case in modern times, the Crown, to whom the defence of the realm was 
entrusted, had wide prerogative power as to taking or using the lands of 
its subjects for the defence of the realm when the necessity arose. But 
such necessity would be in general an actual and immediate necessity 
arising in the face of, the enemy and in circums ances where the rule 
salus populi suprema lez was clearly applicable". 6 
57 The next important case is Burmah oil Company v. Lord Advocate, where the 
modern day operation of the prerogative was considered. The case arose out of 
a claim for damages by an oil company in Burma. The oil company had several 
oil installations which were destroyed by British forces during, the, last war. 
In his speech Lord Reid remarked "(T)here is difficulty in relating the 
prerogative to modern conditions,, 58 and referred to it as "a relic of a past 
55. See note 51, supra. 
56. At p. 552. See also Darling J in In Re Arbitration Between Shipton, 
Anderson & Co. [1915] 3 KB 676 at p. 684, dealing with the seizure of 
wheat by-fNe-Government for the war effort: "We are in a state of war; 
that is notorious. The subject matter of this contract has been seized 
by the State acting for the general good. Salus populi suprema lex is a 
good defence and the enforcement of the essential law gives no, right of 
action to whomsoever maybe injured by it". 
57. [1964] 2 All ER 348. 
Op. cit. at p. 354. The claim succeeded only because the court found 
that the destruction of the oil installations was part of a long-term 
deliberate strategy -and therefore did not fall within the recognised 
exception of battle damage. The principle that damage to civilian 
property as a necessity of battle and therefore not compensable is of 
long standing. It was epitomised by Field J. in a decision of the United 
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past age". 59 Both Lord Reid and Lord Pearce were of opinion that the 
prerogative was available only for a case not covered by statute. 60 A recent 
decision of the English Court of Appeal applied the royal prerogative as an 
alternative plea to defend a circular from the Home Office on supply of police 
equipment to the constabulary. In R v. Secretary of State Exparte Northumbria 
Police Authority'61 the Court said that if the Police Act touching on the 
subject was not applicable, the Home office was entitled to rely on the 
prerogative power to keep peace and for this purpose supply equipment to deal 
with actual or apprehended public disorder. The decision affirms the current 
view that the prerogative power may exist parallel to a statutory power-, but 
may not be exercised if to do so would be incompatible with the statute. 
contd... 
58. States Supreme Court arising from the American civil war, United States 
v. Pacific Railroad Co. (1887] 120 U. S. 227 at pp. 233-34: ', "The 
destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the 
bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had 
to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. Whatever 
would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as the breaking up 
of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple and defeat him, as 
destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the 
commanding general. Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their 
destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this. 
The safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of 
private loss. Salus populi is then, in truth, suprema. lex". 
59. Ibid. See also BBC v. Jones [1965] Ch. 32: "It is 350 years and a civil 
war too late for. the Queen's Courts to broaden the prerogative" (at p. 
79 per Diplock L. J. ). 
60. At pp. 354C and p. 3841 respectively. See reiteration of these 
principles in Laker Airways v. Department of Trade [1977] 2 AER 182 at 
193: "Seeing that the prerogative is a discretionary power to be 
exercised for the public good, it follows that its exercise can be 
examined by the courts just as any other discretionary power which is 
vested in the executive". 
61. (19881 1 All. E. R. 556. 
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Written Constitutions And The Implied Power To Act In Defence 
Of The Realm 
Where there is a written constitution, and in, the'absence of express 
provisions in it to deal with a threat to the security of the state, the cases 
show that a power will be implied authorising the Executive to take all 
necessary measures to safeguard the state. 62 As Isaacs J. declared in the 
Australian case of Farey v. Burvett: 63 "The Constitution, as I see it, is not 
so impotent a document as to fail at the very moment when the whole existence 
of the nation it is designed to serve is imperilled". 64 
In Fort Frances Pulp & Power Company Ltd. v. Hanitoba Free Press Company 
Ltd., 65 the Privy Council had to consider whether the Dominion Government of 
Canada had inherent power to limit the supply of newsprint paper for the whole 
of Canada. The question arose in the contex t of an argument that this subject 
was outside the legislative competence of the Dominion Parliament, being 
reserved for the provincial legislatures. Viscount Haldane for the Board 
premised his decision on the implied power in the constitution to deal with a 
"sudden danger to social order arising from the outbreak of a great war". 66 He 
said: 
"This principle of a power so implied has received effect also in 
countries with a written and apparently rigid constitutions such as the 
62. The continental legal philosopher Grotius called it an "implied mandate" 
from the lawful sovereign to take measures to keep law and order in the-- 
territory whether controlled by the lawful government or an usurper (De 
Jure Belli Et Pacis): see Privy Council in Hadzimbasuto v. Lardner-Burke 
[1968] 3 All ER 561 at pp. 577,579,581.1 1 
63. [1916] 21 CLR 433. 
64. Ibid at p. 451. 
65. [1923] AC 695. 
66. Ibid at p. 703. 
18 
United States, where the strictly federal character of the national 
basic agreement has retained the residuary powers not expressly 
conferred on the Federal Government for the component states ..... In a 
sufficiently great emergency such as that arising out of war, there is 
implied the power to deal ade uately with that emer§ency for the safety 65 of the Dominion as a whole". 
Lord Haldane's reference to the United States experience must apropos be 
the American doctrine of police power. This doctrine is said to be an inherent 
attribute of the American Constitution exercisable without any express grant. 
The inherent police power was a concept devised by the United States Supreme 
Court to overcome the statement of fundamental rights in absolute terms in the 
American Constitution and to enable the government to make regulations for the 
health, peace, morals and good order of the people. 68 
However, the police power doctrine has not been adopted in countries 
with written constitutions which provide expressly for qualification of the 
exercise of fundamental rights in the interest of the state. Thus in India, 
the Indian courts have avoided importing the concept of police power "because 
what has been achieved in the U. S. A. under that concept was exercisable by the 
State in India under the constitution itself". 69 In Dwarkadas v. The Sholapur 
Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd., 70 the Indian Supreme court expressly rejected 
the argument that the take-over of a textile mill could be justified under 
inherent "police power" in the absence of express legislative authorisation. 
Bose J. said: 
67. Ibid at pp. 704-705. 
68. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry v. Illinois 200 U. S. 561; Meyer V. 
Nebraska 262 U. S. 390. 
69. See M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (4th Edn. 1987) N. M. Tripathi 
Ltd. Bombay, pp. 685-686. 
70. AIR 1954 SC 119. 
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"With the utmost respect I deprecate, as I have done in previous cases, 
the use of doubtful words like "police power", "social control", 
"eminent domain" and the like. I say doubtful, not because they are 
devoid of meaning but because they have different shades of meaning in 
different countries, and because they represent powers which spring from 
widely differing sources. In my opinion, it is wrong to assume that 
these powers are inherent in the state in India and then to see how far 
the Constitution regulates and fits in with them. Weýhave to interpret 
the plain provisions of the Constitution and it is for jurists and 
students of law, not for judges, to see whether our Constitution also 
provides for these powers and it is for them to determine whether the 
shape which they take in India resemble any of the varying forms which 
they assume in other countries". 71 
Likewise in Malaysia, which has a constitution modeled on India, it has 
been argued that "the doctrine of inherent police power as interpreted by the 
American courts, has no force or validity and no place in the framework of 
(Malaysia's) constitutional process". 72 The reasoning was that where the 
Constitution itself defines the limitation that may be imposed on the exercise 
of fundamental rights this virtually constitutes "a constitu. tional 
73 modification of the doctrine of police power". 
It is apparent that the difficulty lies not in determining the source of 
the exercise of peacetime emergency powers by governments but in ascertaining 
the scope and extent of these powers. Can the government rely on its inherent 
or residual power to call out the military to quell civil unrest or- an 
insurrection? Does this power extend to handing over the reins of government 
to the military or to exercise martial law powers over the people? If these 
measures are taken, what is the status of the personal and property rights of 
the individual? 
71. Ibid at p. 137. 
72. Mr. Justice E. Abdoolcader, Constitutional Process And The Doctrine of 
Police Power (1977) 2 MLJ-xxxi. 
73. Ibid. 
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civil Unrest, Martial Law And The Necessity Doctrine 
The law of civil necessity is an aspect of the State Necessity doctrine. 
It is grounded on the basic principle that it is as much important to preserve 
the sovereignity of the state from external threat by war or invasion as it is 
to act to quell internal disorder, rebellion, insurrection or any like 
activity leading to a constitutional disruption. 
An early case dealing with this question was Proceedings Against George 
Stratton & Ors. 74 The defendant and his followers were tried in England for 
the misdemeanour of arresting and imprisoning the Governor of the Settlement 
of Madras which belonged then to the East India Company. The defence was that 
the defendant had acted out of necessity to preserve the constitution because 
the Governor was repeatedly flouting it. In his address to the jury Lord 
Mansfield dealt with the elements of the law of civil necessity: 
"It must be very imminent, it must be very extreme, and in all they do, 
they must appear clearly to do it with a view of preserving the society 
and themselves, with a view of preserving the whole ..... If the governor 
does twenty illegal acts, that will not be a justification of it; it 
must tend to the dissolution of society and the intervention must tend 
to the preservation of it. 
But the only question for you to consider is this whether there was that 
necessity for the preservation of the society and the inhabitants of the 
place as authorises private men to take possession of the government; 
and to take possession of the government to be sure it was necessary to 
do it immediately. 
If you can find that there was that imminent necessity for the 
preservation of the whole, you will acquit the defendants". 
The defence failed and the accused were convicted. 
In Philips v. Eyre, 75 the English Court had to consider whether the 
Governor of the Colony of Jamaica was open to actions for assault and false 
74. [1779] 21 State Trials 1046. 
75. [1870] L. R. Q. B. 1. 
21 
imprisonment for steps taken to quell rebellion and insurrection in the 
province. Willes J. dealt at length on the powers of the civil authority to 
quell a rebellion: 
"This perilous duty, shared by the governor with all the Queen's 
subjects, whether civil or military, is in an especial degree incumbent 
upon him as being entrusted with the powers-of government for preserving 
the lives and property of the people and the authority of the Crown; and 
if such duty exist as to tumultuous assemblies of a dangerous character, 
the duty and responsibility in case of open rebellion are heightened by 
the consideration that the existence of law itself is threatened by 
force of arms and a state of war against the Crown established for the 
time. To act under such circumstances within the precise limits of the 
law of ordinary peace is a difficult and may be an impossible task, and 
to hesitate or temporize may entail disastrous consequences. Whether the 
proper, as distinguished from the legal, course has been pursued by the 
governor in so great a crisis, it is not within the province of a court 
of law to pronounce ..... It is manifest, however, that there may be 
occasions in which the necessity of the case demands prompt and speedy 
action for the maintenance of law and order at whatever risk, and where 
the governor may be compelled, "unless he shrinks from the discharge of 
paramount duty, to exercise de facto powers which the legislature would 
assuredly have confided to him if the emergency could have been 
foreseen, trusting that whatever he has honestly done for the safety of 
the state will be ratified by an Act of indemnity and oblivion. There 
may not be time to appeal to the legislature for special powers. The 
governor may have, upon his own responsibility, acting upon the best 
advise and information he can procure at the moment, to arm loyal 
subjects, to seize or secure arms, to intercept munitions of war, to cut 
off communication between the disaffected, to detain suspected persons, 
and even to meet armed force by armed force in the open field. If he 
hesitates, the opportunity may be lost of checking the first outbreak of 
insurrection, whilst by vigorous action the consequences of allowing the 
insurgents to take the field in force may be averted. In resorting to 
strong measures he may have saved life and property out of all 
proportion to the mistakes he may honestly commit u9der information 
which turns out to have been erroneous or treacherous". 6 
In that case the Governor had acted after a proclamation of martial law. 
However, a proclamation is not a prerequisite for a state of martial law to 
exist. In Tilonko v. Attorney General of Natal,, 77 Lord Halsbury called it "an 
entire delusion" that martial law exists by reason of the proclamation. 
76. Ibid at pp. 16-17. 
77. [19071 AC 93. 
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He declared: "The right to administer force against force in actual war does 
not depend upon the proclamation of martial law at all". 78 Inýthe Irish case 
of The King (Ronayne & Mulcahy) v. Strickland & Anor, 79 the court held that 
when a, state of facts exists which justifies the imposition of martial law, 
the forces of the Crown, without any proclamation, may be -employed in 
executing it. 
The question that follows is whether the proclamation of a state of 
affairs justifying martial law is conclusive against judicial review? The 
cases that have dealt with this problem generally arose in the context of 
whether civilians arrested in areas under martial law could be subjected, to 
military tribunals instead of the regular civil courts. In Ex Parte 
Hilligan, 80 and again in Duncan-v. Kahanamoku, 81 the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that, notwithstanding martial law, the military trials of accused 
persons ordinarily, triable in the regular courts whilst those courts were open 
was in violation of the Constitutiori. Duncan was decided a few years after 
martial law was proclaimed in Hawaii following the-Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour. The Supreme Court said that the power to declare martial law does not 
include the power to supplant civilian laws by military orders and to supplant 
78. Ibid at p. 94. See also W. S. Holdsworth in "Martial Law Historically 
Considered" (1902) 18 LQR 117 at p. 129: "The law ..... ac-Es- on the same 
principles in judging the conduct of those who have acted under a 
proclamation of martial law, and in judging the conduct of those who 
have used force to suppress a riot. The'proclamation in no way adds to 
the powers inherent in the government of using force to suppress 
disorder". 
79. (19211 2 IR 333. 
80.18 L. ed. 281,303. 
81.327 U. S. 304 [1945). 
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courts by military tribunals, where conditions are not such as to prevent the 
enforcement of the laws by the courts. But in Ex Parte Marais, 82 the Privy 
Council held on a similar question, that the fact that, civil courts were 
functioning in a district in which martial law has been proclaimed is not 
conclusive that war is not raging. The petitioner-in that case complained that 
he was denied access to the civil courts.,, ý 
Ex Parte Marais depicts the general attitude of the courts under common 
law systems not to review the judgment of the government that circumstances 
exist necessitating the imposition of martial1aw. But judicial reticence in 
this regard cannot be considered as universal or unqualified. In The King 
(Garde & Ors) v. Strickland,, 83 the Irish court said that it has the power when 
its jurisdiction is invoked to decide whether a state of war exists which 
justifies the application of martial law. The point was said to be destitute 
of authority and Molony C. J. expressed his wish to state this proposition in 
"the clearest possible language". 84 In the later case of R. (O'Brien) v. 
Military Governor N. D. U. Internment Camp, 85 Molony C. J. rejected the argument 
that the civil courts of Dublin had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus because of a state of war. He said: '-- 
"I am satisfied that it has not been proved that a state of war or armed 
rebellion at present exists in the city of Dublin. There is, no doubt, a 
certain amount of disorder, and the presence of the military may be 
sometimes required for the purpose of assisting the police in the 
maintenance of order or the protection of buildings. Parliament is, 
however, sitting without interruption, every court is functioning, writs 
are duly served and executed, and while it may sometimes be necessary 
82. [1902] AC 109. 
83. [1921] 2 IR 317. 
84. Ibid at p. 329. 
85. [1924] 1 IR 32. 
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that the civil administration should be aided by military force, it by 
no means follows that in every case where military aid is necessary, a 86 state of war or armed rebellion can be said to exist". 
In Sterling v. Constantin, 87 the United States Supreme Court had to consider 
whether it 'could go behind the Governor's declaration that an insurrection 
exists and that, certain measures are needed to suppress it. In repelling the 
argument -that the Governor's decision was conclusive, Chief Justice Hughes 
declared: "If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is 
manifest that the fiat of a State Governor, and not the Constitution of the 
United States, would be the supreme law of the land ..... There is no such 
avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution". 88 
It is submitted that the American decision has rightly fastened on the 
principle that it is inimical to the notion of supremacy of the Constitution 
if the Executive should have a conclusive say in these matters. 
The term "martial law" is often understood to mean the abrogation of 
constitutional government and its replacement by militaryýrule. The Duke of 
Wellington is reported to have-said that "martial law is neither more nor less 
than the will of the General who commands the army. In fact martial, law means 
no law at all". 89 No less an authority than Maitland appears to confirm this: 
...... it is an improvised justice administered by soldiers". 90 In Duncan v. 
Kahanamoka, 91 Chief Justice Stone gave, a comprehensive constitutional 
86. Ibid at p. 42. '' 
87.287 U. S. 378, [1932]. 
88. Ibid at pp. 397-98. 
89. See Holdsworth, op. cit., at p. 132. 
90. See Heuston, Essays, op. cit., at p. 151. 
91. Supra, note 81. See generally also 8 Halsbury's Laws 4th Edn. p. 625 
et. seq. 
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definition of the term: 11 ..... martial law is the exercise of the power which 
resides in the executive branch of the government to preserve orders and 
insure the public safety, in times of emergency, when other branches of the 
government are unable to function, or their functioning would itself threaten 
the public safety. It is a law of necessity to be prescribed and administered 
by the executive power. Its object, the preservation of the public safety and 
good order, defines its scope, which will vary with the circumstances and 
necessities of the case. The exercise of the powers may not extend beyond what 
is required by the exigency which calls it forth". 92 In Asma Jilani v. 
Government of Punjab, 93 the Supreme Court of Pakistan said martial law is of 
three types: (1) law regulating the, rule of conduct of the armed forces; (2) 
law imposed on an alien territory under occupation by an armed force, and (3) 
law which relates to a situation where the civil power is unable to maintain 
law and order and the military power is used to recreate conditions of peace 
in which the civil power is able to reassert its authority. 94 It is with the 
last of the three situations enumerated that we are presently concerned. 
Martial law is often taken to be synonymous with military rule. In Asma 
Jilani's case, the Pakistan Supreme Court suggested that a, distinction must be 
made between martial law as a machinery for the enforcement of internal order 
and martial law as a system of ýmilitary rule of a conquered or alien 
territory. It was said that martial law of the first category is normally 
brought about by proclamation issued under the authority of the civil 
government. The civil government is displaced only where a situation has 
92. Ibid at p. 336. 
93. PLD 1972 SC 139. 
94. Ibid at pp. 152-53. 
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arisen in which it has become impossible for the civil courts and other civil 
authorities to function. 95 
A distinction may also be made between martial law and emergencies 
proclaimed under a written constitution or under statutory powers as in the 
United Kingdom. It is said that the two are very different concepts. 96 The 
basis of martial law is actual rebellion or insurrection whereas emergencies 
under most written constitution can be proclaimed in anticipation of a 
breakdown of law and order. The fundamental difference lies in the absence of 
formalities that brings about a state of martial law. A similar distinction is 
made between martial law and the French concept of the 116tat de si6ge" (state 
of seige) which like the emergency in the written constitutions of common law 
countries is a constitutionally recognised method of dealing with crises 
situations. 97 
It is the fact of a constitutional breakdown and not the cause of it 
that brings about martial law. Lord Pearce observed in Hadzimbamuto's case: 
"Questions of martial law do not depend upon the merits of an invasion. When a 
state of rebellion or invasion exists, the law must do its best to cope with 
resulting problems that beset itn. 98 However, once a state of martial law 
exists the maxim inter arma silent leges (in the midst of arms the law is 
silent) prevails. Lord Halsbury said in Ex Parte Marais: 99 "The civil courts 
95. Ibid at p. 187. 
96. See M. P. Jain, op. cit., at p. 719. 
97. See Friedrich & Sutherland, Defense Of The Constitutional order, in 
Boyle & Friedrich, Studies In Federalism (Little Brown and Company. 
Boston; Toronto. 1954) at pp. 678-79. 
98. Supra, at p. 5871. 
99. Supra, note 82 at p. 115. 
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will not call in question the propriety of the action of military 
authorities". in R. (Childers) v. Adjutant Ceneral of the Provisional 
Forces, 100 the Irish Court elaborated on this principle: - 
"For the purpose of suppressing this rebellion and restoring order, the 
Provisional Government has been obliged to employ its army. Force must 
be met by force, and violence by violence; -and once an army is, set in 
motion - once a state of war has been established - the rough and ready 
methods of warfare must be adopted, and, take the place of the precise 
and orderly methods of civil government. The ordinary law is silenced by 
the sound of the pistol-shot and the bomb. Inter arma silent leges is a 
maxim two thousand years old, and has come down to us from the Romans. 
Suprema lex, salus populi must be the guiding principle when the civil 
law has failed. Force than becomes the only remedy, and those to whom 
the task is committed must be the sole judges how it should be 
exercised". 101 
It does not mean, however, that the proclamation of martial law ipso, 
facto terminates the civil and fundamental rights of the people affected. The 
correct position is that it does not automatically suspend 'civil rights: 
Wilson & Co. v. Freeman [1959) 178 179F. Supp. 520 at pp. 531-33. In Asma 
Jilani's case, the Pakistan Supreme Court held that martial law by itself did 
not involve the abrogation of the civil law or the Constitution. 102 The case 
considered whether the handing over of the reins of government to the Military 
Commander by the President of Pakistan through a letter exhorting him to 
restore civil order was constitutional. The Military Commander, General Yahya 
Khan, had subsequently abrogated the constitution and proclaimed martial law 
throughout the country. Hamoodur Rahman C. J. ruled, that the, declaration of 
martial law was unconstitutional and invalid: 
100. [1922] 1 IR 5. 
101. Ibid at p. 14, per O'Connor M. R. 
102. Supra, note 93 at p. 190. 
28 
"There was nothing in this letter to show that he (the President of 
Pakistan)- was appointing General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan as his 
successor-in-office or was giving him authority to abrogate the 
Constitution which he himself had given to the country in 1962. Both 
these documents merely called upon the Commander-in-Chief of the army to 
discharge his legal and constitutional responsibility not only to defend 
the country against external aggression but also to save it from 
internal disorder and chaos. He did not even proclaim martial law. 
Nevertheless the Commander-in-Chief on his own proclaimed martial 
law ..... It is difficult however, to appreciate under what authority a Military Commander could proclaim Martial Law. Even in 1958 the Martial 
Law was proclaimed by the President. In my view, the Military Commander 
had no power also to abrogate the Constitution, although the learned 
Attorney-General has contended that the Proclamation of Martial Law by 
its own intrinsic force gave him the right to do". 103 
In third world countries, when the military is invited to intervene to 
restore law and order the situation is often fraught with danger for the 
civilian government. In many cases soldiers when brought out could not be 
returned to their barracks. Many civilian governments have learnt it is not in 
the disposition of a military commander to hold free elections or return power 
to a democratically elected civilian government. Thus the Asma Mani 
possibility always looms omnipresent when control of government is handed over 
to the military. 
But when a civilian government, remains in control and deploys military 
forces to quell civil unrest and disorder it is decidedly not a state of 
martial law. It has long been recognised at common law that the disposition 
and armament of the -armed forces is entirely at the discretion of 'the 
Crown. 104 For example, the use of the military in industrial disputes is not 
uncommon. It is recorded that since 1945, the armed forces intervened in at 
least 23 disputes in Great Britain. 105 A corollary theory at common law that 
103. Ibid at pp. 183-185. 
104. See Chandler V. DPP [1964] AC 763 per Lord Reid. 
105. See Christopher J Whelan, Military Intervention in Industrial Disputes 
(1979) 8 Industrial Law Journal 222; see also, -Geottrey Marshall. 
Constitution Conventions (Oxford 1984) p. 154 et. seq. See further, 
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soldiers could act on their own to restore order where they apprehend a breach 
of the peace can now be regarded as an anachronism of the past. 106 This theory 
called the "soldiers are citizens" doctrine was based on, an extension of the 
right inherent in citizens to effect the private citizen's arrest at common 
law. Today, with the acceptance of the constitutiona1principle of military 
subordination to a civilian government that theory has fallen into desuetude. 
Thus, the constitutional principle is settled that the military may not 
intervene in civil disturbances of their own volition. However, once the 
military is deployed to quell an insurrection or rebellion, the actual 
measures -it takes to complete its job is not justiciable before the Courts: 
The King (Garde) v. Strickland. 107 The maxim inter arma silent leges will 
apply: R. (Childers) v. Adjutant General Of The Rrovisional 'Forces. 108 But in 
EX Parte Harais, 109 Lord Halsbury appeared not to foreclose judicial 
satisfaction of the question whether civil unrest justified military action: 
contd... 
105. Gillian S. Morris, The Police And Industrial Emergencies (1980) 9 
Industrial Law Journal 1, on the use of the police torce to perform the 
work of striking workers in certain essential services. Dr. Morris is 
critical of this practice stating that "it involves-a fundamental shift 
in their role in disputes: officially one of neutrality" (p. 7). 
106. Steven C. Greer, Military Intervention in civil Disturbances: The Legal 
Basis ReconsidereU-(1983) Public Law 573. 
107. Supra, note 83. 
108. Supra, note 100. For a discussion of the right of soldiers to use 
firearms when on duty to maintain peace in circumstances of civil 
unrest, see Attorney General For Northern Ireland's Reference (1977) AC 
105. In this case, a soldier had shot dead an unarmed man seen running 
away from the scene of military operations. The approach of the court 
was to treat the question as essentially a question of fact for the jury 
as to whether the use of force was reasonable. 
109. Supra, note 82. 
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"It may often be a question whether a mere riot, or disturbance neither 
so serious nor so extensive as really to amount to a war at all, has not 
been treated with an excessive severity, and whether the intervention of 
the military force was necessary but once let the fact of actual war be 
established, and there is an universal consensus of opinion that the 
civil Courts have no jurisdiction to call in question the propriety of 
the action of military authorities". 110 
The approach the courts may take to determine the question whether civil 
unrest was of a degree necessitating military intervention can be seen in 
Childer's case. This case was decided by the Dublin Court shortly after the 
establishment of a Provisional Government- in Ireland., O'Connor M. R. 's 
approach was to take cognizance of the fact that a group- opposed to the 
establishment of a Provisional Government had raised an insurrection. He 
observed: "This party has raised an army called the Irish Republican'Army, and 
by means of it they are seeking to overthrow the existing Government, and 
replace it by an Irish Republic. The result has been the reduction of the 
country to a state of chaos". 111 In Court, the Provisional Government had 
tendered an affidavit to prove the state, of unrest in the country. But 
O'Connor M. R. was prepared to take judicial notice of that fact: 
"But if there was no affidavit at all, I would be bound to take judicial 
notice of the fact that for months this country has been enduring a 
state of war. I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a Court 
of Justice. Why? Because one of the noblest buildings in this country, 
which was erected for the accommodation of the King's Courts and was the 
home of justice for more than a hundred years, is now a mass of 
crumbling ruins, the work of revolutionaries, who -proclaim themselves the soldiers of an Irish Republic. I know also that the Public Record 
office (a building that might well have been spared even by the most 
extreme of irreconcilables) has been reduced to ashes, with its 
treasures, which can never be replaced. I know also that railways have 
been torn up, railway stations destroyed, the noblest mansions burned 
110. Ibid at p. 115. 
111. Supra, note 100 at p. 14. 
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down, roadways made impassable, bridges blown up, and life and property 
attacked in almost every county in Southern Ireland. If this is not a 
state of war, I would like to know what is,,. 112 
The learned judge accordingly held that the civil authority was justified in 
taking all measures within its powers to re-establish law and order. 113 
where the civilian government is firmly in'authority, the legal basis 
for military intervention in civil disturbances does not present much 
difficulty. The position is however different where the civil disturbance is 
in reality a revolution which succeeds in overthrowing the government and the 
existing constitutional order. The problem that then confront the courts is of 
a different kind. The Orebels" form the de facto government and in them is 
"vested" the right to exercise emergency powers. If the judges decide to 
continue in office they may have the unenviable task of adjudicating on the 
legality of governmental actions under circumstances where their own position 
under the existing constitutional situation is dubious and the legitimacy of 
the government itself suspect. In that event, do the usual principles 
justifying emergency action apply? Can the actions of a revolutionary 
government be legitimated? We may next examine these questions. - 
112. Ibid at p. 13. 
113. Per O'Connor M. R.: "This is the condition of affairs which confronts me 
when I come to deal with this case, and I have f irst to ask myself is 
this state of things to be allowed to continue, and on whom devolves the 
duty of re-establishing peace and order, and saving the country f rom 
utter destruction? Plainly this 'duty falls upon the Government - 
whatever that Government may be - whether it be merely provisional or finally constituted. Whatever character it bears the salvation of the 
country depends upon it": ibid. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWNS AND 
THE LEGITIMATING PROCESS 
Introduction 
In Hadzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke, 1 Lord Reid acknowledged the reality of 
constitutional breakdowns. He observed that "it is a historical fact" that in 
many countries there are governments that derive their origins from 
revolutions or coup dletat and that "the law must take account of that fact". 2 
Indeed the courts of many third world countries have had to grapple with 
the problem of revolutionary governments since obtaining freedom from colonial 
rule. 
Constitutional Upheavals And Recognition Of The New Order 
A constitutional breakdown can take place in a number of ways. It is not 
the cause of the disruption that has engaged the attention of jurists but its 
effect. The overthrow of the existing legal order has been largely due to 
revolutions and coup dletat. What constitutes or amounts to a revolution- has 
not been easy to define. It has been described as "a sharp sudden change in 
the social location of power, expressing itself in the radical transformation 
of the process of government ..... such transformation could not normally occur 
without violence, but if they did, they would still, though bloodless, be 
1. [1968] 3 All ER 561. 
Ibid at p. 574 A-B. 
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revolution". 3 In the case of The State v. Dosso, 
4 the Pakistan Supreme Court 
defined a revolution by saying that it was an abrupt political change not in 
the contemplation of the constitution: "(I)ts legal effbct is not only the 
destruction of the existing constitution but also the validity of the new 
national legal order". 5 The Court went on to say'that while a revolution is 
generally associated with public tumult, mutiny, violence and bloodshed, from 
"a juristic point of view" the method by which and the persons by whom a 
revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial. 
6 
On the other hand, a coup dletat is a leadership change outside the 
existing legal order and may not result in the displacement or replacement of 
the existing constitutional system. 
The point of note is that a constitutional breakdown creates a legal 
vacuum. The courts of many third world countries have evolved legal principles 
which are designed to legitimise the de facto political situation. The simple 
approach has been for the courts to recognise reality and to accept the new 
legal order. As Beadle C. J. observed in R. v. Ndhlovu, 
7 when dealing with the 
legal status of the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia after it had unilaterally 
declared independence (U. D. I. ) from Britain: 
3. Eugene Kamenka, The Concept of A Political Revolution: quoted in F. 
- - Reyntjens & L. Wolf Phil L_Ea=Systems Of Third 2 e lips, Revolution In Tý 
World States in Essay s On Third7World Perspectives In Jurisprudence (Ed. 
Marasinghe & Conklin, MLJ Publication, 1984), at p. 106. 
4. PLD 1958 SC 533. 
5. Ibid at pp. 537-8. The definition was adopted by the High Court of 
Uganda in Exparte Matovu (1966] E. A. 514. 
6. Ibid. 
7. [1968] 4 S. A. L. R. 515. 
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"I considered I sat as a de facto court exercising jurisdiction because 
the de facto government was prepared to allow me to sit and to allow 
their officials to enforce my orders". 8 
Generally, the courts have resorted to two basic doctrines to legitimise 
the new Order. They are: (1) the doctrine of statenecessity, or (2) the 
Kelsen doctrine of revolutionary legality. 9 
According to Lord Pearce in his able dissent in Madzimbamuto's case, 
"the principle of necessity or implied mandate is for the preservation of the 
citizen, for keeping law and order, rebus sic stantibus, regardless of whose 
fault it is that the crisis has been created or persists". 10 The implied 
mandate theory was evolved by Grotius in his classic work De Jure Belli Et 
Pacis. It was explained by Lord Denning in the case of In Re James (An 
Insolvent) in the following terms: 11 
"When a lawful sovereign is ousted for the time being by an usurper, the 
lawful sovereign still remains under a duty to do all he can to preserve 
law and order within the territory: and, as he can no longer do it 
himself, he is held to give an implied mandate to his'subjects to -do 
what is necessary for the maintenance of law and order rather than 12 expose them to all the disorders of anarchy". 
The early jurisprudence on the subject and the need, to give 'recognition 
in some matters to the acts of the de facto'government can be traced,, toý the 
American Civil War cases that came before the U. S. Supreme Court:, Texas v. 
White (1868] 7 Wallace 733; Horn v. Lockhart [1873] 17 Wallace 580; Baldy v. 
Hunter' [1897] 171 U. S. 388. The principles deduced, from- these cases were 
summarised in Baldy's case as follows: 
B. Ibid at p. 526. 
9. See Leslie Wolf Phillips "Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study_0f The 
Doctrine Of Necessity" (Thi-RF-World Foundation Monograph) p. 3. 
10. Supra, note 1, at p. 584G. 
11. [1977] 2 WIR 1; 1977 1 AER 364. 
12. Ibid at p. 11E. 
35 
11 ..... the preservation of order, the maintenance of police regulations, the prosecution of crimes, the protection of property, the enforcement 
of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the settlement of estates, 
the transfer and descent of property, and similar or kindred subjects, 
were, during the war under the control of the local governments 
constituting the so-called Confederate States; that what occurred or was 
done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these 
local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be 
invalid merely because those governments were organised in hostility to 
the Union established by the National Constitution; this, because the 
existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States 
did not relieve those who were within the insurrectionary lines from the 
necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society, nor do 
away with civil government or the regular administration of the 
laws..... and transactions in the ordinary course of civil society ..... 
although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the 
de facto or unlawful government ..... were without blame except when 
proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion 
or insurrection". 13 
The distinction made in these cases- between laws and acts done f or the 
maintenance, of peace and good order and that undertaken to further the 
rebellion was accepted by Lord Pearce in Nadzimbamuto's case, and Lord Denning 
in Re James. In-the latter case, the Court of Appeal, had to consider whether 
an English court would recognize and enforce a bankruptcy order made by the 
High Court of Rhodesia under the illegal Smith regime. The argument against it 
was since the High Court of Rhodesia was, an illegal court, the bankruptcy 
order was the instrument of an illegal regime. Lord Denning - relied on the 
American cases and said: 
"I would ask this question: if the judges and officers of the 
(Rhodesian) courts had not carried on with their normal tasks, what was 
to happen to the criminal law? Were murderers to go free? Were thieves 
to go unpunished? And, I would add, what was to happen to the civil law? 
Were debtors absolved from payment? Were contracts no longer binding? or 
wrongdoers not to be compelled to make compensation? If law and order 
were to be maintained, it was imperative that the judges should continue 
in office and that the courts should continue to function. That was, I 
am sure, the intendment of the lawful sovereign, the Queen of England, 
as well as of the unlawful regime itself". 14 
13. At pp. 400-401. 
14. Supra, note 11, at p. 10. Lord Denning disagreed with Adams v. Adams 
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Lord Denning concluded that the courts of Southern Rhodesia were lawfully 
exercising jurisdiction over matters coming before them under an implied 
mandate and their orders were valid so long as they did'not apply the laws 
passed by the illegal regime. 15 
The law of necessity has been considered'at length by the Pakistan 
Supreme Court in several cases. Since independence, Pakistan has alternated 
between military dictatorship and civilian government. This has led to several 
interesting cases in its superior courts giving rise to an impressive 
jurisprudence on the law relating to constitutional failures, and the 
rehabilitative doctrines of Kelsen, Grotius and the necessity theory. The 
first important case in this series was Re Special Reference by H. E. The 
Governor General ("the Special Reference" case). 16 The case arose out of a 
constitutional vacuum created in Pakistan after the Governor General dissolved 
the constituent assembly that was set up to draft a new constitution. This act 
was challenged in court in another case, 17 where the court pronounced that 
legislation passed by the Assembly would nevertheless be invalid for non- 
compliance with certain essential formal requirements. The Governor-General 
then purported to pass a Proclamation giving retrospective validity to all 
contd... 
14. (1970] 3 AER 572. In that case the English Probate Court refused to 
recognise a divorce decree pronounced by a Judge of the Rhodesian High 
Court appointed by the illegal Smith regime. According to Lord Denning, 
the validity of an order cannot depend upon which judge presides. 
15. Ibid at p. 11G-H. See also application of the necessity doctrine by Lord 
Denning in Sabally v. Attorney General [1964] 3 AER 377. In that case, 
the doctrine was invoked to uphold the Validation Order in Council that 
sought retrospectively to validate the irregular elections held in the 
then colony of Gambia. 
16. PLD 1955 FC 435. 
17. Federation of Pakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan PLD 1955 FC251. 
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legislation, and for this purpose assumed temporary legislative power pending 
the convening and completion of the work of a new constituent assembly. The 
issue was whether the actions of the Governor General cofild be saved by the 
common law doctrine of necessity. Muhammed Munir C. J. held that having regard 
"to the disaster that stared the Governor General in the face he must be held 
to have acted in order to avert an impending disaster and to prevent the State 
and Society from dissolution". 28 
In October 1958, a peaceful coup took place in Pakistan. President Mirza 
dissolved the legislative assembly, abrogated the Constitution and took power 
for himself. His ostensible reasons were "the ruthless struggle for power, the 
corruption, the shameful exploitation of Islam for political ends ..... (the 
need) to rectify this by a peaceful revolution ..... (and) to devise a 
Constitution more suitable to'the genius of the Muslim people". 19 The validity 
of his actions were challenged in the significant case of the The State v. 
Dosso. 20 The case concerned the-lawfulness of the detention of the appellant 
Dosso. This in turn-depended upon whether the order promulgated by President 
Mirza for the continuation of laws was a, valid instrument. The Pakistan 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Order. It recognised the efficacy of 
the political change brought about by the coup. It clothed the takeover with 
legal form by relying on the "grundnorm" theory of Hans Kelsen. Muhammed Munir 
C. J. wrote: 
18. Ibid at p. 486. For another instance of laws being validated 
retrospectively by application of the necessity doctrine, see - 
Canadian 
Supreme Court in Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985) 1 SCR 721. See 
discussion of this case in P. W. Hogg, Necessity In Constitutional Crisis 
(1989) Vol. 15. Monash University Law Review 253. 
19. Leslie Wolf-Phillips, supra, note 9 at pp. 11-12. 
20. Supra, note 4. 
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"For the purposes of the doctrine a change is, in law, a revolution if 
it annuls the Constitution and the annulment is effective ..... if the 
revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power 
under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country 
to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law- 
creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by 
reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own 
success. on the same principle the validity of the. laws to be made 
thereafter is judged by reference to the new and not the annulled 
Constitution. Thus the essential condition to determine whether a 
Constitution has been annulled is the efficacy of the change ..... Hans Kelsen, a renowned modern jurist, says 11 ..... it is never the 
constitution merely but always the entire legal order that is changed by 
a revolution". This shows that all norms of the old order have been 
deprived of their validity by revolution and not according to the 
principle of legitimacy ..... Every jurist will presume that the old 
order - to which no political reality any longer corresponds - has 
ceased to be valid, and that all norms, which are valid within the new 
order, receive their validity exclusively from the new constitution ..... the no ms of the old order can no longer be recognised as valid legal 
norms". 1 
Kelsen's theory proceeded on the basis that law is a system of -coercive 
rules or norms that can be traced back to a point of origin, which is -the 
basic norm, the historically first constitution. 22 As a logical progression, 
Kelsen's theory recognised that successful revolutions brought about an 
effective change in the basic norm: 
"It is just the phenomenon of revolution which clearly shows the 
significance of the basic norm. Suppose that a group of individuals 
attempt to seize power by force, in order to remove the 
* 
legitimate 
government in a hitherto monarchic State, and to introduce a republican 
form of government. If they succeed, if the old order ceases, and the 
new order begins to be efficacious, because the individuals whose 
behaviour the new orders regulates actually behave by and large, in 
conformity with the new order, then this order is considered as a valid 
order. It is now according to this new order that the actual behaviours 
of individuals is interpreted as legal or illegal. But this means that a 
new basic norm is presupposed. It is no longer the norm according to 
which the old monarchial constitution is valid, but a norm according to 
21. Ibid at p. 537. 
22. J. W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (Butterworths, 1980) p., 59 et., seq. 
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which the new republican constitution is valid, a norm endowing the 
revolutionary government with legal authority. If the revolutionaries 
fail, if the order they have tried to establish remains inefficacious, 
then, on the other hand, their undertaking is interpreted, not as a 
legal a law-creating act, as the establishment of a-constitution, but as 
an illegal act, as the crime of treason, and this according to the old 23 monarchic constitution and its specific basic norm". 
Kelsen's thesis that the new order becomes itself- a basic law-creating fact 
has given comfort to judges caught in revolutionary situations. Faced with the 
daunting task of having to decide on the validity of a revolutionary 
government in de facto control, and the practical absurdity of ruling 
otherwise, a facile resort to Kelsen seemed the answer. It happened in Exparte 
HatoVU24 decided by the Uganda High court. In February 1966, Dr. Milton Obote, 
the Prime Minister of Uganda, took full control of the Government and sacked 
the President. He abrogated the 1962 Constitution of the State and through his 
majority in Parliament had a new Constitution adopted. one of the persons 
detained in the wake of the takeover was Michael Matovu, an Ugandan Chieftain. 
Matovu challenged his detention on the ground that it was in violation of the 
1962 Constitution. The issue before the Ugandan High Court was whether Obote's 
actions in abrogating the 1962 Constitution were valid. The Chief Justice, Sir 
U. Udoma, found the answer in Kelsen: 
"on the theory of law and state propounded by the positivist school of 
jurisprudence represented by the famous Professor Kelsen, it is beyond 
question, and we hold, that the series of events ..... could only 
appropriately be described in law as a revolution ..... Although the 
product of a revolution, the constitution is nonetheless valid in law 
because in international law revolutions and coups dletat are the 
recognised methods of changing governments and constitutions in 
sovereign states ..... Applying the Kelsenian principles, which incidentally form the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in the Dosso Case, our deliberate and considered view is that 
23. Ibid at pp. 71-72, quoting from Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State 
(1945). 
24. [1966] E. A. 514. 
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the 1966 Constitution is a legally valid constitution and the Supreme 
Law of Uganda; and that the 1962 constitution having been abolished as a 
result of a victorious revolution in law does no longer exist nor does 
it now form part of the laws of Uganda, it having been deprived of its 
de facto and de jure validity. The 1966 Constitution, we hold, is a new 
legal order and has been effective since 14 April 1966, when it first 
came into force". 25. I 
Kelsen's theory was acknowledged, but without express approval, by Lord Reid 
in Hadzimbamuto's case. Dealing with the Dosso and Hatovu judgments, 
recognising revolutionary governments, he said: 
"Their Lordships would not accept all the reasonings in these judgments 
but they see no reason to disagree with the results". 
Lord Reid's judgment led Quenet J. P. of the High Court of Rhodesia to proclaim 
in R V. Ndhlovu, that it was now "beyond doubt that a regime, illegitimate at 
birth, can become lawful, that is a lawful regime may follow upon a revolution 
or coup dletat". 27 Kelsen's theory nevertheless has an unacceptable face to 
it. It endorses unconstitutional behaviour and legalises the actions of 
usurpers and mutineers. Before long it was rejected in some jurisdictions. The 
Supreme Court of Nigeria faced the issue in Lakanmi v. Attorney General 
25. Ibid at p. 539. 
26. [1968] 3 ALL E. R. 561 at p. 574H. The Privy Council said the question of 
whether the illegal regime in Rhodesia had become a fact did not arise 
because Her Majesty's Government, as the sovereign authority, was taking 
steps to regain control. 
27. (1968] 4 S. A. L. R. 515 at p. 540A. This was a decision of the Rhodesian 
Court of Appeal soon after the Nadzimbamuto decision in the Privy 
Council. Although the Rhodesian Court itself in Hadzimbamuto's case had 
denied the authority of the Privy Council, it purported in this case to 
argue that the Board's decision was wrong on the law and the facts: see 
Beadle C. J. at p. 523 et. seq. See also Dr. L. Marasinghe, The Legality 
Of National Liberation Moveie'FEs (1978) 2 MLJ VIII at p. XII for a 
similar opinion. The learned au is of the view that "Kelsen's theory 
should have indicated to the Board that the political revolution arising 
out of the U. D. I. had acquired a de jure status according to the 
principle of efficacy". (p. XII). 
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(Western State)28 The case arose out of a rebellion in the armed forces 
resulting in the killing of two of the four state premiers. Although the 
rebellion was foiled, the Federal Ministers met at an emergency session and 
handed over power to the Army Commander. The latter set up a Federal Military 
Government but did not immediately abrogate the - Constitu tion. The Supreme 
Court held that the military coup was not a true revolution presumably because 
the existing constitution was allowed to continue albeit at the total 
sufferance of the military. 29 
In Pakistan itself, Dosso was overruled by the Supreme Court in Asma 
Jilani v. State of Punjab. 30 The case dealt with the validity of the handing 
over of the reins of government by President Ayub Khan to the Army Commander, 
General Yahya Khan. The latter abrogated the Constitution and declared martial 
law throughout the country. The Court ruled that his action was 
unconstitutional. Kelsen's thesis as applied in Dosso was said to have been 
wrongly understood. Hamoodur Rahman C. J. wrote that Kelsen was merely making 
"a jurist's proposition" and not laying down any legal norm for the use of 
judges and lawyers. He said: 
"It was by no means his (Kelsen's) purpose to lay down any rule of law 
to the effect that every person who was successful in grabbing power 
could claim to have become also a law-creating agency..... It is not the 
28. Supreme Court Suit No. 58 of 1969, judgment dated April 24,1970. 
Discussed in T. Akinoda Aguda, The Judiciary in a Developing Country, in 
Essays, op. cit. p. 137 et. seq., at p. 145, and by Leslie Woll-Phillips, 
Up-. clit. at p. 43 et. seq. 
29. For a criticism of the judgment, see Akinoda Aguda, ibid, at p. '146., 
30. PLD 1972 SC 139. For a discussion of the Fijian coup of May 1987 and the 
actions of Colonel Rabuka in abrogating the country's constitution, see 
Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, Heads Of State In The Pacific: A Legal And 
Constitutional Analysis (University of South Pacific, Suva, 1988) pp. 
206 et. seq. 
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success of the revolution, therefore, that gives it legal validity but 
the effectiveness it acquires by habitual submission to it from the 
citizens". 31 
It was pointed out that a few days after the decision in Dosso, President 
Mirza was himself replaced by Field Marshall Ayub Khan; it belied the argument 
that the Mirza Government had become efficacious. The Court concluded that 
Kelsen's theory was misinterpreted and wrongly applied on the facts in Dosso's 
case. 32 
The Court instead preferred the doctrine of necessity. It disputed the 
view that it was a doctrine to validate the illegal actions taken by the 
usurpers. It called the doctrine a principle of condonation and not 
legitimization. The Chief Justice explained his case for the necessity 
doctrine in this way: 
"In my humble opinion, this doctrine can be invoked in aid only after 
theýCourt has come to the conclusion that the acts of the usurpers were 
illegal and illegitimate. It is only then that the question arises as to 
how many of his acts, legislative or otherwise, should be condoned or 
maintained, notwithstanding their illegality in the wider public 
interest. I would call this a principle of condonation and not 
legitimization. Applying this test I would condone (1) all transactions 
which are past and closed, for, no useful purpose can be served by 
reopening them, (2) all acts and legislative measure which are in 
accordance with, or. could have been made under, 'the abrogated 
Constitution or the previous legal order, (3) all acts which tend to 
advance or promote the good of the people, (4) all acts required to be 
done for the ordinary orderly running of the State. I would not, 
however, condone any act intended to entrench the usurper more firmly in 
his power or-to directly help him to run the country contrary to its 
legitimate objectives. I would not also condone anything which seriously 
31. Ibid at p. 180. 
32. Ibid at p. 183. For a close analysis of the Dosso and Jilani decisions, 
see TKK Iyer, Constitutional Law in PakisTa--n-. Kelseii -In The Courts 
(1973) 21 Am J 01-Comp L 759, and Leslie wolf-Phillips, op. cit. p. 17 
et. seq.; Muhammad Munir C. J. who gave the leading judgment in Dosso has 
rebutted the criticism of his judgment made by the Jilani court: see his 
autobiography, Highways 
_& 
Bye-Ways Of Life (Law Publishing Company, 
Lahore 1978) pp. 217,254. 
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impairs the rights of the citizens except in so far as they may be 
designed to advance the social welfare and national solidarityli. 33 
The necessity doctrine remains the preferred theory in Pakistan. In 
Begum Nursrat Bhutto v. The Chief of Army Staff, 34 the Supreme Court rejected 
an attempt to resurrect the Kelsenian theory. The army take-over by General 
Zia-ul-Haq from Prime Minister Bhutto, a popularly elected leader was 
correctly termed an extra-constitutional measure. However, the Court held that 
it was a constitutional deviation dictated by necessity which would be 
tolerated for a short period only. This was in apparent reference to the 
pledge by General Zia, as Chief Martial Law Administrator, that free elections 
would be held shortly to return the country to democratic government. 35 In the 
later case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto v. The State36, the doctrine was widened. It 
was held as "a logical corrollary" that the new Zia regime must be permitted 
in the public interest not only to run the administration but also to work 
towards the achievement of the objective on the basis of which its 
intervention has been validated. 
Apart from Pakistan, the necessity doctrine has been adopted in cases in 
Cyprus and Africa. 37 It's most recent application was in the Court of Appeal 
33. Ibid at p. 207. The condonation theory was expressly rejected by Haynes 
P. of the Grenada Court of Appeal in Mitchell & Ors. v. DPP (1986] LRC 
(Const) 35, stating: "Necessity, when it applies, should legitimise or 
not legitimise; it is difficult to conceive of a judicial jurisdiction 
to pardon an illegality. To pardon should be the prerogative of the 
executive" (p. 89). 
34. PLD 1977 SC 657. 
35. General Zia died, whilst in office in a plane crash in mid-1988, never 
redeeming this pledge. 
36. PLD 1978 SC 40. 
37. Nustafa Ibrahim v. Attorney General (1964] Cyprus L. R. 195; Republic v. 
Nicolaos Sampson [1977] 2 Cyprus L. R.; Lakanmi v. Attorney General 
(Western Region), supra, note 28. 
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of Grenada in the Carribeans. In Mitchell & Ors. v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 38 the Grenada Court had to consider its own validity following a 
succession of military revolutions. The instability in the country led to an 
invasion of the island by the forces of the United States. The Governor 
General then assumed the legislative authority to reinstate the court system 
promulgated by the popular movement that took power in the first of the 
military coups. The Governor's actions were sought to be justified on the 
basis of necessity to restore law and order in the chaos that prevailed soon 
after the invasion. The choice by the Governor of the courts of the first 
military revolution was sought to be justified on the basis of its acceptance 
for the 4 1/2 years that the military government remained in office. Kelsen's 
theory was expressly repudiated by the Court as not applicable to "Caribbean 
jurisprudence" and the doctrine of necessity was adopted as the constitutional 
source for the validation of the laws promulgated by the Governor General. 
It is submitted that the Pakistan supreme Court in the trilogy of cases 
beginning with Asma Mani had rightly given preference to the necessity 
doctrine over Kelsen's thesis. It reflects a more discerning approach to the 
illegal state of affairs produced by the unconstitutional behaviour of a 
military dictator. It enables the court to recognise only those acts necessary 
for the maintenance of law and order and discard actions taken in promotion of 
the rebellion. Lastly, it enables the judges to remain true to their oath. 
i 
38. (1986) LRC (Const) 35. The judgment of Haynes P. is noteworthy for the 
comprehensive coverage of the prevailing theories in this field and of 
the leading Commonwealth authorities touching on the subject. An appeal 
to the Privy Council was dismissed (per Lord Diplock) on jurisdictional 
grounds: see pp. 122-125. 
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Judicial Anxieties 
In many of these cases the Courts acted according to the reality of the 
political situation confronting them. Professor De Smith described the 
Pakistan decisions as "fundamentally political judgments Aressed in legal 
garb,,. 39 
In defence of the judges it may be said that when they are asked to 
decide on the validity of a revolutionary government, they are placed in an 
intolerable position. on the one hand their oath of allegiance to the 
constitution under which they were appointed necessitates that they refuse 
sanction of unconstitutional behaviour. on the other hand, it is a political 
reality that the de facto government would ignore any judgment that pronounces 
against its validity. In that event, the Court decision is rendered an 
absurdity and the judges left with no alternative but to resign. These extra- 
record considerations must surely weigh heavily in the minds of the judges who 
make these decisions. For example, the Chief Justice-who heard the Special 
Reference case in Pakistan spoke candidly some years after the case of his 
anxiety: "The mental anguish caused was beyond description ..... If the court 
had found against the Governor General there would be chaos ..... who could 
enforce a decision adverse to the Governor General. At moments like these 
public law is not to be found in the books; it lies elsewhere ....... 
40 Asma 
Jilani's case, which has been heralded as a bold decision by the Pakistan 
Supreme Court, was decided after the impugned regime of Yahya Khan had fallen. 
39. S. A. De Smith, Constitutional Lawyers In Revolutionary Situations (1968) 
7 West Ontario L. Review 93 at p. 94. 
40. Ibid at p. 98. See generally F. S. Nariman, The Judiciary Under Martial 
Law Regimes (1984) 14 CIJL Bulletin 41; see al-s-oICJ Report on 'FaRstan 
- The Independence Of The Judiciary And The Bar After Martial Law (1987) 
Nos. 19 & 20 CIJL Bulletin p. 66. 
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It is left to surmise whether the decision would have been the same if the 
timing was different. Likewise, Hatovu in Uganda, Ndh1oVU in Rhodesia, and 
Lankanmi in Nigeria were all decisions that sanctioned the actions of the 
government of the day. The result-oriented approach was evident. For example, 
in Ndhlovu, Beadle C. J. saw it as the duty of judges in revolutionary 
situations not to resign their office but to remain in their stations for the 
sake of law and order: "The choice which faces a judge in Rhodesia today may 
be an agonising one, but the choice itself is straightforward enough. It is 
simply this: Is it better to remain and carry on with the peaceful task of 
protecting the fabric of society and maintaining law and order or is it better 
to adhere to the old 1961 Constitution and go on with it ..... To argue that to 
depart along with the old 1961 Constitution is to uphold "the rule of law" is 
pure casuistry. It is not possible to adhere to a constitution that does not 
exist ..... it. 
41 He said that by remaining at his station the judge was neither 
siding nor abetting the revolution; he was simply overtaken by events. 42 
A state of emergency may arise without there being anything as dramatic 
as a revolution or a coup dletat. It nevertheless creates a situation akin to 
a constitutional disruption and the government of the day is unlikely to take 
kindly to a court pronouncing against its actions. The courts are seen as 
roadblocks or a hindrance to the government's efforts to return the country to 
normality. In an empirical study of third world courts, a writer concluded: 
41. Supra, note 27, at p. 534D - F. Beadle C. J. 's affiliation with the Smith 
regime was seen by his involvement in the negotiations with the British 
over U. D. I.: see Claire Palley, The Rhodesian Judiciary And U. D. I. 
(1967) 30 HLR 263 at p. 267. If so, it was suflli-ci-e-R reason for Beadle 
C. J. to have recused himself in Ndhlovuls case. 
42. Ibid at p. 533F. 
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"The courts which had been established to be the last bastion in defence 
of the freedom of the individual and against oppression by or injustices 
of public authorities have been reluctant to confront the executive. 
When opportunities arose for them to pass judgment on executive acts, 
they with a few notable exceptions, exhibited timidity". 43 
Another writer was of similar opinion, concluding that as a result of 
passive judicial response to declarations of emergency, liberty itself was 
placed in jeopardy in these countries. 44 Matters of human rights violations 
and fundamental freedoms which are subjects that should preoccupy the 
judiciary are often treated as political questions. There is a noticeable 
tendency not to adopt an activist approach as regards these complaints and 
avoid hurting the sensitivity of the government. A survey of the judiciary's 
role in defending human rights in the Pacific Island nations concluded: "The 
human rights provisions of constitutions have two major roles, to protect 
individuals from governments and other individuals ..... The tendency of the 
decisions in the cases considered is to support the actions of governments 
against individuals, and to limit the value of constitutions as instruments of 
social change". 45 
Where adverse decisions are given it is not unknown for the government 
to defy and ignore the court order. It happened in Papua New Guinea when the 
Minister of Justice was imprisoned for contempt of court. The Minister 
43. George W. Kanyeihamba, Constitutional obligation in Developing countries 
p. 29 in Essays, u 64. The attitude of third wiir-ld- 
Cýs 
pra, note 3 at p. 
courts is noE -ex ptional. In his comprehensive survey of the courts of 
the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and India, Professor George J. Alexander concludes that their role in 
the protection of human rights in times of crisis as disappointing and 
lacklustre: The Illusory Protection of Human Rights By National Courts 
During Period-s of -Emergency, (1984) 5 Human Rights Law Journal, 1. 
44. William E. Conklin, The Role of Third World Courts, in Essays, supra, 
note 3, at p. 77. 
45. N. K. F. O'Neill , Human Rights In The Hands Of Judges: The Experience In 
The Pacific Island Nations (1983) Vol. 2 No. 2 LAWASIA 194 at p. 216. 
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concerned was accused of scandalizing the court by public statements after the 
court stopped a deportation order made by the government. 46 The Prime Minister 
took over the Ministry of Justice and released the Minister from gaol. This 
led to the resignation of the Chief Justice and two other judges. 47 These and 
other like actions indicate a noticeable lack of'respect for the rule of law 
in some of the newly emergent nations. Sometimes the way out is not to defy 
the Court order but to circumvent it. The case of Ibingira & Ors v. Uganda4s 
illustrates this. The applicants were five cabinet members of the Obote 
Government who were arrested and detained without any charges being preferred 
against them. The Court at first instance had little difficulty in releasing 
them. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision. At that time there was only 
one region of Uganda that was under an emergency where preventive detention 
laws applied. Upon their release the 5 applicants were flown to that region, 
set free, and then preventively detained. on the second round, the Court of 
Appeal realising that a direct confrontation would develop with the Government 
if their release was again ordered, confirmed their detentions. This became 
evident from certain extra-judicial comments that the President of the Court 
was to make later: "I ask you to imagine what might happen if the courts of a 
newly emergent nation, in which the rule of law is not a settled way of life 
either on the part of the executive or of the people, were by their judicial 
decisions to enter the political arena". 49 
46. Public Prosecutor v. Nahau Rooney (1979) PNGLR 448. The Minister made a 
broadcast statement in respect of the decision rendered by the chief 
Justice that she had no confidence in the Chief Justice and other judges 
who are "only interested in administering foreign laws": see pp. 476-77. 
47. See O'Neill, supra, note 45, at p. 202. 
48. [1966] E. A. 306. 
49. See an account of the case in George W. Kanyeihamba and John W. Katende, 
49 
The accusation that the courts are entering the political arena lies at 
the heart of the confrontation between the two limbs of government. It is an 
old complaint. It was evident early in the life of the Amdrican Constitution. 
For example, the French magistrate Alexis de Tocqueville, on a visit to 
America in the 1840's, remarked: "Scarcely any political question arises that 
is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial question". 50 This phenomenon 
is bound to happen in any country seeking to establish by its constitution a 
limited government defining the authority of the executive and the rights of 
citizens. In a conflict between the two interests it is the function of the 
courts to resolve the dispute. The intensity of this conflict is exacerbated 
when the country is under a state of emergency or facing a constitutional 
upheaval. The ICJ Report5l identified this as a problem confronting many third 
world countries today. The undesirable features that accompany a state of 
emergency and the ability of the courts to respond to complaints of wanton 
interference with life and liberty continues to be a challenge to freedom and 
democracy in the third world. 
contd... 
49 The Supranational Adjud catory Bodies And The Municipal Governments, 
Legislatures and Courts: A Confrontation: The East African Experience 
(1972) Public Law 107 at pp. 111-112. 
50. See Archibald Cox, The Role Of The Supreme Court In American Government 
(Clarendon Press Codfor-d-71-9-7-6T p. 1. 
51. States Of Emergency: Their Impact On Human Rights (International 
'Eýommission of Jurists, Geneva, March 1983). 
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PART II 
EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE MALAYSIAN CONSTITUTION 
CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION 
AND THE FORMATION OF MALAYSIA 
Introduction 
since independence, Malaysia has been under a continuous state of 
emergency except for the short period between July, 1960 and September, 1964. 
This hiatus marked the end of the twelve year period of emergency proclaimed 
by the British colonial Government springing from communist insurgent 
activity, 1 and the beginning of a two year period of emergency arising from 
Indonesia's policy of Confrontation towards the newly formed Malaysian 
federation. 2 The emergency provisions of the Malaysian Constitution are 
therefore amongst its most overworked parts. 
The doctrine of state or civil necessity as discussed in Chapters I and 
II provide the jurisprudential underpinning to the emergency provisions in the 
Malaysian Constitution. Article 150 which deals with emergency powers has been 
1. See K. G. Tregonning ,A History of Modern Malaya (Eastern University Press, 1964) p. 290 et seq; Khong Kim Ho6-n-gMerdeka: British Rule And 
The Struggle For Independence In Malaya, 1945-57 (INSAN Publication. ' 
19843--p. 136 et seq. 
2. See Richard Allen, Malaysia: Prospect And Retrospect, The Impact And 
Aftermath Of Colonial Rule (OUP, 1968) p. 157 et seq. 
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classif ied as importing into the Malaysian Constitution the English 
constitutional doctrine of necessity. In-Government of Malaysia v. Kahan 
3 Singh, Lee Hun Hoe Ci (Borneo) referred to the leading English cases4 on the 
subject and observed: - 
"Article 150 gives His Majesty wide powers, -so wide that he could in the interest of the nation during an emergency act as he thought fit. This 
is a most important aspect of the matter. The interest of the nation 
comes first. This is the law of civil or state necessity which forms 
part of the common law and which every written constitution of all 
civilised states takes for granted. The reason underlying the law of 
necessity was aptly put by Cromwell that "if nothing should be done but 
what is according to law, the throat of the nation might be cut while we 
, send for someone to make law". 
5 
It may be observed that the Constitution was itself, "conceived against a 
backdrop of a state of emergency". 6 This was the emergency proclaimed in '1948 
by the British to combat the communist insurgency in Malaya. I 
, The -Constitution, of the Federation of Malaya was based on the Vintage 
Westminster model. It has, however, certain distinctive Malayan 
characteristics, chief of which is the incorporation into the parliamentary 
system -of a constitutional, role for the hereditary Malay Rulers - called the 
Sultans. Through their council, called the Conference of Rulers, the Sultans 
are to elect one from amongst them to be the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the King 
for a period of 5 years. The role played by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the 
3. [19751 2 MLJ 155; the decision was reversed by the Privy Council (see 
[1978] 2 MLJ 133) for reasons other than the constitutional grounds on 
which the instant observation is made, see at p. 134H-I. 
4. Eg. The Saltpetre case [1602] 12 Co. Rep. 12, R v. Hampden 3 St. Tr. 
825, Arbitration of Shipton Anderson & Co. (1915] 3 KB 676. 
5. Ibid at p. 165F-G. 
6. See H. P. Lee, Emergency Powers In Malaysia in the Constitution -of 
Malaysia: Further-Perspectives And Developments (Eds. F. A. Trinidade And 
H. P. Lee) O. U. P. 1986, at p. 135. 
0 
52 
constitutional scheme of things, in particular, in the proclamation of a state 
of emergency and in the exercise of his law-making powers under a state of 
emergency is crucial in understanding the balance between emergency rule and 
parliamentary government in Malaysia. 
However, it is important first to have an appreciation of the historical 
background to the Malaysian Constitution and the political and social milieu 
in which it was evolved. 
The Malay Peninsula at the commencement of the nineteenth century was an 
aggregate of independent states and not a single political entity. 7 The 
dominant population, the Malays functioned under a political structure at the 
apex of which was the hereditary ruler called the Sultan or Yang di-Pertuan. 8 
At that time, these states with hereditary rulers enjoyed the status of 
independent sovereign states in international law. 9 
The pre-eminence of the Malay Rulers in early Malay society and their 
interaction with the British after colonisation did much to shape the 
political history of the Malays, and in turn-the Malay- Peninsula. 10 For 
example, it was the subordinate status accorded to the Malay Rulers that 
doomed the British proposal-for the formation for the first time in the- Malay 
7. Professor Khoo Kay Kim, Nineteenth Century Malay Peninsula in Glimpses 
of Malaysian History Ed-. Z-ainal Abidin Wahid (Dewan -BaFas-a & Pustaka 
Publication; 1970) aE-p. 51. 
Ibid. 
See Duff v. Govt. of Kelantan (1924] AC 797. 
10. For a critical study of the- unique political-cum-sociological 
relationship between the Malay Rulers and their subjects, see Dr. 
Chandra Muzaffar, "Protector: An Analysis Of The concept And Practice Of 
Loyalty Within Malay Sociý (An ALIRAN Publication, Kuala Lumpur, 
1919). - For an examination he same subject from the Malay cultural 
v 
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Peninsula of a united constitutional entity called the Malayan Union. 11 This 
event in 1946 is significant because it led also to the creation for the first 
time in Malaya of nationalistic political activity among-the Malays. 12 When 
post-war Malay political efforts culminated in Independence and the 
establishment of parliamentary democracy under a written constitution, it was 
the "traditional elements"'13 principally the unique position of the Malay 
Rulers, that gave the Malayan Constitution its distinctive characteristic and 
set it apart, in form, from the other countries in the Pacific region that 
also adopted the vintage Westminster model. 24 
Early Legal History And British Rule 
It has been observed that recorded legal history of any significance in 
Malaysia began with the British acquisition of the island of Penang in 1776 
contd... 
10. standpoint, see-Shaharuddin Maaruf, Conce t Of A Hero In Malay Society 
(Eastern University Press, 1984). An-e-n-nliahtening personal account is 
given by Sir Frank Swettenham (the first British Resident General in 
Malaya) in the form of a series of short sketches (written in 1895) 
called Malay-sketches (1984 Reprint) Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd S'pore. 
11. See generally Zainal Abidin Wahid, The Malayan Union: It's Introduction 
in Glimpses, supra, note 7, at p. 99 et seq; Khong Kim Hoong in Merdeka, 
supra, note 1, at p. 77 et seq; Dr. Chandra Muzaffar in Protector, 
supra, note 3, at p. 53 et seq. 
12. See Professor Khoo Kay Kim, The Malay Peninsula: A Political Survey, 
1900-1941 in Glimpses, supra n. 11, at p. 81. See also Zainal Abidin 
Wahid: The Japanese Occupation And Nationalism In Glimpses, supra, at p. 
93 et seq. 
13. For an account of the same, see Tun Salleh Abas, Traditional Elements Of 
The Malaysian Constitution in Constitution, Law & Judiciary (SelecEe-d 
1TEicies & Speechegl (Mal-aysian Law Publishers, K. L. 1984) at p. 37 et 
seq. 
14. For an account of the latter, see C. J. Lynch, The Westminster Model In 
The Pacific in The Parliamentarian (Journal of the Parliaments of the 
Commonwealth) at p. 138 et seq. 
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and the passage of the Charters of Justice in 1807,1826 and 1855.15 
British presence in Malaya began as a trade presence in the late 
eighteenth century through the East India Company. It was -concentrated in the 
trade ports of Singapore, Malacca and Penang. After the East India Company was 
abolished, these ports were formed into the Straits Settlements under the 
British Colonial office. The British adopted a studious policy of non- 
intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. However this did not prevent 
the British ' maintaining strong commercial interests in the mainland Malay 
States especially in the rich'tin and rubber resources of these states. 16 
The 'British commercial presence on the mainland led inevitably to a 
reassessment of 'the policy of non-intervention. -Initially 'there wasý a 
divergence of views. Whilst the Colonial office was insistent on maintaining 
non-intervention, the British officials on site were in favour of abandoning 
the policy. The latter held"a disdain for the governing -abilities of the 
native chiefs. For example, in October 1860 the' Governor of the Straits 
Settlement, Colonel Cavanagh wrote to the India Office17 complaining that 
British commercial interests in the Malay hinterland was in jeopardy because 
of the inability of the Malay rulers to govern and suggested that it was an 
abdication of "one of the responsibilities attached to (our) high position as 
15. See Professor Ahmad, Ibrahim, Towards A History-Of Law In Malaysia And 
Singapore (Stamford College Press, Singapore, 1970) at p. 1. 
16. For an account of British relationship with the Malay States prior to 
formal British intervention, see L. A. Mills, British Malaya 1824-67 
(OUP, 1966) (first published in 1925). 
17. The British ruled the Straits Settlement from their Headquarters in 
Calcutta. For a lucid account, see Tun Mohd. Suffian, Malaysia And India 
- Shared Experiences In The Law (A. I. R. Publications, Nagpur, India, 
1980) at p. 12 et seq. 
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the dominant power in this quarter". 18 The attitude of the British Government, 
based in India, towards this question may be, seen in one of the official 
letters that'was sent from Calcutta to Penang: 
"It is doubtful how far the British Government is Justified in 
interferring to defend even the life and property of the innumerable 
Asiatic subjects of Her Majesty who for their own private advantage 
choose to take up their residence in foreign states under an uncivilised 
or weak administration. ý ... 
19 If British subjects choose to live and 
trade in an uncivilised country like Perak (one of the Malay States), 
they must submit to the local customs and practices". 20 
In the end, British commercial interests prevailed and the policy of 
non -intervention -was abandoned. There was an overall, reassessment of the 
British policy of non-intervention in'the'affairs of the Malay States in the 
1870, s. 21 The formal abandonment, of the policy came with the epochal Pangkor 
Treaty of January 20,1874 which the British signed with the Sultan of Perak. 
By this Treaty the Sultan was "to provide a suitable residence for a British 
officer to be called a Resident ..... whose advice must be asked and acted upon 
in all questions other than those touching upon Malay religion and customii. 22 
18. Recorded in, C. M. 'Turnbull, The Origins Of British Control--In The Malay 
States Before Colonial Rule in Malaysian And Indonesian Studies Ed. John 
Bastin (oxford, 1964) at p. 166. 
19. Letter dated March 12,1866. Ibid at p. 182. 
20. Letter dated February 15,1866, Ibid. 
21. It will not be entirely correct to say that it was commercial interests 
alone that led the British to reassess their policy of non-intervention. 
The late nineteenth century saw an aggressive expansion of European 
powers in East and South East Asia - the French in Indo-China and the 
Dutch in the East Indies. The British being ever mindful of the markets 
in Europe for raw materials to fuel the industrial revolution obviously 
did not want the fertile Malay States to fall prey to the designs of the 
Dutch, French or Germans: see Chan Hon-Chan, The Development of British 
Malaya 1896-1909 (OUP. 1964, K. L. ) at p. 2. 
22. For an account of the Treaty and its terms, see Khong ý Kim Hoong, in 
Merdeka, supra, note 1, at p. 2. 
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The Pangkor Treaty marked the beginning of British expansion into the Malay 
States. 23 By the end of the decade the Residence system was in operation in 
the States of Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang and Johore. 
By the Residence system the British effectively ruled these States and 
exercised varying degrees of influence in the neighbouring States. It was 
observed of the system, that "in theory, the British Resident was supposed to 
advise the Sultans; in practice, however, he ruled, getting the Ruler's advice 
on matters of religion and Malay customsit. 24 
British intervention also brought about the, first recognizable form of 
an administrative government in the Malay Peninsula. In 1895, the British 
formalised the Residence system by setting, up a federation of the states under 
the Residency called the Federated Malay States (F. M. S. ). -It provided for a 
centralised form of government with the States retaining their legislative 
councils. The post of a Resident-General was created. However, centralization 
brought about certain difficulties. Again, it was in the form of remonstration 
from the Malay Rulers, who had been reduced to "matters of local importance 
and execution of the, directions of the Federal Government". 25 The powers of 
23. For a detail account of British expansion, see C. Northcote Parkinson, 
British Intervention In Malaya (University of Malaya Press, K. L., 1964) 
which is regarded as the leading work on the subject. An interesting 
personal account of the Pangkor Treaty is given in Isabella L. Bird's 
The Golden Chersonese: Travels In Malaya In 1879 (John Murray, London 
1883 Republished By -OUP1985) at pp. 269-270. Miss Bird, a Victorian 
lady, was an intrepid traveller of fame in those days. She suggests that 
the Treaty and British intervention may initially have been just an 
administrative decision: "The London press began to ask how it was that 
Colonial Officers were suffered to make conquests and increase Imperial 
responsibilities without the sanction of Parliament" (at p. 270). 
24. Khong Kim Hoong, op. cit. at p. 3. 
25. Tun Salleh Abas, "Federation In Malaysia - Changes In The First Twenty 
Years" in ConstituEl-onLaw & Judiciary, op. cit. at p. 15. 
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the Resident-General were cut-down, and in 1930 an active decentralisation 
policy under a new High Commissioner named Sir Cecil Clements was 
undertaken. 26 
British rule in the Malay states was by this time complete. They ruled 
directly in the F. M. S. and indirectly in the "Unfederated Malay States" of 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis. In respect of the latter States, the 
ever present threat of Siamese suzerainity caused the Malay rulers there to 
claim British protection in return for control of their foreign affairs and 
27 the exercise of considerable influence in their governments. 
The British introduced for the first time a discernible legal system in 
the Malay Peninsula. By the Charter of Justice of 1807, a Court of Judicature 
was established in the straits Settlements that was to have the powers and 
jurisdiction of the Superior Courts in England. For example, an -early case 
decided in Penang laid down that the charter introduced English law in the 
Straits Settlements. 28 The juristic approach of the early Colonial judges was 
a pragmatic one meant to ensure that due regard was given to local customs and 
practices. For example, in Malacca andýSingapore, where there was some form of 
pre-existing basis law in reliance of which the inhabitants had conducted 
their affairs, whether Dutch, Portugese or Malay, the approach was to accord 
26. For an account of the Decentralisation programme and the system of 
British administration generally during this period, see Jagjit Singh 
Sidhu, The Administrative Development of Malaya, 1896-1941 in Glimpses, 
supra, note 7, at pp. 75-76. 
27. See Tun Salleh Abas, op. cit., at p. 15. 
28. Kamoo v. Basset [1808] 1 KY. 1. The decision was endorsed in the case of 
Reg v. Williams [1858] 3 KY. 16. The point was later affirmed by the 
Privy Council in the case of Ong Cheng Neo v. Yeap Cheah Neo [1872] 1 
KY. 326,343-44. 
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some form of recognition to this. This was illustrated in the case of Sharp v. 
Hitchell, 29 when Sir Benson Maxwell C. J. said: 
"The Portugese while they held Malacca and after them the Dutch, left 
the Malay custom or lex non scripta in force. -That it was in force when 
this Settlement was ceded to the Crown appears to be beyond dispute and 
that the cession left the law unaltered is equally plain on general 
principles: Campbell v. Hall Cowp. 204,209. It was held by Sir John 
Claridge in 1829 to be then in full force; and although it was decided 
by Sir B. Malkin in 1834 in conformity with what had been held in India, 
that the law of England had been introduced into the settlement by 'the 
Charter which created the Supreme Court it seems to me clear that the 
law so introduced will no more supersede the custom in question than it 
supersedes local custom in England". 
The reliance on the old case of Campbell v. Hall is noteworthy because it was 
in that case that Lord Mansfield laid the proposition that the laws of a 
conquered country continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror. 
In appreciation of the fact that the inhabitants of the Straits 
Settlements were Malays, Chinese and Indians with diverse customs and 
religions, the British judicial policy under the Charters was also to give due 
recognition to their personal law. In a famous case called the Six Widows 
case, 30 concerning the Chinese custom of' polygamous unions, Braddell J. 
declared in the, Court of Appeal of theýStraits Settlements: 
..... the law of England would necessarily require to be administered 
with such modifications as to make them suitable to the religions and 
customs of the inhabitants who were intended to be benefited by them. 
They are dictated from a regard of that constant policy of our rulers to 
administer our laws in our Colonies with a tender solicitude for the 
religious beliefs and established customs of the races-living under the 
protection of our Flag, and to regard them as a charge to our Courts to 
exercise its jurisdiction with all due regard to the several religions, 
manners and customs of the inhabitants .......... 11.31 
29. (1890) Leic. 466 at p. 469. Taken from the discussion by Professor Ahmad 
Ibrahim, Towards A History of Law, supra, note 15, at p. 10. 
30. In the Estate of Choo Eng Choon, deceased [1908] S. S. L. R. 120. 
31. Ibid at p. 218. See also generally, Sir Roland Braddel, "The Law of The 
Straits Settlements: A Commentary" (O. U. P. Reprint 1982, Singapore-Y 
First Published by Kelly & Walsh Ltd., 1915. For an account of the legal 
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It may also be noted that the British policy of governing the Straits 
Settlements from Calcutta led to the importing of several Indian statutes some 
of which are in operation to this day. 32 The significant statutes in this 
respect are the Evidence Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and the great 
Indian Penal Code. 33 
But the extent to which English principles of constitutional law applied 
in the F. M. S. was less clear. It would appear from the decision of the F. M. S. 
34 Court of Appeal in the case of Yap Hon Chin v. G. L. Jones Parry & Anor, 
that, unlike the straits settlements, the F. M. S. was not constitutionally on 
the same footing as a Colony. The question arose in the context of an argument 
that the Banishment Enactment 1900, in force in the F. M. S., was ultra vires 
because it was made to apply extra-territorially and that it was not competent 
for a colonial legislature, without the sanction of the British Parliament or 
King, to make laws with extra-territorial application. In rejecting the 
contention, Law C. J. C. said: 
contd... 
31. history of the Colony'and the application of English-legal principles 
with the necessary modifications to suit local conditions: see Chapter 
II p. 73 et seq. In R. H. Hickling's, The Influence of the Chinese upon 
Legislative History In Malaysia and Singý2ore (1978) 20 Mal. L. R. 265 an 
account is given of the history of the governing of the Chinese 
community by the British and how the rule by Chinese custom, 
administered by Chinese, was gradually replaced into a system of rule by 
English law taking account of Chinese custom. See also R. H. Hickling, 
Malaysian Law (Professional Law Book Publishers, K. L. 1987) at p. 113 et 
seq. 
32. See an account of this in Tun Mohd. Suffian, Shared Eý2eriences, op. cit. 
at pp. 18-21; see also Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, Legislation In the Malay 
States (1977) 2 MLJ Supp. 1xiii at p. 1xv. 
33. Drafted by the English historian Thomas Macaulay when he served as 
Indian Administrator (1834-36), it was the "fruit of three 'years" 
unstinted labour: see Arthur Bryant, Macaulay (1979 Reprint, Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, London) at p. 36. This Fre-m-arr-RaSle document, drafted when 
Macaulay was not yet thirty years of age, has found acceptance in far 
places as Queensland (Australia) New Zealand and many parts of British 
Africa. 
34. [1911] 2 F. M. S. L. R. 70. 
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11 ..... Matters here are not in the same footing as in a Colony. I think the supreme legislative authority in the State (of Selangor) is vested 
in the Sultan, except perhaps the Sultan may have himself limited his 
own powers by treaty, or by grant of legislative authority to some 
Council or other body, and I think that, except in so far as he may have 
limited his authority as above referred to the Sultan must have the same 
power of legislation as Parliament has in the United Kingdom". 35 
It was explained by Ebden J. C. in the same case that the 1895 Treaty between 
the British and the Rulers of the Malay States did not in any way diminish the 
Sultans' authority to govern: 
"By this Treaty the said Rulers agreed to accept a Resident-General as 
agent and representative of the British Government under the Governor of 
the Straits Settlements and to follow his advice in matters of 
administration not touching the Muhammadan religion. It, was, however, 
provided that nothing in the Treaty should curtail the power or 
authority of the said Rulers in their respective states or alter the 
relations then existing between the said States and the British 
Empire .............. the Federated Malay States are undoubtedly in a high degree under British influence in respect of their legislation as 
of other matters; but I know of nothing to imply that tPeir Rulers have 3 ever made any surrender of the legislative power ..... I do not think it can be said that the limitations (on the legislative competence of 
colonial legislatures) apply to the Legislature of a Protected State 
save on terms of Treaty or some form of expressed consent". 37 
In reality, this reasoning was aýfiction that served both sides well. The 
Sultans retained their status at the apex of Malay Society and along with it 
the facade of power and authority, but the British were actually in control. 38 
This, however, does not detract from the fact that from the constitutional and 
theoretical standpoint the judgment in Yap Hon Chin's case had correctly 
stated the position. 
35. Ibid at p. 73. 
36. At p. 82. 
37. At p. 82. 
38. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar in Protector, supra, note 3, at p. 50: "The 
British were in fact the Rulelr-s,, -Me-. ýIultans were mere puppets, it was 
"a convenient cloak for British colonialism". Professor Ahmad Ibrahim 
says: "whatever the practical result, the agreement (setting up the 
Federal Council in 1909) was to reduce the Sultans in status": See 
Legislation In The Malay States, op. cit. at p. lxvi. 
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The internal constitutional position in'the F. M. S. was'said to be alike 
that in the United Kingdom. The existence of a State Constitution did not 
affect the concept of legislative supremacy in the person of the sultan in 
Council. In Anchom Bte Lampong v. Public Prosecutor, " it was sought to, argue 
that certain Muhammadan laws in Johore were ultra vires the State 
Constitution. In repelling the argument, Poyser C. J. observed: 
"The Constitution of Johore ..... is in the nature of an Enactment which 
can at anytime be amended or varied, and therefore has the force of law. 
In view of its terms I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion 
that this court has no power to pronounce on the validity or invalidity 
of any Enactment passed by the Council of State and assented to by the 
Sultan, any more than the English courts could pronounce an Act of 
Parliament to be invalid. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the 
sovereignity of the Sultan and the legislature and to treat Enactments 
of the Johore legislature as the English courts treat by-laws ..... it. 
40 
In The Pahang Consolidated Company Ltd. v. The State of 'Pahang, 41, the 
Privy Council had to consider the constitutional position of the Malay Rulers 
in the F. M. S. and the effect of laws enacted by the Federal Council on behalf 
of the Rulers. The Federal Council, created in 1927, was the Central 
Legislature of the F. M. S.. The Rulers themselves did not sit in the Federal 
Council but were represented by their respective British Residents. The -laws 
passed were declared to be enacted by the Rulers. The question that arose in 
the case was whether an Enactment passed by the Federal Council could override 
the terms of a mining lease given to a corporation by the British Resident on 
behalf of the Sultan of Pahang. The Privy Council, and the F. M. S. Court of 
Appeal before it, held that the Enactment had an overriding effect. Lord 
39. [1940] M. L. J. Rep. 18. 
40. Ibid at p. 22H-I. 
41. [1933] M. L. J. 247 P. C. 
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Tomlin, who delivered the advice of the Board, observed that the sultan was 
"an absolute ruler in whom resides all legislative and executive power subject 
only to the limitations which he has imposed upon himself". 42 The Board held 
that the creation of the Federal Council was such a limitation in that the 
laws passed by the legislature would prevail over laws passed by the State 
Council. However it was also observed that the laws of the Federal Council 
would have to be signed by each of the Malay Rulers, and that nothing in the 
setting up of this legislature was to curtail the power or authority of the 
Rulers in their respective states. 
Thus the position that obtained in the Malay Peninsula up to the coming 
of the Second World War was that the Malay states, in private and public 
international law, were very much in the nature of sovereign states. 
Internally it was a mixture of absolute monarchism and constitutional 
government. The choice of which prevailed in any given case was not that of 
the Sultan but of the British Resident upon whose advice he was bound to 
act. 43 
This was the position until the advent of the Japanese occupation during 
the Second World War. 
42. Ibid. See also Stevens J. in Pillai v. State of Kedah (1927] 6 FMSLR 
160. In Wong Ah Fook v. State of Johore [1937] M. L. J. 121 the executive 
act of the Sultan of Johore was successfully challenged on the ground 
that the Sultan had himself in 1908 declared that he was subject to the 
law. The correctness of this decision of a single judge is however 
doubtful in the light of the full bench decision in the Anchom case, 
supra. see criticism of the decision in Mohd Arif Yusof, Post-war 
Political Changes: Constitutional Developments Towards Independence And 
Changing Conceptions Towards Judicial Review In Malaysia (1982) Vol. 9 
19 at p. 26 (Foot-note 24). 
43. For an account of how the British influenced or inveigled the sultans in 
decision-making, see Dr. Chandra Muzaffar in Protector, supra, note 3, 
at p. 52 et seq. 4 
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Post-War Constitutional Reforms 
British rule separated the early Malay Kingdoms from the present 
per. lod. 44 The Japanese conquest of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore in 1942 
destroyed British rule. 45 The British were never again to regain their pre- 
eminence in the Malay Peninsula. The attainment of independence in India and 
the successful overthrow of the Dutch yoke in neighbouring Indonesia had its 
impact on the nascent nationalist movement in Malaya. 
Thus when the British, returned to Malaya they faced a changed situation. 
There was for the first time political awareness amongst the various races in 
the country. 46 This was soon to burgeon when the British introduced the ill- 
fated Malayan Union plan in 1946. 
44. Ibid at p. 50. 
45. "Within 70 days in 1942, the Japanese brought to an end British 
colonisation that had begun with the colonisation of Penang in 17860: 
see Khong Kim Hoong in Merdeka, op. cit. at p. 24. Churchill had 
obviously underestimated tH-e Japanese offensive in the Far East. When 
told by his advisers of the threat to Singaporer Churchill had 
reportedly brushed it aside with these words: "The little yellow men 
will never dare to challenge the might of the British Empire": see AJP 
Taylor, The warlords (Penguin, 1984 Reprint) at p. 89. The Japanese 
ruled Malaya-Y-o-r3 1/2 years. For an account of the Japanese legal 
administration in occupied Malaya, see S. K. Das, Japanese occupation And 
EX-Post Facto Legislation In Malaya (MLJ Publication, March, 1960. 
Reproduced trom (1958) and (1§59) Malayan Law Journal) and Sim Ewe Eong, 
An Account Of The Japanese occupation Of The settlement of Penanq, 
Malaya was attended with violence and cruelty to the local populace, 
especially the Chinese. For a personal account of Japanese atrocities, 
see Sybil Kathigasu, No Dram Of Mercy (OUP 1983; First Published 1954). 
In the Preface to tFe 19-83 Edition Cheah Boon Kheng records the 
observation made to him by Gen. Fujiwara in Tokyo in 1976: "Japan lost a 
golden opportunity to show Asians that as an Asian power, she was a kind 
liberator who would treat them better than the European powers". Gen. 
Fujiwara was the head of the Japanese military agency during the war. 
46. See Zainal Abidin Wahid, The Japanese Occupation And Nationalism in 
Glimpses, op. cit. at p. 93. For a detailed political study see Rolf, Lhe 
origins Of Malay Nationalism. 
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The immediate British plan was to deal with the breakdown of authority 
following the Japanese surrender. Thus, they formed the British Military 
Administration (BMA) which had as its main objective the reimposition of 
British rule in Malaya. 47 The methods of the BMA were autho ritarian. It was in 
reality a military government. 48 I 
The Malayan Union 
In October 1945 the British proposed the formation of a unitary state in 
Malaya called the Malayan Union. The proposal has been described variously as 
the product of enlightened British officials with a commitment towards 
decolonization or otherwise as a British attempt to create the basic political 
infrastructure leading towards eventual self-rule. 49 It will be a mistake, 
however, to consider that the motive was entirely altruistic. The British 
methodology in implementing the scheme was to bear this out. From the British 
standpoint, a centralized administration without the bother of the pre-war 
consultative advisory scheme was advantageous for political and economic 
reasons. 50 
47. Khong Kim Hoong in Merdeka, op. cit. at p. 37. 
48. Ibid at p. 38. The military administration lasted from September 1945 to 
April 1946: see Mohd Arif Yusof, in Post-War Constitutional Changes, 
op. cit. at p. 20. 
49. See Khong Kim Hoong, Ibid at p. 73, quoting Nordin Sopiee, From Malayan 
union To Singapore separation, (University of Malaya Press, 1974) at p. 
16. 
50. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar in Protector, op. cit. at p. 54: "Many reasons 
have been advanced for the new policy. It has been said that the desire 
to create a militarily more defensible state, given the British debacle 
in the face of the Japanese invasion of 1941, the disillusionment with 
the Malays many of whose leaders had a sided with the Japanese during 
65 
But the Malayan Union scheme proved abortive. Its implementation, in 
both substantive and procedural terms, was unacceptable to the now- 
51 politically conscious Malays, and in particular the Rulets. In substance, 
the Malayan Union was an attempt to change the constitutio nal status of the 
Malay States from protectorates to colonies; except in matters of the "Malay 
religion and customs the Rulers would be required to surrender their 
jurisdictions to the British Government thus enabling the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act of 1890 to have effect in Malaya. 52 Laws passed by the legislature would 
no longer require their assent either individually or collectively but that of 
the British Governor. 
Lastly, the method by which the British procured the assent of the 
Rulers to the Proposal was considered an affront to the dignity of the Rulers 
and, in turn, the Malays. The assent of the Rulers was needed because the 
Sultans had 'constitutionally never ceded their jurisdiction to the British. 
contd... 
50. the war, the desire to reward the Chinese some of whom had fought the 
Japanese and the desire to prepare the country for eventual 
-, 
self- 
government, were among the major reasons for the formation of the 
Malayan Union. While all this may have influenced British policy-makers, 
it is doubtful if any of the factors cited could have been the major 
motivation". 
51. See Tun Salleh Abas, "Federalism In Malaysia" in The constitution, Law & 
The Judiciary, op. cit. at p. 15-16: "The Malays opposed the Union; its 
Faýsisrejected their special position as sons of the soil. The liberal 
franchise laws would disturb the Malay-Chinese balance. They did not 
wish to be overwhelmed by a race which had little, if any, real loyalty 
and commitment to the country. Centralisation would also deprive the 
Malay Rulers of their power". For a detailed account of the opposition 
to the Malayan Union proposal, see Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka, op. cit. at 
pp. 73 et seq. 
52. see zainal Abidin Wahid, The Malayan Union: Its Introduction in 
Glimpses, op. cit. at p. 101. 
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The task was given to Sir Harold MacMichael who was flown in from Britain 
solely for this purpose. Within two months he had obtained the consent of all 
the Rulers in circumstances that Richard Winstedt, a local historian of 
British descent, call - ed "sharp practice". 53 The Sultans had continued in 
office during Japanese occupation, and, indeed six of the ten, had ascended to 
their thrones during that time. It was obvious that MacMich ael had threatened 
dethronement of the recalcitrants. 54 
The public outcry against the Union proposal was astonishing. It led to 
the formation of the first ever Malay movement towards nationalism. A Malay 
political party called the United Malay Nationalist Organisation (UMNO) was 
formed in May 1946 on the palace grounds of the Johore Sultan with the avowed 
aim of opposing the proposal. 55 
The British relented. 56 As a result, it was decided at a meeting of the 
Rulers and the Malayan Union Governor that a committee be formed to resolve 
the crisis. The Committee comprised, inter alia, representatives of the Rulers 
and of UMNO. 57 The report of this committee, which was accepted by the 
British, led to the formation of the Federation in Malaya. 
53. Ibid at p. 103. 
54. J. Allen in his study The Malayan Union (Yale University: South East 
Asia studies Monograph Series, New Haven 1967) quotes the Sultan of 
Kedah: "I was presented with a verbal ultimatum with a time limit, and 
in the event of my refusing to sign the new agreement ..... a successor 
who would sign would be appointed Sultan": Quoted in Khong Kim Hoong, 
Merdeka, op. cit. at p. 81. MacMichael was also described by Allen as 
noE---Having given due respect to the Rulers. He was "brusque, 
discourteous and overwhelming, showing irritation at the slightest 
delay". Ibid. 
55. See Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Political Awakening (Pelanduk 
Publications, K. L. 1986) at p. 4. 
56. "The Malayan ýUnion remained as an object lesson in the folly of 
establishing a constitutional structure without prior local 
consultation": Mohd Arif Yusof, Post-War Constitutional Changes, op. cit. 
at p. 23. 
57. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Political Awakening, op. cit. at p. 4. 
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The Federation of Malaya, 1948 
The first proposal for a Federation had come from the Rulers. It was 
made on 20th March, 1946 on the eve of the establishment of the Malayan Union. 
However, it was never considered seriously by the British who thought that it 
came too late in the day. 58 When the British decided to dismantle the Malayan 
Union, the Rulers revived the proposal for a Federation through a working 
committee set up to recommend a new constitutional arrangement for Malaya. 
The Working Committee was given terms of reference to make proposals for 
the establishment of a strong central government which would nevertheless 
ensure that the individuality of each of the Malay States is maintained; a 
common form of citizenship for all those who regard Malaya as their only 
homeland; lastly, the proposals were to be directed towards the achievement of 
ultimate self government. 59 Interestingly, the Working Committee was expressly 
required to propose a scheme "which would be acceptable to Malay opinion". 60 
The terms of reference showed that the British Government had taken note of 
the sensitivity of the Malay Rulers and leaders with regard to the authority 
of the Sultans and the special position of the Malays. 61 
58. See Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka, op. cit. at p. 98.1- 11 
59. Khong Kim Hoong. Ibid. 
60. See Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Working 
Committee, Kuala Lumpur 1947: quoted in Mohd Arif Yusof, Post-War 
Constitutional Changes, op. cit. at p. 27 (Foot-note no. 14). 
61. See Khong Kim Hoong op. cit. at p. 98. In his book The Malay Dilemma 
(Federal Publication 1981 Ed) Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamed, Prime Minister 
of Malaysia since 1981, acknowledged that Hall changes leading up to 
independence was done in full consultation and agreement not only with 
the Malay Rulers but also with the Malay people represented by UýMýN. O. " 
(at p. 130)'. 
68 
The Committee's proposals were embodied in, a Draft Agreement which was 
given conditional approval by, the British Government. 62 The Draft Agreement 
provided- for the continuance of a British government'-in Malaya. A High 
Commissioner was to replace the Governor, and was to retain all powers except 
those touching on Malay customs and the Muslim, religion. Th ese matters were to 
be returned to the Sultans. , 
The Federation Agreement was signed by all the Rulers and on February 1, 
1948 the Federation of Malaya came into being. 63 
The Federation Agreement of 1948 brought into existence for the first 
time a federal government consisting of the nine Malay States and the two 
settlements of Malacca and Penang. 64 There was a clear definition of the ambit 
of the legislative authority of the Federal legislature. Such residual 
legislative power that existed, together with the power to legislate on 
matters of the Muslim religion and custom of the Malays was left to the State 
legislatures. 65 However, the Malay Rulers were not constitutional rulers. They 
62. The secretary of State for the-Colonies announced in London that "no 
final decision would be made until all interested parties had full and 
free opportunity of expressing their views": see Khong Kim Hoong, op. 
cit. at Pp. 100-101. 
63. The Federation Plan was opposed by some quarters eg. the Communist who 
saw it as a consolidation of British colonialism, radical Malay groups 
and some non-Malay groups: see Khong Kim Hoong op. cit. at pp. 101-121, 
and also Tunku Abdul Rahman, Political Awakening, op. cit. at p. 9 et, seq. 
The Federation also saw num-ero-u-sFUlissensions from amongst its member 
states for a number of localised reasons and there were threats also of 
secession: see Tun Salleh Abas, Federation in Malaya op. cit. at pp. 16- 
18. - 
64. Tun Mohd Suffian, An Introduction To The Constitution of Malaysia, 2nd 
Edn. (Government Printers 1976) at p. 10. 
65. See Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 in Malayan Constitutional 
Documents Vol I, 2nd Edn. (Government Printer 1962) at p. 7. 
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presided over an Executive council appointed in' each State and technically had 
power to overrule the advice of the Executive Council. 66 
The Federation Agreement did not introduce a constitutional monarchy or 
a parliamentary government in Malaya. It's significance was in being "an 
important milestone", and providing "a structure in the advance' towards self- 
government with a constitutional form of government". 67 
The Reid Commission 
In 1956, the British Government in consultation with the Malay Rulers 
appointed a Constitutional Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Reid68 to 
deliberate and propose a Constitution for independent Malaya. By its terms of 
reference the Reid Commission was enjoined, inter alia, "to make 
recommendations for a federal form of government for the whole country as a 
single self-governing unit within the Commonwealth based on parliamentary 
69 democracy with a bicameral legislature". 
66. See paragraph 177 of the Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission 1957 (The Reid Commission Report) (Government 
Printer 1957) at p. 77 and generally Paragraphs 22-25 on the workings of 
the legislature and government of the Federation. 
67. Mohd Arif Yusof, Post-War Political Changes, op. cit. p. 24. 
68. The members of the Commission were: The Rt. Hon. Lord Reid, a Lord of 
Appeal in ordinary, Sir Ivor Jennings Q. C., Master of Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge, both nominated by the United Kingdom Government; Sir William 
McKell Q. C., a former Governor General of Australia nominated by the 
Australian Government; Mr B Malik, a former Chief Justice of the 
Allahabad High Court, nominated by the Government of India; and Mr. 
Justice Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High Court, nominated by the 
Government of Pakistan. 
69. See the Reid Commission Report op. cit. at p. 2. 
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The Reid Commission presented its recommendations in the form of a draft 
Constitution for the Federation. 70 In making the Recommendations the 
Commission declared expressly that it had two objective in mind; that "first 
there must be the fullest opportunity for the growth of a united free and 
democratic nation, and secondly that there must be every facility for the 
development of the resources of the country and the maintenance and 
71 improvement of the standards of living of the people". 
A Working Party was appointed in the Federation to make a detailed 
examination of the Report and to submit recommendations. In the meantime, the 
Report was studied by London. A conference in London in May 1957 between the 
representatives of the Federation Government and of the Malay Rulers and the 
British Government resulted in agreement on all points of principle and a 
revised Draft Constitution for an independent Malaya was adopted. 72 
70. The Commission had 113 sittings in all in the Federation, of which 31 
sittings were to hear representations from interested persons or bodies: 
see the Reid Report op. cit. at paras. 8-12. The Commission received 131 
written memoranda. The most significant were those from the Rulers and 
the Alliance Party, the principal political party at that time: see 
Zainal Abidin Wahid Merdeka in Gli! ýýes op. cit. at p. - 150. The 
Recommendation and th-eD-ra-E consEl-Eution were later drafted by the 
Commission in Rome-in December 1956: see para. 13 of the Reid Report. 
71. See paragraph 14'of the Reid Commission Report. For reliance, on the 
objectives of the Reid Commission in interpreting the Constitution: see 
Supreme Court in Theresa Lis Chin-Chin & ors v. Inspector General of 
Police [1988] 1 SCR 141; Federal Court in Dato Menteri Othman v. Dato 
Ombi [1981] 1 MLJ 29 at p. 37B-D. 
72. For an account of the stages towards independence, see generally, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, Political Awakening op. cit. and Challenging Times 
(Pelanduk Publications 1986 K. 1 T. -z 
71 
Independence 
Thereafter events moved swiftly towards the proclamation of independent 
Malaya. The constitutional machinery devised to bring the new Constitution 
into force consisted of: - 
(a) the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957; 
(b) in the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 
1957, together with orders in Council made thereunder; 
(c) 
-in 
the Federation, the Federal Constitution ordinance, 1957, and 
(in each of the former Malay States) State Enactments approving, 
and giving the force of law to the Federal Constitution. 73 
On 31st July, 1957 the British Parliament passed the Federation of 
Malaya Independence Act, 195774 to make provisions for the establishment of 
the Federation of Malaya as an independent sovereign country. 
on 5th August, 1957 the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 195775 was duly 
entered into between the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty and their 
Highnesses the Rulers for the establishment of the Federation of Malaya as an 
independent country. A Constitution for the proposed Federation of Malaya was 
annexed as the First Schedule to' the Agreement. 
On 27th August, 1957, the Federal Legislature of the Federation Malay 
States passed the Federal constitution Ordinance, 195776 to approve the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957. By an Order in Council of Her Britannic 
73. See R. H. Hickling in Preface to Malayan Constitutional Documents Vol. 
(2nd Edn. ) (Government Press 1962) at p. xiii. 
74. Ibid at pp. 1-8. 
75. Ibid at pp. 9-12. 
76. Ibid at pp. 13-14. 
72 
Majesty, termed the Federation of Malaya Independence Order in Council, 1957 
(Statutory Instrument No. 1533)77 laid before the British Parliament on 29th 
August, 1957 the Federal Constitution was declared to have the force of law 
within the Straits Settlement's colonies of Penang and Malacca with effect 
from 31st August, 1957. Thus, after more than a century, direct British rule 
ended in these colonies on 31st August, 1957. 
Independence was proclaimed on 31st August, 1957 where at a ceremony in 
Kuala Lumpur, the Duke of Gloucester, acting on behalf of Her Majesty, the 
Queen, formally handed over to the Prime Minister the constitutional documents 
signifying the independence of the Federation of Malaya. At the ceremony 
there was also read by the new Prime Minister a document called the 
"Proclamation of Independence". 78 This remarkable document79 encapsulated in 
its contents the essence of the type of government established by the new 
Constitution. It declared that by the Constitution "provision is made to 
safeguard the rights and prerogatives of their Highness, the Rulers, and the 
77. Ibid at pp. 15-16. 
78. Ibid at pp. 17-18. 
79. It's draftsman Professor, R. H. Hickling has called it "a neglected 
document": see R. H. Hickling, "The Historical Background To The 
Malaysian Constitution" in Reflections on -TFe-Malaysian Co-n-s-Titution 
(ALIRAN PublicatioF-, -Penang. 1987) at p. 26. There is also an accoun-t-o-f 
how the document came to be drafted. According to Hickling: "on the eve 
of independence I was working as the legal draftsman in the Attorney 
General's Chambers here in Kuala Lumpur - in the old Secretariat, now 
the Supreme Court. I was summoned by the Attorney himself, Tom Brodie, 
an excellent, thorough, honest law officer. (Why do I say "honest" - are 
not all lawyers honest? Well, of course they're nott) He was not exactly 
enchanted. "The Tunku" (Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister) he 
said, "would like a draft Proclamation of Independence". Well, I 
thought, why not? Independence does. not come every day. What to do? The 
American Declaration of Independence, "We the People", something like 
that? It was a sober thought ..... In the event there came in the end, 
completed by the Tunku's master touch - the Proclamation of 
Independence ..... To me, there is something splendid about it. It must 
not be forgotten: one of the happiest inspirations of the Tunku". Ibid. 
73 
fundamental rights and liberties of the people and to provide for the peaceful 
and orderly advancement of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu as a constitutional 
monarchy based on Parliamentary democracy". 80 
Malaysia 
In 1963, came the formation of Malaysia with. the enlargement of the 
Federation of Malaya by the admission of the neighbouring British Colonies of 
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into the Federation through the Malaysia Act, 
1963.81 This was enabled by Article 2 of the Malayan Constitution which 
provided inter alia that "Parliament may by law admit other states to the 
Federation". 82 
80. Malayan Constitutional Document, Vol. 1, op. cit. at p. 18. 
81. Act No. 26 of 1963 w. e. f. 16 September 1963 (Halbury's Statutes of 
England Vol. 4,3rd Edn. at pp. 374-79). The Malaysia Act amended the 
Constitution by: (a) amending Article 1(1) which provides that "the 
Federation shall be known by the name of Persekutuan Tanah Malayu (in 
English the Federation of Malaya) by substituting for it that "the 
Federation shall be known in Malay and in English by the name 
"Malaysia"; (b) amending Article 1(2) by adding the states of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore to the states originally enumerated. By the 
Constitution Amendment Act No. 14 of 1962, Article 159(4) was amended by 
providing that only a simple majority was needed for the passing of an 
amendment made for the admission of a new State to the Federation. In 
criticism of this, Professor H. E. Groves has argued that the amendment 
makes "it possible for a simple majority in the House of Representatives 
to vary at any time as a purely unilateral action any agreement which 
any state now joining the Federation may make with the Government of the 
Federation of Malaya as to it's admission and association: see H. E. 
Groves "Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1962, (1962) Vol. 4 Mal. L. R. 329. 
82. Article 2 was evidently modeled on Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, 
which reads: "Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, 
new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit". The Malaysian 
Article 3 is likewise based on the Indian Article 3 dealing with the 
right of Parliament to alter the boundaries of a state with the consent 
of the State Legislature. Interesting case-law from India suggests that 
these provisions do not entitle Parliament to cede territory to a 
74 
The formation of the enlarged Federation was challenged in Court by the 
Government of the State of Kelantan: see The Covernment of the State of 
Kelantan v. The Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman 
Putra Al Haj. 83 The case was decided dramatically , on 
the eve of the 
proclamation of the new Federation. The challenge was mad e on several legal 
grounds: 
1) that the Malaysia Act would abolish the Federation ofý Malaya 
thereby violating the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957; 
2) that the proposed changes needed the consent of each of the 
constituent states, including Kelantan, and this had not been 
obtained; 
3) that the Ruler of Kelantan should have been a party to the 
Malaysia Agreement; 
that constitutional convention called for consultation with Rulers 
of individual States as to substantial changes to be made to the 
Constitution; 
5) that the Federal Parliament had no power to legislate for Kelantan 
in respect of any matter regarding which that State had its own 
legislation. 84 
contd... 
82. foreign country: see Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Court in In 
Reference On Berubari AIR 1960 SC 845. However, the settlement of a 
boundary dispute with another country involving adjustment of territory 
will not offend the principle: see Naganbhai v. Union of India AIR 1969 
SC 783. 
83. [19631 29 MLJ 355. 
84. Ibid at p. 357E-H. Of the several grounds of legal challenge, the 
"failure-to consult" argument was politically the real complaint. As one 
opposition Member of Parliament declared during the debate on the 
proposed Malaysia Act: "This Bill really mutilates our Constitution and 
75 
Accordingly, the petitioners claimed that the Malaysia Agreement and the 
subsequent Malaysia Act were null and void. The questions were undoubtedly of 
great significance. However, Thomson C. J., whilst claiming a right to deal 
with the arguments on their merits, rolled up the several issues into a single 
question: "whether Parliament or the Executive Government has trespassed in 
any way the limits placed on their powers by the Constitution". 85 In the 
result, the Court held that Parliament had correctly followed the amending 
proceSS86 and the changes were therefore valid: 
"In doing these things I cannot see that Parliament went in any way 
beyond its powers or that it did anything so fundamentally revolutionary 
as to require fulfilment BT a condition which the Constitution itself 
U55-esnot prescribe, that is to say a condition to the effect that the 
State of Kelantan or any other State should be consulted. It is true in 
contd... 
84. kills the Federation of Malaya ..... The Federation Government should not 
only have discussed the matter here but it should also have consulted 
the States" (Malayan Parliamentary Debates Vol. V No. 11,17 August, 
1963 Cols. 1155-1156): see generally Shafruddin Hashim, The Constitution 
And The Federal Idea In Peninsula Malaysia (1984) Vol. 11 JMCL 139, for 
a discussion of the-oppos-IFlon to the Malaysia plan from some Members of 
Parliament, p. 161 et seq. 
85. Ibid at pp. 358I-359A. Thomson C. J. 's approach has been criticised as a 
judicial anti-climax i. e. to "generalise as one issue what was clearly 
five different bases for challenging the constitutionality of the 
Agreement and the Act": see S. Jayakumar, Admission of New States, 
(1964) 6 Mal. L. R. 121 at p. 135. 
86. An amendment to the Constitution for purposes of admitting a new State 
is an exception to the general rule that amendments must have a 2/3 
majority in Parliament: see Art. 159(4)(bb). In respect of limitations 
on the amending power of the Federal Parliament in relation to certain 
subjects affecting the States of Sabah and Sarawak requiring the 
concurrence of the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor) of these States, see 
Art. 161E(2): see generally, Datuk Nicholas Fung: "The Constitutional 
Position of Sabah", in The Constitution of Malaysiai. 
- 
Further 
Perspectives And D' evelopments (Essays In Honour Of Tun Mohd. Sufflan-T 
Ed. F. A. Triniclade & H. P. Lee (OxIord, Singapore 1986) at p. 92 et seq 
3, and; Datuk Hj. Mohd Jemuri bin Serjan: "The Constitutional Position 
of Sarawak" in Further Perspectives Ed. TrIn-11aa-de & H. P. Lee, op. ciE-., 
at p. 114 et seq. 
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a sense that the new Federation is something different from the old one. 
It will contain more States. It will have a different name. But if 
that state of affairs be brought about by means contained in the 
Constitution itself and which were contained in it at the time of the 
1957 Agreement, of which it is an integral part, I cannot see how it can 
possibly be made out that there has been any breach of any foundation 
pact among the original parties. In bringing about these changes 
Parliament has done no more than exercise the powers which were given to 
it in 1957 by the constituent States including the State of Kelantan.,, 87 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, two days later on 16 September 1963, Malaysia was established. 
88 
The new nation is conceptually a confederation. It brought the new units of 
Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into association with the former Federation of 
87. At p. 359B-D. Thomson C. J. 's qualification that there might be some Act 
of Parliament "so fundamentally revolutionary" that although done in 
conformity with the Constitution may nevertheless be invalid unless 
fulfilling some condition such as State consultation not prescribed in 
the Constitution, has been consistently criticised by several writers: 
see Sheridan & Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia, 4th Edn. (Malaya 
Law Journal Publication, 1987) at p. 3; L. A. Sheridan, constitutional 
Problems of Malaysia (1964) 13 ICLQ 1349 at pp. 1352-53; 
TEI'ssion of New States, op - cit. at p. 187; H. P. Lee, The Process of 
Constitutional Change in the Constitution of Malaysia: It's Development 
1957-1977 Ed. Tun Suffian et al., (OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1978) p. 373 at 
pp. 375-76. The present writer is, however, of the opinion that these 
criticisms do not take into account the fact that the Malaysian 
Constitution is in constitutional terms the product of a treaty 
arrangement between the Malay Rulers and the British Sovereign contained 
in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1957, and therefore the 
requirement for consultation can reasonably be implied as arising 
therefrom. A reasonable argument can be mounted that the Federation 
Constitution, whilst otherwise exhaustive, has nevertheless to be read 
conjointly with the other constitutional documents that brought about 
Independence. Furthermore, Thomson ci's view may now be justifiable 
under "the basic features" doctrine (ie. that there is an implied 
restraint on the amending power of Parliament such that it cannot amend 
the Constitution so as to destroy its basic features) laid down by the 
Indian Supreme Court in a landmark decision: Keshavanandha Bharati v. 
State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 146. A fuller discussion of the impact of 
this case on Malaysian constitutional law is made later in this study: 
see Chapter XII. 
88. For an account of the political and diplomatic steps leading to the 
formation of Malaysia including the protests by the neighbouring 
countries of Indonesia and the Philippines, and the appointment by the 
United Nations of a fact-finding commission (called the Cobbold 
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Malaya; thus the units were, prior to the separation by Singapore, really not 
fourteen States but rather four units, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, 
of which the first consists of eleven parts. 89 The judgment in the Kelantan 
case did not deal with the conceptual character of the new nation although it 
was acknowledged by the Chief Justice that "in a sense the new Federation is 
something different from the old one; it will contain more States; it will 
have a different name". 90 These reasons would suggest that the change brought 
about by the admission of the new States did not change the character or 
structure of government under the old Constitution. It was rightly observed 
by another writer9l that the Federation of Malaya continued as "Malaysia" and 
that the Malaysia Act merely amends the Constitution of the Federation of 
Malaya and does not create a new Constitution. 
contd... 
88. Commission after its chairman Lord Cobbold, the former Chairman of the 
Bank of England) to ascertain the wishes of the people and the local 
leadership of Sabah and Sarawak to the Malaysia plan, see Richard Allen, 
Malaysia: Prospect And Retrospect (The Impact And Aftermath of Colonial 
Rule) Oxford University Press, London 1968 at p. 144 et seq. For a 
ae-tailed account of the Indonesian and Filipino claims, see Malaysia- 
Indonesia Conflict, Ed. A. G. Mezerik (International Review Service) Vol. 
XI No. 86 (New York, 1965). 
89. See H. E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia: The Malaysia Act (1963) 5 
Mal. L. R. 245. 
90. At p. 359C. 
91. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, Professor Groves' Constitution of Malaysi A 
Book Review) (1964) 2 MLJ xcvii. Indeed the Official Statement of e 
Government on the formation of Malaysia was emphatic " ..... in no sense is it a new State that has come into being but the old State has 
continued in an enlarged form and with a new name": see Official 
Statement of Government of Malaysia on Transition of Malaya Into 
Malaysia (reproduced in A. G. Mezerik, Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict, 
op. cit. at pp. 95-96). 
78 
The SingaporeSeparation 
On 9 August 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia and became an 
independent sovereign nation. 92 separation was achieved by the constitutional 
mechanism of the Malaysian Parliament passing the Constitution of Malaysia 
(Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965.93 By section 3, Singapore ceased to be a 
part of Malaysia and became an independent, sovereign state. It gave 
statutory force to the Independence of Singapore Agreement 1965 made between 
the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Singapore. Article IV of the 
Agreement provided for the enactment by the Malaysian Parliament of an Act 
which was set out as an annexure to the Agreement. By section 6 of the said 
Amendment Act, the sovereignity and authority of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of 
Malaysia ceased and became vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, the Head of 
State of Singapore. 94 By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1966 the necessary 
92. Irreconcilable differences between the leaders in Singapore and Kuala 
Lumpur and a difference in outlook on vital questions like racial unity 
and Malay rights made a parting of ways inevitable: see Richard Allen, 
Malaysia: Prospect and Retrospect, op. cit. at pp. 206-208; R. S. Milne & 
Diane Mauzy, Politics And Government in Malaysia (Federal Publications, 
Singapore, 1973) p. 67 et seq. For an interesting analysis of 
Singapore's sojourn in Malaysia and the expulsion crisis, see James 
Minchin, No Man Is An Island (A Study of Singaeore's Lee Kuan Yew) Allen 
& Unwin, -Sy-crn--ey1986 pp. 125-161. A less critical version is given in 
Alex Josey: Lee Kuan Yew: The Struggle For Singapore (Angus & Robertson) 
1980 Ed. pp. 186-189. 
93. Act No. 53 of 1965. For an account of Singapore's legal status whilst in 
Malaysia and the autonomy it enjoyed on matters of local government, 
legislative power, and education, see Ahmad Ibrahim, The Position Of 
Singaýore In Malaysia (1964) 2 MLJ cxi. The future legislative history 
of Singapore is outside the scope of this study, but for an account of 
the transition and acquisition of legislative power by the 'Singapore 
Parliament, see A. J. Harding, Parliament And The Grundnorm In Singapore 
(1983) 25 Mal. L. R. 351. 
94. This provision gave rise to the interesting case of Sng Hung Meng v. 
Public Utilities Board [1966] 2 MLJ 25, decided by the then Federal 
court in Singapore, where the court had to consider Singapore's 
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changes to the text of the Malaysian Constitution was made as a result of 
Singapore's departure. 
Whilst the precipitate decision of the Malaysian 'Executive to expel 
Singapore has been politically questioned on the Malaysian side, 95 the 
constitutional basis of the excision remains unexplored. It is submitted that 
in the absence of a provision in the Constitution authorizing Parliament to 
secede any territory as opposed to a power to admit new States (Art. 2(a)), 
the jurisdiction can only rest on the argument that in public international 
law it is an essential attribute of sovereignity that a sovereign state can in 
case of necessity cede a part of its territory in favour of a foreign state, 
and that this can be done in the exercise of its treaty making power: see in 
Re The Berubari Reference By the President of india. 96 
contd... 
94. constitutional status af ter separation. The question arose in a very 
ordinary way. A writ was issued out in Singapore by the plaintiff for a 
debt in November 1965, after the Separation, with the endorsement "in 
the name and on behalf of His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong". It was 
an obvious mistake but the Court invoked section 6 to hold that the writ 
was a nullity because it was issued out "in the name of a sovereign of a 
foreign country". 
95. See Allen, op. cit. at p. 208. 
96. AIR 1960 SC 845. The case is an Advisory Opinion of the Indian Supreme 
Court on a reference from the President of India. The Court had to 
consider, in the context of their Article 1 (which is similarly worded 
to our Article 2), whether it was lawful for the Indian Government to 
cede part of the Berubari territory to Pakistan by way of treaty in 
exchange for the acquisition of new territory. 
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ll"Anmr. ln TIT 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AND KEY FEATURES 
OF THE MALAYSIAN CONSTITUTION 
Introduction 
In moving the second reading of The Federal Constitution Bill on August 
15,1957 Tunku Abdul Rahman, subsequently the first Prime Minister of the 
Federation, declared: 
"It must be remembered that the freedom to which we aspire is the 
freedom to govern ourselves under a system in which parliamentar 
institutions shall be exclusively representative of the people's will". 
The 1957 Constitution purported to establish in Malaya a parliamentary 
democracy based on the Westminster model. A bi-cameral legislature, a 
constitutional monarchy and the establishment of three distinct organs of 
State - Parliament, an Executive and the Judiciary - were the obvious 
characteristics of the vintage model that was adopted. However, of equal 
importance were the dissimilarities. This gave the Malayan Constitution a 
distinctive character. Professor Hickling rightly observed: "The ideas of 
Westminster and the experience of India have mingled with those of Malaya to 
produce a unique form of government". 2 The independence constitution of 1957 
was also described as evolutionary in character having grown out of the early 
federal arrangement in 1895 and its progeny the Federation Agreement of 1948. 
1. Malayan Constitutional Documents (Second Edition) Vol. 1 at p. iv. 
2. R. H. Hickling, The Historical 
in Reflections on The Malaysia 
at p. 29. 
To The Malaysian Constitution 
on (ALIRAN PUBLICATION, 1987Y 
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Hickling sees in this development "an increasing assertion of the Malay 
origins of the Constitution" embodied, in particular, in the offices of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the Rulers. 3 However, not to bb diminished are the 
other features that reflects the underlying compact between the, races that 
produced the independence Constitution. 
The Reid Commission was evidently mindful of the multi-racial and multi- 
religious character of the population. The Commission therefore proposed a 
fundamental rights chapter in the Constitution providing for freedom of 
5 religion'4 liberty and equality of the person, and rights to education 
regardless -of race or religion. 
6 The Reid proposal on the race question was 
undoubtedly influenced by the Memorandum of the Alliance Party which was the 
principal political party in the country. It was itself a coalition of 
political parties representing the three major races in the country. Thus the 
Constitution has been described as "very much a product of ethnic bargaining 
and accommodation". 7 underscoring the significance of a bill of rights in 
Ibid. 
Article II. 
5. Articles 5 and 8. 
6. Article 12. For a discussion of the fundamental liberty clauses of the 
Malaysian Constitution, see: Koh Eng-Tian, Fundamental Rights Under The 
Malayan constitution (1958) Me Judice, 5; R7HE-T-1-c-Eing, Some Aspects Of 
Fundamental Liberties Under The Constitution Of The Federa-Elon 
- 
Of Malaya 
(1963) MLJ x1iv; Fundamental Liberties: Are Theý Real Or Illusory? 
Editorial INSAF (1976) Vol. 9. 
7. Tan Chee Beng, Ethnic Dimension In The Constitution, INSAF Vol. XX No. 3 
September, 1987 at p. 31. The purpose and function of a Bill of Rights 
is best described in this passage from the judgment of Justice Jackson 
of the United States Supreme Court in West Virginia state Board of 
Education v. Barnette 319 U. S. 624 [1943]: "The very purpose of a Bill 
of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
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respect of ethnic and religious minority rights. Indeed in a government 
publication the Constitution is described as Ila binding agreement solemnly 
entered into by all the races". 8 In brief the accommodation between the races 
is seen in the provision of liberal citizenship rights for the non-Malays in 
return for the recognition of special privileges for the Malays. 
9 
contd... 
7. officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
Courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a 
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental 
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections". 
S. Towards National Harmony (Government Printers, Kuala Lumpur 1971). 
9. The "special privilege" clause of the Constitution is Article 153. 
Clause (2) reads: "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, - but 
subject to the provisions of Article 40 and of this Article, the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this Constitution 
and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the 
special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah 
and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of any 
of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem 
reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public 
service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar 
educational or training privileges or special facilities given or 
accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or licence for 
the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, 
subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits 
and licences". The accommodation had much to do with the, wisdom, 
personality and character of the country's first Prime minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman. R. H. Hickling has written of the Tunku that "his 
personality did much to inform and influence the pattern of the new 
Constitution": An Overview of Constitutional Changes In Malaysia: 1957- 
1977 (The Constitution of-Malaysia. -I-ETs Development 1957-1977 Ed. Tun 
Suffian, H. P. Lee, FA Trinidade). The Tunkuls role in the early days in 
bringing about a united nation is remembered as his greatest 
accomplishment: See citation on being conferred the outstanding 
Malaysian Award by ALIRAN on 15th August, 1987: 
"Only an extraordinary leader could have brought together the 
Malays and other communities in the 150s in a common quest for a 
common goal - Merdeka. To understand the magnitude of this task, 
one has to be aware of the fears and apprehensionst the doubts and 
suspicions that existed between and among the various communities. 
For the Malays, granting citizenship on such liberal terms to 
recently-domiciled Chinese and Indians, was a traumatic 
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The balance of ethnic interests is seen in the recognition given to 
certain traditional features of Malay society and its incorporation 
structurally into the Constitution. Apart from this the Constitution 
entrenched the special position of the Malay language as the National Language 
and "a special privileges" clause for Malays. 10 These features, inter alia, 
have been called "the traditional elements" of the Constitution. 
11 The term 
has been used in relation to features of Malay society and culture that "have 
been in practice long before the British colonial', administration itself and 
have passed through several successive constitutional and political 
developments". 12 These indigenous features have been identified as: - 
contd... 
9. experience. It had relegated them from a nation to a community among 
communities. Among the non-Malays, on the other hand, there was 
pervasive fear that their economic, political and cultural interests and 
aspirations would be at the total mercy of a Malay political elite. As a 
result of these fears and anxieties there was quite a bit of communal 
hysteria in those days. It took the warm, assuring hand of the Tunku to 
assuage the doubts and apprehensions on both sides, to calm down Malays 
and non-Malays so that they would compromise and accommodate each 
other's position": ALIRAN Monthly Vol. 7 (August 1987) at p. 2. 
10. -, The Constitution itself is silent on the question of Malay hegemony -'or 
dominance in government. At the political level, however, it is 
considered axiomatic. It has been argued that Malay dominance was -an 
agreed compact between the races as a condition for non-Malay rights 
after independence: See speech by Datuk Abdullah Ahmad, a member of the 
ruling U. M. N. O. (United Malay Nationalist Organisation) party at the 
Institute of International Affairs, Singapore: "The political system of 
Malay dominance was born out of a sacrosanct social contract which 
preceded national independence. There have been moves to question, to 
set aside, and to violate this contract that have threatened the 
stability of the system. The May 1969 riots arose out of the challenge 
to the system agreed upon, out of the non-fulfilment of the contract" 
(The Sunday Star, August 31,1986 p. 11). The social contract, argument 
has been criticised as an "invented theory" and that Malay dominance 
only came about as a political reality: see rebuttal by Dr. Mavis 
Puthucheary, The Star, Saturday, September 6,1986. 
. 
11. See Tun Salleh Abas, Traditional Elements Of The Malaysian Constitution 
in Constitution, Law and JudiSjLrZ (Malaysian Law Publishers, Kuala 
Lumpur 1986) at p. 37 et seq. 
12. Ibid. 
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(1) The Sultanate or Rulership 
(2) Islamic Religion 
(3) Malay Language 
(4) Malay Privileges. 13 
In the result, ' as one writer observed: 
"The Federation Constitution of 1957 was a superb example of the 
intricacies involved in balancing competing interests in a complex 
society. To start with, the Constitution attempted to balance the 
interests of the constituent states of the Federation with those of the 
centre. The position of hereditary Sultans was adjusted to the demands 
of a democratic polity which vested sovereignity with the people. Given 
the fears of the indigenous Malay community, its status and symbols had 
to be protected. Given the apprehensions of the non-indigenous Chinese 
and Indians, on the other hand, their legitimate aspirations had also to 
be considered. At the same time, since the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Democracy was the objective, various fundamental freedoms 
had to be incorporated into the Constitution. However, since an 
emergency was in force - the consequence of a communist insurgency - the 
state also chose to arm itself with vast powers which gave priority to 
security over liberi- n 14 ty . 
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT 
The Reid Commission was directed by its terms of reference to make 
recommendations for a federal form of government based on parliamentary 
democracy and a bi-cameral legislature. 15 The mandate was evidently to use the 
Westminster model and adapt it to suit local requirements. The Commission had 
several previous models to work on. 16 The final proposal showed that the form 
13. Ibid. 
14. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, Constitution And Society: an overview in 
Ref lections, op. cit. , note 2, -at p. 289. 
15. See the Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional commission 
1957 at p. 22, para. 57. 
16. Eg. the Constitutions of India, Australia, the British North America Act 
of Canada, and Ceylon. 
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and structure of government was largely modeled on the Indian Constitution. As 
Suffian F. J. (as he then was) acknowledged in Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal 
Dalam Negeri, (Ninister for Home Affairs)17: ...... to a great extent the Indian 
Constitution was the model for our Constitution". 18 
There are nevertheless significant differences between the two which 
should not escape notice. For one, Professor Hickling observes that the 
Constitution was-essentially evolutionary in character: 
"There, is no proud preamble, declaratory of the will of the people; no 
constituent assembly hammered it out with the strange paradox to be 
found in the Indian Constitution nor did any poyular referendum set a 
popular seal upon its single but lengthy text". 1 
In Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor2O the Federal Court termed the 
Constitution as an Anglo-Malayan venture. 21 The issue that arose in that case 
was whether the principle enunciated by the Indian Supreme Court in the 
landmark decision of Kesavanandha Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461, 
of an implied limitation on the amending power of Parliament should be adopted 
in Malaysia. In declining to follow the Indian doctrine, the court relied on 
the so-called differences between the two Constitutions. The principal 
difference was said to be the presence in the Indian -Constitution of an 
17. [1969] 2 MLJ 129 F. C. 
18. The alternatives suggested were the Ceylonese and Canadian models: see 
Shafruddin Hashim, The Constitution And The Federal Idea In Peninsular 
Malaysia (1984) 11 JMCL 139,140 (Foot-_n5`E_e7_2)_T. 
19. R. H. Hickling in overview, op. cit. at pp. 2-3. 
20. [1980] 1 MLJ 70 FC. 
21. At p. 73. See also Raja Azlan Shah Ag LP in Dato Nenteri Othman v. Dato 
Ombi Syed AM [1981] 1 MLJ 29 at 32 F. G.: "The Federal Constitution was 
enacted as a result of negotiations and discussions between the British 
Government, the Malay Rulers and the Alliance Party relating to the 
terms on which independence should be granted". 
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express declaration of state and social policy- in its Preamble and in Part IV 
called the Directive Principles of State Policy. In his classic treatise on 
the Indian Constitution, Dr. Basu observes that the Directive Principles were 
inserted by the makers of the Indian Constitution to meet the aspirations of 
their peoples and that the Directive Principles, -albeit no n-justicable, were 
incorporated in the Indian Constitution to "serve as a moral restraint upon 
future governments and prevent the policy from being torn away from the ideas 
which inspired the makers of the organic law". 22 Further, the Indian Supreme 
Court uses the Directive Principles as authorised aids to interpret the 
constitution. 23 Having in mind these distinctions, Suffian LP concluded: 
...... it is understandable that Indian jurists should infer from the 
Preamble and Directive Principles ideas and philosophies animating the 
Indian Constitution and controlling its interpretation so much so that 
there are limits on the power of the Indian Parliament to amend their 
constitution. In Malaya, on the other hand, the constitution was the 
fruit of Anglo-Malayan efforts and our Parliament had no hand in its 
drafting ..... When the British finally surrendered legal and political 
control, Malaya had a ready-made constitution and there was no occasion 
for Malayans to get together to draw up a constitution. our constitution 
has no preamble and no directive principles of state policy ...... our 
constitution was not drawn up by a constituent assembly and was not 
"given by the people". "24 
The similarity with the Indian Constitution lies in the federal system 
and the distribution of legislative powers between a federal legislature and 
state legislatures. Both Constitutions attempt to demarcate legislative power 
22. Basuls Commentary On The Constitution of India 6th Ed. Vol. A (1973) 
(Sarkar & Anor Ltd, Calcutta) at pp. 21-22. He also observes: "The 
sanction behind the Directives is, of course, political and not 
judicial" (1981 Ed. Vol E at p. 4). 
23. See eg. In Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1955 SC-1958: Hagan Lal v. 
Hunicipal Corporation Bombay [1974] 2 SCC 402. 
24. Op. cit. at p. 73E-I. 
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according -to subjects with respect to which the centre or state legislatures 
can enact laws. 25 In Malaysia, the distribution of legislative power is 
closely tied up with the scheme of the Federation. I 
In proposing a federation for the Malay Peninsular, the Reid commission 
recommended "a strong central government with a measure of autonomy for the 
States". 26 There was established a duality of' government with a clear 
demarcation of legislative and executive powers between the Centre and the 
States. The Constitution provided for separate executive and legislative 
branches at both the Federal and State levels. 
The Federal Parliament is bi-cameral in character composed of an upper 
house of appointed senators and a lower house that is entirely elected. Like 
its English model, the executive government is formed from the Lower House, 
called the Dewan Rakyat. The-Yang di-Pertuan Agong appoints as Prime Minister 
a member of the Dewan Rakyat who in his judgment is likely to command the 
confidence of the majority of the members of the House (Article 43)., The Prime 
Minister presides over a Cabinet that is chosen from members of the Dewan 
Rakyat. 27 Since the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is a constitutional monarch -he is 
bound to act on the advice of the Cabinet save in some matters. 28 The upshot 
25. For a comprehensive analysis*of the position in India see'H. M. -Seervai, 
Constitutional Law of India 3rd Edn. Vol. II Ch. XXII (Legislative Power 
of the Union and the State) p. 1892 et. seq. 
26. The Reid Report, op. cit. para. 17, p. 77. 
27. The Constitution however also provides for appointment of members of the 
Senate (the Upper House, called the Dewan Negara) to the Cabinet. 
28. There were 3 matters in which the King may ostensibly act on his own. 
They are: (1) appointment of the Prime Minister (2) withholding consent 
to dissolution of Parliament, and (3) requisitioning a meeting of the 
Conference of Rulers. He will no doubt be governed by constitutional 
conventions in the exercise of his discretion in these matters: see 
generally, Tun Mohd Suffian, Parliamentary System v. Presidential System 
- The Malaysian Experience [1979) 2 MLJ Iiii. 
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of the whole scheme was the creation of a Cabinet style government based on 
the Westminster model. It was the obvious intention of the framers of the 
Constitution that the executive government should be, answerable to and 
controlled by Parliament. 
At the state level, the same model was adopted except that an unicameral 
legislature was set up. Each of the states retained their own constitution. 
29 
The system of accountability to an elected legislature by the executive 
government is similar to that at the federal level. 
The significant feature of the federal system under the Reid proposals 
was the clear demarcation of legislative power between the federal and state 
parliaments. The Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution carries the 
demarcation in three separate lists called the Federal List, the State List 
and the Concurrent List. An examination of the subjects contained in these 
Lists indicates a strong central bias eg. defence, police, internal security, 
foreign affairs, fiscal policy, all come under the Centre. 
30 The main subjects 
alloted to the States are land administration and matters of the Islamic 
religion. By Article 4 of the Federal Constitution the vires of a statute may 
be challenged on the basis that the Federal Parliament had trespassed onto a 
State matter. The decision of the Supreme Court in Namat bin Daud v. 
Gove. rnment of Malaysia, 31 is a case in point. The question there was whether a 
29. However by Article 4 of the Federal Constitutiont the Federal 
Constitution is declared to override the state constitutions in the 
event of conflict. The point will be discussed more fully later in this 
study. 
30. For a discussion of the distribution of legislative powers between the 
Federal Parliament and the State Legislaturesl see Ahmad Ibrahim, 
Malaysia As A Federation (1974) JMCL 1; Shad Salim Faruqi, The Legal 
Basis For Federal. Rate Relationship In Malaysia (1981) INSAF Vol. XIV 
No. 3 at p. 14 et. seq.; Shafruddin Hashim, The onstitution And The 
Federal Idea In Peninsula Malaya (1984) 11 JMCL 139. 
31. [1988] 1 SCR 153; [1988] 1 MLJ 119 SC. 
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provision in the Penal Code creating the offence of causing religious disunity 
was in pith and substance a measure directed at the Islamic religion or was it 
a provision dealing with the subject of public order. If'it was the former, 
the statute would be invalid as falling outside the legislative competence of 
the Federal Parliament whereas a public order measure would pre-eminently be 
within its sphere. In deciding this question, the Supreme Court adopted the 
doctrine of colourable legislation from India. - That doctrine was outlined by 
the Indian Supreme Court in KCG Narayan, Deo v. State of Orisa AIR 1953 SC 395, 
379 in the following terms: 
"It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of colourable 
legislation does not involve any question of "bona fides" or I'mala 
fides" on the -part of the legislature. The whole doctrine, resolves, 
itself into the question of competency of a particular legislature to 
enact a particular law. If the Constitution of a State distributes the 
legislative powers amongst difference bodies, which have to act within 
their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, of 
it there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of 
fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the legislature in 
a particular case has or has not, in respect to the subject matter of 
the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of 
its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent, manifest or 
direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to 
this latter class of cases that the expression "colourable legislation" 
has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed 
by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a 
statute purported to act within the limits of its powers, yet in 
substance and in reality it transgressed these powers, the transgression 
being veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence 
or disguise". 
Applying the doctrine, the Supreme Court in Hamat's case struck down the 
provision holding that it was in pith and substance not a legislation on 
"public order" but a law on the subject of religion with respect to which only 
the States have power to legislate. 32 The case illustrates that the courts 
32. For a general discussion on limits to legislative power under the 
Constitution, see S. Jayakumar, Constitutional Limitations on 
Legislative Power In Malaysia (1967) 9 Mal. L. R. 96. 
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would be prepared to solicitously uphold the federation system in Malaysia and 
enforce the constitutional provisions relating to distribution of legislative 
powers between the Federal and State Legislatures. The only overriding 
instance when the question of legislative competence becomes irrelevant is 
when a state of emergency is in force and a legislative measure is expressly 
declared to be an emergency measure. This position will be discussed later in 
this study when the impact of a proclamation of emergency is considered. 
A significant point about the parliamentary system in Malaysia is the 
establishment of Cabinet Government. It is outside the scope of this work to 
inquire whether the parliamentary system has in substance provided for a 
representative government in malaysia. 33 Likewise, it is not intended to 
discuss whether Parliament has fulfilled its role of controlling the executive 
government. However, a note may be made of the fact that Malaysia experiences 
what is often regarded as a principal drawback of the parliamentary system 
everywhere, namely, that the ruling party with an overwhelming majority in 
Parliament can control Parliament through the executive government rather than 
vice versa. 34 In Malaysia, the same party has been in power since independence 
with an overwhelming four-fifth's of the seats in the Dewan Rakyat (Lower 
House) most of the time. The commanding majority of the ruling party has 
resulted in what some quarters have described as the decline of Parliament 
33. For example it has been argued that the Constitution by providing f or 
representation to the Dewan Rakyat by reference to single member 
constituencies provides no guarantee that minority or conflicting or 
opposing interests will be represented in Parliament: see Raja Aziz 
Addruse, Does Our Constitution Provide For Opposing And Varied Interest 
In Parliament? (1976) 1 MLJ lxxviii. See also the Commentaries oH this 
article by Senator Kamarul Ariffin (1976) 1 MLJ lxxxiii and Lim Kean 
Chye (1976) 1 MLJ lxxxii. 
34. Lord Hailsham has called this an "elective dictatorship": see 
_, 
his 
Dilemma Of Democracy (Collins, London 1978) at p. 125. 
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under the weight of Executive dominance. 35 Thus, there has evolved for all 
real purposes the concept of parliamentary sovereignity in Malaysia rather 
than constitutional supremacy as envisaged by the Constitution. The ruling 
party with its overwhelming voting power can push any measure through 
Parliament including amendments to the Constitution. 
35. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, The Decline of Parliament ALIRAN Monthly 
April/May 1985 Vol. V No. 4 at p. 2: "Executive dominance is mainly 
responsible for diminishing parliamentary power. Parliament is 
completely subservient to the whims and fancies of the Executive... A 
related factor has further reinforced executive power. This is the rise 
of Malay capitalism in the last fifteen years or so. Malay capitalism is 
dependent upon the State; just as the State is committed to Malay 
capitalism which is to be expected in a system like ours. A strong, 
secure, executive which brooks no challenge from any quarter is what the 
government and Malay capitalists want so that the latter can accumulate 
wealth without hinderance. If parliamentary debate is going to slow down 
the growth of this class of capitalists, then it has to be set aside. 
If, on the other hand, the UMNO (the dominant component in the ruling 
party) Assembly serves as a useful vehicle for strengthening the 
interest of this class, then it is inevitable that it will emerge as the 
nation's prominent forum. This explains in part why the Annual UMNO 
General Assembly is far more important than any parliamentary session. 
For that is where real power residesl" See also, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, 
Democracy - Last Rites?, ALIRAN Monthly, Vol. V. No. 8 (1985) at p. 7. 
The belief that over the years Parliament has become a mere rubber-stamp 
of the executive government is also a view expressed in his book The 
Malay Dilemma (Federal Publications 1981 Edn) by the present Prýime 
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, whilst a backbencher in Parliament: "In 
the main, Parliamentary sittings were regarded as a pleasant formality 
which afforded members opportunities, to be heard and quoted, but which 
would have absolutely no effect on the course of the Government. The 
general feeling was that whether or not the Parliament sat, the 
Government would carry on. The sittings were a concession to a 
superfluous democratic practice. Its main value lay in the opportunity 
to flaunt Government strength. of and on, this strength was used to 
change the Constitution. The manner, the frequency and the trivial 
reasons for altering the constitution reduced this supreme law of the 
nation to a useless scrap of paper". (at p. 11) 
For further discussion of the role of Parliament, see: 
1) Tommy Thomas, Parliamentary Democracy (1985) INSAF Vol. 
xviii. No. 3 p. 34 et. seq. 
2) Shad S. Faruqi, Parliamentary Government In Malaysia: Some 
Reflections (1985) INSAF Vol. xviii No. I p. 19 et. seq. 
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Does the Constitution provide any restraint on the exercise of majority 
power in Parliament? In Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 70 
the Malaysian court declined to follow the jurisprudence evolved by the Indian 
Supreme Court in Kesavanandha Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 that 
parliament has no power, to amend the constitution so as to alter its basic 
features. Thus a constitutional obstacle to a legislative measure of the party 
in government is easily overcome by amending the Constitution itself. It 
raises serious doubts as to the viability of the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy under the Malaysian Constitution. We shall now examine this 
doctrine. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
Article 4 declares that "this Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with 
this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void". Article 
4 is fundamental to the meaning and effect of the Constitution. Professor 
Hickling rightly observed that to "misunderstand Article 4 is to misunderstand 
the whole document (ie. the Constitution) n. 36 It purports to establish the 
contd... 
35.3) Tan Chee Khoon, The Role of Parliament (Reflections On The 
Malaysian Consti ution - ALIRAN PUBLN. 1987) p. 114. 
4) Lim Kit Siang, Role of Parliament in Reflections, op. cit. 
p. 122. 
5) Nik Abdul Rashid, The Malaysian Parliament in Suffian, Lee 
and Trindade, The Constitution Of Malaysia Its Development: 
1957-1977 (OUP, 1978) at p. 136 et. seq. 
36. R. H. Hickling, Overview, op. cit. at p. 5. 
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doctrine of constitutional supremacy in Malaysia in place of the theory of 
parliamentary supremacy which prevails, for example, in countries like the 
United Kingdom. The purpose behind Article 4 is obviously to establish the 
Constitution as. the basis or foundation for the Rule of Law to prevail in the 
country on the principles enunciated in the constitution. It posited for all 
laws passed by Parliament or the State Legislature to conform to the 
provisions of the Constitution at pain of being otherwise invalidated. Its 
significance as a cornerstone principle of the Constitution was duly noted by 
the Federal Court in Loh Koi Choon v. Govex-nment of Nalaysia, 37 when it was 
observed, per Raja Azlan Shah Fi (as he then was): 
"The constitution is not a mere collection of pious platitudes. It is 
the supreme law of the land embodying 3 basic concepts: one of them is 
that the individual has certain fundamental rights upon which not even 
the power of the State may encroach. The second is the distribution of 
sovereign power between the States and the Federation, that the 13 
states shall exercise sovereign power in local matters and the nation in 
matters affecting the country at large. The third is that no single man 
or body shall exercise complete sovereign power, but that it shall be 
distributed among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches of 
government, compendiously expressed in modern terms that we are a 
government of laws, not of men". 38 
The significance of Article 4 as establishing the principle of 
constitutional supremacy, in preference to legislative supremacy, is seen by 
considering the position before the coming into force of the Federal 
Constitution. In Ancbom bte Lampong v. Public Prosecutor, 39 decided in 1939, 
the then Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue whether the state 
37. [1977] 2 MLJ 187. 
38. See reiteration of this principle by the learned Judge upon his 
appointment as Sultan of Perak in (1984) JMCL Vol. II, Supremacy Of Law 
In Malaysia, at p. 1 et. seq. 
39. [1940] MLJ Rep. 18. 
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legislature of Johore was precluded by the Constitution of Johore, 1895, from 
revising or amending the Mohammedan law applicable to the State. Poyser CJ 
said: 
"The Constitution of Johore ..... is in the nature of an Enactment which 
can at anytime be amended or varied, and therefore has the force of law. 
In view of its terms I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion 
that this court has no power to pronounce on the validity or invalidity 
of any Enactment passed by the Council of State and assented to by the 
Sultan, any more than the English courts could pronounce an Act of 
Parliament to be invalid. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the 
sovereignity of the Sultan and the legislature and to treat Enactments 
of the Johore legislature as the English Courts treat by-laws... ot. 40 
The position changed with Independence and the coming into force of the 
Federal Constitution in 1957. This is demonstrated in a series of cases. 41 We 
do not propose to discuss them for our present purposes. 42 It suffices to 
quote what Suffian LP said in Ah Thian v. Government of Malaysia: 43 
40. At p. 22H-I. 
41. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj. Openg (No. 2) (1967] 1 MLJ 46; 
Assa Singh v. Kenteri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30; Gerald Fernandez v. 
Attorney General, Nalaysia [1970] 1 MLJ 262. In The City Council Of 
Georgetovn v. Government Of The State of Penang (1967) 1 MLJ 169, the 
Federal Court applied Article 75 of the Constitution to invalidate a 
state law which was inconsistent with Federal law. See generally, S. 
Jayakumar, Constitutional Law Cases From Malaysia & Singapore. (second 
Ed. (MLJ 197ýy -pp. 2-16. 
42. For example, the view point in Chia Khin Sze v. Nenteri Besar Selangor 
[1958] 24 MLJ 105 that the doctrine of constitutional supremacy does not 
apply to pre-merdeka laws was laid to rest by the Privy council in S. s. 
Kanda v. Government of Nalaysia [1962] 28 MLJ-169. The error in Chia 
Khin Sze's case was duly noted in Aminah v. Supt. of Prisons Kelantan 
[1968] 1 MLJ 92 and Assa Singh v. Nenteri Besar Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30. 
See also Loke Kit Choy constitutional, Supremacy In Malaysia In The 
Light Of Two Recent Decisions (1969) Vol. 11 Mal. L. R. 260, where the 
above cases are discussed. TE article concludes: "With the case of Assa 
Singh the corpse of limited constitutional supremacy is finally buried" 
(at p. 263). NB: "Limited constitutional supremacy refers to the theory 
advanced in Chia Khin Sze's case, supra. 
43. [1976] 2 MLJ 112. 
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"The doctrine of supremacy of Parliament does not apply in Malaysia. 
Here we have a written constitution. The power of Parliament and of 
State legislatures in Malaysia is limited by the Constitution, and they 
cannot make any law they please. Under our Constitution written law may 
be invalid on one of these grounds: 
(1) in the case of Federal written law, because itxelates to a matter 
with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law, and in 
the case of State written law, because it relates to a matter with 
respect to which the State legislature has no power to make law, 
article 74; or 
(2) in the case of both Federal and State written law, because it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, see Article 4(1); or 
(3) 'in the case of State written law, because it is inconsistent with 
Federal law, article 7511.44 
An important aspect of the supremacy question is the amendability of the 
Constitutional itself. Can a law declared to be supreme and thereby binding on 
Parliament be itself amended by Parliament? This poser calls for a 
45 
consideration of Article 4 in the context of Article 159, which confers 
amending 
-power 
on Parliament to amend the Constitution. In Phang Chin Hock v. 
Public Prosecutor, 46 the Federal Court said that "the rule of harmonious 
contd... 
44. At p. 113A-D. 'The suggestion by Pike CJ in Stephen-Kalong Ningkan v. Tun 
Abang Hj. Openg [1967) 1 MLJ 46 that the constitutional validity of a 
statute can only be challenged under Article 4(3), namely, on the ground 
that the Federal Parliament had trespassed on a matter reserved for the 
State legislature, can now be considered overruled. 
45. Article 159 reads: "(1) Subject to the following provisions of this 
Article and to Article 161E the provisions of this Constitution may be 
amended by federal law. (2) A Bill for making any amendment to the 
Constitution (other than an amendment excepted from the provisions of 
this clause) and a bill for making any amendment to a law passed under 
Clause (4) of Article 10, shall not be passed in either House of 
Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by 
the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of 
that House". 
46. [1980] 1 HLJ 70. 
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construction" in construing Article 4(l) and Article 159 enables them to hold 
that Acts of Parliament made in accordance with the conditions set out by 
Article 159 are valid "even if inconsistent with the, Constitution" (See 
Article 4(l). 47 Earlier in Loh Kooi Choon v. Public Prosecutor, 48 the Federal 
Court rejected the argument that the Constitution -as the supreme law cannot be 
inconsistent with itself. The decision was predicated on the argument that the 
term "law" as defined in Article 160 (dealing with definitions) "must be taken 
to mean law made in the exercise of ordinary legislative power" and quite 
different from "law" made as a constitutional amendment under Article 159 with 
the result that "constitutional amendments" are not "affected" by Article 
4(1). 49 In Phang Chin Rock's case, Suffian LP arrived at the same result 
albeit in a different way. He did not discuss the meaning of "law" in Article 
160. He held that a harmonious reading of Article 4 and Article 159 leads to 
the conclusion that the term "law" in Article 4(l), refers only to ordinary law 
as opposed to constitutional amendments; thus only "ordinary law" needs to 
conform to the Constitution. 50 
In the result, these two decisions have firmly established the rule that 
the supremacy clause in Article 4(1) does not fetter the power of Parliament 
to make constitutional amendments of any type as it deems fit. The effect is 
as Raja Azlan Shah F. J. (as he was then) said in Loh Kooi Choon's case: 
47. At p. 72H-I. 
48. (19771 2 HLJ 187. 
49. At p. 190G-H. 
50. op. cit. at p. 72. 
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"When that is done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, it 
is the supreme law, and cannot be said to be at variance with itself". 1 
It does not lie within the scope of this study to examine the question 
as to whether an unlimited amending power in Parliament is inimical to the 
concept of supremacy of the Constitution. It suffices for the present to 
observe that an unchecked and unbridled power to amend the Constitution 
establishes de facto supremacy in Parliament and negatives for all practical 
purposes the declaration contained in Article 4(1) of supremacy of the 
Constitution. 
THE POSITION OF THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG 
Under the Constitution, the, position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is, not 
merely ceremonial. - Indeed at first blush, some of the provisions of - the 
Constitution vesting powers in His Majesty would seem to place him as a ruler 
with an unfettered prerogative rather than as a constitutional monarch. 52 A 
Malaysian Monarch had once described the role of the King in rather wide terms 
extending beyond constitutional functions: 
"A King is a King, whether he is an absolute or constitutional monarch. 
The only difference between the two is that whereas one has unlimited 
powers, the other's powers are defined by the constitution. But it is a 
mistake to think that the role of a King, like a President is confined 
to what is laid by the onstitution. His role far exceeds those 
constitutional provisions". 
S3 
51. Op. cit. at p. 188. 
52. For a discussion of the royal prerogative in Malaysia, see R. H. 
Hickling, The Prerogative In Malaysia (1975) 17 Mal. L. R. 207. 
53. Raja Tun Azlan Shah, The Role of Constitutional Rulers: A Malaysian 
Perspective For The Laity (1982) Vol. 9 JMCL 1 at p. 17. Also published 
in Trindade & Lee, The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives 
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Let us consider some of the provisions of the Constitution enumerating 
the functions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Article '32(1) declares the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong as the "Supreme Head of the Federatibn" and Article 39 
declares that the executive authority of theTederation shall be vested in 
him. Article 40(l) enjoins the Yang di-Pertuan Agong when exercising his power 
under the Constitution or under Federal law to act, on - the advice of the 
Cabinet. However,, Article 40 (2) says he may act in his discretion with respect 
to, appointment of a Prime Minister; withholding consent to dissolution of 
Parliament; requisition of a meeting of the Conference of Rulers when 
concerning solely with the privilege and honour of the Rulers. In matters 
where the security or the economic life or public order of the Federation or 
any part thereof is threatened, Article 150(l) empowers the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to issue a Proclamation of Emergency if he "is satisfied" that a grave 
emergency exists. Under Article 153 the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is vested with 
the responsibility of safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the 
natives of the Borneo States (ie. Sabah and Sarawak) and is for that purpose 
empowered to make reservation - of positions in the public service or 
reservation of scholarship and other educational privileges and give general 
directions to the relevant authority charged with the issue of trade and 
business licences to ensure the reservation of such proportion of such permits 
or licences; in undertaking all the responsibilities aforementioned the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong is authorised to act "as he may deem reasonable". 
contd... 
53. And Developement (Oxford) under the title "The Role of Constitutional 
Rulers In Malaysia 
'" 
at p. 76 et. seq. Raja Azlan shah, a member of the 
Perak royal family was then Lord president of the Federal Court of 
Malaysia. On 3rd February 1984 he was installed as the Sultan of Perak. 
On 18th September 1989 he was installed as the 9th Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
of Malaysia. See Special Commerative Issue of the Supreme Court Journal: 
(1989) 2 SCJ p. 1 et. seq. 
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It has been observed that the office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is 
governed by the political, social and economic realities of Malaysia. 
54 In 
recommending the creation of theýoffice of Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the 
Constitution Commission stated thatýllhe will, be a symbol of the unity of the 
country". 55 Certainly the features of the monarchial institution in Malaysia 
is unique. It is the only monarchy anywhere ý providing for the election of the 
King. The King holds office on rotation with his brother Rulers. The body that 
elects the King is the Majlis Raja-Raja or Conference of Rulers. This body 
established under Article 38 of the Constitution is composed of the Malay 
Rulers of the nine states and the Governors of Penang, Malacca, Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
The Governors however take no part in the election of the Agong or on 
questions relating to the privileges, position, honours or dignities of the 
Rulers. The Conference of Rulers is undoubtedly a body sui geniris. It is said 
to have n'o legislative, executive or financial power -but "is the most 
56 
prestigious body in the country". 
By Article 38(2) the Conference of Rulers exercises the functions of: - 
(a) electing, in accordance with the provisions of the Third Schedule, 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
(Deputy King); 
54. R. H. Hickling, op. cit. at p. 216. 
55. The Reid Reportr op. cit. at p. 22 para. 58(i). The Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
is "a visible symbol of unity in a remarkably diverse nation": H. E. 
Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (Malaysia Publications Ltd., 
Singapore, 1964) at p. 42. 
56. Tun Mohd Suffian, Parliamentary System Versus Presidential System: The 
Malaysian Experience (1979) 2 MLJ III at p. It has also been 
described as a constitutional body "with certain executive, deliberative 
and consultative functions" per Raja Azlan Shah Ag. LP in Phang Chin 
Hock v. Public Prosecutor (No. 2) (1980) 1 MLJ 213. 
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(b) agreeing or disagreeing to the extension of any religious acts, 
observances or ceremonies to the Federation as a whole; 
consenting or withholding consent to any law ýind making or giving 
advice on any appointment which under this Constitution requires 
the consent of the Conference or is to be made by or after 
consultation with the Conference, 
By Article 38(6) it has the following discretionary functions: - 
(a) the election or removal from office of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
or the election of the Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong; 
(b) the advising on any appointment; 
(c) the giving or withholding of consent to any law altering the 
boundaries of a State or affecting the privileges, position, 
honours or dignities of the Rulers; or 
(d) the agreeing or disagreeing to the extension of any religious 
acts, observances or ceremonies to the Federation as a whole. 
The powers of election and removal of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the 
Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong emphasise that the King and Deputy King are 
accountable to the Conference of Rulers whilst in office. 57 The powers of the 
57. For an account of the election procedure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
see F. A. Trindade & S. Jayakumar, The supreme Head of the Federation 
(1964) Vol. 6 Mal. L. R. 280 at7 -pp. 282-84; F. A. Trindade, The 
Constitutional Position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agon .n Suffian, 
Tr-1-n-daFe & Lee, The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Deve1opments 1957- 
1977, op . cit. p. 101 et. seq. at pp. 103-105. The election would seem Eo 
sErHictly follow the electoral list according to the Third Schedule of 
the Constitution and is by secret ballot although it is known that the 
list has been departed from: see Tunku Abdul Rahman, View points 
(Pelandok Press, K. L. 1978) at pp. 72-73. For further readings on the 
election of the Agong, see Professor Dato Dr. Visu Sinnadurai, The Yanq 
di-Pertuan Agong: The Appointment Process Under the Federal Constitution 
Tl--98--9T-2 SCJ 65. The removal of the-Ya-n-g-Ul'-pertuan Agong or the 
Timbalan is of course a serious matter and has never happened. Professor 
Trindade has made the observation in relation to the removal power over 
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Conference of Rulers increased after the May 1969 Emergency resulting from the 
outbreak of racial riots in Kuala Lumpur. In the result, 'it 'has been said 
pointedly of the powers of the body: "It stands outside Parliament, yet can 
veto certain bills 'and has legislative powers of its own in relation to 
certain religious observances in the States, of Malaya ...... and 
it can discuss 
anything". 58 By two amendments to the Constitution made in March 1971,59 after 
parliamentary rule was restored in the aftermath of the 1969 race riots, 
Article 159 was amended to provide by clause (5)' that the' consent of the 
Conference of Rulers is required for any law that seeks*to change Article 38 
(Conference of Rulers), Article 70 (Precedence of Rulers) and Article 71 (the 
right of a Ruler to hold and exercise the constitutional right and privileges 
of Ruler of the State). Apart from these provisions relating to the position 
and status of the Royalty, by Article 159(5) consent of the Conference is also 
needed for any changes to: (a) Part III of the Constitution dealing with 
citizenship (b) Article 10(4) providing for the passing of any law in the 
interest of public order from prohibiting the questioning of the so-called 
sensitive - issues like citizenship, national language, the special privileges 
clause, and the position of the Royalty, (c) Article 152 establishing the 
Malay language as the national language, and (d) Article 153 relating to 
contd. 
57. the Yang di-Pertuan Agong: "He cannot be removed by the Cabinet or even 
by the Malaysian Parliament itself. In this respect his position is 
stronger than that of the President of India who can be impeached by 
both Houses of the Indian Parliament but not as strong as the English 
Monarch who cannot, it seems, be removed at all": F. A. Trindade, The 
Constitutional Position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong op. cit. at p. 106. 
58. L. A. Sheridan & H. E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (MLJ 
Publication, 1987) 4th Edn. p. 131. 
59. The Constitution Amendment Act 1971 (Act A 30) of 10 March 1971 and the 
Constitution Amendment Act (No. 2) 1971 (Act A 31) of 24 March 1971. 
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special privileges for the indigenous people of Malaysia. It will be noted 
that these matters are essentially those matters which was said to be the 
underlying compact between the races in producing a balan6e in the original or 
independence Constitution. The objective of giving this role to the Rulers 
would seem to be the maintenance of "a cordial inter-ethnic relationship" in 
the country. 60 However, the more plausible reason would seem to be the need to 
placate Malay sensitivities and assure them of the safeguarding of their 
rights and privileges. Thus the resort to, the time-honoured practice of 
placing these matters in the hands of the Malay Rulers. The assurance that no 
constitutional change could be made on these subjects without the consent of 
the Conference of Rulers make "the Malays feel safe, because it is to the 
Rulers that they entrust the role of protecting their rights as the Rulers 
must necessarily be Malays and are above politics". 61, The objective behind 
giving this quasi-legislative role to the Rulers is obvious - to ensure that 
these matters precious and sensitive to the Malays should not be subject to 
the vicissitudes of politics and be left solely in the hands of politicians. 
From the constitutional standpoint, the position is clear that if the consent 
of the conference is not obtained to any such bill, it has no legal effect and 
would not become law. It is unthinkable that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong would 
60. See Azmi Abdul Khalid, Role of the Monarch: Influences Upon The 
Development of Parliamentary Government, in Reflections op. cit. p. 44 
et. seq. at p. 4Y. - 
61. See Raja Tun Azlan Shah, The Role of Constitutional Rulers op. cit. p. 
16. He further observes: "It is true that the Conference of rulers acts 
on advice in this matter. But one will not expect that the consent of 
the Rulers could be obtained easily in these matters. Any government 
trying to force these issues on the Rulers would be courting trouble as 
the Malay masses would definitely back the Rulers when it comes to the 
question of preserving their special privileges" (at pp. 16-17). 
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give assent to a bill that has been refused consent by the Rulers. If by some 
fortuition such a bill receives the Royal assent its validity is very 
doubtful. 62 
In the writer's view the position is clear that the Conference of Rulers 
is not a mere consultative body. In the constitutional sense and in the 
context of Article 159(5) it is part of the amending legislative process of 
Parliament. In the political sense, the Malay Rulers through the Conference 
and individually, play a significant role in the public affairs of the 
country. 63 The traditional position of the Rulers of being at the apex of 
Malay society and the power or capacity of the Conference to discuss any 
subject affirms this position. 
62. see The Bribery Commission v. Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172; J1964] 2 All -ER 
785 PC, where the Privy Council struck down a purported amendment to the 
Constitution of Ceylon which had received the Royal assent but did not 
comply with the special procedure prescribed by the Constitution that 
the amending Bill should carry a Speaker's certificate that the Bill was 
passed with the requisite majority, per Lord Pearce: "Where the 
certificate is not apparent there is lacking an essential part of the 
process necessary for amendment" (p. 791A). See also AG for New South 
Wales v. Trethowan Hong Kong [1932] AC 526 PC; Rediffusion (Hong Kong) 
Ltd v. AG of Hong Kong (1970] AC 1136 PC; Australian High Court in 
Cormack v. Core [1974] 131 CIR 432. 
63. Ironically Tunku Abdul, Rahman Putra Al-Haj, the first Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, has lamented that he had not given more power to the Sultans 
when the original constitution was framed. He made this observation in 
the context of the dismissal of the Lord President of the Supreme Court 
in August 1988 by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Mahmood Iskandar of 
Johore who he said "was asked to do it by the (Prime Minister)". He 
observed: "Neither the King nor the other Sultans had any constitutional 
power to check an elected leader's ambitions if they felt he was going 
against the people's wishes": see Rodney Tasker, Second Thoug s in Far 
Eastern Economic Review . 
26 January 1989 at p. -24. It is 7ebatable 
whether the Tunku is right in his thinking that the Rulers should be 
empowered to interfere in the political decision - makingý of the 
Executive no matter how justified it may seem in a given case. Such a 
role could hardly be compatible with the status of the Rulers as 
constitutional monarchs. 
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However, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is not primus inter pares vis-a-vis 
his brother Rulers nor does he hold any exalted position over them. He 
exercises no right or power over them. His significance lies in the functions 
ascribed to him under the Constitution. In the exercise of them he enjoys 
certain protection and immunities peculiar to his post. 
The question of immunity enjoyed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the 
Malay Rulers may be examined at two levels. At the f irst level, is the ambit 
of the Court's power of justiciability on questions relating to the position 
and privileges of the Rulers. At the next level, is the pure question of 
jurisdiction over actions done by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Rulers in 
their personal or official capacities. On the first question, the relevant 
constitutional provisions are Articles 71(l) and 181. Article 71(1) reads: 
"The Federation shall guarantee the right of a Ruler of a State to 
succeed and to hold, enjoy and exercise the constitutional rights and 
privileges of Ruler of that State in accordance with the Constitution of 
that State; but any dispute as to the title to the succession as Ruler 
of any State shall be determined solely by such authorities and in such 
ýmanner as may be provided by the Constitution of that state". 
And Article 181 reads: 
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the sovereignity, 
prerogatives, - powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers and the 
prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Ruling Chiefs of Negeri 
Sembilan within their respective territories as hitherto had and enjoyed 
shall remain unaffected. 
(2) No proceedings whatsoever shall be brought in any court against 
the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity. " 
In Dato Nenteri Othman bin Baginda & Anor v. Dato Ombi Syed Alwi, 64 the 
provisions of Article 71 was described as "a graphic illustration" of the 
"strength of our -constitutional law to guarantee and protect matters of 
succession of a Ruler". 65 The issue in that case was whether the court had 
64. [19811 1 HLJ 29 FC. 
65. Per Raja Azlan Shah AG LP. Ibid. p. 32 (R) G. 
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jurisdiction to entertain a writ challenging the election of one of the Ruling 
Chiefs (called "the Undang") of the State of Negeri Sembilan. The Federal 
Court by a majority held that the question was not justiciable. Raja Azlan 
Shah AG. L. P. gave the answer in emphatic terms: 
"This court, being the highest court in the land in constitutional 
matters should take the occasion to reaffirm expressly, unequivocably 
and unanimously the constitutional position of the Ruler in matters of 
succession including the election of the Undang and to hold that it is 
non-justiciable". 66 
The question of justiciability of royal succession arose again in Daeng Baha 
67 Ismail v. Tunku Mahmood Iskandar. The question was whether the court had 
jurisdiction to hear and determine a question as to the legality or otherwise 
of the election of a Ruler as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The Supreme Court 
held that the decision of the Conference of Rulers, which elects the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong, was not open to judicial scrutiny. It said that whether a 
particular Ruler was eligible for election or not is a matter solely for the 
Conference of Rulers to decide. 68 
66. Ibid p. 33A-B. Suffian L. P., as did Abdul Hamid F. J. (as he then was) at 
first instance, held that the question of lawful succession of Rulers 
was justiciable. Abdul Hamid F. J. was of the view that it would be the 
function of the court to invoke the relevant adat (traditional Malay 
mores and customs) to determine the question (of lawful appointment) 
before the court (p. 30F). Suffian LP held that clearer provisions would 
be needed in the provisions of the Federal or State Constitutions to 
oust the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on the election. 
67. Reported only in note-form in (1987) 1 MLJ vi. 
68. In the absence of a full judgment, it is not possible to say whether the 
Dato Kenteri Othman case, supra, was adopted in totem verbis. The High 
Court, at first instance, had apparently held that the immunity under 
Article 32(1) applied (see (1987) 1 MLJ vi). The basis of the High 
Court's decision is questionable because the protection under Article 
32(l) could apply only if the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was rightfully 
appointed. A sounder basis for the decision would be as given in the 
Dato Kenteri Othman case viz that by Article 71(l) "the right to 
succeed ..... shall be determined solely by such authorities and in such 
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In the writer's view the scope of immunity was too widely drawn in both 
the Dato Menteri Othman case and in Daeng Baha Ismail. In both cases the 
courts, had failed to make the distinction between choice &nd eligibility, and 
appear to have confused the two. Whilst the former is e ssentially a non- 
justiciable question the latter is undoubtedly a legal one. Thus for example, 
there is set' out in the Third Schedule to the Constitution the essential 
matters' dealing with eligibility and procedure for election of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong. If the Third schedule is ignored or if the appointment of the 
Ruler or the election of the Agong is not made by the proper body under the 
State or Federal Constitutions it cannot be said that the succession is 
lawful; nor can a patently unconstitutional appointment be cured by 
endorsement or approval by any appropriate body. 'To hold otherwise would be to 
say that the Rulers may collectively dispense with constitutional provisions. 
In this respect, the first instance judgment and the minority opinion on 
appeal in the Dato Nenteri Othman case are to be preferred to the majority 
judgments as striking the right balance between immunity and justiciability. 
Article 181(2) reiterates the common law doctrine*of sovereign immunity 
from legal suit. 69 In Dato Menteri Othman, the Federal Court held that the 
immunity given by Article 181(2) does not apply where the title of the Ruler 
contd... 
68. manner as may be provided by the Constitution of that State". In the 
instant case, the contention was that the Ruler concerned was not 
eligible for election as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong because he had not 
rightfully succeeded to the throne in his State. The ratio in the Dato 
Menteri Othman case would therefore apply appropriately. 
69. This right existed even before Independence as illustrated in the case 
of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore (1894] 1 QB 149. It was a breach of 
promise to marry suit. The charge was that the then Sultan of Johore had 
come into England incognito under the assumed name of Albert Baker and 
had promised to marry the plaintiff. The action failed upon the plea of 
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is itself in dispute. 70 However, where it properly applied, the provision has 
been given a wide application. In Mobil oil Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. v. official 
Administrator Malaysia, 71 Article 181(2) was held to absolve the estate of the 
deceased Sultan of Perak from liability under a commercial contract. The 
plaintiff there claimed against the estate of the'late Sultan for the price of 
diesel oil supplied to a mining company of which the late Sultan was the sole 
proprietor. It was held that Article 181(2) applied to preclude legal action 
72 against the estate. In Karpal Singh v. Sultan of Selangor, Article 181(2) 
was applied to bar legal action against a Ruler in respect of his statement as 
to the manner in which he proposes to exercise his powers of pardon. The 
plaintiff had applied for a declaration that the public statement by the 
Sultan- of Selangor as reported in the newspapers that he would not pardon 
anyone who has been sentenced to the mandatory death sentence for drug 
trafficking in Selangor was in violation of the parýon-power given under the 
Constitution. Abdul Hamid C. J. (Malaya) rejected the argument that Article 
181(2) did not apply because the Sultan had made the statement in his official 
capacity. He held that the statement was made by the Sultan in his personal 
contd... 
69. sovereign immunity and certification by the British Foreign office 'that 
Her Majesty's Government recognised the Sultan of Johore as an 
independent sovereign monarch. As to the waiver of this immunity by 
voluntary submission to jurisdiction, see Tengku Abu Bakar v. Sultan of 
Joho. re [1949] 15 MLJ 187; on appeal, [1952] AC 318 PC. 
70. All the judgments given in the case were agreed on this point. Whilst 
the holding on this issue is undoubtedly correct it should be noted that 
insofar as the majority judgments were concerned it was inconsistent 
with their major premise that a Ruler's ascension to the throne was non- 
justiciable. 
71. [1988] 1 HIPJ 518. 
72. [1988] 1 MLJ 64. 
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capacity because it was not done in the course'or progress of a Pardons, Board 
Meeting. He also held, in the alternative, "in line with the spirit and 
intention of the Constitution", that proceedings brought against a 'Ruler 
purportedly in his official capacity will attract Article 181(2) if it is in 
effect and substance an action against the Ruler personally. The decision has 
considerably broadened the application of Article 181(2) and obliterated for 
all practical purposes the dichotomy between "personal capacity" and "official 
73 capacity". 
The seemingly wide application of Article 181(2)74 should be seen in 
contradistinction to the circumscribed approach taken by the courts in respect 
of the protection given by Article 32(l). The, obvious difference between the 
two immunity provisions lie in that the latter applies only to the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong. 
73. In the Mobil oil case, supra, the distinction was recognised. The 
learned judge compared the protection afforded by Article 181(2) and 
Article 32(l) which does not carry the words "in his personal capacity" 
(see p. 520E-I). and concluded that Article 181(2) was strictly confined 
to acts done by the Ruler in his personal capacity. This view is 
preferred to that in the Karpal Singh case. If it were otherwise 
governmental actions undertaken by the Ruler as a constitutional monarch 
would attract the shield of Article 181(2) and operate as a bar to suits 
against the Government on the basis of the "in substance" test. The 
decision is also not defensible on the first ground stated. A Ruler 
cannot be said to be acting in his personal capacity when he speaks of 
his constitutional functions regardless of the time and place of the 
statement. A Ruler does not lose his official capacity by time or place. 
A Ruler may be said to act in his personal capacity where he transacts 
on a private basis for personal considerations. As Lord Denman ci 
observed in Nunden v. Duke of Brunswick 10 QB 656 "sovereign princes may 
contract obligations in their private capacity on considerations purely 
personal". Both Mobil Oil and Karpal Singh are decisions of the High 
Court. Because of the apparent divergence of opinion on the ambit of 
Article 181(2) it will be left to the Supreme Court on a future date to 
settle the point. 
74. At a Seminar held in August 1987, "To Review 30 years of the 
Constitution", two distinguished Malaysian Constitutionalists expressed 
disquiet over "misbehaviour" by some members of royalty. Tun Suffian 
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The question naturally is whether the acts of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
done pursuant to powers conferred by the Constitution are immune from 
challenge or judicial review. Article 32(1) declares that-the Agong "shall not 
be liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court". A number of court 
decisions in tandem has resolved the question to say that the acts of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong are not immunized from legal challenge. The scope of the 
protection conferred by Article 32(l) was first considered in Stephen Kalong 
Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj. Openg & Anor (No. 2), 75 where the plaintiff 
challenged his dismissal as chief Minister of the State of Sarawak on the 
grounds, inter alia, that the Proclamation of Emergency in the State by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong, pursuant to which a meeting of the Council Negeri 
(State legislature) was convened to vote him out of office, was null and void 
contd... 
74. observed: "The name of the monarch in Malaysia is sometime besmirched by 
crimes committed by minor princelings ..... Though enjoying legal immunity each of them should scrupulously honour the spirit as well as 
the letter of the Constitution: Role of the Monarchy in Reflections op. 
cit. at p. 40,42; Reproduced in INSAF Sept. 1987 1, xx No. 3 at p. 20 
et. seq. Tun Suffian may be mistaken if he is saying that legal immunity 
extends also to royal personages other than the Ruler of the State. 
Article 181(2) read with Article 160 (Interpretation provision defining, 
inter alia, the term "Ruler") makes it clear that immunity does not go 
all the way down the Royal line. For example, see Public Prosecutor v. 
Tunku Kahmood Iskandar [1973] 2 MLJ 128 and Public Prosecutor v. Tunku 
Nahmood Iskandar [1977] 2 MLJ 123. - At the same seminar Tunku Abdul 
Rahman Putra Al-Haj, the first Prime Minister of Malaysia suggested the 
creation of a special court composed of Rulers to try offences by 
royalty: "What I am concerned about is the position of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong and the Rulers who are above the law, which means they are 
free to commit crime without being subject to prosecution under the 
law ..... Firstly I feel that no person should be exempted from the law but a special court might be provided to deal with offences committed by 
those above the law. This court should be made up of their brother 
rulers whose decision shall hold good. This is done in order to protect 
the fundamental rights of all citizens of this country": Reflections, 
op. cit. p. 20. For an expression of support to the Tunku's call, s 
ALIRAN Vol. 7/8 Sept. 1987 p. 24. 
75. [1967] 1 MLJ 46. 
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as, being made in fra'udem legis. Responding to the argument that Article 32(l) 
precluded any acts of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong from being questioned in 
court, Pike Ci (Borneo) said: 
"Article 32(1) only protects the Yang di-Pertuan Agong personally from 
proceedings in a court but cannot be construed, to protect the Federal 
Government f rom action in the courts in respect of its acts committed in 
the name of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, and when the, Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong acts on the advice of the Cabinet his act must be deemed to be the 
act of the Federal Government". 76 
In - related proceedings, Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of 
Kalaysia77 commenced in the Federal Court by the, same plaintiff invoking its 
original jurisdiction, Ong Hock Thye FJ (as he then was), in a strong dissent 
on the question of justiciability of a proclamation of emergency by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, said: 
"His Majesty is not an autocratic ruler since Article 40(l) of the 
Federal Constitution provides that "in the exercise of his functions 
under this Constitution or federal law, the Yang. di-Pertuan Agong shall 
act in accordance with the advise of the Cabinet". In this petition 
therefore when it was alleged by the petitioner "that ýthe said 
proclamation was in fraudem legis in that it was made, not to deal with 
a grave emergency whereby the security or economic life of Sarawak was 
threatened, but for the purpose of removing the petitioner from his 
lawful position as Chief Minister of Sarawak", there never was even the 
ghost of a suggestion that His Majesty had descended into the arena of 
Malaysian politics by taking sides against Sarawak's legitimate Chief 
76. Ibid at p. 47. Professor Trindade disagrees with this view. comparing 
Article 32(l) to Article 181(2) where the words "in his personal 
capacity" are' expressly mentioned he suggests that "the immunity 
intended to be conferredýby Article 32(l) is wider than that suggested 
by Pike CJ": see FA Trindade, The Constitutional Position of the, Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, in Suffian, Lee & Trindade, The Const-1-tuti-O-nof 
MaTaýysia, op. cit. at pp. 107-8. However, the result of a wider readiný 
of Article 32(l) would be to immunize from legal action acts which are 
really that of the executive government but carried out in the name of 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a thing which is inimical to the whole 
concept of a constitutional monarch. The true position is that in such 
cases it is not even necessary to implead the sovereign in the suit: see 
Carlic v. The Queen & Kinister of manpower & Immigration (1968] 65 DLR 
633. 
77. [1968] 1 MLJ 119. 
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Minister. With the greatest respect, it is unthinkable that His Majesty, 
as a constitutional ruler, would take on a role in politics different 
from that of the Queen of England ..... It was repeatedly and publicly stated, in the plainest of terms, that it was on Cabinet advice that the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed the Emergency ..... With all respect, therefore, I will not join in what I consider a repudiation of the Rule 
of Law, for I do not imagine, for a moment, that the ýabinet has ever 
claimed to be above the Law and the Constitution". 78 
In Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor, 79 the Privy Council considered 
the validity of emergency legislation promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
once Parliament had sat. In the course, of his judgment Lord Diplock observed: 
"Article 32(l) of' the Constitution makes the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
immune from any proceedings whatsoever in any court. so mandamus to 
require him to revoke the Proclamation would not lie against him; but 
since he is required in all executive functions to act in accordance 
with the advice of the Cabinet mandamus could, in their Lordships, view, 
be sought against the members of the Cabinet requiring them to advise 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke the Proclamation". 10 
In the light of these decisions, the position is unambiguous that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong is a constitutional monarch bound to act as such at all times 
even when the country'is under emergency rule. His functions and powers under 
the Constitution, save those expressly reserved to be exercised in his 
individual discretion under Article 4'0(2), Bl are deemed, for purposes of 
judicial review, to be the decision and act of the Cabinet or the relevant 
Minister of Government. It is undoubted also that these decisions and acts are 
78. At p. 125 B-G. 
79. [1979] 1 HLJ 49; 1979 2 WIR 623. 
80. At p. 55 F-G; See also Abdoolcader J. in Balakrishnan v. Ketua Pengarah 
Perkhidmatan Awam (1981] 2 MLJ 259,263 E-F and Herdeka University Bhd. 
v. Government of Nalaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356,358 B-C. 
81. The appointment of a Prime Minister; withholding of consent to a request 
for dissolution of Parliament; requisition of a meeting of the 
Conference of Rulers for certain purposes. 
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amenable to the traditional prerogative writs issuable by the courts in the 
form of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and the like to rectify a legal 
wrong. 
The discussion, for our immediate purposes, can conclude by considering 
the case of Re Tan Boon Liat e Allen et al, 82 where the Federal Court held 
that a finality clause in a feýeral law pursuant to which His Majesty acted 
was not sufficient to give immunity to his act if it was wrong in law. In that 
case the Yang di-Pertuan Agong had confirmed certain detention orders in the 
absence of any recommendation from the Advisory Board, a safeguard prescribed 
by the Constitution (Article 151(l)(6)). In rejecting the submission that the 
court was precluded from judicial review by section 6(2) of the Emergency 
(Public order and Prevention of Crime Ordinance) 1969 which declared the 
decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as nfinal and shall not be called in 
question in any court", Suffian L. P. said: 
"I am of opinion however that that section applies only to real 
decisions, not ultra vires decisions, of His Majesty (see Anisminic Ltd. 
V. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147) and here clearly His 
Majesty's decision was ultra vires, and therefore the court is free to 
order release of the Appellants". 83 
In the writer's view this approach is undoubtedly correct. The decisions on 
Article 32 have placed the constitutional role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 
its correct perspective and enhanced constitutional government by promoting 
executive accountability. 
82. [1977] 2 MLJ 108. 
83. At P. 109 1. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EMERGENCY PROVISIONS: THE ORIGINAL THEORY AND TRANSFORMATION 
Introduction 
The provision in the independence Constitution of 1957 of a power to 
declare a state of emergency was very much a product of its times. It was 
gestated in the wake of the British struggle against a communist insurgency in 
pre-independence Malaya. The Reid Constitutional Commission was considerably 
influenced by this fact. In its recommendations for a Constitution for 
independent Malaya it observed: 
"We must first take note of the existing emergency. We hope that it may 
have come to an end before the new Constitution comes into force but we 
must make our recommendation on the footing, that it is then still in 
existence". 1 
The "existing emergency" referred to was the state of emergency proclaimed by 
the British colonial Government throughout- Malaya in June 1948. 
The Communist Emergency 1948-1960 
The proclamation of a state of emergency on 12th June, 1948 was brought 
about by the declared policy of the Malayan Communist Party (CPM) to resort to 
armed struggle to gain power in British Malaya. During the Japanese occupation 
the Communists had co-operated with the British forces and other local anti- 
Japanese units to fight the Japanese. The organisations were grouped under the 
umbrella of a fighting force called the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army 
(MPAJA). 2 Several factors have been ascribed for the switch in policy of the 
1. The Reid Report, at p. 75 para. 173. 
2. For judicial cognizance of the role of the MPAJA during the war, see In 
Re Loh Kai Fat (1946) 12 MLJ 91, a decision of the Military Court 
established by the British Military Administration which re-occupied 
Malaya. 
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Malayan communists from one of co-operation within the existing -political 
framework to that of -an armed struggle to unseat the British. Forr , one, the 
Communists were emboldened by the British loss of invincibility resulting from 
their defeat at. the hands of the Japanese in Malaya. The other reason was the 
result of changes in policy in the World communist movement itself. The policy 
change emanating from Moscow was to discard moderate policies and pursue a 
more determined struggle to gain power in places where the communist movement 
was significant. This line was conveyed at a meeting of eastern communist 
organs at the Asian Youth Congress in Calcutta in March 1948 where Moscow's 
instructions for national communist movements to adopt a policy of armed 
uprising in the name of national liberations was adopted. 
3 It should be noted, 
however, that the communists in Malaya were more under the influence of Peking 
than Moscow. 4 
In any event, in June 1948 the CPM gave up its peaceful struggle for 
power through the labour unions and launched a wave of terror in Malaya. Three 
European planters were killed and violence occurred at rubber estates and tin 
3. See Gene Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle In Malaya (University of 
Malaya Press) 1971 (Fir-st--pu-Mished in 1954) at p. 104 et. seq. See also 
Zainal Abidin Wahid, The Emergency: Its Consequences in Glimpses of 
Malaysian History (Dewa-n-BaFas-a Publication, 1970) at p. 113. 
4. Reliance is placed on a major document issued by the CPM in December 
1948 called "Strategic Problems Of The Malayan Revolutionary War" which 
bore striking resemblance to Mao Tse Tung's "Strategic Problems of 
China's Revolutionary War" written in 1936. The copious reference to 
Mao's works in the CPM document and the call to imitate the 
revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people would seem to bear out this 
theory: see Khong Kim Hoong, Merdeka: British Rule And The Struggle For 
Independence In Malaya, 1945-1957 (INSAN Publica s) K. L. 1984 at p. 
138 et. seq. PeKing's impact is understandable because 95% of the 
guerillas in Malaya were Chinese by ethnic descent: see Victor Purcell 
in Introduction to Hanrahan, op. cit. at p. 14. 
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mines perpetrated -by communists or their sympathisers in the labour force. The 
communist military strategy was best outlined in an extract taken from a 
directive issued at that time by the CPM: 
"The objective of our army lies in preserving itself and in eliminating 
the enemy, and also in endeavouring to obtain every opportunity and 
every possibility to expand itself. 'Therefore, we must refrain 'from 
being impetuous and adventurous. We will strike only when we feel 
confident, we will not strike when we do not feel so. We want to strike 
hard to score victory in every encounter and to ensure that the enemy is 
eliminated and his arms seized. Thus we will train our forces, expand 
them and raise their quality until ultimately the position of 
superiority and strength of the enemy and our position of inferiority 
and weakness is reversed. For this reason our army is adopting the 
policy of a protracted war. Armed strength in a colonial revolution must 
gradually attain development during a long-term war. We are not afraid 
of a protracted war; on the contrary, subjectively we seek the strategy 
of a protracted war". 5 
The decision to declare a state of emergency throughout Malaya was 
largely due to the pressure applied by British planters. The planters 
protested that they could not maintain normal work because of lawlessness in 
the labour force and the rapid deterioration of law and order. 
6 Quite apart 
from this; ' British military intelligence was itself aware of , the potential 
danger posed by any active collaboration between communist guerillas operating 
from the jungles and about 650,000 Chinese squatters settled along the jungle 
fringes. 7 
5. Hanrahan, op. cit. at pp. 110-111. On 6th October, 1951, shortly after the 
issue of the communist directive, the British High Commissioner in 
Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, was ambushed and killed by guerillas whilst 
motoring up the mountain road to Frasers Hill: see Victor Purcell, ýop. 
cit. at p. 12. 
6. See Khong Kim Hoong, op. cit. at p. 150 quoting a report in the Straits 
Times of 4th June, 1948. 
7. This was about a fifth of the entire Chinese population in Malaya at 
that time: see R. S. Milne & Diane K. Mauzy, Politics And Governmentý In 
Malaysia (Federal Publications, 1978, Singapore) at p. 33. The 
evacua n and resettlement of Chinese squatters into 550 settlements 
throughout the country, called "new villages", was probably the most 
successful programme launched by the British military authorities to 
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Thus on 12th June, 1948, a state of emergency was proclaimed throughout 
Malaya. For our purposes, we shall focus on the features of emergency rule 
during this period to examine the influence it exerted on'the Reid Commission 
proposals. 
The emergency was initially proclaimed dnder the British Military 
Administration (Essential Regulations) Proclamation. 8 By this time there was 
already in force the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948 by which laws were 
to be passed by an appointed legislative council, save laws in the interest of 
public order and good government which could be enacted by the High 
Commissioner himself. 9 However, the authority of the British Military 
Administration (the BMA) to make laws by proclamation was not revoked. It was 
nevertheless felt by the British that it was not desirable that the vast 
coercive powers exercisable under the proclamation should be by way only of a 
contd... 
7. defeat the Communists. The programme was called the "Briggs Plan" after 
Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs who conceived and implemented the 
plan. The resettlement was carried out as a military operation over a 
number of years and effectively cut off communication between the 
Communists and the civilian population, and more importantly, their 
supplies. Each new village became a separate civic unit with schools and 
other community programmes, and was later to be the foundation of 
legitimate Chinese participation in the mainstream of political life in 
independent Malaya. For an excellent account of the "new villages" 
programme, see R. Dhu Renick, The Malayan Emergency: Causes And Effect, 
Journal of Southeast Asian History. Vol. 6, No. 2, Sept. 1965-, -aF-p--. 9 
et. seq. 
"British Military Administration" was the name by which the re-occupying 
British military forces ruled Malaya until the establishment of the 
Federation of Malaya in 1948. At the time of the initial Proclamation of 
emergency, the transition from the military administration to the 
civilian administration under the new Federation was not complete and 
therefore for a while two legal regimes existed side by side. 
9. See sections 51 and 52 of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 (G. N. 
No. 6 of 5th Feb. 1948, No. 1 Vol. 1). 
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military edict. 10 There was undoubtedly another reason. This was the British 
experience with the Sultans and the emerging Malay nationalists over the 
aborted Malayan Union plan in 1946 and the commitment through the Federation 
plan in 1948 to take Malaya progressively towards self-government. 11 Thus on 
7th July, 1948, the legislative Council of the Federation passed the Emergency 
Regulations ordinance, 1948. On 13th July, 1948, acting under the provisions 
of section 3 of the ordinance, the High commissioner re-declared that a state 
of emergency existed. On 31st July, 1948, the Legislative Council adopted by 
resolution the Proclamation made by the High Commissioner. 
Emergency rule by the British was largely through emergency laws. on 
15th July, 1948, the High commissioner in exercise of powers given under 
section 4 of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948 made the Emergency 
Regulations, 1948. By this provision, the High Commissioner was empowered to 
make emergency law without recourse to the Legislative Council. Throughout the 
period of the emergency this power was exercised by successive High 
Commissioners to make not only numbered Emergency Regulations eg. the 
Emergency Regulations 1951 (Federation of Malaya No. 10 of 1948) but also 
titled Emergency Regulations eg. Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations, 
1948 (C. N. 2032/48). As one writer observed: 
"The scope and intensity of the Emergency Regulations effected a 
complete coercive embrace of the population". 2 
10. See Dhu Renick, op. cit. at p. 19. 
The aborted Malayan Union plan and its impact on the rise of Malay 
nationalism is discussed in Chapter III. 
12. R. Dhu Renick, op. cit. at p. 19. The Emergency Regulations 1948 created 
a number of offences relating to security eg. Regulation 6A, the offence 
of habouring a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public 
safety (see Lee Tong Lai v. PP [1949] 15 HLJ 66); Regulation 6A(l), the 
offence of consorting with terrorists (see Soo Sing & Ors v. PP [1951] 
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The Emergency Regulation 1948, the principal emergency legislation, was 
itself broad in its sweep. Its long title read: "An ordinance to confer on the 
High Commissioner power to make regulations on occasions of emergency or 
public danger". By section 3(i), the High Commissioner was empowered to 
declare by proclamation a state of emergency "whenever it appears to him that 
an occasion of emergency or public danger has arisen, or that any action has 
been taken or is immediately threatened by any persons or body of ýpersons of 
such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated by interfering 
with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light, or with the 
means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of 
the community, of the essentials of life". The 1948 Ordinance was modeled on 
its precursor, the Emergency Regulations Enactment, 1930 which was an 
enactment of the Federated Malay States. 13 Section 3(i) of the 1948 Ordinance 
was a reproduction of section 2(i) of the 1930 Enactment. 
A distinctive feature of British emergency rule, which had overtones of 
a regime of martial law, was the meticulous care with which the British 
administrators armed themselves with legal authority to undertake a range of 
emergency measures. Thus even harsh actions like detention without trial or 
the punishing of an entire village for rendering assistance to the Communists 
were legalised and given the requisite legislative basis. 14 Therel may have 
contd... 
12.17 MLJ 143; PP v. Tan Thoy [1951] 17 MLJ 186). The Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance 1948 and the Regulations made under it were kept alive after 
independence by Article 163 of the independence Constitution on a year 
to year basis. They were repealed with effect from July 31,1960 by a 
Proclamation dated July 29,1960 pursuant to Legal Notification 185 of 
1960: see Malayan Constitutional Documents Vol. I 2nd Edn. p. 128. 
13. The 1930 Enactment itself replaced the Public Emergency Enactment 1917. 
14. Detention without trial was authorised under the Emergency Regulations, 
1951. The Chief Secretary could order the detention without trial of any 
person for a period not exceeding two years. The "collective punishment" 
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been several reasons for the British to, place so much emphasis on this 
approach. A principal, if not dominant, ' reason must undoubtedly have been the 
British realisation, early in the communist struggle, tMt the battle was to 
be won not in the battlefields but in the hearts and minds 'of 'the' Malayan 
contd... 
14. provision was the notorious Regulation 17DA. It authorised the 
collective punishment of the inhabitants of an area"if suspected of 
having aided, abetted, consorted or failed to give information about a 
person who intended or had or was about toýact in a manner prejudicial 
to the public safety or security. The power included the right to order 
closing of shops in the area or the establishment of a curfew. D. Dhu 
Renick, supra, at p. 27 et. seq. records the harsh manner in which the 
High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer, meted out collective punishment 
to the residents of the small foot-hill town of Tanjong Malim in Perak: 
"On March 28,1952 General--Sir Gerald Templer went personally to Tanjong 
Malim to pronounce the sentence -a strict 22 hour curfew, shops to be 
open only two hours per day, no person was allowed to leave the town, 
all schools were to be closed, and the rice ration was reduced to less 
than half the ordinary amount for men and women. The reason that this 
sentence was imposed on a town of 20,000 persons was that General 
Templer believed that the inhabitants of the town had failed to give 
information about persons suspected of participating in acts detrimental 
to public order and safety. Thereds some doubt as-, to whether or not 
proper procedures were followed in the punishment of Tanjong Malim. 
Emergency Regulation 17DA requires that an inquiry into the facts and 
circumstances be made and that a written'report containing a certificate 
that all procedural requirements for the inquiry have been met. These 
procedural requirements include giving the inhabitants of the area an 
adequate opportunity to understand the subject of the inquiry and to 
make statements concerning the alleged charge. There is no indication 
that this procedure was followed in the case of Tanjong Malim. It is 
interesting to note that to, get the sentence remitted the town of 
Tanjong Malim had to make a public demonstration of its good faith and 
its conviction to cooperate fully with the government. Each adult 
citizen of Tanjong Malim, was required to fill out a form in which he was 
supposed to give all the pertinent information "he possessed about 
individuals connected with the insurrection. These forms were collected 
by a pseudo-secret balloting technique and delivered to General Templer, 
at his headquarters by a delegation from Tanjong Malim. Full advantage 
was taken of the situation for its propaganda value. Photographs and 
news releases reflected the change in behavior of the citizens of 
Tanjong Malim. They were now cooperating fully with the government and 
were once again considered valuable citizens. No indication has ever 
been given of the contents of the forms submitted by the citizenry, or 
whether such information was of any value in the prosecution of the 
Emergency". 
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people. 15 The British policy, behind the various emergency regulations, was 
described as "an example of seeking to find a compromise between civilian and 
military needs during an insurrection, by the successful application of a 
"carrot" and "stick" philosophy of law and order". 16 The "carrot" method was 
to reward individuals who had assisted the Government by the conferment of 
awards, and in respect of pro-government townships and districts by the 
removal of restrictive Emergency Regulations and the provision of social 
welfare services to these places. This policy was also to accentuate the 
difference in methodology between British rule, and later their Malayan 
successors, and the communists. It succeeded in portraying the Communists as 
bandits and insurgents who were unfit to govern. In this British policy 
succeeded and the Communist armed struggle failed. By 31 July 1960 the first 
Government of independent Malaya was able to officially end the Emergency. 
17 
15. See postscript by Sir Robert Thompson to Hanrahan's book, supra, p. -136 
et. seq. at p. 143. Sir Robert Thompson was an acknowledged authority on 
guerilla warfare in S. E. Asia. The British strategy was to categorise 
the Communists as insurgents and bandits opposing the rule of law, and 
that the British were invoking the rule of law against them as a 
counter-insurgency measure. Thus the British, and later their Malayan 
successors, made sure "every action had a legal basis and enforcement of 
the law applied equally to'friend and foe; European and Asian": see 
Zakaria Hj. Ahmad in Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia (Ed. 
Chandran Jeshurun) ISEAS Publn. S'pore 1985 at p. 163. 
16. D. Dhu Renick, op., cit. p. 33. 
17. within a year of their "armed'struggle" policy, the Communists were 
isolated and forced to retreat to the jungles. By 1955, when the first 
local elections in Kuala Lumpur were held, a large part of Malaya was 
already declared a "white area" or safe area: see Thompson, ibid. The 
emphasis placed by the Government of Independent Malaya on socio- 
economic development and economic prosperity was an effective counter 
measure against any appeal the Communists may have especially with the 
local Chinese population. The policy was epitomised in the words of the 
first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman: "As I have said more than once 
121 
The Reid Recommendations 
The British style of operating an emergency left a lasting impression on 
the Reid Commission. The Commission observed in its Report: "The history and 
continued existence of the present emergency show that organised attempts to 
subvert constitutional government by violence or other unlawful means may have 
to be met at an early stage by the use of emergency powers if they are to be 
prevented from developing into serious and immediate threats to the security 
of the State". 18 The recommendations to retain the power to declare a state of 
emergency was modeled on the Emergency Regulations Ordinance 1948. Like the 
function exercised by the Legislative Council under the Federation Agreement 
1948, in respect of the first emergency, the recommendation by the Commission 
was also for parliamentary review of the proclamation of emergency. 
contd... 
17. before, it is the policy of our country to provide, our people with food 
instead of bullets, clothing instead of uniforms and homes instead of 
barracks": see Chandran Jeshurun, Government Responses to Armed 
Insurgenýy in Malaysia, 1957-82 in Governments And Reb-ellliýons in 
Southeast Asia, op. cit., at p. 134 et. seq. 
18. The Communists continued to operate in the jungles in small bands 
largely confined to the northern parts along the Malayan-Thai border. 
After the failure of the Baling peace talks on December 28,1955 between 
the then Chief Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Malayan Communist 
leader Chin Peng, the communist leaders returned to the jungles. They 
remained a clandestine organisation. (For a personalised account of the 
Baling talks, see Tunku Abdul Rahman, Political Awakening (Pelanduk 
Publications, 1986) at p. 63 et. seq. ). -IF-w-a-sai-Nost 34 years to the 
date when Chin Peng and other communist leaders appeared in public 
again. On December 3,1989 Chin Peng and other noted leaders of the CPM 
appeared in the Thai border town of Haadyai to sign a peace accord with 
the Malaysian and Thai Governments and officially give up their armed 
struggle. Little is known yet of how this dramatic and historical deal 
was brokered. The New Straits Times, December 3,1989 observed: "The 
formal cessation of the armed conflict between the Governments of 
Malaysia and Thailand and the Communist Party of Malaya brings to an end 
41 years of bloody hostility... " (at p. 10). See also C. C. Too, The 
Communist Party Of Malaya And Its Attempt To Capture Power (New Stralts 
Hime-sSerial, published December 3,1989 to December 6,1989). 
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The Reid Commission by Clause 138 of the draft Constitution provided for the 
Federal Government to have the power to declare a state of emergency 
throughout the Federation or parts of it under certain circumstances. It also 
provided for -a scheme of government under emergency rule. The provision to 
override fundamental rights, and the division of powers between the Federal 
and State Government, was intended to apply only, to the. extent necessary and 
for the duration of the emergency. The commission observed: 
"Neither the existence of fundamental rights nor the division of powers 
between the Federation and the States ought to be permitted to imperil 
the safety of the State or the preservation of a democratic way of life. 
The Federation must have adequate power in the last resort to protect 
these essential national interests. But in our opinion infringement of 
fundamental rights or of State rights is only justified to such an 
extent as may be necessary to meet any particular danger which threatens 
the nation. We therefore recommend that the Constitution should 
authorise the use of emergency powers by the Federation but that the 
occasions, on which, and so far as possible the extent to, which, such 
powers can be used should be limited and defined". 19 
The emergency provisions as recommended were incorporated with some 
modifications into the independence Constitution of 1957. It was obvious from 
the scheme introduced that Emergency rule was never intended to be a permanent 
f eature of government. However, the several amendments to the Emergency 
provisions over the last 30 years has transformed the original purpose behind 
it to something other than transitory. Thus, today emergency rule stands as, an 
accepted feature of government in Malaysia. 
We will now examine these amendments and discuss how they were brought 
about. 
Theoriginal Theory 
The Reid commission in the draft Constitution for independent Malaya 
created a special section to deal with subversion and emergencies. This was 
19. The Reid Report. Para. 175 pp. 75-76. 
123 
Part XI under the caption "Special Powers to deal with Subversion, the Power 
to Proclaim a state of Emergency, and the Power of Preventive Detention". The 
provision against subversion was Clause 137 which read as'follows: 
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article, if an Act of Parliament 
recites that action has been taken or threatened by any substantial body 
of persons, whether inside or outside the Federation, to cause, or to 
cause any substantial number of citizens to fear, organized violence 
against persons or property, any provision of such Act designed to stop 
such action or meet such threat shall be lawful notwithstanding that it 
is repugnant to any of the provisions of Articles 5,9,10,68 or 73. 
(2) Any Act of Parliament to which clause (1) applies shall cease to 
operate on the expiration of a period of one year from the date of the 
enactment thereof, without prejudice to the power of Parliament to renew 
such Act in accordance with the provisions of this Article". 
20 
The recommendation on Emergency Powers was Clause 138: 
"(1) If the Federal Government is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or of any 
part thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or 
internal disturbance, the Yang di-Pertuan Besar may issue a Proclamation 
of Emergency, in this Article referred to as a Proclamation. 
(2), When a Proclamation is issued in accordance with the provisions of 
Clause (1), if Parliament is not sitting it shall be the duty of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Besar to summon Parliament as soon as may be 
practicable. 
(3) A Proclamation shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, 
if not sooner revoked, shall cease to operate at the expiration of a 
period of two months from the date of its issue, unless, before the 
expiration of that period, it has been approved by resolutions in both 
Houses of Parliament. 
(4) While a Proclamation is in operation, notwithstanding anything in 
this constitution - 
(a) the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to 
any of the matters within'the legislative authority of a 
State and to the giving of directions to the Goverrment of a 
State or to any officer or authority thereof; 
(b) the legislative authority of Parliament shall extend to - 
20. See draft Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, Appendix II to the 
Reid Report, op. cit. 
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any matter within the exclusive legislative authority 
of a State; 
(ii) the extension of the maximum duration of Parliament or 
of a State Legislature, the suspehsion of any election 
required by or under this constitution or the 
Constitution of any State, and the making of any 
provision consequential upon or incidental thereto; 
and 
(c) if and so long as'either House of Parliament is not, sitting 
and the, Federal Government is satisfied that existing 
circumstances require immediate action, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Besar shall have power to promulgate ordinances having the 
force of, law. 
(5) Any provision of an Act of Parliament enacted while a Proclamation 
is in force shall be valid notwithstanding that it is repugnant to any 
provision of Part II. 
(6) Any provision of an Act of Parliament which would, but for the 
provisions of this Article, be invalid shall cease to have effect on the 
expiration of a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased 
to operate, except as to things done or omitted to be done before the 
expiration of the said period. 
(7) An ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same 
force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such ordinance - 
(a) , shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall 
cease to operate at the expiration of fifteen days from the 
reassembly of both Houses unless before the 'expiration of 
that period it is approved by resolution in both Houses, and 
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Yang di-Pertuan Besar. 
(8) Where a Proclamation relates to a part only of the Federation, the 
expression "State" in this Article means a state wholly or partially 
within that part". 21 
Clauses 137 and 138 were adopted with minor modifications as Articles 149 and 
150 of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya. For the present, we shall 
focus on Article 150 only. It read originally as follows: 
"(1) If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or of any 
part thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or 
internal disturbance, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency. 
21. Ibid. 
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(2)"'If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is not 
sitting, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall summon Parliament as soon as 
may be practicable, and may, until both Houses of Parliament are 
sitting, promulgate ordinances having the force of law, if satisfied 
that immediate action is required. 
(3) A proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under 
clause (2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not 
sooner revoked, shall cease to be in f orce -' 
(a) a Proclamation at the expiration of a period of two months 
beginning with the date on which it was issued; and 
(b) an ordinance at the expiration of a period of fifteen days 
beginning with the date on which both Houses are first 
sitting, 
unless, before the expiration of that period, it has been approved by a 
resolution of each House of Parliament. 
(4) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in force the executive 
authority of the Federation shall, notwithstanding anything in this 
Constitution, extend to any matter within the legislative authority of a 
State and to the giving of directions to the Government of a State or to 
any officer or authority thereof. 
(5) While a Proclamation ofEmergency is in force Parliament may, 
notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, make laws with respect to 
any matter enumerated in the State List (other than any matter of Muslim 
law or the custom of the Malays), extend the duration of Parliament or 
of a- State Legislature, suspend any election, and make any provision 
consequential upon or incidental to any provision made in pursuance to 
this clause. 
(6) No provision of any law or ordinance made or promulgated in 
pursuance of this Article shall be invalid on the ground of any 
inconsistency with the provisions of Part II, and Article 79 shall not 
apply to any Bill for such a law or any amendment to-such a Bill. 
(7) At the expiration of a period of six months beginning with the 
date on, -'which a Proclamation of Emergency ceases to be in force, any 
ordinance promulgated in pursuance of the Proclamation and, to the 
extent that it could not hale been validly made but for this Article, 
any law made while the Proclamation was in force, shall cease to have 
effect, except as to things done or omitted to be done before the 
expiration of that period". 
However, Article 150 has been tranformed by a number of amendments made over 
the years. We shall now examine these amendments. 
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The Amendments To Article 150 And The Amending Power of Parliament 
Since 1957, Article 150 has been amended six times. It ranks amongst the 
most amended provisions of the Federal Constitution. The end product is a 
radical transformation of the original format. The single. thread that ran 
through all the amendments was the enhancement of the executive power to 
declare and perpetuate a state of emergency. In this regard one writer 
observed: 
"The emergency powers of the Federal Government at independence were 
wide but various amendments, including those in contemplation of 
Malaysia have made them extraordinarily extensive and have induced 
within them the capacity to destroy the entire constitutional order". 22 
These amendments were made on separate occasions. Each occasion was actuated 
by different considerations but all were united in the objective of 
strengthening the exercise and deployment of the emergency power. The facile 
exercise of the amendment power by Parliament to transform Article 150 into an 
engine "with the capacity to destroy the entire constitutional order" raises 
serious questions as to Parliament's authority to amend the Constitution 
without restriction or limitation. can Parliament create an amending power 
that enables the Constitution itself to be by-passed or scuttled? If that is 
possible what are its implications on the Constitution being the basic law or 
supreme law of the land? An understanding of the amending power of Parliament 
is therefore material for an appreciation of the context in which emergency 
powers operate within the Malaysian constitutional framework and of 
constitutionalism itself in the country. 
22. Yash Ghai, The Politics of the Constitution: Another Look at the Ningkan 
Litigation (1986) 7 Sing. IR 147 at pp. 160-61. 
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A written constitution is-classified as "controlled" or "uncontrolled., 23 
according to the ease with which its provisions can be amended. Lord 
Birkenhead L. C. used this classification in his seminal decision in McCawley 
v. The King. 24 It was an appeal to the Privy council from Queensland 
(Australia) as, to whether it was competent for their legislature to enact a 
law inconsistent with the constitution without declaring it to be an amending 
legislation. Lord Birkenhead's observation repays full consideration: 
"The first point 'which requires consideration depends upon the 
distinction between constitutions the term of which may be modified or 
repealed with no other formality than is necessary in the case of other 
legislation, and constitutions which can only be altered with some 
speciality, and in some cases by a specially convened assembly .......... Many different terms have been employed in the text-books to distinguish 
these two contrasted forms of constitution. Their special qualities may 
perhaps be exhibited as clearly by calling the one a controlled and the 
other an uncontrolled constitution as by any other momenclature. Nor is 
a constitution debarred from being reckoned as an uncontrolled 
constitution because it is -not, like the British constitution, 
constituted by historic development, but finds its genesis in an 
originating document which may contain some conditions which cannot be 
altered except by the power which gave it birth. It is of the greatest 
importance to notice that where the constitution is uncontrolled the 
consequences of its freedom admit of no qualification whatever. The 
doctrine is carried to every proper consequence with logical and 
inexorable precision". 
The Board held that in the absence of a special procedure to amend the 
Queensland Constitution it was "uncontrolled" and that every legislation that 
conflicted with the constitution was pro tanto an alteration of it. The 
23. Dicey uses the terms "rigid" and "flexible": see AN. Dicey, An 
Introduction To -The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution (loth Ed-nT 
MacHiMin press London (1982 Rpt) at p. 127: A llfleixi7l-ell constitution 
is one under which every law of every description can legally be changed 
with the same ease and in the same manner by one and the same body. A 
"rigid" constitution is one under which certain laws generally known as 
constitutional or fundamental laws cannot be changed in the same way as 
ordinary laws". 
24. [1920] A. C. 691. 
128 
doctrine of an implied amendment of the constitution was rejected by the Board 
in The Bribery Commissioners v. Ranasinghe. 25 The case was concerned with 
whether the creation of a special tribunal by legislation in Ceylon to try 
bribery offences, apparently in conflict with a provision of the Ceylonese 
Constitution, was nevertheless a valid law having the effe ct of amending the 
Constitution. Lord Pearce for the Board held that the McCawley conclusion was 
inapplicable to the Ceylonese Constitution: 
"It is possible now to state summarily what is the essential difference 
between the McCawley case and this case. There the legislature, having 
full power to make laws by a majority, except on one subject that was 
not in question, passed a law which conflicted with one of the existing 
terms of its Constitution Act. It was held that this was valid 
legislation, since it must be treated as pro tanto an alteration of the 
constitution, which was neither fundamental in the sense of being beyond 
change nor so constructed as to require any special legislative process 
to pass on the topic dealt with. In the present case, on the other hand, 
the legislature has purported to pass a law which, being in conflict 
with a s. 55 of the order in council, must be treated, if it is to be 
valid, as an implied alteration of the constitutional provisions about 
the appointment of judicial officers. Since such alterations, even if 
express, can only be made by laws which comply with the special 
legislative procedure laid down in s. 29(4), the Ceylon legislature has 
not got the general power to legislate so as to amend its Constitution 
by ordinary majority resolutions, such as the Queensland legislature was 
found to have under s. 2 of its Constitution Act, but is rather in the 
position, for effecting such amendments, that that legislature was held 
to be in by virtue of its s. 9, namely compelled o operate a special 
procedure in order to achieve the desired result". 
16 
In a later Ceylon appeal, Kariapper v. wijesinha, 27 the Privy Council held 
that the McCawley principle of implied amendments would apply, even in 
circumstances of a controlled constitution, if the prescribed procedure for 
alteration of the constitution, was followed. Section 29(4) of the Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946 provided: 
25. [1964) 2 All ER 785. 
26. At p. 792 D-H. 
27. [1967) 3 All ER 485. 
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"In the exercise of its powers under this section, Parliament may amend 
or repeal any of the provisions of this order, or of any other order of 
Her Majesty in Council in its application to the island: Provided that 
no bill for the amendment or repeal of any of the-provisions of this 
order shall be presented for the Royal Assent unless it has endorsed on 
it a certificate under the hand of the Speaker that the number of votes 
cast in favour thereof in the House of Representatives amounted to not 
less than two-thirds of the whole number of the member of the House 
(including those not present). " 
This was the provision that earlier led the Privy Council in Ranasinghe Is case 
to conclude that the Ceylon Constitution, unlike the Queenslapd Constitution 
in McCawley's case, was a controlled constitution. The question here was 
whether a bill which would otherwise be an effective amendment of the 
Constitution, having the requisite number of votes to alter it, would 
nevertheless be ineffective as an amending bill because it was not described 
as an amendment and did not carry the Speakers Certificate. In holding that 
the bill effectively amended the constitution, the Privy council said: 
"The bill which became the Act was a bill for the amendment... of the 
constitution simply because its terms were inconsistent with that 
section. It is the operation that the bill will have on becoming law 
which gives it its constitutional character not any particular label 
which may be given to itn. 28 
The Privy council rejected the argument that the implied amendment theory 
would result in the constitution being amended without any deliberation or 
system and without regard to its effect on the whole instrument. The short 
answer given was that "consideration of this sort, powerful as they ought to 
be with the draftsman, cannot in a court of law weigh against the 
considerations which have brought the Board to its conclusions that a bill, 
which on its passage into law would amend the constitution, is a bill for its 
amendment.,, 29 
28. At p. 495F. 
29. At pp. 495-496. 
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The implied amendment, theory could not, however, operate in a written 
constitution that describes the co nstitution as the supreme law and declares 
any law inconsistent with it to be invalid to the extent thereof. Article 4(1) 
of the Malaysian Constitution carries this declaration. Thus the theory should 
not ex facie apply in Malaysia. 30 In Ah Thian v. Government . of Nalaysia, 31 the 
Federal Court declared. - 
"The ýdoctrine of supremacy of Parliament does not apply in Malaysia. 
Here we have a written constitution. The power of Parliament and of 
State legislatures in Malaysia is limited by the constitution, and they 
cannot make any law they please. Under our constitution written law may 
be invalid on one of these grounds: 
30. Article 159 which deals with the amending process does not on the face 
of it provide that any bill seeking to amend the constitution should be 
expressed as one. Thus the view has been taken in respect of the like 
provision in the Singapore Constitution that the implied amendment 
theory as stated in Kariapper's case would apply: see S. Jayakumar, The 
constitution (Amendment) Act, 1979 (1979) 21 Mal. L. R. 111 @ 112-113. 
TFe-present writer does agree not with this view. A provision like 
Article 4(l) of the Malaysian Constitution that expressly declares any 
law inconsistent with it to be invalid should suffice to ensure that the 
theory of amendments by implication is not applicable. This view is 
borne out by the practice by which constitutional amendments are made in 
Malaysia. In the constitutional history of Malaysia, every amendment of 
the constitution has been expressed as an amendment bill particularising 
the provision and manner of amendment. The one instance when an 
Amendment Act was not intituled as such was the Malaysia Act (No. 26 -of 
1963) when Malaysia was formed by the admission of new states to the 
existing Federation of.. Malaya. However, the recital to the Act clearly 
mentioned that the-Act was also to amend the Constitution and it was 
, passed by both Houses of Parliament with the requisite majority to 
operate as an amending Act: see The Government of Kelantan v. The 
Government of the Federation of Malaya & Tunku Abdul Rahman [1963] MLJ 
355. An instance in the Constitution where it is expressly provided that 
a Bill has to be certified as an amending Bill is Article 79(l) dealing 
with any changes to the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List on 
which Parliament has the power to make laws or those matters in the 
State List (for'both see Ninth Schedule) on which the Federation may 
exercise executive authority. 
31. [1976] 2 MLJ 112. The Federal Court in this case was dealing with a 
challenge to the Firearms (Increased Penalties) (Amendment) Act, 1974 as 
being ultra vires the Federal Constitution. The decision was confined 
purely to the procedure for such challenge. 
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(1) in the case of Federal written law, because it relates to a matter 
with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law, and in 
the case of State written law, because it relates to a matter with 
respect to which the state legislature has not power to make law, 
article 74; or 
(2) in the case of both Federal and State written law, because it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, see Article-4(1); or 
(3) in the case of State writ en law, because it is inconsistent with 
Federal law, Article 75. "ý2 
The principle in theory and its effect in practice are however two different 
things. In practice, the true position is that the Malaysian constitution may 
be subjected to amendment directly and indirectly. Direct amendments are 
brought about under Article 159 of the Federal Constitution. Indirect 
amendments result from the passage of emergency laws under Article 150, which 
by virtue of Article 150(6), are valid even if inconsistent- withý- the 
Constitution. For the present we are concerned only with direct amendments. 
In this regard, it should first be noted that the Malaysian Constitution 
was intended to be a controlled constitution. The Reid commission observed: 
"It is important that the method of amending the Constitution should be 
neither so difficult as to produce frustration nor so easy as to weaken 
33 seriously the safeguards which the constitution provides". The format 
adopted appeared to meet this balance, except that the safeguard of a special 
amendment procedure is of little significance if the party in power controls 
more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament. 34 Thus if an ordinary law 
meets with a constitutional impediment the way around is to make two laws. one 
32. Ibid. 
33. The Reid Commission Report, op. cit. at p. 31 Para. 80. 
34. Since independence, the ruling Alliance Party has always held power in 
Malaysia with more than a two-third majority in Parliament. The Alliance 
Party is now known as the Barisan Nasional or "the National Front". 
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law to amend the Constitution and another law to achieve the desired 
objective. 35 Nevertheless, in certain specified instances, Parliament does not 
possess an uncontrolled power to amend the Constitution. *Article 159, in its 
present form'36 reads as follows: 
"(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Article and to Article 
161E the provisions of this Constitution may be amended by federal 
law. 
(Repealed). 
(3) A Bill for making any amendment to the constitution (other than an 
amendment excepted from the provisions of this Clause) and a Bill 
for making any amendment to a law passed under Clause (4) of 
Article 10 shall not be passed in either House of Parliament 
unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the 
votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members 
of that House. 
(4) The following amendments are excepted from the provisions of 
Clause (3), that is to say: 
(a) any amendment to Part III of the Second or to the Sixth or 
Seventh Schedule; 
(b) any amendment incidental to or consequential on the exercise 
of any power to make law conferred on Parliament by any 
provision of this constitution other than Articles 74 and 
76; 
(bb) Subject to Article 161E any amendment made for or in 
connection with the admission of any State to the Federation 
or its association with the States thereof, or any 
modification made as to the application of this Constitution 
to a State previously so admitted or associated; 
(c) any amendment- consequential on an amendment made under 
paragraph (a). 
35. See observation by Tun Salleh Abas, Amendment of the 
_ 
Malaysian 
Constitution (1977) 2 MLJ xxxiv at p. xlvi. 
36. This provision has itself been amended six times: see Tun Salleh, ibid, 
footnote (12). The significant change was that effected by the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 which enhanced the role of the 
Conference of Rulers in the amendment process. 
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(5) A law making an amendment to Clause (4) of Article 10, any law 
passed thereunder, the provisions of Part III, Article 38,63(4), 
70,71(l), 72(4), 152 or 153 or to this Clause shall not be passed 
without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. 
(6) In this Article "amendment" includes addition and repeal; and in 
this Article and in Article 2(a) "State" includes any territory. " 
In Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia, 37 Article . 159 was read as 
prescribing four different methods of amending different parts of the 
Constitution: 
"(1) Some parts of the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority 
in both Houses of Parliament such as that required for the passing 
of any ordinary law. They are enumerated in Clause (4) of Article 
159, and are specifically excluded from the purview of Article 
159; 
(2) The amending Clause (5) of Article 159 which requires a two-thirds 
majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the 
Conference of Rulers; 
(3) The amending Clause (2) of Article 161E which is of-- special 
interest to East Malaysia and which requires a two-thirds majority 
in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the Governor of 
the East Malaysian State in question; 
(4) The amending Clause (3) of Article 159 which requires a majority 
of two-thirds in both Houses of Parliament.,, 38 
It would follow that apart from the provisions excepted under Clause (4) of 
Article 159, the amendment of any other provision of the Constitution 'would 
need the support of not less than two-third of the total number of members of 
both Houses of Parliament on the Second and Third Readings. This provision 
would qualify the Malaysian Constitution as a controlled or rigid constitution 
according to the NcCawley and Ranasinghe decisions aforementioned. It has led 
the court in Loh Kooi Choon's case to classify those provisions requiring a 
special procedure for amendment as entrenched provisions. Raja Azlan Shah F. J. 
(as he then was) said: 
37. (19771 2 MLJ 187. 
38. At p. 189D-F. 
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"In my opinion the purpose of enacting a written constitution is partly 
to entrench the most important constitutional provisions against repeal 
and amendment in any way other than by a specially prescribed 
procedure. "39 
This seems to follow the reasoning of Lord Diplock in the Privy Council case 
of Hinds v. The Queen. 40 The case was a challenge to the validity of the Gun 
Court Act 1974 in Jamaica establishing a special court of record, called "the 
Gun Court", to try all firearm offences. Like the Malaysian Constitution, the 
Constitution of Jamaica was declared as supreme and carried a provision for 
the amendment of some of its parts by specified majorities only. Lord Diplock 
observed: 
"one final general observation: where, as in the instant case, a 
constitution on the Westminster model represents the final step in the 
attainment of full independence by the peoples of a former colony or 
protectorate, the constitution provides machinery whereby any of its 
provisions, whether relating to fundamental rights and freedoms or to 
the structure of government and the allocation to its various organs of 
legislative, executive or judicial powers, may be altered by those 
peoples through their elected representatives in the parliament acting 
by specified majorities, which is generally all that is required, though 
exceptionally as respects some provisions the alteration may be subject 
also to confirmation by a direct, vote of the majority of the peoples 
themselves. 
The purpose served by this machinery for "entrenchment" is to ensure 
that those provisions which were regarded as important safeguards by the 
political parties in Jamaica, minority and majority alike, who took part 
in the negotiations which led up to the constitution, should not be 
altered without mature consideration by the parliament and the consent 
of a larger proportion of its members than the bare majority required 
for ordinary laws. so in deciding whether any provisions of a law passed 
by the Parliament of Jamaica as an ordinary law are inconsistent with 
the Constitution of Jamaica, neither the courts of Jamaica nor their 
Lordships' Board are concerned with the propriety or expediency of the 
law inpugned. They are concerned solely with whether those provisions, 
however reasonable and expedient, are of such a character that they 
39. op. cit. p. 189A-B. 
40. (1976] 1 AER 353 PC. 
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conflict with an entrenched provision of the Constitution and so can be 
validly passed only after the Constitution has been amended 41 
by the 
method laid down by it for altering that entrenched provision. " 
The appellation "entrenched provisions" or "entrenchment"* is however illusory 
and affords no real safeguard against an easy amendment of the Constitution, 
including the so-called "entrenched provisions",, where the party in power 
commands the requisite majority in the legislature. 42 The Malaysian courts, 
following a line of Privy Council cases from KcCawley to Ranasinghe, have held 
that the Constitution can be validly amended so long as the requisite 
procedure is followed. The Privy Council approach was appositely given in 
Ranasinghe's case by Lord Pearce: 
(A) legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law- 
making that are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates , its 
power to make law ..... such a constitution can 
indeed be altered or 
amended by the legislature, if the regulating instrument so provides and 
if the terms of those provisions are complied with: and the alteration 
or change may include the change or abolition of those very provisions. 
41. At p. 361d-g. Lord Diplock repeated this observation more recently in 
respect of the Constitution of Trinidad, & Tobago which carry similar 
provisions: see Kcleod v. Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago [1984] 1 
AER 694 PC at 697a-b. 
42. The possibility of abuse of power by a parliamentary majority ''has led 
Lord Hailsham to use the term "elective dictatorship". He advocated, at 
least when out-of-office, for the entrenchment in Britain of certain 
liberties in a written or controlled constitution: see his Dilemma of 
Democracy (Collins, London: 1978) chapters "Elective Dictatolr-sFirýp-11(p. 
125 et seq). Constitutions, Written And Unwritten (p. 133 et seq). For a 
similar view, -s-e-e-Lo-rT-S carman, En5E1: Law - The New Dimension (Hamlyn SF 
Lectures) Stevens (London 1974). The phrase "tyranny of the majority" is 
itself attributable to Alexis de Tocqueville in his classic treatise 
"Democracy in America" (First Published in 1835; Reprinted in Mentor 
Books--(USA) 1956 Print Ed. Richard Heffner). He quotes Jefferson, one of 
the founders of the American republic as saying: "The executive power in 
our government is not the only, perhaps not even the principal, object 
of my solicitude. The tyranny of the legislature is really the danger 
most feared, and will continue to be so for many years to come. The 
tyranny of the executive power will come in its turn, but at a more 
distant period": at p. 122. In a Westminster style constitution, unlike 
the American model, the executive more likely than not controls the 
legislature, and so the fear expressed by Jefferson is immediate with 
respect to these Constitutions. 
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The proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once 
established, has some inherent power, derived from the mere fact of its 
establishment, to make a valid law by the resolution of a bare majority 
which its own constituent instrument has said shall not be a valid law 
unless made by a different type of majority 'or by a different 
legislative process. n4 
In Phang Chin Hcck v. Public Prosecutor, 44 the amending power of Parliament 
was fully tested in Malaysia. The question, inter alia, was whether Parliament 
could make an amendment that was itself inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The Federal Court rejected this as a limiting factor stating that if it were 
so then no change whatsoever could be made to the Constitution. 45 The Court 
drew a distinction between ordinary legislation which under Article 4(1) would 
be invalid if they offend the Constitution and legislation intended to amend 
the Constitution. In respect of the latter, Suffian LP, following Ranasinghe's 
case, said: 
"(I)t is enough for us merely to say that Parliament may amend the 
Constitution in any way they think fit, provided they comply with all 
the conditions precedent and subsequept regarding manner and form 
prescribed by the Constitution itself. n4 
In an earlier case, Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Nalaysia47 the Federal 
Court dismissed a like argument when considering whether Article 5(4), dealing 
with the rights of arrested persons could be amended. Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as 
he then was) concluded: 
"I concede that Parliament can alter the entrenched provisions of clause 
(4) of Article 5 ..... so long as the process of constitutional amendment 
as laid down in Clause (3) of Article 159 is complied with. When that is 
43. See The Bribery Commissioners v. Ranasinghe, op. cit. at p. 792D-F. 
44. [1980] 1 MLJ 70 FC. 
45. At p. 72F. 
46. At p. 74C. 
47. [1977] 2 MLJ 187. 
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done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, it is the su q reme 
law, and accordingly cannot be said to be at variance with itself. " 8 
These two decisions, 49 being the principal cases dealing with the 
amending power under the Malaysian constitution, suggest ýuite explicitly that 
the courts do not recognise any conceptual limitation or restriction on the 
amending power of Parliament. This differs from the doctrinal approach of the 
Indian Supreme Court on the same question. 50 In the sixties and seventies, the 
Indian Supreme Court, in a remarkable display of judicial innovation, declined 
to recognise the unbridled power of Parliament to' alter the constitution even 
if it complies with the requisite amendment procedure. The first was the 
decision in I. C. Golak Nath & Ors v. State of Punjab5l in 1967 where the 
Indian supreme court ruled that Parliament implicitly lacked the power to 
amend the fundamental liberty provisions of the Indian constitution. In 1973 
came the landmark decision in Kesavananda Dharati v. State of Kera1a52 when 
Golak Nath was overruled, and the Supreme Court adopted the broader principle 
48. Ibid at p. 190C. 
49. They are both decisions of the Federal Court delivered before the 
Supreme Court came into being as the final court of appeal on January 
1st, 1985. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Supreme 
Court will not, when confronted with a like question, decide in the same 
vein. 
50. Tun Salleh observes: "In interpreting Article 159, the Malaysian 
judiciary deserves to be congratulated for its pragmatic approach. It 
has rejected the conceptual approach pregnant with theories and 
ideologies which beset the judicial interpretation of the Indian 
Constitution": see Tun Salleh Abas, Amendment of the Malaysian 
Constitution, op. cit., note 37, p. x1iii. Tun Salle-Er-sconclusion is 
challengeaHe as not ascribing sufficient value to the objective behind 
these doctrines, which is to prevent the Constitution from being 
emasculated by a passing majority in Parliament. 
51. AIR 1967 SC 1643; see also comment by K. Subba Rao "Freedom in Free 
India" [1968] 55 AIR 22. 
52. AIR 1973 SC 1461. There have been numerous articles written in law 
journals, mostly from India, on this epochal decision. For a 
comprehensive account in a journal from outside India, see David Gwynn 
Morgan, The Indian "Essential Features" Case (1981] 30 ICLQ 307. 
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that the amending power of Parliament did not extend to altering the basic 
features of the Indian Constitution. Sikri Ci in that case, identified the 
basic features (although by no means exhaustive) of the -Indian Constitution 
as: (1) supremacy of the constitution (2) republican and democratic forms of 
government (3) secular character of the constitution (4) separation of powers 
between legislature, executive and judiciary (5) federal character of the 
constitution. 53 The Malaysian courts have so far declined to adopt the Indian 
doctrine. 54 The Malaysian courts55 have instead opted to follow the pre-Golak 
Nath cases like Shankari Prasad Deo v. union of India [1951]56 and Sajjan 
Singh v. State of Rajasthan57 [1965] which do not recognise any restraint on 
the amending power of Parliament. 
In the result, the position obtaining in Malaysia presently is that in 
the absence of express restrictions found in the Constitution itself there is 
no implied restraint on Parliament's power to amend. The supremacy provision 
(Article 4(1)) of the constitution cannot be a restraining factor. An argument 
in this regard was rightly dismissed in Phang Chin Hock Is case. ý On a like 
provision in the constitution of Trinidad & Tobago, Lord Diplock observed 
(Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago v. Mcleod): 58 
53. The rule laid down in this case still prevails in India:. see Indira 
Nehru Candhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299; Waman Rao v. Union of India 
AIR 1981 SC 271. 
54. See Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor, supra. A fuller discussion of 
"the basic features" doctrine and its relevance in the Malaysian context 
is discussed in Chapter XII. 
55. Ibid. 
56. AIR 1951 SC 458. 
57. AIR 1965 SC 845. 
58. (1984] 1 AER 694 PC. 
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"Although supreme the constitution, is not immutable ..... constitutions 
on the Westminster model..... provideýfor their future alteration by the 
people acting through their representatives in the parliament of the 
state. In constitutions on the Westminster model, this is the 
institution in which the pleniture of the state's legislative power is 
vested. "59 
In the writer Is, view the requirement f or. a specif ied maj ority f or amendment, of 
the Constitution is not a safeguard against an expedient use of the power by 
the government of the day. It is therefore illusory to refer to the provisions 
covered by this procedure as entrenched provisions. 
60 
The only true entrenchment occurs in respect of the provisions covered 
by Article 159(5) requiring the consent of the Conference of Rulers, 
61 as a 
condition precedent to any amendment of those provisions. Clause (5) of 
Article 159 reads: 
59. At p. 697a-b. 
60.1 In its 30 year history the Malaysian Constitution has been amended 31 
times including and up to the 1988 Amendments (Amendmefit Act A 704, of 
1988). The amendments up to 31 December 1987 are listed at p. 217 of the 
Federal Constitution Reprint No. 1 of 1988 (Government Printers, ' 1988). 
The frequent lament of parliamentarians, especially those from the 
opposition bench, is that insufficient time is given to consider and 
debate the amendments: see Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, Bills: Give Sufficient 
Time (1983) 2 CLJ 51; see also INSAF Vol. XVI No. 3 August 1983 p. 14 
Tin_ýd-er the heading: ContemporaIX Law Making In Malaysia. The most 
--apposite comment in this regard was made by the Prime Minister -Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamed himself when serving as a backbencher in Parliament: 
"Laws were hurriedly passed without prior consultation with , the 
representatives who had to "sell" these laws to the people ..... The 
manner, the frequency and the trivial reasons for altering the 
Constitution reduced this supreme law of the nation to a useless scrap 
of paper": see his The Malay Dilemma (Federal Publications) 1981 Edn. at 
p. 
61. The unique position and status of the Conference of Rulers established 
under Article 38 of the Constitution is discussed in Chapter IV. The 
Conference of Rulers has judicially been recognised as a constitutional 
body "with certain executive, deliberative and consultative functions": 
see Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor* (No. 2) [19801 1 MLJ 213 FC. 
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"A law making an amendment to Clause (4) of Article 10, any law passed 
thereunder, the provisions of Part III, Article 38,63(4), 70,71(l), 
72(4), 152 or 153 to this clause, shall not be passed without the 
consent of the Conference of Rulers. " 
This clause was created by the constitution (Amendment) Act, 1971.62 It may be 
noted, however, that the role of the Conference of Rulers in the amendment 
process had existed from the beginning. Clause (5) of Article 159 of the 
independence Constitution read as follows: 
"A law making an amendment to Article 38,70,71(l) or 153 shall not be 
passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers. "63 
It covered provisions dealing largely with the position, privileges and 
honours of the Malay Rulers. Article 38 is concerned with the functions and 
powers of the Conference of Rulers; Article 70 deals' with the order of 
precedence of Rulers and Governors; Article 71(l) contains the guarantee of a 
Ruler to succeed, hold, enjoy and exercise the constitutional rights and 
privileges of a Ruler of a state; and lastly, Article 153, the only provision 
in the series not connected with the position and privileges of the Rulers, 
deals with the special rights and privileges of the Malays and the natives of 
the Borneo states and the legitimate interests of the other communities. By 
the Amendment Act 1971 the power and role of the Conference of Rulers in the 
amendment'process was enhanced by the addition of other provisions to the list 
requiring approval of the Rulers before any amendment in respect of them could 
62. Act A 30 of 1971. 
63. See Malayan Constitutional 'Documents Vol. One, 2nd Edn (Government 
Printers) p. 122. 
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be validly passed. The significant addition was Article 10(4)64 and any laws 
passed under that provision. These inclusions were also explanatory of the 
background to the Amendment Act 1971. The amendments were brought about as a 
result of the racial riots on May 13,1969 in several parts of Peninsula 
Malaysia. 65 A state of emergency was declared throughout the country on May 
15,1969. As events went Parliament was not convened until 20 February 1971. 
Meanwhile, in order to curb inflammatory speech and conduct by racial 
extremists, the amendments were introduced aimed at restricting freedom of 
speech. The amendment Act added to Article 10 dealing with the right of free 
speech, Clause (4) which read: 
"In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof or public order under Clause (2)(a), 
Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, 
right, status, position, privilege, sovereignity or prerogative 
established or protected by the provisions of Part III, Article 152,153 
or 181 otherwise than in relation to the implementation thereof as may 
be specified in such law". 66 
z 
64. Articles 63(4) and 72(4) are consequential to the inclusion of Article 
10(4) because they deal with the removal of parliamentary privilege in 
respect of a seditious speech in Parliament and the State Legislature 
respectively. 
65. See HP Lee, The Amendment Process Under The Malaysian Constitution 
(1974), 1 JMCL 185 at-p. 196. See also Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, 
Parliamentary Debates On The Constitution Amendment Bill 1971 (1972) MLJ 
pp. ix-xv. The 1969 race riots and the Proclamation-of Emergency in 
consequence thereof is discussed in Chapter VI. For a comprehensive 
account of Sino-Malay Relations and the May 13 riots, see Leon Comber, 
13 May 1969: A Historical survey Of Sino-Malay Relations (Heinemann 
Asia) 1986. Rpt. 
66. The amendment made to the Sedition Act 1948 by Emergency Ordinance No. 
45 of 1970 promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was however never 
made into a law under Clause (4) of Article 10. The effect of the 
amendment was to widen the definition of "seditious tendency" under the 
Sedition Act 1948 and "making ........ taboo any topic of public discussion calling in question" any of the "sensitive matters" 
identified in the Act: see Ong C. J. in Nelan bin Abdullah v. Public 
Prosecutor [1971] 2 HLJ 280 at p. 282. 
142 
It authorised Parliament to pass a law validly curbing speech in respect of 
four "sensitive" matters namely, the special position of the Malays and of the 
natives of the Borneo States, citizenship rights of the non-Malays, the status 
of the National Language and languages of the other communities and the 
position , of the Rulers. 67 The true entrenchment of the provisions covered by 
this clause is assured by the fact that an amendment to Clause (5) -of Article 
159 has itself to receive the consent of the Rulers. 68 As observed by one of 
their Majesties in respect of the confiding of these sensitive matters in the 
hands of the Rulers: 
"It is true that the Conference of Rulers acts on advice in this matter. 
But one will not expect %t the consent of the Rulers could be obtained 
easily in these matters". 9 
In summary, on the present state of authgritiesi the Malaysian r 
Parliament is not subject to any restrictions as to its amending power other 
than those 'ýexpressly contained in Article 159 itself. Thus an amendment of 
Article ' 150 would be valid, no matter how radical, so long as the prescribed 
procedure is followed. 
67. Parliament has yet to pass a law under Article 10(4), although as noted 
above, the Sedition Act 1948, a pre-independence statute, has been 
amended to proscribe discussion of these sensitive matters. The Act, of 
course, has a wider coverage than these matters. It is of a disturbingly 
wide application and speaks of "seditious tendency" as being speech 
calculated to create ill-will and hostilities between the races or 
disaffection between the Rulers and their subjects etc. In the seventies 
and eighties the Act was invoked on several occasions to prosecute 
individuals: see PP v. Ooi Kee Saik [1971] 2 MLJ 108; PP v. Fan Yew Teng 
[1975] 1 MIJ 176, [19751 2 MIJ 235; Oh Keng Seng v. PP [19801 2 MIJ 244; 
PP v. Nark Koding [1983] 1 MLJ 111. The most recent prosecution under 
the Act, and the only one todate resulting, in the acquittal of the 
defendant, was PP v. Param Cumarasvamy [1986] 1 MLJ 518. 
68. See observation by HP Lee, The Amendment Process Under The Malaysian 
Constitution, op. cit. at 199: "Herein lies the justifi-cation for 
describl-n-gthe Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1971 as an attempt at 
entrenchment". 
69. DYMM Sultan Azlan Shah, The Role Of Constitutional Rulers: A Malaysian 
Perspective For The La#Y-1-1-9-8277T -JMCL 1 at p. 16. 
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In the result between 1960 and 1985, Article 150 has been amended six 
times without let or hindrance. Some of them like the amendments made in 1966 
to deal with the so-called Sarawak crisis were purely to overcome perceived 
constitutional obstacles to a pre-determined course of action, whilst others 
were minor involving a mere change of words like the 1976 amendment. But other 
amendments were portentous and far reaching striking at the very heart of 
constitutionalism in the country. 
We may now examine each of the amendments to determine the extent to 
which there has been deviation from the original scheme of emergency rule 
envisaged under Article 150: 
Amendment to Article 150(3) by the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act No. 10 of 1960 dated 31 May 1960 
Article 150(3) deals with the life and duration of a proclamation of 
emergency. Article 150(3) originally read as follows: 
"A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under Clause 
(2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and if not sooner 
revoked, shall cease to be in force 
(a) A Proclamation at the expiration of a period of two months 
beginning with the date on which it was issued; and 
(b) An Ordinance at the expiration of a period of fifteen days 
beginning with the date on which both Houses are first sitting, 
unless, before the expiration of that period, it has been approved by a 
resolution of both Houses of Parliament". 
This clause was substituted by section 29 of the constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1960, in force from May 31,1960, with a new clause70 which 
reads as follows: 
70. Article 150(3) in its present form is identical to the amendments made in 1960 except that "clause (2) in the body of Article 150(3) now reads 
as "clause (2B)" because of the amendments made to Article 150(l) and (2) by Act A514 of 1981. 
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"A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under clause 
(2) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not sooner 
revoked, shall cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by both 
Houses annulling such Proclamation or ordinance, but without prejudice 
to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the power of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to issue a new Proclamation under clause (1) or 
promulgate any ordinance under clause (2). " 
The Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Bill in . Parliament merely 
stated: 
"It is considered that the Article should be, amended in order to permit 
a Proclamation or ordinance to continue in force until revoked ýy His 
Majesty or annulled by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.. 71 
The impact of the change was,, however, not quite so simple. It dealt with two 
essential features of a state of emergency, namely, duration of, the emergency 
and parliamentary control over the Proclamation, and of emergency laws. - It 
essentially reversed the process of ending or extending an emergency. 72 
Whereas previously there was a positive burden on the Executive to convene 
Parliament to debate the Proclamation within two months, in which event 
emergency laws would lapse within f if teen days of the commencement of the 
sitting73 unless approved by resolution of both Houses, there was now no time 
limit for the seeking of Parliamentary approval. 74 Thus if an emergency is 
proclaimed when both Houses of Parliament are not sitting, the state of 
71. See Federal Government Gazette dated 31 March 1960 (Explanatory 
Statement Para. 15). 
72. INSAF Editorial Vol. xii (No. 1) June 1979; see also GTS Sidhu, 
Emergency Powers Under Article 150 Of The Constitution, INSAF Vol. xxi 
(No. 1) June 1990 at p. 79. 
73. The comment in the Explanatory Statement (Para. 151, supra, ) that it is 
fifteen days "from the date of tabling" would appear to be an erroneous 
statement. 
74. A further amendment to Article 150 with regard to parliamentary control 
was the removal through Act A514 of 1981 of clause (2) dealing with the 
requirement to convene Parliament "as soon as may be practicable". 
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emergency can continue indefinitely until the Executive sees it fit to convene 
Parliament. This happened in 1969 after race-riots, broke out on 13 May 1969 
following the general elections. An emergency was proclaimed throughout the 
Federation on 15 May 1969. Parliament had by then been dissolved for the 
purposes of the general elections. 75 It was notýconvened until 20 February 
1971. During the period, the emergency continued and the country was governed 
for all practical purposes by a Director of operations without parliamentary 
sanction. 
Thus the amendment by removing the constitutional imperative of laying 
the Proclamation before Parliament for debate and approval within a specified 
time has theoretically made it possible for a Government to continue a state 
of emergency indefinitely. In the writer's opinion the amendment is a radical 
departure from the letter, spirit and intent of the original Article 150 
proposed by the Reid Commission. 
(2) Amendment of Article 150(l), (5) and (6) And the Addition of 
New Clause (6A) by Act No. 26 of 1963 dated 16 September 1963 
The dominant purpose of Act No. 26 of 1963, or the Malaysia Act 1963, 
was to amend the Constitution to provide for the establishment of Malaysia by 
the admission of new states, namely Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. In making 
the necessary modifications for this purpose, Parliament had apparently made a 
comprehensive review of the Constitution and also made changes to parts which 
were, strictly speaking, unconnected with the creation of the new Federation. 
75. See observation by Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo) in Covernment of Malaysia v. 
Kahan Singh [1975] 2 MIJ 155 FC at 164A: "The emergency in 1969 is 
different from the previous emergencies in that when the Proclamation 
was made, Parliament had already been dissolved and elections to Dewan 
Ralayat had yet to be completed. As it was not possible to summon 
Parliament, the Proclamation could not be laid before Parliament. " 
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The emergency provisions fell in this category. By section 39 of the Malaysia 
Act 1963, clauses (5) and (6) of Article 150 were substituted with new clauses 
(5), (6) and (6A). The Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Bill in 
Parliament76 made no mention of the amendments to Article 150 implying thereby 
that the amendments were inconsequential. A closer scrutiny-would reveal that 
this was far from being the true position. 
We may deal, separately with each of the three clauses amended in this 
session: 
(a) Article 150(l) 
This clause read originally as follows: 
"If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security or economic life of the Federation or 
any part thereof is threatened, whether by war or external 
aggression or internal disturbance he may issue a Proclamation of 
Emergency. " 
The amendment removed the words "whether by war or external aggression or 
internal disturbance" so that the clause now reads: 
"If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
whereby, the security or economic life of the Federation or any part is 
threatened he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency. " 
The removal of the words widened the circumstances in which an emergency could 
be declared. There was no longer a need to relate the threat to the security 
or economic life of the country to "war, external aggression or internal 
disturbance. 11 Any event threatening the security or economy of the country 
could now notionally justify the proclamation of a state of emergency. 77 
76. Goverment Gazette dated 13 August 1963. 
77. See, for example, GTS Sidhu, Emergency Powers under Article 150 of the 
Constitution, op. cit. p. 80, who suggests that even a srike by workers 
could be a justifying ground. 
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(b) Article 150(5): 
The amendment to this clause enlarged the law-making power of Parliament 
during an emergency. Parliament was no longer circumscribed by the subjects on 
which it could make laws nor could the coming into force of these laws be 
impeded by the requirement under the Constitution to obtain any consent or 
concurrence or the assent of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to any bill. Under the 
original clause (5), emergency laws also possessed an overriding quality but 
of a limited scale. The original clause read: 
"While a Proclamation of Emergency is in force Parliament may, 
notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, make laws with respect to 
any matter enumerated in the State List (other than any matter of Muslim 
law or the custom of the Malays), extend the duration of Parliament or 
of a state legislature suspend any election and make any provision 
consequential upon or incidental to any provision made in pursuance to 
this clause. " 
The effect of this clause was to permit Parliament's law-making power during 
an emergency to cover subjects listed in the State List (see Ninth Schedule to 
the constitution) being matters on which only the state legislature ordinarily 
had the jurisdiction to make laws. Parliament was also expressly empowered to 
make an emergency law extending its duration and that of a state legislature 
and to suspend any election. Except in respect of these enumerated subjects, 
Parliament was otherwise obliged to abide by the Constitution in the exercise 
of its law-making function. This limitation was removed by the amendments. 
Clause (5) was amended to read as follows: 
"Subject to clause (6A), 78 while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
force, Parliament may, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution 
make laws with respect to any matter, if it appears to Parliament that 
the law is required by reason of the emergency; and Article 79 shall not 
apply to a Bill for such a law or an amendment to such a Bill, nor shall 
any provision of this Constitution or of any written law which requires 
78. Clause (6A) was also introduced by the 1963 Amendments. 
148 
any consent or concurrence to the passing of a law or any consultation 
with respect thereto, or which restricts the coming into force of a law 
after it is passed or the presentation of a Bill to the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong for his assent. " 
The effect of the change was to remove all the stops. The enumeration 
previously of the matters in respect of which Parliament could pass overriding 
emergency laws was removed and in its place was conferred the carte blanche 
authority "to make laws with respect to any matter". This effectively 
obliterated the division of legislative powers between the Federal and State 
legislatures and concentrated all legislative power in the Central Executive 
for the period of the emergency. Thus, under a state of emergency the concept 
of a Federation with distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and 
the states becomes virtually non-existent, constitutionally speaking, and if 
it is seen to exist, it is entirely at the let and the sufferance of the 
Centre. 
The passing of an emergency law on a subject reserved for the State 
legislature under the State List is entirely at the discretion of Parliament. 
The phrase "if it appears to Parliament that the law is required by reason of 
the emergencyn does not admit of any judicial debate on the question whether 
Parliament had acted informedly or wisely in enacting an emergency 
legislation. This would echo the judicial position as stated by Lord Guest in 
the Privy Council in Akar v. Attorney General of Sierra Leone: 79 "Emergency 
laws cannot be challenged on grounds that it was not reasonably justifiable 
for the situation. "80 
The free hand of Parliament to legislate on any matter as an emergency 
measure is facilitated by the removal of all the procedural checks. Thus 
79. [1969] 3 All ER 384. 
so. At P. 395. 
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Article 79(l) requiring certification of any Bill changing the enumerated 
subjects, inter alia, in the concurrent List is rendered inapplicable as also 
the minimum period specified in Article 79(2) of notice before the Bill could 
be moved. Next, the dispensation of the requirement for any consent or 
concurrence is designed to remove compliance with Article 159(5) and enable a 
by-passing of the Conference of Rulers. The matters contained in Article 
159(5) like Article 10(4) dealing with abridgement of criticism and free 
discussion in respect of certain "sensitive matters" or the position and 
privileges of the Rulers would ordinarily require the consent of the 
Conference of Rulers before any changes could be made to them. An emergency 
law under clause (5) now does not need the consent of the Rulers even if it 
affects the'matters covered by Article 159(5). 
Lastly, even the assent of the Yang di-Pertuan'Agong is dispensed with' 
so that an emergency Bill, may come into-force without the imprimatur of the 
Sovereign Head. The requirement for assent is contained in Article 6681 of the 
Constitution and provides that: a Bill upon being passed by both Houses of 
Parliament shall be presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for his assent and 
shall become law on being assented to. We see a departure from this norm in 
respect of emergency legislation. significantly it symbolises complete 
executive control and dominance in matters relating to the administration of 
the state of emergency. Thus the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who in any event is 
duty bound under Article 40(l) to act on the advice of the cabinet as a 
81. This Article was amended in January 1984 (Constitution Amendment Act 
A584) with effect from 20 January 1984. The need for the assent of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong was one of the subjects that sparked off the 
controversy in late 1983 between the executive Government and the 
Rulers. The constitutional crisis of 1983 is discussed in the following 
pages. 
150 
constitutional monarch, 82 ceases to play any role in an emergency once he 
issues the Proclamation, 'and'once Parliament is convened. 
(C) Article 150(6) and New Article 150(6A) 
The amended clause (6) and the new clause (6A) are inter-related. Clause 
(6A) was introduced to impose restrictions on the width of the amended clause 
(6). In its original form, clause (6) read as follows: 
"No provision of any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance 
of this Article shall be invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with 
the provisions of Part II and Article 79 shall not apply to any Bill for 
such law or any amendment to such a Bill. 11 
Part II of the Federal constitution deals with fundamental liberties. Prior to 
the amendment, emergency legislation could only override the fundamental 
liberties provisions and not the other provisions of the Constitution. This 
was in keeping with the observation of the Reid Commission that "the existence 
of fundamental rights ..... ought (not) to be permitted to 
imperil the safety 
of the state". 83 However, the amendment removed this restriction. The new 
clause (6) reads as follows: 
4 
"Subject to clause (6A), no provision of any ordinance promulgated under 
this Article, and no provision of any Act of Parliament which is passed 
while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which declares that 
the law appears to Parliament to be required by reason of the emergency, 
shall be--invalid on ground of inconsistency with any provision of this 
Constitution. " 
82. See Lord Diplock in Teh Cheng Poh v. PP [1969] 1 MLJ 49 PC at p. 55F-G; 
see also Ong F. J. in Stephen Kalong Ningkan V. Covernment of Malaysia 
[1968] 1 MLJ 119 at p. 125B-G: "His Majesty is not an autocratic ruler 
since Article 40(1) of the Federal Constitution provides that "in the 
exercise of his functions under this Constitution or Federal law the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall act in accordance with the advice of the 
Cabinet. " 
83. The Reid Report Para. 175 pp. 75-76. The Report also cautioned "that the 
infringement of fundamental rights ..... is only justified to such an 
extent as may be necessary to meet any particular danger which threatens 
the nation. " 
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The effect of the amendment is to give a general overriding quality to 
emergency legislation. Article 4(1) which declares the Constitution as the 
supreme law is itself overridden so that an emergency legislation today 
prevails over the Constitution. In the writer's view no other provision of 
the Constitution strikes so deadly a blow to the fabric of constitutionalism 
in the country as does this clause. 84 The superogatory quality of emergency 
legislation by virtue of clause (6) is limited only by the new clause 6(A). 85 
This clause reads: 
"Clause (5) shall not extend the powers of Parliament with respect to 
any matter of Muslim law or the custom of the Malays, or with respect to 
any matter of native law or custom in a Borneo State; nor shall clause 
(6) validate any provision inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Constitution relating to any such matter or relating to religion, 
citizenship or language. " 
The effect of clause (6A) is to preserve and keep inviolate certain subjects 
which are put beyond the reach of emergencyý legislation. ' These subjects 
reflect -the compromise or bargain at the time of Independence between the 
multi-ethnic , and multi-religious communities of Malaysia. They are the same 
subjects that have consistently been given special treatment in the 
Constitution. For example, under Article 10(4) Parliament may, pass a law 
prohibiting the questioning of any matter, inter alia, pertaining- to 
citizenship or the national language. In like vein, these subjects are also 
84. clause (6) --and 
its effect on constitutionalism in the country is 
discussed in chapter XI later. 
85. Another limiting factor is explicit in clause (6) itself, namely, that 
the Act of Parliament must declare that the law is required by reason of 
the emergency. This is a condition of law-making and unless the law 
conforms to the same it will not have the special quality of emergency 
legislation as discussed: see Bribery Commissioners v. Ranasinghe [1964] 
2 AER 785,782 PC. 
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insulated from amendment under Article 159(5) without the prior approval of 
the Conference of Rulers. A noticeable omission from the list of subjects in 
Clause (6A) is the position, privilege and status of the Rulers themselves. 
There is no discernible reason for this omission. Thus as Article 150 stands 
today it is technically possible for emergency legislation to be passed by 
Parliament, affecting the rights and privileges of the Rulers which would be 
valid under Clause (6) because it is not protected by Clause (6A). Moreover, 
in view of Clause (5) it will be possible for such legislation to be brought 
into force without the assent of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
(3) Temporary Amendment to Article 150(5) and (6) made by the Emergency 
(Federal Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, 1966, No. 68 of 
1966 effective 20 September, 1966 
The Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, 
1966 was passed on 20 September 1966 purely to deal with the so-called 
constitutional crisis in Sarawak in respect of which the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
had proclaimed an emergency in the State on 14 September 1966. The 
constitutional crisis was brought about by the dismissal of the Chief Minister 
of the State by the Governor on the perceived ground that he no longer 
commanded the confidence of a majority of the members of the state 
legislature, called the Council Negri. The dismissal was struck down by the 
High Court, Borneo on the ground that the Governor had-no power of dismissal 
under the State Constitution and that the Chief Minister could only be removed 
if he suffers a vote of no-confidence in the Council Negri. 86 Thwarted in its 
efforts to remove the recalcitrant Chief Minister, the Federal Government 
invoked its emergency powers under Article 150 to achieve its objective. The 
86. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Openg (No. 1) [1966] 2 MLJ 187 per 
Harley Ag. CJ. 
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Emergency (Federal constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act 1966 was 
passed with only this object in mind. A perceived restriction in Article 
150(5) and (6) was removed temporarily so that Federal 'law overriding the 
State Constitution could be passed to permit the Governor to convene a session 
of the Council Negri to pass a vote of no-confidence on the Chief Minister. 
The Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Bill in Parliament dealt with 
this objective quite explicitly: 
"In a recent judgment of the High Court in Borneo it was held that the 
question whether the chief Minister commands the confidence of a 
majority of the members of the Council Negri cannot be resolved 
otherwise than by a vote in the Council itself. It was further held, in 
the same judgment, that the State Constitution confers no power on the 
Governor to dismiss, or by any means to enforce the resignation of, a 
Chief Minister, even when it has been demonstrated that he has lost the 
confidence of a majority. This is a serious lacuna in the State 
Constitution, and one which enables a Chief Minister whose majority has 
become a minority to flout the democratic convention that the leader of 
the Government party in the House should resign when he no longer 
commands the confidence of a majority of the members. The occurrence of 
such an event, resulting in the breakdown of stable Government and 
thereby giving rise to the spreading of rumours and alarm throughout the 
territory, is in the opinion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, as expressed 
in the Proclamation of Emergency, a threat to the security of Sarawak. 
Clause 3 of the Bill is designed to remove any doubt as to whether the 
power of Parliament to make laws pursuant to a Proclamation of Emergency 
extends to making laws inconsistent with the provisions of a State 
constitution, as it expressly does in relation to the Federal 
Constitution - Article 150(5) and (6). The proposed amendment of the 
Constitution is intended to be a temporary one, which will cease to have 
effect six months after the Proclamation of Emergency ceases to be in 
force.,, 87 
Clause 3 was enacted as Section 3 of the 1966 Act. It read as follows: 
"(1) In Article 150 of the Constitution - 
(a) in Clause (5), after the word "Constitution" where it first 
occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or in the 
Constitution of the State of Sarawak"; and 
87. See Bill dated 19 September 1966. 
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(b) in clause (6), after the word "Constitution" at the end 
thereof, there shall be added the words "or of the 
Constitution of the State of Sarawak" 
(2) The amendments made by subsection (1) of this-section shall cease 
to have effect six months after the date on which the Proclamation 
of Emergency issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the fourteenth 
day of September 1966 ceases to be in force. " 
The remarkable feature of this amendment was its temporary duration. As it 
turned out, it has been the only temporary amendment to the Federal 
Constitution in'the constitutional history of the country. 
However, the necessity for the amendments was doubtful. It's purpose was 
to overcome the provision in the Sarawak Constitution that did not authorise 
the Governor of the State to convene a sitting of the Council Negri to take a 
vote of confidence on the Chief Minister. Clause (5) of Article 150 as it 
stood even before the temporary amendment enabled Parliament to encroach onto 
the legislative sphere of the State legislatures. Thus by Federal emergency 
law, Parliament could have empowered the Governor to convene a sitting of the 
council Negri, as it did by this Act, without having to amend Clause (5). 
Moreover, by Article 75 it is declared that state law which is inconsistent 
with federal law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. In the 
writer's view the constitutional supremacy accorded to emergency legislation 
by Clause (5) and the ef f ect of Article 75 should have - been suf f icient to 
place the Act beyond challenge. In addition, there was Clause (4) which read: 
"While aýProclamation of Emergency is in, force the executive authority 
of the Federation shall, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
extend to any matter within the legislative authority of a State and to 
the giving of directions to the Government of a State or to any officer 
or authority thereof. " 
one would have thought that Clause (4) was wide enough to empower the Federal 
Government to instruct the clerk of the council Negri or its Speaker, by 
executive order, to convene a sitting to determine the question whether the 
Chief Minister enjoyed the confiaence of a majority of its members. 
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It is likely that the resort to the extreme measure of invoking 
emergency powers under Article 150, and the making of the 1966 temporary 
amendments, was probably undertaken ex abudanti cautela -to ensure that the 
Federal Government achieved its, objective in'Sarawak. 
(4) Amendment of Article 150(l) and (2) and the Addition of 
New Clauses (2A), (2B), (2C)j (8) and (9) By The 
Constitution (Amendment) Act A514 of 1981 effective 
14 May 1981 
The amendments in 1981 probably effected the most significant change to 
Article 150. At one end of the spectrum it enlarged the power to proclaim a 
state of emergency. At the other, it purported to immunise the act of 
proclamation from legal challenge and judicial review. The amendments were 
occasioned by the landmark decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. 
Public Prosecutor, 88 where in the course of striking down emergency 
legislation made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after Parliament had sat, Lord 
Diplock made several observations about the status and continuity of a regime 
of emergency in Malaysia. For example, about the continuity, he observed: 
"Apart from annulment by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament it 
(the Proclamation) can be brought to an end only by revocation by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong. If he fails to act the court has no power itself 
to revoke the proclamation in his stead. This, however, does not leave 
the court powerless to grant to the citizen a remedy in cases in which 
it can be established that a future to exercise his power of revocation 
would be an abuse of his discretion ..... (M)andamus could, in their Lordship's view, be sought against the members of the Cabinet requiring 
them to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke the Proclamation. 1189 
88. (1979] 1 MLJ 50 PC; [1980] AC 458. 
89. At p. 55E-G. 
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On overlapping proclamations of emergency, which was the case when the 1969 
Emergency was proclaimed to overlap the still existing 1964 Emergency, he 
said: 
"In their Lordship's view, a proclamation of a new emergency declared to 
be threatening the security of the Federation as .a whole must 
by 
necessary implication be intended to operate as a revocation of a 
previous Proclamation, if one is still in force". 90 
The 1981 amendments purported to negative these observations. We will take a 
closer look at the changes: 
(a) Article 150(1) and (2) 
Clause (1) was amended by adding the word "public order" as 
follows: 
"If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security, or the economic life or public order 
in the Federation or any part thereof is threatened, he may issue 
a Proclamation of Emergency making therein, a declaration to that 
effect". 
The addition of the words "public order" was to widen the existing grounds 
upon which an emergency could be declared. It is difficult to envisage what 
it is intended to cover because of the all-embracing character of the term 
"whereby the security ...... of the Federation or any apart thereof is 
threatened" already found in Article 150(l). It has been suggested that the 
amendment was a response to a problem extant then, namely, the protest in many 
quarters in the country to the amendment to the societies Act. 91 The likely 
90. At p. 53H. 
91. See GTS Sidhu, op. cit. at p. 81. The amendments to the Societies Act 
1966 was far reaching. It was perceived as an infringement of the right 
to freedom of association. societies were classified as political and 
non-political societies. It drew widespread criticism from public 
interest groups including the Bar Council. A protest march by lawyers to 
Parliament led to the participants being charged for partaking in an 
unlawful assembly: see PP v. Cheah Beng Poh & 42 others [1984] 2 MLJ 
225; Siva Segera v. -Tublic, Prosecutor (1984] 2 MLJ 212 FC. 
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reason is found in the Government's response to a number of urban terrorists 
attacks that rocked Kuala Lumpur in 1974 and 1975 resulting in the enactment 
of several legislative counter measures like the Essentiil (Security Cases) 
Regulations 1975.92 Moreover there was an increased number of cases of 
unlawful possession of firearms in the late ' seventies which made the 
Government to conclude that the potential for internal disturbance was not 
over. 
The insertion of the "public order" ground is ironical since "internal 
disturbance" was removed as a head for declaring an emergency by the 1963 
amendments. Apart from the change of circumstances presented by the urban 
unrest problems in the nineteen-seventies, the term "public order" in its 
generic sense is wider than "internal disturbance" and possibly explains its 
insertion. The meaning of the term was considered in Re Tan Boon Liat93 in 
the context of a preventive detention law94 that authorised the Minister for 
Home Affairs to make a detention order "if he is satisfied it is necessary to 
do so to prevent any person acting in any manner prejudicial to public order". 
Abdoolcader J. said: "Danger to human life and safety and disturbance of 
public tranquility must necessarily fall within the purview of the 
expression ...... it is used in a generic sense and is -not necessarily 
antithetical to disorder and is wide enough to include consideration of public 
92. See Chandran Jeshurun, Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in 
Malaysia, 1957-82 (ISIS PublilEation Singapore: Government And Rebellions 
In South East Asia) p. 134 et. seq. and at p. 143. See also observation 
by Wan Suleiman FJ in PP v. Khong Teng Khen [1976] 2 MLJ 166 at p. 176 
of "Circumstances now prevailing in this country ..... which takes 
various forms including widespread illegal possession and use of 
firearms". 
93. [1976] 2 MLJ 83. 
94. Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969. 
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safety in its signification". 9,5 This definition of "public order" is likely 
to be accepted also in the context of Article 150(l). Article 150(2) was a new 
insertion. It reads: 
"A Proclamation of Emergency under Clause (1) may be issued before the 
actual occurrence of the event which threatens the . security, or 
the 
economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part thereof if 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied there is imminent danger of the 
occurrence of such event". 
Even more significant than the insertion of the above provision was the 
deletion of the existing Article 150(2). That clause read as follows: 
"If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall summon Parliament as soon as may be 
practicable and may, until both Houses of Parliament are sitting, 
promulgate ordinances having the force of law if satisfied that 
immediate action is required". 
This constitutional provision was pivotal in the Teh Cheng Poh case in 
invalidating emergency legislation made after Parliament had sat in February 
1971. It's deletion is directly attributable to that decision. The purpose 
was to remove a ground for invalidating emergency law-making by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong during an emergency after Parliament had sat. The necessity for 
this deletion is questionable in the light of the enactment by Parliament soon 
after the decision of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 in January 
1979 to overcome the consequences of the Privy Council ruling. 
Additionally, we see here the move towards a further reduction of the 
role of Parliament in an emergency. The removal of the existing Clause (2) 
removes the duty cast upon the Government to convene Parliament "as soon as 
may be practicable". Although this phrase is open-ended and imposes no time- 
limit for the convening of Parliament to debate the emergency, it had a 
95. At p. 86D-F. A more detailed discussion of the "public order" head for 
proclaiming an emergency is found in Chapter VIII. 
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salutary effect. It carried an important principle that the norm was for 
Parliament to govern and that executive-rule through an emergency was the 
exception. 
The new Clause (2) empowers the proclamation-of an emergency even before 
the actual occurrence of the event which is said to constitute a threat to the 
security or the economic life of the Federation or to public order if there is 
an imminent danger of that occurrence. It considerably broadens the 
circumstances in which an emergency may be declared. It is no longer 
necessary for the Government to justify the proclamation by identifying any 
particular event, incidentýor occurrence as the cause of the emergency. It is 
now possible for the Government to act on intelligence reports alone and 
declare an emergency as a preventive measure. The obvious purpose of the 
amendment is to enlarge the power of the Government in declaring an emergency. 
Ironically, the position previously did not also require that the Government 
prove any disorder or disturbance to justify an emergency. This was 
manifested in the Privy Council's decision in the Ningkan case96 when it 
ruled, in repelling an argument that the State of Sarawak where the emergency 
was declared had shown none of the symptoms of a grave emergency, that an 
emergency is capable of covering a very wide range of situations and 
occurrences and that the Government could act on information and apprehensions 
not known to those who challenge its validity. 97 
(b) New Clauses (2A), (2B), (2C) and Clause (9) 
The new clauses are as follows and may be considered together: 
"(2A)The, power conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by, this 
Article shall include the power to issue different 
Proclamations on different grounds or in different 
96. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1968] 2 MLJ 288 PC. 
97. At pp. 241-242. 
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circumstances, whether ýor not there is a Proclamation or 
Proclamations already issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
under Clause (1) and such Proclamation or Proclamations are 
in-operation. 
(2B) If at any time while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation, except when both Houses of Parliament are sitting 
concurrently, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that 
certain circumstances exist which render it necessary for 
him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such 
ordinances as circumstances appear to him to require. 
(2C) 'An ordinance promulgated, under Clause, (2B) shall have the 
same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, and shall 
continue in full force and effect as if it is an Act of 
Parliament until it is revoked or annulled under Clause (3) 
, or until it lapses under Clause (7); and the power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to promulgate ordinances under Clause 
(2B) may be exercised in relation to any matter with respect 
to which Parliament has power to make laws, regardless of 
the legislative or other procedures required to be followed, 
or the proportion of the total votes required to be had, in 
either House of Parliament. 
(9) For, the purpose of this Article the Houses of Parliament 
shall be regarded as sitting only if the members of each 
. House are respectively assembled together and carrying out the business of the House". 
These clauses were again inserted to overcome the observations made by 
the Privy council in the Teh Cheng Poh case. Clause (2A) enables the 
Goverrment to declare overlapping proclamations of emergency. It is a direct 
response to Lord Diplock's comment that a new declaration of emergency that 
overlaps an existing emergency impliedly revokes the latter. 98 Previously in 
the Ningkan case, the Privy Council had observed that the continued existence 
of an emergency did not preclude the invocation again of the powers under 
Article 150.99 However, the distinction between the Teh Cheng Poh situation 
and the Ningkan situation was that in the case of the former the emergencies 
98. See Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit. at p. 53H. 
99. See Ningkan, op. cit. at p. 242E. 
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were truly overlapping because they were nation-wide emergencies whereas in 
the case of the latter, the emergency was only state-wide, being confined to 
the State of Sarawak. 
Clauses (2B) and (2C) deal with the law-making power of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong during an emergency. Clause (2B) deals with when the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong can make emergency laws, whereas Clause (2C) deals with the 
character of these laws. Clause (2B) was evidently enacted with the purpose 
of reinstating the majority opinion of the Federal Court in Public Prosecutor 
v. Khong Teng KhenlOO which was overruled by the Privy council in Teh Cheng 
Poh. The majority in Khong Teng Khen's case gave a literal meaning to the 
phrase "when Parliament is sitting" under the former Article 150(2) to mean 
when Parliament is actually sitting and deliberating. 
101 Clause (2B) read 
together with Clause (9) now makes it clear that the executive power to make 
emergency legislation through the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is retained throughout 
an emergency so long as both Houses of Parliament are not assembled together 
and deliberating. As the Federal Court itself observed in Khong Teng Khen's 
case, the two Houses do not sit at the same time. 
102 
Clause (2C) ensures that the width of the law making power of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong is co-extensive with that of Parliament and suffers no 
legislative or procedural limitations in its exercise. The necessity for 
Clause (2C) may be questioned in the light of Clause (6) which already confers 
a super-overriding quality to emergency legislation. 
100. [1976] 2 MLJ 166. 
101. See the convincing dissent of Ong Hock Sim F. J. who spoke of the 
absurdity of that interpretation: "(If) so the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's 
law-making function would revive over the week-end or when Parliament is 
in recess": at p. 172. 
102. At p. 172F. 
162 
(c) New Clause 81 
_L 
The introduction of Clause (8) made one of the most radical 
changes to Article 150. Clause 8 reads as follows: 
"(8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution 
(a) the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong mentioned 'in 
Clause (1) and Clause (2B) shall be final.. and conclusive and 
shall not be challenged or, called in question in any court 
on any ground; and 
(b) no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine 
any application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, 
on any ground, regarding the validity of - 
a Proclamation under Clause (1) or of a declaration 
made in such Proclamation to the effect stated in 
Clause (1); 
(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation; 
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B); or 
(iv) the continuation in force of any such ordinance. 
The Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Bill in Parliament gives the 
reason for the introduction of Clause (8) as follows: 
"The new Clause (8) seeks to provide that the satisfaction of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong under Clause (1) and Clause (2B) is final and, 
conclusive and cannot be challenged or called in question in any court 
or on any ground. This Clause also provides that no court shall have 
jurisdiction in relation to the validity of a Proclamation issued under 
Clause (1) or any declaration made in such Proclamation, or the 
continued operation of such Proclamation, or in relation to any 
ordinance promulgat 193 under Clause (2B) or the continuation in force of 
any such ordinance. 
The objective behind Clause (8) is obvious; it is to oust judicial review in 
respect of: (a) the declaration of a state of emergency, and its continuance, 
and (b)- the promulgation of any emergency ordinance and its continuance. 
Whether Clause (8) achieves its objective may be considered in the context of 
the discussion later of the justiciability of a proclamation of emergency. 
103. See Bill dated 19th April 1981. 
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(5) The Constitution (Amendment) Act A 566 of 1983 And the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act A 584 of 1984 Considered Together 
The 1983 amendments and the 1984 amendments to Article 150 may 
conveniently be discussed together. They dealt with the same subject and were 
in actuality a single occasion. The amendments made, in December 1983 were 
reversed in January 1984 in the wake of an unprecedented crisis that seemed to 
pit the Rulers , against the Federal Government. This confrontation which 
threatened to paralyse the process of Government104 was the direct result of 
the effect of the 1983 amendments, which is to diminish the role of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong in certain constitutional respects. The crisis highlighted 
the great importance attached by the Government to the presence and easy 
availability of the emergency powers under the Constitution. The amendments 
and the crisis that followed repay close scrutiny. 
The 1983 , amendments purported , to make a number of changes - to the 
Constitution. 105 -, However, the most important were those pertaining to the 
curtailment of the functions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the State 
Rulers. In this regard the proposed change to Article 150 must be examined in 
the context of the amendment to Article 66. The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 
purported to amend Article 66, dealing with the assent of the Yang di-Pertuan 
104. See H. F. Rawlings, The Malaysian Constitutional Crisis of 1983 (1986) 35 
ICLQ 237. 
105. There were 22 in all. some of the changes were to increase the number of 
Parliamentary and State seats, and provision to establish a Supreme 
Court in place of the Federal Court upon termination of appeals to the 
Privy Council. See generally, RH Hickling: Malaysia - constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1983 And Constitution (Amendment) Act 1984 (1T8,4) JMCL 
213. 
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Agong to bills passed by Parliament before they become law, by providing for 
its dispensation if'the Yang di-Pertuan Agong does not give his assent within 
fifteen days of it being presented to him. 106 
Article 150, was'changed by substituting the "satisfaction of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong" to declare an emergency for that of the Prime Minister. The 
amended Article 150(1) read as follows: 
"If the Prime Minister is satisfied that a grave emergency exists where 
by the security, or the economic life, or public order in the Federation 
or any part thereof is threatened, he shall advise the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong accordingly and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall then issue a 
Proclamation of Emergency making therein a declaration to that effect. " 
The other parts of Article 150 were likewise amended to ref lect the change 
that it was the satisfaction of the Prime Minister that was operative and that 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acted merely on advice. 
The objective behind the amendments to Articles 66 and 150 was to remove 
all ambiguity with regard to the purely constitutional role that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong plays in these matters. There can be little doubt that in 
assenting to a bill passed by Parliament, His Majesty acts as a constitutional 
monarch and cannot refuse to give his assent based on his private conception 
of the Bill. 107 Likewise on the question whether the Agong could act on his 
106. Article 66(5) was amended to read as follows:, 
"A Bill shall become law on being assented to by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong. If for any reason whatsoever the Bill is not 
assented to within fifteen days of the Bill being presented to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong, he shall be deemed to have assented to the 
Bill and the Bill shall accordingly become law. " 
A parallel change was made to Paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule to 
effect a similar dispensation in respect of the Ruler's assent to state 
legislation. 
107. This has been the consistent view of all leading writers on the subject. 
Professor Trindade in his article "The constitutional Position Of The 
Yanq-di-Pertuan Agong (see The Constitution of Malaysia -Its 
Development: 
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own in proclaiming a state of emergency under Article 150, all possible doubts 
should have been dispelled by the Privy Council's observation in Teh Cheng 
Poh's case: 
"(The Agong's) functions are those of a Constitutional monarch ..... he does not exercise any of his functions under the Constitution on his own 
initiative but is required by Article 40(l) to act in accordance with 
the advice of the Cabinet. So when one finds in the Constitution itself 
or in a Federal law powers conferred upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that 
are expressed to be exercisable if he is of opinion or is satisfied that 
a particular state of affairs exists or that a particular action is 
necessary, the reference to his opinion or satisfaction is in reality a 
reference to the collective opinion or satisfaction of the members of 
the Cabinet.... ". 108 
In the light of the obvious position that obtained prior to 1983 on 
these matters, the question asked is what prompted the Federal Government to 
act as it did? , It might be as one writer observed that it "constituted the 
Federal Government's attempt at a pre-emptive strike to mitigate the effects 
of the election of an autocratic or unpredictable Agong". 109 This was in 
reference to the unique monarchial system in Malaysia where one of the Malay 
Rulers is elected on rotation once in five years to fill the post of Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong or Supreme Head of the Federation. 110 It'so happened that 1984 
contd... 
107.1955-79 Ed. Suffian, Lee Trindade at p. 101 et. seq. ) concludes on this 
question that: "Nevertheless it does not seem possible for the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to withhold assent to a Bill passed by both Houses of 
Parliament". Likewise, a royal monarch has himself observed with regard 
to the royal assent: "In Malaysia, the role of the Rulers is 
specifically provided for in the Constitutions and the Rulers have no 
power to refuse: See Raja Tun Azlan Shah (as he then was) in The Role of 
the Constitutional Rulers: A. Malaysian Perspective For The Laity" (19 
JMCL 1. 
108. Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor (1979] 2 MIJ 50 at p. 52. 
109. H. F. Rawlings, op. cit. at p. 248. 
110. The principal feature. s of this system are discussed in Chapter IV. 
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was election year. The two eligible candidates were the Rulers of Perak and 
Johore. 111 The fears of the Federal Government in regard to the accession of 
either of these Rulers was encapsulated by Rawlings in hig, article: 
"The immediate cause of the crisis was the Federal Government's response 
to the prospect of an election of a new Agong to, take office in 1984. 
In order to understand this response, it is'necessary to explain that 
the conference of Rulers, when selecting a new Agong is in fact 
constrained in its choice by a series of rules set down by the Third 
schedule to the Constitution. The effect of these rules for the 1984 
election was that only two candidates, the Rulers of Perak and Johore, 
were immediately eligible, since all other states with hereditary Rulers 
had previously supplied a Ruler to serve as Agong. As the senior of the 
two, the Ruler of Perak was entitled to first refusal of the position. 
The problem for the Federal Government was simply that it did not 
wish either of the eligible Rulers to serve as Agong. Both Rulers, had 
come into conflict with their Chief Ministers and, as already mentioned 
in each case the Chief Minister had ultimately been compelled to resign. 
More recently, both Rulers had occasioned considerable confusion in 
their capacities as Heads of Islam by announcing that the Muslims 
fasting month of Ramadan would begin earlier in their states than in all 
other states - an indication of possible unwillingness to follow Federal 
Government or state Executive Council advice. Further, it was reported 
that at least one of the candidate Rulers had spoken openly of an 
intention, on assuming the office of Agong, to declare a Proclamation of 
Emergency under Article 150 of the Constitution and seek to exercise 
some governmental powers himself-. Finally, it should be said that the 
Ruler of Johor, at least, had a reputation as a somewhat colourful 
character, and his high-spirited exuberance had, prior to his accession 
to the throne of Johore, twice led to criminal convictions for offences 
involving personal injury to others. 
Furthermore, in at least one state (Pahang) the Ruler had refused 
to assent to state legislation as a tactic to bring pressure on his 
Chief Minister. 112 
111. The Ruler of Perak then was Sultan Idris Shah who died shortly before 
the election and was succeeded to the throneby Sultan Azlan Shah. The 
Ruler of Johore was Sultan Mahmood Iskandar who was eventually elected 
the eighth Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
112. H. F. Rawlings, op. cit. at p. 246. A remarkable feature of the 
constitutional crisis was the near-silence in the local media of the 
controversy. only foreign news journals commented on the crisis and 
provided the essential details. It was perceived that the news clamp was 
on the directions of the Government. In November 1983, the ALIRAN 
Quarterly observed: "When the amendments to Articles 66 and 150 were 
passed by Parliament in early August there was hardly any news in the 
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The crisis broke out when the Yang di-Pertuan Agong refused to assent to 
i 
the Constitution (Amendment) Bill passed by Parliament in August 1983. A 
local columnist wrote: 
"The King had earlier on been briefed by the -Prime Minister about the 
amendments and he had agreed to them. But apparently he did not quite 
understand the full import of the amendment to the Eighth Schedule or he 
had not been briefed on them. When his brother Rulers realised the full 
impact of the amendment to Schedule Eight they were up in arms. Led by 
the Sultans of Perak and Johore, they resolved that the King should not 
contd... 
112. local media. 'The regional magazines carried some information. A couple 
of opposition monthlies also discussed the issue ..... Even now with 
banner headline in the newspapers and demonstrations in different parts 
of the country, the pros and cons of the amendments have not been 
explored in any depth. once again, we have put on display one of our 
"national traits": we talk but do not think" (see ALIRAN Quarterly Nov. 
1983, The Constitutional Crisis And Democracy p. 1). It was evident that 
even during the parliamentary debate on EFe-amendments in August 1983, 
Government backbenchers noticeably avoided discussing the changes to 
Articles 66 and 150. The opposition Leader wrote: "We seem to be staging 
a Wayang Kulit, where we see the shadows but not the substance, as 
nobody seems to be brave enough to deal with the real substance of the 
amendments. The Bill before the House is one of the most important 
amendments to be made to the Constitution, as for the first time since 
Merdeka, amendments are proposed which would have grave consequences to 
the system of government in Malaysia. Everybody is aware of the great 
import of this amendment, but everyone is steering clear of the subject. 
In the Parliament canteen or outside this Chamber, when MPs discuss the 
1983 Constitutional Amendment Bill, they do not talk about the proposed 
increase of parliamentary seats, nor do they discuss the proposed 
amendment to Article 48 to specify the circumstances whereby an MP 
convicted of criminal offence would lose his seat. What they all discuss 
is the purpose, reason and consequences of the proposed amendments to 
Article 66 and Article 150 of the Constitutionl similarly, outside 
Parliament, when the present batch of constitutional amendments are 
discussed by those who are knowledgeable, by the political leaders 
inside or outside the Barisan Nasional, by the press, they all focus 
their attention on the proposed amendments to Articles 66 and 150. But 
in these two days of debate, all the Barisan MPs avoided these two 
Articles, and even those UMNO MPs who had always been the first to jump 
up and speak and are in the habit of breathing "fire and brimstone" are 
this time uncommonly and extraordinarily quiet and subdued": see Lim Kit 
Siang, The "Wayang Kulit" Debate (1983) ALIRAN QUARTERLY Vol. 3 No. 3 p. 
9. (Writers Note: "wayang kulit" is the Malay term for "shadow play"). 
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give the Royal Assent to the Bill. Then at the Conference of Rulers in 
Kota Kinabalu in 0 tober, the Rulers voted 8-0 against the acceptance of 
the amendments". 115 
However, the disagreement of the Rulers was, not confined merely to the changes 
to the Eighth Schedule. - They also, saw in the amendments to Articles 66 and 
150 an infringement of Article 38(4), which read: 
"No law directly affecting the privileges, position, honours or 
dignities of the Rulers shall be passed without the consent of the 
Conference of Rulers. " 
It was no doubt a complex question as to whether the dispensation of the need 
for the Royal Assent under the Eighth. Schedule and Article 66, or removing 
"the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong" under Article 150 constituted 
an affront to "the privileges position, honours or dignities of the 
Rulers.,, 114 For our -purposes,, in respect of Article 150, the relevant 
question was the import of substituting the satisfaction of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong for that of the Prime Minister. Since the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
was bound by Article 40(1) to act on the advice of the Cabinet, the reference 
to the Prime Minister instead of the Cabinet in the Amendment Bill was 
113. Dr. Tan Chee Khoon in his weekly column "Without Fearýor Favour", The 
STAR, 4 Jan 1984. See also Michael Ong, Malaysia In 1983 (Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1984 - ISEAS, Singapore) pp. 202-03. 
114. For an excellent discussion of this question, see HP Lee, The Malaysian 
Constitutional Crisis: Kings, Rulers And Royal Assent INSAF Sept. 1985 
Vol-. XVIII 7 at pp. 13-16. Mr. Lee reproduces as an appendix to the 
article the opinion of the Attorney General (see also (1983) 2 CLJ 229) 
to the effect that: (1) the amendments to Article 66 does not require 
the consent of the Conference of Rulers because it is not mentioned in 
Article 159(5), (2) signifying assent to a bill passed by Parliament has 
no relevance to "the privileges, position, honours and dignities" of the 
Yang- di-Pertuan Agong, and (3) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong cannot refuse 
to assent to any bill passed by Parliament. Mr. Lee takes the view that 
probably only the changes to the Eighth Schedule would infringe Article 
38(4). For a discussion of Article 38(4) and the role of the Conference 
of Rulers, see Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor (No. 2) [19801 1 MLJ 
213, which considered whether the consent of the Rulers was needed for 
the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. 
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significant. Theoretically it enabled the Prime Minister to act on his own 
without consulting the Cabinet., It is unclear whether the Rulers had, this 
upper-most in their minds or whether they saw the curtaiIment-of their royal 
functions of assent under the Eighth Schedule and Article 66 as the more 
serious infraction. They nevertheless refused to'permit the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to assent to the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1983. 
In the result an impasse developed because the, Bill passed by 
Parliament in August 1983 could not be brought into force. A solution was 
reached finally in the form of a compromise. 115 An agreement was 'struck116 
between the Rulers and the Government whereby the Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong as Acting King117 would give assent to the Amendment Bill in its 
existing form. The ostensible reason was to enable the electoral law changes 
to be immediately brought into force. In return the Government undertook to 
move a new Bill in Parliament to give effect to, the terms of the compromise on 
Article 150 and Article 66. 
The compromise was contained in the, Constitution (Amendment) Bill 
1984118 which came into force as Act A584 on 19 January 1984. Very briefly, 
on Article 150 it deleted the amendments made in 1983 and reinstated the 
115. According to Rawlings, the first suggestion came from the former Prime 
Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, to the effect that the Rulers give an 
assurance that they will not withhold assent to any legislation: see 
Rawlings, op. cit. at pp. 250-251. 
116. According to HP Lee there was a written agreement containing the 
compromise and also an "oral undertaking" that the Rulers would give 
royal assent to state legislation within the fifteen day period: see HP 
Lee, op. cit. at p. 16. 
117. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong was at the material time indisposed. 
118. Reproduced in (1984) 1 CLJ 7. 
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provisions before they were amended. 119 The end result was the highlighting 
of the consciousness of the Rulers and some sections of the public to the 
significance of the "advice power" under Article 150(l)" It affirmed the 
constitutional position that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acts on cabinet advice 
and not of the Prime Minister alone in proclaiming'a state of emergency. 120 
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the Government's concession 
on Article 150 was a quid-pro-quo for the significant change to Article 66. 
The new Article 66 provides for the dispensation of the Royal Assent once 
Parliament has re-debated the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's initial refusal to give 
assent. 121 The significance of this change is undoubtedly far-reaching. In 
119. HP Lee writes that in procuring a withdrawal of the amendments on 
Article 150 "the Rulers have rendered a signal service (possibly, 
unwittingly) to the nation": see op. cit. p. 22. See also (1983) INSAF 
Vol. 16 p. 3 "Hurried Legislation" where the Rulers are commended for 
their "vigilance and opposition" to the constitutional changes. 
120. This question is discussed in detail in chapter VII. 
121. The changes to Article 66 are as follows: 
(a) by adding the words "except as otherwise provided in this 
Article", after the word "and" in Clause (1); 
(b) by substituting for Clause (4) the following Clauses (4), (0) and 
(0): 
"(4) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall within thirty days after a 
Bill is presented to him - 
(a) assent to the Bill by causing the Public Seal to be 
affixed thereto; or 
(b) if it ýis not a money Bill, return the Bill- to the 
House in which it originated with a statement of the 
reasons for his objection to the Bill, or to any 
provision thereof. 
(4A) If the Yang, di-Pertuan Agong returns a Bill to the House in 
which it originated in accordance with Clause (4)(b), the House 
shall as soon as possible proceed to reconsider the Bill. If after 
such reconsideration the Bill is passed by the votes of not less 
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short, whilst the Government may have succeeded in precisely defining the 
royal function in the exercise of the assent power the Yang di-Pertuan Agong Is 
"right" of "first refusal" is now constitutionally recogrfised, something he 
did not possess previously. 122 The end result was, that: (1) Article 150 
emerged unscathed, but (2) there was a radical change to Article 66 on the 
exercise of the assent power. 123 
contd 
121. than two-thirds of the total number of members of that House in 
the case of a Bill for making any amendment to the Constitution 
other than an amendment excepted pursuant to Article 159, and by a 
simple majority in the case of any other Bill, with or without 
amendment, it shall be sent together with the objections to the 
other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if 
similarly approved by members of that House, the Bill shall again 
be presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for assent and the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong shall give his assent thereto within thirty days 
after the Bill is presented to him. 
(4B) If a Bill is not assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
within the time specified in Clause (4)(a) or (4A) hereof, it 
shall become law at the expiration of the time as specified in 
Clause (4) (a) or (4A) , as the case may be, in the like manner as if he had assented to it. 
(c) by substituting for Clause (5) the following Clause (5): 
"(5) A Bill shall become law on being assented to by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong or as provided in Clause (0), but no'law shall come 
into force until it has been published, without prejudice, 
however, to the power of Parliament to postpone the operation of 
any law or, to make laws with retrospective effect"; and 
(d) by repealing clause (5A). 
122. See note 107, supra. 
123. Rawlings' conclusion that Malaysian constitutionalism and democracy 
emerges enhanced from the 1983 crisis is a likely overstatement not 
borne out by a close study of the implications of the changes see 
Rawlings op. cit. at p. 250. For a critical article debunking the 
Government's claim to wa people's victory", see Chandra Muzaffar, 
constitutional Crisis: The Aftermath (1984) ALIRAN Quarterly p. 3. For a 
contrary view, see A. J. Sto 1, Princes And Politicians: The 
Constitutional Crisis In Malaysia, 1983-84 (Constitutional H ads And 
PoIIHET Crises, Ed. D. A Low, Cambridge Commonwealth Series, Macmillan 
Press, 1988, London) 182 at 186-7. 
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Conclusion 
It is indisputable that the many changes to Article 150 between 1960 and 
1984 has radically altered the concept and principle of ' emergency rule in 
Malaysia. The amendments have progressively denuded Article 150 of its 
original inbuilt safeguards. The 1963 and 1981 amendments were by far the 
most radical of the six sets of amendments during this period. At one end, we 
see the diminution of the role of Parliament in determining the continuance of 
an emergency. At other end, we see limits to judicial review of matters 
pertaining to an emergency. This has effectively cleared the way for the 
Executive, if it chooses, - to rule perpetually under conditions of an 
emergency. 124 
In third world countries, the judicial function in curbing executive 
excesses especially under times of emergency has had a dubious track 
record. 125 The courts have never been found to be a bulwark in the defence of 
the liberty of the subject or to safeguard the existing constitutional 
system. 126 Thus it is arguable that it is the decline of the role of 
124. The Bar Council Editorial in its publication, INSAF, for June 1979 read 
as follows: "On looking at Article 150 as it now stands it may be a 
great temptation to someone in the future in order to retain himself in 
power-to cause an Emergency to be declared on some vague ground that the 
economic life of the Federation is threatened and thereafter by -the 
promulgation of Ordinances or Acts passed by a simple majority legislate 
to keep the Constitution suspended or destroy its basic structure or 
even not to introduce any motion for resolutions to be passed to annul 
such Proclamation": see The Constitutional Road To Dictatorship (INSAF 
June 1979 Vol. XII, 1. 
125. See William -Conklin, The Role of Third World Courts During Alleged 
Emergencies in Essays on Third World Perspective In Jurisprudence (Ed. 
Marasinghe & Conklin) MLJ Publication 1984 at p. 69 et. seq. 
226. As Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer of the Indian Supreme Court observed of 
judges in general: "The fundamental fallacy is that judges are a 
hallowed species. Justice is too important to be left to the judges": 
see The Judiciary: Crisis of Credibili , India Today, July 15,1990 at 
p. 41. 
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Parliament which is truly lamentable. The very first amendment in 1960 
stripped Parliament of determining, within two months of its proclamation, 
whether an emergency should continue and further to decide whether emergency 
legislation should stand. By the 1981 amendments the need to summon 
Parliament "as soon as may be practicable" to debate the declaration of an 
emergency under the then Article 150(2) was deleted. As one writer observed: 
"For a democratically-constituted Parliament, the right to proclaim, 
oversee and terminate an Emergency is vital to its very existence. It 
is during an Emergency that Parliament is compelled to surrender 
temporarily its normal law-making function to the Executive. This makes 
it all the more imperative for it to retain control over all aspects of 
an Emergency so that what is temporarily conceded does not become a 
permanent feature of the political system as a result of manipulation by 
an authoritarian Executive. iol27 
It is apparent that the diminishing of the role of Parliament was 
deliberate. It was done with a view of enhancing and strengthening Executive 
control over an emergency. After the 1983 amendments it was observed: 
11 ..... changes to Article 150 indicate that the role of the legislature has gradually been replaced by Cabinet authority and, ultimately now, 
the satisfaction, authority and responsibility of only the Prime 
Minister. "128 
At a more serious and conceptual level, the diminution of the role of 
Parliament and the Judiciary in matters pertaining to an Emergency is 
destructive of separation of powers which is the cornerstone of a Westminster- 
style democracy. The end result after two decades of systematic amendments to 
127. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, The Decline of Parliament (1985) ALIRAN 
Quarterly Vol. V at p. 2. 
128. See Azmi Khalid, Emergency Powers And Constitutional Changes (1983) 
ALIRAN Quarterly V. 3 at p. 7. 
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Article 150 is the complete dominance of the Executive on all questions 
relating to the declaration of an emergency, its continuance, its extent, the 
making of emergency laws - their scope and width, and the cessation of the 
state of emergency. The only safeguard 'against abuse and excess would appear 
to be the good faith and sense of 
-those 
in power'. As one writer correctly 
observed during the 1983 constitutional crisis: 
..... the integrity of institutions cannot be protected through the 
goodness of individuals alone. This is why the truly just laws are 
always concerned with entire processes, not particular personsit. 129 
Thus the position that obtains today is that the whole edifice of the 
constitutional system may be scuttled through the medium of emergency powers 
exercised under Article 150. 
- 1, .1 
129. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, The Constitutional crisis And Democracy, op. 
cit. at p. 2. one is reminded of the famous 11-n-e-From the speech of 
Herbert Morrison during the debate in the British Parliament on the 
Defence Regulations quoted by Prof. Allen in his book Law And Orders 3rd 
ed. at pp. 364-65: "1 am not going to use the argument usu-aIly- put 
forward as a matter of courtesy that we do not believe the present 
Minister would be wicked but that his successors might be. I think that 
any minister is capable of being wicked when he has a body of 
regulations like this to administer". 
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PART III 
THE FOUR EMERGENCIES IN MALAYSIA 
CHAPTER VI 
THE FOUR EMERGENCIES, 1957 TO 1977: 
THE INTERPLAY OF LAW AND POLITICS 
IN A NEW DEMOCRACY 
I 
Since independence, Malaysia has been under a continuous state of 
emergency except for a short period of three years between 1960 and 1964. For 
most of the time the country has concurrently been under more than one state 
of emergency. It has been a case of successive proclamations, each overlapping 
the other. 1 
Given the frequent use of emergency powers in the short constitutional 
history of the country, the question is whether the use of Article 150 has 
been in accordance with its constitutional objectives or not? An examination 
of the instances when Article 150 was invoked is therefore imperative. 
The Four Emergencies 
2 Since the ending of the Communist Emergency in July 1960, Malaysia has 
experienced four occasions when Article 150 was invoked to declare a state of 
emergency. On two occasions namely in 1964 and 1969, the proclamation of 
1. The various proclamations are discussed below. 
For a full discussion of the background and circumstances behind the 
Communist Emergency 1948-1960, see the preceeding chapter. 
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emergency was on a nation-wide basis. On the other two occasions, an emergency 
was declared only in respect of a particular state ie. Sarawak in 1966 and 
Kelantan in 1977. 
We shall now consider the circumstances in which an emergency was 
declared on each of these occasions: 
The 1964 Emergency 
On 3 September 1964 the Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed a state of 
emergency throughout the Federation. The reason given was that "the security 
of the Federation was threatened". 3 The emergency was a direct result of 
neighbouring Indonesia's declared policy of confrontation against Malaysia. 
The Malaysian state was formed on 16 September 19634 against strong protests 
from Indonesia. The diplomatic offensive initially launched by Indonesia, 5 
which categorised the British sponsored Federation as a neo-colonialist 
creation, soon developed into an armed conflict. 6 
3. See Proclamation published in the Federal Gazette Vol. VIII No. 21,3 
September 1964 L. N. 271. It is reproduced in Appendix B hereto. 
4. The legal processes involving the enlargement of the Federation of 
Malaya and the Borneo States of Sarawak and Sabah, and the island of 
Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia was discussed in Chapter III. 
5. For an account of Indonesia's diplomatic offensive, see Malaysia 
Indonesia Conflict Ed. A. G. Mezarik (International Review Service, New 
YorF-1-9-6-5-) . 
6. The term "confrontation" was a euphemism. There was no doubt that the 
two nations were in a state of armed conflict. The Federal Court sitting 
in Singapore held that Indonesia's "confrontation" was an "armed 
conflict" within the meaning of that expression in the Geneva Convention 
on Prisoners of war, 1949: see Stanislaus Krofan v. Public Prosecutor 
[1967) 1 MLJ 133, a case concerning an Indonesian saboteur who was 
apprehended on landing by sea in Singapore armed with explosives. The 
Privy Council in Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Koi [1968] 1 MLJ 14; 
[1968] 1 AER 419, an appeal by Indonesian saboteurs sentenced to death 
by the Singapore courts, also took judicial notice of the existence of 
"a state of armed conflict" between Malaysia and Indonesia (p. 423). 
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It was evident throughout 1964 that there was a steady build-up of 
events portending an armed assault on Malaysia. A central organisation for 
sabotage, and guerilla training was established in the Riau Archipelago south 
of Singapore, whilst other training bases were set up on the islands off the 
Sumatra coast which provided easy access to the peninsula across the straits. 7 
On August 17,1964 there was a sea-borne landing of about 180 Indonesian 
troops at Pontian in south-west Johor to establish a, guerilla training base. 8 
However, what immediately led to the declaration of an emergency was the 
air-borne invasion of Malaysian territory on the night of September 1-2,1964 
by parachutists from Indonesia. The particulars of the landings can be 
gathered from the facts given at the trial in the Malaysian courts of these 
invaders. 9 There were ten such cases which came on appeal, and they all 
involved Malaysian-Chinese who had been members of Indonesian raiding 
parties. 10 The facts as presented in court may be relied upon as they were 
7. See Richard Allen, Malaysia: Prospect & Retrospect - The Impact And 
Aftermath Of Colonial Rule (OUP, London 1968) at pp. 187-88. 
8. Ibid. 
9. They were to the last man detained by Malaysian authorities almost a day 
or two after landing. The facts as given in court disclosed an invasion 
which was ill-planned and amateurish. The cases involving the Indonesian 
invaders are all published in (1966) 1 MLJ from pp. 100-252. 
10. The Indonesian parachutists were treated as prisoners of war. See 
discussion generally in S. Jayakumar, Judicial Decisions on Prisoners of 
War Questions Arising From Indonesia's Confrontation Against Mala a 
(1968) 10 Mal-. -L. R. 339. In Public Prosecutor v. Ool Kee Kol And 
Associated Appeals [1968] 1 AER 419, the Privy Council ruled that the 
Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War was limited in application to the 
armed forces of opposing countries and not to own citizens who formed 
part of the invading armed forces. This was the position earlier taken 
by the Federal Court in Lee Hoo Boon v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 2 MLJ 
16. Thus Malaysians who were captured with the Indonesian invaders were 
denied the. protection of the Geneva Conventions and charged under the 
domestic laws, to wit, the Internal Security Act, 1960. The Privy 
Council in Ooi Kee Koi, supra held by a majority that the Malaysian 
Internal Security Act cannot, as a matter of construction, apply to the 
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largely undisputed. For example, in Ng Seng Huat y. Public Prosecutor, 11 the 
facts disclosed that the landing party comprised 41 Indonesians and 7 
Malaysians. In Law Kiat Leong v. Public Prosecutor, 12 'the invading force 
comprised 34 Indonesians and 14 Malaysians. In several of these cases the 
defence was 'that the accused did not know they were being sent on an invasion 
mission to Malaysia. A typical case was Tan Hwa Lam v. Public Prosecutor13 
where this defence was summarily rejected. Thomson LP said: 
"Then there was an argument that seemed to be the effect"that when the 
appellant embarked on the expedition of ist September he was under the 
impression that it was a training exercise, that he could not have known 
till after the aircraft left Medan and the money was distributed that a 
landing in Malaysia was contemplated and that at that stage he could do 
nothing to avoid being brought into the airspace forming part of a 
security area. Accordingly he could not be guilty of any offence. 
Even if that argument possesses any plausibility when considered in an 
almost intellectually impossible isolation it completely disregards the 
evidence in the case as a whole and the surrounding circumstances of 
which we all have knowledge and of which we must take judicial notice. 
The appellant had voluntarily left his own country, against which he 
admitted a grudge, to go to Indonesia for military training; it was the 
openly avowed policy of the Republic of Indonesia to crush Malaysia, a 
policy which was being ruthlessly carried into effect by invasions of 
Malaysian soil by sea and air; and on both sides of the Straits of 
Malacca "Konfrontasill was a household word. The actual expedition in 
which the appellant was voluntarily engaged was a military one and its 
members were fully armed; the leader was an Indonesian officer; the 
members were either Indonesian soldiers or Malaysians who had gone to 
contd... 
10. Indonesian soldiers. For a criticism of the majority opinion, see s. 
Jayakumar, supra, at p. 343 et. seq. Further in Stanislaus Krofan v. 
Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 MIJ 133, the Singapore Court ruled that 
Indonesian saboteurs who came in civilian clothing were not entitled to 
be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. This 
position was subsequently affirmed on appeal by the Privy Council in 
Osman & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1968] 2 MLJ 137, a related case on 
similar facts. 
11. [1966] 1 MLJ 210. 
12. [1966] 1 MLJ 215. 
13. [1966] 1 MLJ 147. 
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Indonesia. It was a training exercise with what end was the training 
being undertaken if not to attack Malaysia? And was not that an activity 
in which the appellant was consorting with the other occupants of the 
aircraft which was prejudicial to the public security of this country? 
If they were not about to do something actively prejudicial that night 
they were training themselves to do it some other night. And how could 
it be said that even if the appellant did not intend to use his arms and 
ammunition that ver Y4 night but some other ni 
. 
ght that in itself made his 
possession lawful? " 
In that case Thomson. LP also outlined the type of invasion that took 
place on the night of 1-2 September 1964: - 
"During the night of 1st/2nd September, 1964, an Indonesian aircraft 
carrying 48 armed men under the command of Lieutenant Sutikno of the 
Indonesian Air Force left Medan inýIndonesia and flew to Malaysia. Some 
of the men in the aircraft were members of the Indonesian armed forces, 
others were Malaysians who were not members of the Indonesian forces. 
The object of the expedition was sabotage to disrupt the economy of 
Malaysia. 
Shortly after 2 a. m. on the morning of 2nd September the aircraft was 
over Malaysian territory in the neighbourhood of a land settlement area 
known as Kampong Tenang, near Labis in the State of Johore and some 40 
miles east of the coast, which is within a proclaimed Security Area thus 
described in the schedule to the Proclamation of 17th August, 1964 
(Legal Notification No: 245 of 1964): - 
"The area comprising the territories of the States of Johore, 
Malacca and Negeri Sembilan". 
When the aircraft was over Kampong Tenang the party of armed men left it 
be means of parachutes carrying their arms and ammunition with them and 
in due course they came to earth. Later the same morning, the present 
appellant, who is Malaysian, was arrested. 'He was thought to have been 
one of thearmed men who had left the aircraft by parachute and he was 
prosecuted on three charges under the Internal Security Act, 196011.1-5 
Apart from air-borne landings there were also sea-landings by armed 
personnel from Indonesia. Lee Fook Lum v. Public Px-osecutorM was such a case. 
The accused who was armed -and in possession of hand-grenades had landed near 
14. At p. 149-150. 
15. At p. 14 7. 
16. [1966] 1 MLJ 100. 
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the town of Pontian in the south of the Peninsula on 17-18 August 1964 after 
having undergone some months of military training in Indonesia. He was quickly 
apprehended by villagers and was subsequently charged in dourt. 
Against this background, the Malaysian Government acted swiftly and 
declared a nationwide emergency on 3 September, 1964 and braced itself for 
more armed assaults from Indonesia. As events went, Indonesia's policy of 
confrontation subsided by 1965 after internal dissensions and disturbances in 
the country itself. The justification for declaring a state of emergency 
throughout the Federation on security grounds on 3 September 1964 was 
generally accepted. However, as events went, the 1964 Emergency was never 
officially revoked. It is nevertheless considered today to have lapsed by 
effluxion of time. 
The 1966 Sarawak Emergency 
The Sarawak Emergency of. 1966 was the first of the emergencies limited 
in a geographical sense to a particular state. 17 It was also the first that 
raised serious doubts as to whether the emergency power was exercised for bona 
fide purposes. 18 It also provided the first opportunity for the development of 
a local jurisprudence on whether the proclamation of an emergency is 
justiciable. 19 It'was by this case that the position got established that our 
17. The other occasion was to take place in 1977 in Kelantan. 
18. A scathing attack in this regard is found in Yash Ghai, The Politics of 
the Constitution: Another Look At The Ningkan Litigatio (1986) 7 -Fi-ng. 
L. R. 147. 
19. This would be the Kingkan cases arising from the dismissal of the Chief 
Minister of Sarawak, Stephen Kalong Ningkan from office on 17 June 1966. 
A series of legal actions commenced over both the dismissal and the 
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courts would adopt a conservative approach and defer to the Executive in these 
matters. 20 
The emergency declared by the Federal Government in Sarawak on 14 
September 196621 had its origins in certain political squabbles in the State 
and not on the basis of any external threat of aggression, -. like in 1964. The 
events leading to the emergency were inextricably tied up with the political 
moves at the Federal level to oust the incumbent Chief Minister of the State. 
The State of Sarawak, which is separated from Peninsula Malaya by the 
South China Sea, had its own native peoples who possessed cultural traits 
peculiar to themselves. Like its sister Borneo state of Sabah, there were 
always fierce local loyalties which invariably created tension between the 
Centre and the State. The incumbent Chief Minister of Sarawak under British 
rule was a native Than by the name of Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan. After the 
absorption of Sarawak into the Malaysian union on 16 August 1963, his 
political party called the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) joined the Alliance 
Party, which was the ruling party at the federal level, and he thereby 
continued in office as the Chief Minister of Sarawak. He was soon found by the 
Centre to be intractable because of his independent ways. It would appear that 
the Federal Government was annoyed with his continued dependence on British 
contd. 
19. LLsequent political action taken by the Federal Government by way of an 
emergency to procure his removal. These cases may be found in [1966] 2 
MLJ 187; [1967] 1 MLJ 46; (1968] 1 MLJ 109; [1968] 2 MLJ 238 PC. 
20. For example, Barakbah LP in Ningkan v. Government of Halaysia (19681 1 
MLJ 119, in dealing with justiciability of the proclamation of emergency 
in Sarawak went on the basis that it was incumbent on the Court to 
assume that the Government was acting in the best interests of the 
nation (p. 122E). 
21. Proclamation is published as P. U. 339A Jil. 10 Bil. 20 Federal 
Government Gazette of 14 September 1966. The Proclamation is reproduced 
in Appendix B hereto. 
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expatriate officers and the fact that they often found themselves dealing with 
expatriates in Sarawak and not Malaysian officials. 22 A vivid account of the 
crisis is given by a Kuala Lumpur based lawyer and political emissary, named 
Syed Kechik, reportedly sent by the Federal Government to procure the removal 
of Ningkan. 23 Amongst the cloak and dagger actions taken was the transporting 
of 21 of the 42 members of the local legislature, called the Council Negri, to 
Kuala Lumpur from where on 14 June 1966 a letter was addressed by all of them 
to the Governor of Sarawak expressing a lack of confidence in Ningkan. 
Predictably Ningkan ignored the letter with, inter alia, the comment that 21 
was not a majority of 42. On June 17,1966 the Governor informed Ningkan that 
he had ceased to be the Chief Minister and purported to appoint another in his 
place. on the same day the removal and replacement were published in the State 
Government Gazette. 
Ningkan promptly commenced legal proceedings challenging his removal as 
being ultra vires the State Constitution and conventions. Harley Ag. C. J. 
delivered his judgment on 7 September 1966 declaring that Ningkan's removal 
from office was ultra vires the Constitution and reinstated him to his post. 24 
Harley C. J. concluded with the observation that a political solution by 
calling for an election would be the best way to avoid multipl e legal 
proceedings. 25 Whether influenced by this or not, the Federal Government 
22. See Bruce Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism: Syed Kechik in East 
Malaysia (Singapore 1976) at pp. 36-37. An added reason was the Feaera 
Government Is annoyance with Ningkan f or his outward sympathy f or 
Singapore following the latter's expulsion from Malaysia on 9 August 
1965. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj Openg [1966] 2 MLJ 187. For a 
perceptive analysis of the judgment, see S. M. Thio, Dismissal of Chief 
Ministers (1966) 8 Mal. L. R. 283. 
25. At p. 195E. 
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decided not to appeal against the decision. Meanwhile, according to Ross- 
Larson, on the day of the judgment, Syed Kechik contacted Kuala Lumpur to say 
that Ningkan had to be brought down at whatever cost - financial or 
constitutional. 26 A constitutional stalemate had come into being because 
Ningkan's opponents were unable to force a vote in the Council Negri since the 
State Constitution vested the power to convene a sitting of that body in the 
Chief Minister and his Cabinet only. It was obvious that something had to give 
-a solution had to be found to fill the "gap" in the State Constitution. The 
only way in which a State Constitution could be altered other than by its own 
provisions was by federal decree under a state of emergency. 27 The Governor 
had to be empowered to convene a sitting of the Council Negri to test 
Ningkan's confidence because it was a fact that Ningkan had by then lost the 
support of a majority of his party's legislators. He was for all intents and 
purposes a recalcitrant Chief Minister. Although there was in existence a 
political impasse, no doubt annoying to the Federal Government, there was 
nothing untoward in the form of overt incidents or disorder in the state to 
justify the proclamation of an emergency. on this, the Privy Council was later 
to comment that the word 'emergency" in Article 150(l) was not confined to the 
unlawful use or threat of force in any of its manifestations and that there 
need not be an actual or threatened outbreak of violence. 28 
The stage was then set for declaring a state of emergency in Sarawak for 
the obvious purpose of removing Ningkan. Ross-Larson writes that in August 
1966, press releases were made emphasizing the gravity of the security 
26. Op. cit. at p. 46. 
27. See Article 150(5). 
28. Lord MacDermot in Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia (1970] AC 39 at p. 
390C-E. 
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situation in the State. Groups opposed to Ningkan distributed leaflets 
denouncing the death of democracy. Demonstrations by anti-Ningkan groups were 
organised, and although such assemblies were illegal, Ross-Larson observes 
that "the police had been informed of the benign intent and asked to stay out 
of it". 29 These organised activities had their desired effect because the 
Ibans, Ningkan's own clansmen, also started grouping in response and it was 
reported that many had come by bus-loads from the interior, resplendent - in 
their ceremonial war-gear, which included spears, swords and shot-guns to stand 
by Ningkan. On the political front, the cause for concern for the Federal 
Government was Ningkan's growing strength: the court victory had given the 
impetus to Ningkan and there was every possibility that the Chinese-based 
Sarawak United People's party (SUPP) would form an electoral understanding 
with him. The impasse was in Ningkan's favour and the Federal authorities had 
to act. 
On 14 September 1966 a state of emergency was declared in Sarawak. 30 The 
Proclamation merely declared that "a grave Emergency exists whereby the 
security of a part of the Federation, to wit the State of Sarawak, is 
threatened". 31 A more candid reason was given in the Explanatory Statement to 
the Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, 1966. 
The Act was passed by the Federal Parliament under Article 150(5) to empower 
the Governor to convene a'sitting of the Council Negri to decide on a vote of 
confidence on Ningkan. 32 The Government statement carried the following 
passages: 
29. Supra, at p. 51. NB: The police force came under the authority of the 
Federal GovernmentT. 
30. The Proclamation is reproduced in Appendix B. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Section 4. 
185 
Ill. A constitutional crisis has occurred in Sarawak which the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong is satisfied constitutes a grave emergency whereby the 
security of Sarawak is threatened. 
2. There is already in force a proclamation'of dmergency issued on 
September 3,1964, in respect of the whole Federation, the occasion for 
which is a matter of public knowledge. 
3. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong, in exercise'of his powers under Article 
150 of the Constitution, has on September 14,1966, issued a further 
proclamation in respect of Sarawak only, in order to deal with the 
present crisis as a distinct emergency additional to the emergency 
already proclaimed. In a recent judgment Of the High Court in Borneo it 
was held that the question whether the Chief minister commands the 
confidence of a majority of the members of the Council Negri cannot be 
resolved otherwise than by a vote in the Council itself. It was further 
held, in the same judgment, that the State Constitution confers no power 
on the Governor to dismiss, or by any means to enforce the resignation 
of, a Chief Minister, even when it has been demonstrated that he has 
lost the confidence of'a majority. This is a serious lacuna in the State 
Constitution, and one which enables a Chief Minister whose majority has 
become a minority to flout the democratic convention that the leader of 
the Government party in the House should resign when he no longer 
commands - 
the confidence of a majority of the members. The occurrence of 
such an event, resulting in the breakdown of stable Government and 
thereby giving rise to the spreading of rumours and alarm throughout the 
territory,, is in the opinion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, as expressed 
in the 35 oclamation of emergency, a threat to the security of 
Sarawak". 
It was obvious that the dominant objective of the emergency was to secure the 
amendment of the State Constitution to enable a sitting of the Council Negri 
to vote on-Ningkan. In the event, the vote was called'on 23 September 1966 and 
Ningkan was defeated and removed from office. 34 The political objective behind 
33. Government Gazette (Bill dated 19 September 1966). 
34. Ningkan and his supporters boycotted the sitting maintaining that the 
convening of the Council Negri by the emergency amendment was unlawful. 
He later unsuccessfully challenged the vires of the proclamation: see 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia (1968] 1 MLJ 119; on 
appeal to the Privy Council [1968) 2 MLJ 238; [1970] AC 379. Stephen 
Kalong Ningkan never regained the Chief Ministership. Under a state of 
emergency there was no obligation for the authorities to call for 
elections. Elections were finally held in May 1969 together with the 
general elections in the country. The elections were temporarily 
suspended with the outbreak of communal violence in the Peninsula on 13 
May 1969, and finally concluded in June 1970. The election results were 
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the emergency was thus achieved. As one writer observed, the Sarawak emergency 
was "the clearest example of the manipulation of the Constitution" by creating 
conditions "which would justify the proclamation of an emergency". 35 The 
Sarawak Emergency, although never officially revoked, is considered for all 
legal purposes to have lapsed. 
The 1969 Emergenc 
If the circumstances surrounding the 1966 emergency in, Sarawak were 
impugnable, the events leading to the proclamation of a nationwide emergency 
on 15 May 1969 in Malaysia were generally indisputable. 36 The circumstances 
leading to the declaration of the emergency have been the subject of judicial 
contd... 
34. inconclusive, but still making it possible for Ningkan to form a 
government if he could find a coalition partner. But political manoeuvre 
and negotiations prompted by the Federal Government made that 
impossible. In the event, the incumbents favoured by the Federal 
Government formed the Government and Ningkan eventually faded out of 
politics: see R. S. Milne & K. J. Ratnam, MalUsia - New States in a New 
Nation: Political Develoýment of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia (Frank 
Cass & Co.; London; 1974) at pp. 236-240. See a1sF Milne & Ratn-am, The 
Sarawak Elections of 1970: An Analysis of the Vote, Journal of So7utH 
East Asian Studies Vol-. -111 1972, p. 111 et. seq. It is also reported 
that the SUPP (the Chinese based party), which was placed in a pivotal 
position of being able to give a majority to either the Ningkan faction 
or the incumbents to form the state government, was warned by the 
Federal, authorities that if they affiliated with Ningkan, the emergency 
would not be ended and direct rule will continue: see Margaret Roff, The 
Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak (OUP; 19T4-) 
at pp. 144-45 quoted in Yash Ghai, supra 18, at p. 168. 
35. Yash Ghai;. Ibid at p. 161. 
36. This is not to say that there is no dispute as to how the communal riots 
started. The Government side and the opposition have each accused the 
other of not having exercised control over their supporters resulting in 
the outbreak of racial riots. 
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comment. In N. Hahadevan Nair v. Government of Malaysia, 37 Chang Min Tat J. 
(as he then was) observed: 
"The state of emergency which arose from the grave disturbances from May 
13 onwards which the applicant says he is prepared to accept as a fact 
must mean that even in his estimation, the future of the country was 
balanced precariously on a razor's edge, that it was touch and go 
whether law and order would be restored and that extraordinary measures, 
were required". 38 
In Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor, 39 Aru1nandom J. said: 
"In fact anybody who knew of the terror and turbulence, the violence and 
the bloodshed, the total threat to law and order in the country that 
erupted on 13 May 1969 would not have the temerity to argue 
1 
that. 
public security was (not) seriously threatened". 0 
The 1969 race riots leading, to the emergency had its origins in the 
political make-up of the country. The of f icial reasons f or ý the communal 
violence were cryptically - given in the introduction to the Report, of ! the 
National operations Counci, 41 released on 9 October 1969 as follows: 
"The eruption of violence on May 13 was the result of an inter-play 'of 
forces that comprise the country's recent history. These include a 
generation gap and differences in interpretation of the ýconstitutional 
structure by the different races in the country, and consequently the 
growing political encroachment of the immigrant races against certain 
important provisions of the Constitution which relate to the Malay 
language and the position of the Malays, principally Articles 152 and 
153; the incitement, intemperate statements and provocative behaviour of 
37. [1975] 2 MLJ 286. 
38. At p. 291C. 
39. [1978] 1 MLJ 30. This was the first instance decision. The case went on 
appeal finally to the Privy Council (see [1979] 1 MLJ 50) where a 
landmark decision was delivered that invalidated all emergency 
regulations made by the executive after Parliament was reconvened in 
February 1971. The case is fully discussed in Chapters IX and X. 
40. At p. 32G-H. 
41. This was a special body set up under Emergency Ordinance No. 2 of 1969, 
soon after the declaration of emergency, to assist the Director of 
operations in administering the emergency. Its composition and functions 
are discussed later in this study. 
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certain racialist party members and supporters during the recent General 
Elections; the part played by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and 
secret societies in inciting racial feelings and suspicion; and the 
anxious, and later desperate, mood of the Malays with a background of 
Sino-Malay distrust, and recently, just after the General, Elections, as 
a result of racial insults and threats to their future survival and 
well-being in their own country". 42 
As one writer explained: "Malaysia from the beginning was a plural society, 
but there was no sign of integration among the various races living in it. In 
its place, as far- as the Malays and Chinese were concerned, there was a rather 
precarious agreement or understanding between UMN043 and MCA44, top leaders 
that Malay special rights should not, be, questioned and the political 
predominance of the Malays should not be, challenged provided that the Chinese 
were allowed to pursue unimpeded their traditional commercial and industrial 
activities". 45 All this collapsed in the campaign leading to the general 
elections held on 10 May 1969. It was undoubtedly one of the most racist of 
election campaigns, as communal frustration of both Malays and non-Malays were 
brought to a pitch by candidates and parties openly courting for communal 
votes. 46 The non-Malay frustration was largely centred on the government 
42. The May 13 Tragedy: A Report Of The National Operations Council, 9 
October 1969 at p. IX (hereinafter referred to as "the Official 
Report"). 1 
43. Acronym for the United Malay Nationalists Organisation, the dominant 
political party in the country and the dominant partner of the' coalition 
that has governed the country since independence. 
44. Acronym for the Malaysian Chinese Association, the Chinese, partner of 
the ruling coalition. 
45. Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-Malay Relations 
(Heinemann Asia, 1988) at p. 53. 
46. See official Report op. cit. at p. 21. See also Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas 
in The Rukunegara And The Return To Democracy In Malaysia, (1971) Vol. 2 
No. 4, Pacific Community (Tokyo) 800 at 801-02, "Whatever the 
explanation offered for the May 13 riot, the fact remains that 
(politicians) caused the tragic incident ..... communal sentiment of 
the 
destructive type had been whipped up by unscrupulous politicians". 
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policy of special privileges for the Malays in education and. public sector 
employment whereas the Malays were unhappy with their economic position47 and 
perceived government slowness in implementing the Mal&y language as the 
national language of the country. 48 
However, for our immediate purpose, what brought about, the emergency 
were, the riots and the violence that followed. As one politician from the 
government bench commented: "It is not relevant, really, when you consider it, 
whether Mr. X threw the first stone, whether Party X organised the first 
rally, whether so -many Malays or so many Chinese or so many Indians were 
killed in such a tragedy as the 13th of May". 49 The riots began on 13 May, two 
days after the election results and a day after several victory parades were 
held in Kuala Lumpur by opposition parties. The results stunned the ruling 
Alliance party whose leaders had grossly underestimated the degree of non- 
Malay frustration with the Government. Although the Alliance party had won 
the elections, ý it was its worst performance yet, suffering major defeats in 
non-Malay dominated constituencies. The MCA won only 13 of the 33 seats it 
contested, and the state of Penang was lost to the opposition for the first 
time. The greatest uncertainty was in Selangor, which housed the nation's 
capital, where the Alliance party had not won enough seats outright to form 
47. In 1969, the Malays had only 1% share of the share capital of resident 
limited companies whereas the Chinese had 22.8%, and the largest share 
was held by foreign-controlled companies: Leon Comber, ibid, p. 57. 
48. Ibid pp. 62-65. The causes for the May 13 riots have been written about 
extensively eg. R. S. Milne & Dianne K. Mauzy, Politics And Government In 
Ma aysia (Federal Publications, Singapore: 1977), John slimming, 
Mara--ysla: Death Of A Democracy (London, 1969); Karl Von Vorys, Democracy 
Without consensus: Communarism And Political Stabiliýx In -Ma-1-aysia 
(Princeton, 1975); Goh Cheng Teik, The May 13 Incident And Democracy In 
Malaysia (OUP, Kuala Lumpur, 1971). - 
49. Dato Musa Hitam during the Parliamentary debate on the Constitution 
Amendment Bill 1971, quoted in Milne & Mauzy, op. cit. at p. 78. 
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the State Government. 50 The uncertainty coupled with the victory parades held 
by the opposition on May 11 and 12 in Kuala Lumpur were provocative to the 
supporters of the ruling party which had actually won the" elections. 
51 UMNO 
supporters'then decided to hold a counter-demonstration on 13 May and obtained 
a police permit for this purpose. The procession was to assemble at the 
Menteri Besar's house on the evening of May 13.52 Then Prime Minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman was to write'later: "I was personally worried that the procession 
which UMNO was about to hold might*lead to'trouble. It was not easy to stop 
it at this stage as 'the opposition - had ý already held processions, and 
permission had already been obtained for UMNO to have theirs. I could only 
pray to ' God that nothing serious would happen". 
53 Thus the situation was 
explosive that evening and tensions were high. It only needed an incident to 
spark-off hostility between the supporters of the various political parties 
who, unfortunately, were *grouped'along racial lines. The incident occurred in 
Setapak, a suburb of Kuala Lumpur, in the evening of May 13 at about 6.30 p. m. 
involving a clash between Chinese youths and Malay youths on their way to 
attend the gathering. 54 The riots quickly spread to several parts of Kuala 
50. Leon Comber, op. cit. pp. 67-69. As events went, the Parti Gerakan 
Malaysia (Gerakan) an opposition party decided not to form an alliance 
with the other successful opposition party called the Democratic Action 
Party (DAP) to form the State Government, thus paving the way for the 
Alliance party led by the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) in the state, 
Dato Harun Idris, to re-form the Government. 
51. official Report, op. cit. pp. 29-36. 
52. The official Report reproduces police statements recorded from aides to 
the Menteri Besar who spent May 12 actively rounding up participants for 
the procession from the Malay kampongs (villages) around Kuala Lumpur: 
see pp. 38-43. 
53. Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13: Before & After (Utusan Melayu Press, 
September 1969) p. 86. 
54. Official Report, op. cit. p. 44. 
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Lumpur. "Malays and Chinese indulged in an orgy of killing, looting and 
burning". 55 By 8 p. m. a curfew was declared by the police throughout Kuala 
Lumpur. Shooting and rioting continued the next day, Mcýy 14, and with the 
possibility of trouble spreading to other parts of the coun try the Government 
decided to declare a state of emergency. 
The emergency was declared on 15 May 1969 and it was made to extend 
throughout the Federation. 56 The Tunku explained: "(I)t was necessary for me 
to advise His Majesty to proclaim a State of Emergency throughout the country 
as there was -no other way of dealing effectively with the current 
situation". 57 He went on television on the night of May 16 and said: ý 
"A State of Emergency has now, been declared because circumstances demand 
that we must act, and act quickly as otherwise, the situation might well 
deteriorate and become uncontrollable, and we will be faced with a State 
of Emergency as was faced by the British in 1948 ........ The only 
course open to us is to declare a State of Emergency and to take all 
such measures as are possible to prevent the situation from 
worsening ..... Whe terrorist Communist have worked out their plan to take over power. 8 They have managed to persuade voters by threat, by 
55. Leon Comber, op. cit. p. 70. According to official figures, between 13 
May and 31 July, 196 persons lost their lives, 6000 persons rendered 
homeless, 753 buildings destroyed by fire and at least 211 vehicles 
damaged (p. 71). It has, however, been said that the Government figures 
on the deaths may be underestimated: see Milne & Mauzy, op. cit. p. 79. 
56. The Proclamation is reproduced in Appendix B. 
57. Tunku Abdul Rahman, op. cit. p. 98. 
58. In this view the Tunku would appear to stand alone. Both in the official 
Report and elsewhere the communist theory is -rejected: see official 
Report,, op. cit. at p. 27: "It would not be correct to say that the 
Communist Party of Malaya had started the May 13 disturbances in order 
to seize power immediately". The view is also not shared by the then 
Minister of Home Affairs, Tun Dr. Ismail (brought into Government soon 
after the riots) who said: "Everybody ýthought the Communists were 
responsible for the disturbances. Later we found that they were as much 
surprised as we were": Leon Comber, op. cit. p. 73. The Tunku was 
however right to the extent that leftist elements were involved in the 
demonstrations that preceded the riots, often carrying red flags or 
pictures of Mao Tse-Tung in processions: see photographs given on pp. 
59-61 of the Tunku's book, op. cit. 
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intimidation and by persuasion to overthrow the Alliance through the 
process of democracy, but fortunately for us we were returned in 
sufficient majority ...... n. 
59. 
The 1969 Emergency-is unique for a number of reasons, mostly for the 
special administrative apparatus that was set up, to administer the Emergency. 
By the Emergency (Essential Power) Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 made by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 15 May 1969, the power to govern by emergency 
regulations was conferred upon the Government. By another law made the 'next 
day, called the Emergency, (Essential Powers) ordinance No. 2 of 1969, there was 
appointed a special officer-called the Director of Operations, 60 who was to 
be assisted by a newly created special body, called the National operations 
Council'61 to administer the State of Emergency. ý Section 2(l) of the said 
ordinance declared that the executive authority of the Federation was to be 
delegated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to the Director of Operations62 who was 
nevertheless to act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. 63 
These newly created appointments and bodies were a special feature of the 1969 
emergency. 64 Another unique feature of the emergency was the "absence" of 
Parliament. 65 Parliament could not be convened because the riots had broken 
59. Tunku Abdul Rahman, op. cit. pp. 105-106. 
60. Section 2(1). 
61. Section 3. 
62. The person appointed as Director of operations was the then Deputy Prime 
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. 
63. Section 2(2). 
64. They are discussed more fully later in Chapter XI. 
65. In Government of Nalaysia v. Kahan Singh [1975] 2 MLJ 155, Lee Hun Hoe 
CJ (Borneo) explained: "The emergency in 1969 is different from the 
previous emergencies in that when the Proclamation was made, Parliament 
had already been dissolved, and elections to the Dewan Rakyat had yet to 
be completed" (p. 164). 
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out before the elections to the Federal and, State legislatures had been 
completed in the East Malaysian States. By section 7 of Emergency Ordinance 
No. 1, these elections were suspended indefinitely after' the Emergency was 
declared. The elections in these States were held in February 1971 after a 
hiatus of almost 2 years. 
The 1969 racial strife and the emergency that followed was a watershed 
in the country's political life. It brought about radical transformation in 
the Government's political and economic policies which took a, more strident 
approach towards strengthening Malay political hegemony and the upliftment of 
their economic position. " The Proclamation of Emergency continues, unrevoked 
to date and is the basis presently for the continued application of emergency 
laws alongside the ordinary legislation passed by Parliament. 
THE 1977 KELANTAN EMERGENCY 
The 1977 emergency declared in the state of Kelantan, like the Sarawak 
emergency of 1966, was confined to a particular state and was likewise brought 
about by political squabbles in the State. However, the approach and 
administration of the emergency by the Federal Government in Kelantan was 
vastly different from that in Sarawak. 
The problem from beginning to end was a struggle for control of the 
State Government of Kelantan between UMNO and the Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS). 
The latter were the incumbents in Kelantan whereas the former governed at the 
Federal level. A break-up of the coalition at the federal level between the 
two parties led to an open struggle in Kelantan where UMNO made no secret of 
66. For a concise account see Milne & Mauzy, op. cit. p. 83 et. seq. and p. 
321 et. seq. 
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its ambition to wrest control of the state from PAS. 67 It would appear 'that 
UMNO had secretly won over the support of the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) 
himself, who was the principal'PAS official in the State -Government. This led 
to a crisis within PAS. Although the Menteri Besar, Dato Mohd. Nasir, and 
seven other PAS Central Committee members of like-mind, did not cross-over to 
UMNO, it was evident that he had lost the confidence of the majority of the 
PAS members in the State legislature. The Menteri Besar was given an 
ultimatum by his party to resign or face a no-confidence motion in the State 
assembly where PAS held 22 of the 36 seats. He refused to resign contending 
that the disaffection with him had nothing to do with his supposed affiliation 
with UMNO but over his withdrawal of the concession of 350,000 acres of 
concession land to a controversial company called the Timbermine ' Company. 68 
The connection between the concession and the UMNO/PAS struggle for control of 
the State had always seemed'tenuous. 'Nevertheless, as events went, Dato' Mohd 
Nasir was expelled form the party in late September. At the session of the 
Kelantan State Assembly on 15 October 1977 a vote of no confidence was passed 
on him. Clause XVI(6) of the Kelantan State Constitution provided that "If 
the Menteri Besar ceases to command the confidence of the majority of 
the members of the Legislative Assembly, then unless at his request His 
67. See Raja Tun Azlan Shah', 'The Role of Constitutional Rulers (1982) JMCL 1 
at p. 10. 
68. See Lim Kit Siang, Time Bombs In Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1978) p. 248. 
Tun Suffian described the disenchantment in these words: "The Chief 
Minister, Dato Mohd Nasir, was a PAS man, but he was honest-and strict 
and gradually fell out with his fellow party members in the state 
Executive Council": see Tun Suffian, Malaysia, and India - Shared 
Experiences In The Law (AIR Publication, Nagpore, India, 1988) at p. 80. 
Tun Suffian obviouslFdid not intend to suggest by these words that PAS 
officials were not honest but the suggestion does appear that Nasir's 
strictness had something to do with the falling-out. 
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Highness dissolves the legislative assembly, he shall tender the resignation 
of the State Executive Council". It was'evident from a plain reading of this 
provision that the State Government had to resign unless the Ruler on the 
advice of the Menteri Besar dissolved the Assembly. In this case the Menteri 
Besar did not resign but instead tendered advice, as he was entitled to do, to 
the Regent69 to dissolve the Assembly. However the Regent did not make any 
decision on the request. 70 It was then-incumbent on the Menteri Besar, by the 
above provision, to tender the-resignation of his Government in which event 
the Ruler will be obliged to dissolve the Assembly or call upon some other 
person who in his opinion is likely to command the confidence of the majority 
in the Assembly to form a new Government. It was unlikely that the Regent 
would allow the State to function without a government. But the impasse was 
allowed to continue until-8th November 1977 when an emergency was declared in 
Kelantan. During this intervening period, the Federal Government actively 
pursued several political options. According to one source the Federal 
Government gave anýultimatum to PAS that it would impose an NOC-type7l rule in 
69. At the material time the Sultan of Kelantan was the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong and his son was the Regent in Kelantan. 
70. Raja Tun Azlan Shah (as he then was) suggests that "the Federal 
Government had some influence over the State Ruler in the exercise of 
his discretion with regard to the dissolution of the State Assembly": 
op. cit. p. 10. However, Tun Suffian suggests that because of the 
Menteri Besar's refusal to resign there was considerable political 
confusion in the State and "because of the uncertainty, the Regent held 
his hand as ...... he was entitled to": op. cit. p. 81. 
71. NOC stands for National operations Council, the administering body set- 
up under Emergency ordinance No. 2 of 1969 to administer the Emergency 
declared on 15 May 1969.. It would have been legally possible- for the 
Federal Government to institute an NOC-type government in Kelantan by 
special parliamentary or emergency legislation for this purpose under 
the rubric of the 1969 emergency which was still in force. 
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Kelantan and gave it until November 7 to respond. 72 Obviously PAS stood its 
ground because on 8th November 1977 a state of emergency was declared 
throughout the state of Kelantan. The Proclamation73 declared that a grave 
emergency existed whereby the security or the economic life of a part of ' the 
Federation, to Wit, the State of Kelantan was threatened" There were no 
outward manifestations of any disorder or riots in the week or so preceeding 
the proclamation. There was a demonstration in support of the Menteri Besar 
on 19 September, a few days after the vote in the State Assembly but the 
police 'had acted swiftly by imposing a curfew in the state capital of Kota 
Bahru and the town of Kubang Krian. Notwithstanding the curfew, public 
rallies and demonstration were allowed to take place but only to express 
support for the Menteri Besar. 74 For example, an hour-long orderly rally was 
held on 24 September in the town "padang" (field) attended by about 60,000 
people to demostrate support for the Menteri Besar. It was evident that the 
situation was well under control, and-in the absence of intelligence. reports 
to the contrary, there was nothing outward to show there was a breakdown of 
law and order in the State in the days leading to the declaration of the 
emergency. 75 
72. Lim Kit Siang, op. 'cit. p. -249. But it is not mentioned what the 
ultimatum was. However, it would not be difficult to surmise that it 
must relate to PAS allowing Dato Nasir to continue in office until fresh 
state elections were held. As events went, because of the Emergency, 
Dato Nasir continued in office and contested the elections as Menteri 
Besar. 
73. P. U. (A) 358 Gazette 8 November 1977. The Proclamation is reproduced in 
Appendix B. 
74. Speech by opposition Leader in Parliament, 8 November 1977 over the 
Emergency in Kelantan: Lim Kit Siang, op. cit. p. 249. An instance was 
quoted of where the Chief Police Officer of Kelantan had welcomed the 
Menteri Besar to a rally in his support, which was being held without 
police permit (pp. 248-49). 
75. Tun Suffian's characterization that there was "turmoil in the State" is 
not supported by the contemporary accounts of the law and order 
situation in Kelantan: see Tun Suffian, op. cit. p. 81. 
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The unique feature of the Kelantan emergency was the NOC-style 
government that was imposed as an emergency measure in the State. The 
Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 197776 suspended the State Government 
including the office of Menteri Besar and vested all executed powers in the 
office of a Director of Government appointed under the Act. 77 All legislative 
powers - of the State Assembly were also removed and vested 
in the State 
Ruler. 78 The Act and its provisions were declared to prevail over the State 
Constitution. 79 The sum effect- of the Act was to suspend the State 
Constitution and bring the State under Federal control in the person of the 
Prime Minister. - The Director for Kelantan was subject to specific and general 
directions from the Prime MinistersO who may at anytime suspend or dismiss him 
from office. 81 The Prime Minister was also empowered to make rules for the 
implementation of the Act. 
Thus, by the exercise of emergency powers under Article 150 and the 
passing of the said Act by the Federal Government, PAS lost control of 
Kelantan State. The State was for all practical purposes now run by UMNO from 
the Federal level. The Menteri Besar consolidated his position during the 
emergency by the formation of a new political party called BERJASA comprised 
of PAS dissidents. The emergency was revoked in about 3 months by the repeal 
76. Act 192 of 1977. 
77. Sections 3,4 and 5. 
78. Section 10. 
79. Section 15. 
80. Section 7. 
81. Section 3(2). 
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of the Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 1977 on 11 February 1978.82 State 
elections were held on 11 March 1978. UMNO and BERJASA swept into office and 
ended 18 years of PAS rule in Kelantan. The Menteri Besai was made a Federal 
Cabinet Minister and UMNO took the post of Menteri Besar. 
The Kelantan problem was from beginning to end a political crisis which 
on all accounts had not degenerated into a state of civil disorder. There was 
justifiable scepticism as to whether, as in Sarawak, a state of emergency had 
to be declared to resolve the crisis. ýt 
82. The Emergency Powers (Repeal of the Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 
1977) Order 1978 P. U. (A) 46 Government Gazette dated 12 February 1978. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FOUR EMERGENCIES: A CONSPECTUS ' 
Introduction: The Key-Role Of The Prime Minister 
The declaration of four emergencies within a short period of 13 years 
(1964 to 1977) naturally raises the question whether the emergency powers 
under Article 150 are not being too easily invoked. In Teh Cheng Poh v. 
Public Prosecutor, l Lord Diplock affirmed the position that in all matters 
where the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is called for (as in the 
case of Article 150(1)) it is in reality the exercise of power by the 
Cabinet. 2 It is acknowledged that the power to impose an emergency under 
Article 150 is a Cabinet decision by the Government of the day. 3 In reality, 
it is principally the decision of the Prime minister. In this regard, it is 
possible for the Prime Minister to act alone and not necessarily with the 
prior concurrence of his Cabinet. This seemingly happened in the case of the 
1969 emergency. The decision to declare a state of emergency in May 1969 was 
taken by the then Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman personally. 4 The riots 
had broken out even before the Tunku could constitute his new Cabinet. Thus, 
on the night of the outbreak of the riots, May 13, he declared over 
1. [1979] 1 MLJ 50. 
2. At p. 52 D-E. 
3. His Majesty as a constitutional monarch does not refuse to act in these 
matters when so advised by the Cabinet: see discussion of the Yang di- 
Pertuan's role in Chapter IV. 
4. see account given in his book of the May 13 riots, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
May 13 Before & After, (Utusan Melayu Press, 1969) at p. 90 et. seq. 
0 
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television: "I have no choice now but to declare a State of Emergency in Kuala 
Lumpur and, if - necessary, to declare a State of Emergency throughout 
Malaysia". 5 When the Tunku made this statement it was evident that he had not 
consulted his caretaker cabinet. 6 This was borne out by the Tunkuls' account 
of the events of the next day, May 14: 
"I arranged for a special meeting of the senior Ministers of the old 
Cabinet ...... I was presiding over an ad-hoc Cabinet of "emergency". I informed my colleagues of my intentions, the decisions I had arrived at 
overnight. First of all, I said it was necessary for me to advise His 
Majesty to proclaim a State of Emergency throughout the country ...... 
That afternoon I summoned the Solicitor-General to my house and drafted 
with him the various legal notifications to declare a State of Emergency 
in the country ...... and that evening I called on His Majesty at the Istana to obtain his Royal signature on all the Proclamations". 7 
But it would appear that he had at least the concurrence of the then Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. In an affidavit submitted to court in the 
case of N. Mahadevan Nair v. Government of Malaysia, 8, some years later, Tun 
Razak deposed of his role in obtaining the signatures of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to Emergency Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 on May 15: "... 1 personally 
presented the said Ordinance to His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong at 
Istana'Negara-for his consideration and approval". 9 
Ibid. 
1 
6. Several cabinet members had lost in the elections especially from the 
MCA. On the afternoon of May 13, a delegation from MCA met with the 
Tunku to say they would not serve in the Cabinet because they seemed to 
have lost the confidence of the Chinese community: Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
op. cit. pp. 85-86. 
7. Tunku Abdul Rahman, op. cit. pp. 98-99. 
8. (1975] 2 MLJ 286. 
9. See his Affidavit tendered in court and reproduced in the law report at 
p. 288. 
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In the case of Kelantan, the then Prime Minister Dato Hussein Onn had 
left the task of finding, a solution to the crisis to his deputy, Dr.. Mahathir 
Mohamed. Thus the ultimatum of a threat of imposing an NOC-style government 
in Kelantan, unless PAS capitulated, was called the "Mahathir formula". 10 it 
was the rejection of this formula in discussions with the Prime Minister on 7 
November that led to the declaration of an emergency the next day. 11 
These instances show the key-role played by the Prime Minister in the 
declaration of -an emergency. The constitutional requirement under Article 
40(l) that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong should act on-the advice of the cabinet 
is in reality the advice of the Prime Minister. Even if the cabinet- 
consultation had come later, it is very likely that he would receive ex post 
facto approval for, his actions. 12 If the Prime Minister had worked in tandem 
with key cabinet personnel like the Deputy Prime Minister, as happened in 1969 
and 1977, Cabinet approval is a mere formality. 
The experience of India in 1975 shows that it is entirely possible for 
the Prime. Minister to procure the declaration of an emergency without prior 
consultation with the Cabinet. The 1975 emergency was the first time that an 
10. See parliamentary speech by the opposition Leader on 8 November 1977 on 
the Kelantan emergency: Lim Kit Siang, Time Bombs In Malaysia (K. L., 
1978) p. 249. 
11. Ibid. 
12. This fact throws a shadow of irony over the constitutional crisis in 
1983 where one of the provisions for amendment was Article 150(l). The 
proposed change was to substitute "the satisfaction" of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong in Article 150(l) for that of the Prime Minister. Given 
the fact that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong does not act on his own, the 
proposed change was a constitutional redundancy. However, as previously 
discussed, the proposed change was motivated by fear that a new 
incumbent to the throne might give a literal reading to the provision 
rather than any fear of the diminution of the role of the Prime Minister 
or Cabinet in the declaration of an emergency: see discussion in chapter 
V on this question. 
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emergency was declared in India for merely internal disturbances. 13 It came 
on 25 June 1975 exactly two weeks after the then Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi suffered an adverse ruling in the Allahabad High Court on an election 
petition. The court had declared that her election to Parliament was invalid 
because of a number of election offences committed during her campaign. ' In 
consequence, she was disqualified from contesting the elections for a period 
of six years. The court verdict created an unprecedented political crisis in 
the country. It cast grave doubts as to whether Mrs. Gandhi could continue in 
office as Prime Minister. The limited stay given by the Supreme Court did not 
alleviate her position. The stay order was to the effect that whilst she 
could remain as Prime minister and participate in the proceedings of the Lok 
Sabha (the Lower House) she was precluded from voting in' the House. 14 The 
Supreme Court's decision was delivered on 24 June 1975 and the embarrassing 
restraint it imposed led to a major call for her resignation including by all 
the leading newspapers. 15 Mrs. Gandhi reacted the next day. Acting solely on 
her own, she advised the-President to declare a state of emergency under 
Article 352 of the Indian Constitution on the ground that the country was 
13. The previous emergencies in India like in 1962,1966 and 1971 were as a 
result of external aggression, namely the Indo-Chinese border war in 
1962 and the Indo-Pakistani Conflict in 1966 and 1971. 
14. For a detailed discussion of the case and the events leading to the 
Indian emergency, see P. Bhusan, The Case That Shook India (Vikas 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1978); K Nayar, The Judqm (Vikas 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1977). Mrs. Gandhi's appeal was heard in the 
Supreme Court during the emergency. The appeal focused on the amendments 
made expost facto to the Constitution and the election laws to exonerate 
offences of the type that disqualified Mrs. Gandhi: see Indira Nehru 
Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299. The amendments to the 
Constitution were struck-down by a majority in the court but the appeal 
was allowed on the grounds that the amendments to the election laws were 
validly made. 
15. P. Bhushan, Ibid pp. 126-127. 
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threatened by internal disturbance. 16 The Cabinet was only informed of this 
the next day. 17 Such was the control she exerted over her colleagues that 
they went along, and together presided over the darkest days of Indian 
democracy. 18 Soon after her massive election defeat in January 1977, the new 
Government moved the 44th amendment which amended the Constitution to 
expressly provide that "the President shall not issue a Proclamation unless 
the decision of the Union Cabinet (that is to say the Council consisting of 
the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Cabinet rank) that such a 
proclamation may be issued has been communicated to him in writing". 29 
16. This finding was made by the Shah Commission that was set up in 1977 to 
investigate the excesses during the Emergency: see H. M. Seervai, 
Constitutional Law Of India Vol. 1,3rd Ed. at p. 981 (Tripathi, Bombay, 
1983); see also SeervHE, -The Emergency, Future Safeguards And The Habeas 
corpus Case (Tripathi, -RiEay, 1978) at p. vii. on the morning OT-26 
June 1971, after the emergency was declared, hundreds of people 
throughout India, mostly political opponents of Indira Gandhi were 
arrested under a preventive detention law called the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act 1971. Mrs. Gandhi's control over the country by 
emergency laws became complete with a Presidential decree suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus. The Indian Supreme court docily upheld the 
Presidential decree in a decision reminiscent of the American Dred Scott 
and French Dreyfus decisions: see ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla AIR 
1976 SC 1207. 
17. A leading Cabinet member acknowledged: "We were told of the proclamation 
the next day. What could we do? ": quoted in Seervai, Constitution Law, 
Ibid, para. 8 at p. 980. 
18. The emergency saw many abuses and misuse of power by officials, causing 
Justice Shah, who headed a fact-finding commission, to conclude: "Man's 
inhumanity to man seems to know no limits at all - of the officials it 
is still worse": Seervai, Future Safeguards, op. cit. p. 95. The levels 
to which the Judges becam-e-ZieFa-ched trom the realities around them was 
seen in this remark of Chandrachud J. in the Habeas Corpus case 
(Shivkant Shukla, supra) when it was submitted to R-m-17ay-India has 
descended to the levels of Hitlerite Germany: ...... I have a diamond- 
bright, diamond-hard hope that such things will never come to pass in 
Free India (at p. 1349)". 
19. See Basuls Commentary On The Constitution Of India 6th Edn. Vol. N 
(Sarkar & Sons, Calcutta, 1988) at p. 189. The amendment was called the 
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act 1977. 
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The abuse of the emergency power in India in the circumstances 
aforementioned was patently obvious. A noted constitutional writer commented: 
"on the facts found by the Shah Commission, it is clear that Mrs. Gandhi 
advised the proclamation of an emergency to secure her own position as Prime 
Minister, and in order to forestall a public demand that after the Supreme 
Court had refused an absolute stay that she should step down as Prime Minister 
till the Supreme Court decided her appeal ..... Mrs. Gandhi had procured the 
promulgation of the Emergency secretly and therefore dishonestly in order to 
confront the Cabinet with an accomplished fact". 
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Article 150: Is the Power Politicised? 
In Malaysia, it is the Sarawak and Kelantan emergencies that have been 
most criticised as being, politically motivated. 
21 The other emergencies have 
generally been accepted as warranted by,, the extraordinary dangers then 
confronting the country namely the threat of external aggression in 1964 and 
the spectre of large-scale, internal disorder in 1969. 
The Sarawak Emergency was specifically challenged in court as having 
been made in fraudem, legis. 22 In the Privy Council, the argument against the 
emergency was pointedly advanced by Sir Dingle Foot OC for Ningkan . in the 
20. H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of-India Vol. I (Tripathi, -Bombay; 
1983) p. 981. 
21. RH Hickling in- his -Constitutional Changes In Malaysia 1957-1977 
observes: "Article 150 can 56, and I think has been on two, occasions 
used for political ends": see Suffian, Lee & Trindade, The Constitution 
of Malaysia: Its Development 1957-77 (OUPI 1978) at p. 7. Although 
Professor Hickling has not luentitied the two occasions it is reasonable 
to assume that he was referring to the Sarawak and Kelantan emergencies 
22. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1970] AC 379. 
205 
following terms: "Seven days after the judgment of the acting Chief Justice23 
holding that the Governor had no power to dismiss the appellant from his 
office as Chief Minister, on September 14,1966, a State of Emergency was 
declared. There was in reality no emergency. The emergency powers were 
invoked merely to remove the Chief Minister, and it was therefore not a valid 
proclamation of emergency ...... The purpose of Article 150 of the Constitution 
of Malaysia was to deal with an emergency such as a revolution, violence etc. 
but it was not designed to be used simply to alter the constitutional 
arrangements in Sarawak". 24 
one sees some parallels between_the Sarawak emergency and the 1975 
emergency in India. Like in India, an unpopular court decision brought 
matters to a head culminating in an emergency. In Sarawak, the political 
tension was said to be exaggerated and the public demonstrations and unrest 
contrived. In India, Seervai wrote: ... the facts alleged by Mrs. Gandhi in 
support of the Emergency are not borne out by official records: there was 
nothing alarming on the economic front: periodical reports as to law and order 
showed that the situation was in complete control all over the country; the 
Home Ministry received no reports from the State Governments indicating any 
deterioration in the law and order situation in the period immediately 
preceding the proclamation of Emergency". 25 There was a similar allegation in 
Sarawak that the demonstrations were stage-managed and the situation contrived 
23. This is in reference to the decision of Harley Ag CJ in Stephen Kalong 
Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj Openg (1966] 2 MLJ 187 delivered on 7 September 
1966 holding that the dismissal of Ningkan as Chief Minister was 
invalid. 
24. See arguments of counsel reproduced in (1970) AC at pp. 393-394. 
25. Seervai, op. cit. p. 980. 
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to justify the proclamation of an emergency. After the High Court ruled in 
Ningkan's favour, the Federal Government had the choice of either appealing 
the decision or taking political action to resolve the ctisis. They decided 
on the latter because the delay was, assisting Ningkan in the wake of the 
euphoria over his court victory. It was obvious that the demonstrations 
against. - Ningkan were pre-planned and had the tacit approval of the Federal 
authorities. According to one account:, "A demonstration was organised ...... 
hundreds assembled to proclaim their support for Tawi, Sli26 and the Sarawak 
Alliance Government. Although such assemblies were strictly illegal under the 
emergency regulations'27 the police had been informed of the benign intent and 
asked to stay out of it. - As frosting to all -this, some 
Berjasa- supporters 
engaged in a list of vandalisms later that evening, breaking the windows of a 
few establishments in Kuching to ref lect anti-British and anti-Ningkan 
sentiment. And reports on the tense security situation had been, circulating 
for some days., The tension was real; the manifestations of it, contrived. 
But the Federal Government had the justification it needed for fresh and 
28 radical action". 
on the basis of the surrounding. facts, one would have thought there was 
enough material on which the Emergency could have been assailed as having been 
made malaf ide. The attitude of the Privy Council on the question was one . of 
scrupulous avoidance. Approaching it largely as a question of onus of proof, 
the Privy council was reluctant to question the judgment of the responsible 
26. The Dayak leader who replaced Ningkan after his initial removal. Tawi 
Sli headed the Sarawak Alliance Party. 
27. These are emergency regulations made under the 1964 emergency which was 
then still in force. 
2S. Bruce Ross-Larson, op. cit. p. 51-52. 
207 
29 government and concluded that the complainant had failed to prove his case. 
On the absence of any outward manifestation of a breakdown of law and order, 
they relied on Lord Dunedin's statement that "a state of emergency is 
something that does not permit of any exact definitioni, 30 and said that the 
Government would have acted on information and apprehensions which are not 
known and cannot always be known to those-who seek to impugn the emergency. 31 
Like in Sarawak, there, was in Kelantan no visible deterioration of law 
and order before the emergency was declared. ý The irony lies in that unlike in 
Sarawak, the exertions of the Federal authorities in Kelantan were to retain 
the Chief Minister in office and, not to remove him. It was evident that the 
period between the passing of the no-confidence motion on the Menteri Besar on 
15 October 1977 and the declaration of an emergency on 8 November 1977 was 
actively used by the Federal Government to work-out a political solution to 
the crisis. The emergency was only declared after the PAS officials failed to 
come to an agreement in a meeting with the Prime Minister on the eve of the 
declaration. This drew a scathing criticism from the Leader of the opposition 
in Parliament who characterised it as "blackmail in political negotiations". 
In his words: '"If a grave emergency exists, then a Proclamation of Emergency 
should have been made a long time ago, and not dependent on ý acceptance or 
rejection of the Mahathir formula32 ..... emergency situations 
justifying the 
Proclamation of Emergency waits for no personln33 It was evident that the law 
29. [1970] AC 379 at p. 391. 
30. Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor [1931] 58 IA 169. 
31. [1970] AC 379 at p. 390. - 
32. As previously mentioned, this was the formula apparently proposed by the 
then Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamed. 
33. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit. p. 250; 
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and order situation was not such that it could not be adequately handled by 
the police themselves. The objective was, like in Sarawak in 1966, to obtain 
a political result. The target was the constitutional maýhinery in the state. 
In Sarawak, it was the so-called "gap" in the State Constitution that created 
an impasse where a recalcitrant Chief Minister could continue in office by 
refusing to convene a sitting of the state legislature. But there was no such 
constitutional lacuna in the Kelantan constitution. Indeed the Constitution 
expressly provided the solution for'this eventuality. 34 ý In Sarawak, ' the 
overriding' power given by the Emergency was merely used to amend ' the state 
constitution and supply the omission. In Kelantan, the Emergency was used to 
suspend the operation of the State Constitution and completely take over the 
administration of the State. In both cases the desired political objective 
was attained. Ningkan was removed in Sarawak and Nasir was retained in 
Kelantan; in both the ruling party at the Centre was the victor. 
Tun Suffian termed the Kelantan crisis as "a breakdown of Government". 35 
In the absence of a breakdown in law and order, the reference by Tun Suffian 
must be to the constitutional impasse created by the refusal of the Menteri 
Besar to resign and the non-action of the Regent in dissolving the State 
Assembly. It was not unlike the situation that prevailed in Sarawak although 
under different circumstances. Can a constitutional impasse be equated with a 
breakdown of government justifying the imposition of any emergency? A 
parallel may be drawn with the use and application of Article 356 of the 
34. 
35. 
Clause XVI(6) 
Tun Suffian, 
of 
op. 
the 
cit. 
Kelantan state Constitution. 
pp. 80-81. 
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I Indian Constitution. 
36 This is one of the emergency provisions of their 
Constitution specifically dealing with a situation where a "government of the 
state cannot be carried on in accordance with the* provisions of the 
Constitution". In that event, the President of India, either on report from 
the Governor of the State or otherwise, may by proclamation impose what is 
commonly called "President's Rule" in the State. By the Proclamation he would 
assume for himself the governing of the State. The enormity of this power may 
be seen in that it is not only a sitting State legislature that may be 
dissolved but also one that has yet to be summoned after the completion of 
36. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution in its relevant parts reads: 
(1) If the President on receipt of a report from the Governor of a 
State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which 
the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation: 
(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the 
Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested 
in or exercisable by the Governor ..... or any body or 
authority in the State other than the Legislature of the 
State; 
(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State 
, shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; 
(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as 
appeared to the President to be necessary or desirable for 
giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including 
provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation 
of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body 
or authority in the State; 
(2) Every Proclamation under this article shall be laid before each 
House of Parliament and shall, except where is a Proclamation revoking a 
previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months 
unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by 
resolutions of both Houses of Parliament; 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the satisfaction of 
the President mentioned in Clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and 
shall not be questioned in any court on any ground. 
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elections. 37 The experience of India with Article 356 has however not been a 
happy one. As a noted constitutional lawyer observed: "The power under 
Article 356 had been grossly abused and President's rule imposed on the States 
more than seventy times. 38 All States except Maharashtra and Sikkim, had been 
given at one time or another doses of this pretentious curative. several 
cases where President's rule has been imposed by the Centre in a partisan 
spirit for party ends have already passed into history". 39 In a fuller study 
of the subject, one of India's leading constitutionalists analysed that over 
the years President's rule had been imposed for broadly three reasons: (a) 
breakdown in law and order and administration, (b) stringent financial 
exigencies, and (c) political problems. 40 His conclusion was also that the 
declaration of President's rule in a State has been "motivated by political 
considerations". 41 
The problem in India stems from the wide interpretation, given by the 
courts to the phrase "cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution" and the chapter-heading "failure of constitutional 
machinery in a state". A reference to these decisions would be useful for our 
understanding of what is considered to be a breakdown in government. For 
37. See K. K. Aboo v. Union of India AIR 1965 Kerala 229. 
38. Presumably since Indian independence in 1947. For a complete list of the 
instances when Article 356 was invoked, see Basuls Commentary On The 
Constitution of India 6th Edn. Vol. 0,1989 pp. 19-27. 
39. N. A. Palkhivala I We The People: India - The Largest Democracy (Strand 
Book Stall, New Deihi 1984) at p. 252 (Chapter headed: I-Centre-State 
Relations" p. 247 et. seq. ). 
40. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, President's Rule In The States (Indian Law Institute, 
New Delhi, 1979 Ed. N. M. Tripathi, Bombay, Publishers) at pp. 110-122. 
41. Ibid at p. 126. 
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example, in Re A. Sreeramulu, 42 Chinappa Reddy J, went on the basis that 
Article 356 does not enumerate the situations when President's rule can be 
imposed and observes: 
"The petitioner seems to labour under the impression that if a party has 
an undisputed majority in the Legislature to enable its leader to form a 
Ministry, it can never be said that a situation has-. arisen where the 
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. That is not correct. There may be many 
diverse and varied considerations. An outbreak of unprecedented 
violence which the Government is unable to curb may be a consideration. 
A great natural calamity like a severe earthquake or a flood creating a 
situation which the Government of a State is unable to meet may be a 
consideration. A large epidemic leading to mass deaths and exodus may 
be another. In all these cases there may be such a failure of the 
Government of the State as to amount to an abdication of its 
Governmental power. Any other cause which may paralyse the Government 
of a State may be a consideration. The Government of a state may enter 
into alliances with Foreign Governments and that may be a 43 consideration". 
However, the reality is that Article 356 has been invoked more often than not 
to resolve political crisis within the state. In K. K. Abools case, 44 the 
intervention in Kerala in 1965 was because of the uncertain election results 
which did not bring out any clear winner; however, the Communist Party which 
had the largest number of seats, ahead of the Congress party that ruled at the 
Centre, could have formed a coalition government. In Rao Birinder Singh's 
case, 45 the intervention in Haryana State was as a result of mass defections 
from the Congress Party that was ruling the State. In the result, the 
government went to the opposition which sought to keep itself in office by 
political bribery by the appointment of a large number of the legislators as 
Ministers. 
42. AIR 1974 AP 106. 
43. Ibid at p. 110. 
44. Supra n. 120. 
45. AIR 1968 Punjab Haryana 441. 
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The leading case on the subject is State of Rajasthan v. Union of 
India, 46 commonly called "the Dissolution case". The case itself proves the 
acute politicization of the power. After the complete defeat of the Congress 
Party under Indira Gandhi in the 1977 national elections, there was 
considerable doubt whether the Congress State Governments in nine states 
continued to enjoy the mandate of the people to govern. The Centre which was 
now governed by the Janata Party, but still in the opposition in the nine 
states, issued a directive to the State Governments concerned to dissolve 
themselves well before expiry of their term of office and hold fresh 
elections, confident that the Congress Party would be routed in the polls as 
they were in the national elections. When it was imminent that President's 
rule was likely to be imposed as a result of the defiance of the direction, 
the States concerned applied to the Supreme Court to determine the legal 
propriety of invoking Article 356 in the circumstances. Bhagwati and Gupta ii 
acknowledged that merely because the ruling party in a State suffers defeat in 
the national elections is not a reason to say that the Government of the State 
cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. 47 However, they 
held that the circumstances then prevailing were unique: 
"The defeat of the ruling party in a state at the Lok Sabha elections 
cannot by itself, without anything more, support the inference that the 
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. To dissolve the- Legislative Assembly 
solely on such ground would be an indirect exercise of the right of 
recall of all the members by the, President without there being any 
provision in the constitution for recall even by the electorate. But 
where there has been a total rout of candidates belonging to the ruling 
party which has not been able to secure a single seat, it is symptomatic 
of complete alienation between the Government and the people. It is 
axiomatic that no Government can function efficiently and effectively in 
46. AIR 1977 SC 1361. 
47. Ibid at p. 1416. 
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accordance with' the Constitution in a democratic setup unless it enjoys 
the goodwill and support of the people. Where there is a wall of 
estrangement which divides the Government from the people, and there is 
resentment and antipathy in the hearts of the people against the 
Government, it is not at all unlikely that it may lead to instability 
and even the administration may be paralysed. The consent of the people 
is the basis of democratic form of Government and when that is withdrawn 
so entirely and unequivocally as to leave no room for doubt about the 
intensity of public feeling against the ruling party,, the moral 
authority of the Government would be seriously undermined and a 
situation may arise where the people may cease to give respect and 
obedience to governmental authority and even conflict and confrontation 
may develop between the Government and the people leading to collapse of 
administration. These are all consequences which cannot be said to be 
unlikely to arise from such an unusual state of affairs and they may 
make it impossible for the Government of the State to be carried on in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Whether the 
situation is fraught with such consequences or not is entirely a matter 
of political judgment for the executive branch of Government. But it 
cannot be said that such consequences can never ensue and that the 
ground that on account of total and massive defeat of the ruling party 
in the Lok Sabha elections, the Legislative Assembly of the State has 
ceased -to reflect the will of the people and there is complete 
alienation between the Legislative Assembly and the people is wholly 
extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of Article 356 Clause (1). This 
ground is clearly a relevant ground having reasonable nexus with the 
matter in regard to which the President is required to be satisfied 
before taking action under Article 356, Clause (1)n. 48 
In the result the supreme Court of India concluded that the imposition of 
President's rule to procure a dissolution in order to hold elections in the 
belief, justifiably held, that the Government of the States concerned had lost 
the mandate to govern was not an improper exercise of the power under Article 
356. 
The Indian experience illustrates that the question whether a 
constitutional crisis has caused a breakdown in government or caused a failure 
48. Ibid. Professor Upendra Baxi, a noted Indian constitutionalist, has 
written of this judgment: "The Dissolution Case, it should be clear is a 
political judgment and it should frankly be recognised as such. I do not 
see any objection in Justices of the Supreme Court taking account of 
hard political facts and discharging what they, in their conscience, feel 
to be their constitutional responsibilities in their role as the top 
adjudicators of the nation. I put it to the critics that they would not 
have done otherwise if they were in the judgment seat" (The Indian 
Supreme Court And Politics, Lucknow 1980. Eastern Book Co. ) J p. 133. 
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of the constitutional machinery is very much a matter of political judgment. 
The legal considerations are purelý peripheral, useful for justificatory 
purposes but not otherwise constituting an impediment. Ih the ultimate, the 
decision invariably was based'on political considerations. 
The Sarawak and Kelantan crises were essentially political crises albeit 
with constitutional overtones. They were brought about by recalcitrant chief 
ministers who refused to-resign inspite of having lost the mandate to govern. 
The corresponding failures of the heads of state to dissolve the assembly and 
pave the way for elections created the so-called constitutional impasse. It 
must be noted also that the situation in each State was created by the 
political action of the opposition party in the assembly to procure a change 
of government. Could deliberate political action of this nature be the basis 
for an emergency or should it not be resolved within the framework 'of the 
existing constitution machinery, namely dissolution and elections? 
Australia has experienced a similar crisis brought about by moves to 
oust the political party in power. Like the Kelantan crisis, the Australian 
crisis was the result of a deadlock which could have been resolved by either a 
resignation of the government or a dissolution of the elected assembly. The 
brief facts were as follows. By November 1975 it was obvious that the Whitlam 
Labour Government was unable to get the supply vote in the Upper House (the 
Senate) where it was effectively blocked. By an unprecedented move, the 
Governor General, Sir John Kerr, stepped in and broke the deadlock by 
dismissing the Whitlam Government and commissioning the then leader of the 
opposition, Sir Malcolm Frazer, to form a caretaker government. Fraser's 
appointment was on condition that he undertook to advise the dissolution of 
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both Houses and pave the way for a general election. 49 According to the 
Governor-General he had acted to break the deadlock and to prevent the Whitlam 
Government from governing in breach of conventions. In hig words: 
...... Mr. Whitlam and his-colleagues should, I thought, be dismissed 
because they insisted, contrary to the customary procedures of 
constitutional government, on governing without parliamentary supply, 
failing to resign or advise an election. These were the two sides of a 
single coin". 50 
There was considerable scepticism then as to whether the Governor-General was 
correct in his understanding of parliamentary conventions. 51 Lord Hailsham for 
one was of the opinion that Sir John Kerr had acted correctly. in dismissing 
49. The Governor-General's decision led to a crisis of epical proportions in 
Australia. A number of books have been written on the event, the chief 
of which are those by the protagonists themselves, namely Sir John Kerr, 
Matters For Judgment (The MacMillan company of Australia, 1978); Gough 
Whitlam, The Truth Of The Matter (Penguin Books of Australia, 2nd Edn., 
1983). There are also availa le a number of legal treatise on the 
constitutional aspects of the crisis, see especially Geoffrey Sawer, 
Federation Under strain (Melbourne University Press, 1977); Labour And 
The Constitution, areth Evans (Heinemann, Australia, -1-9-7-7-T-. An 
impressive monograph dealing fully with the legal questions is I. TM 
Cooray's Australian constitutional Convulsions of 1975 - The Reserve 
Powers Of The Governor General And Implications For The Future (1979) 21 
Mal. L. R. 303 and (19-BOT-22-Ma-1. L. R. 107. 
50. Matters For Judgment, op. cit. at p. 336. 
51. The Governor-General had evidently sought and obtained the written 
advice of the Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Garfield Barwick, as to 
his proposed course of action, before dismissing the Whitlam Government. 
The letter is published in his autobiography, Matters For Judgment, op. 
cit. pp. 342-343. The Chief Justice advised: "IT, -Ee-Ing unable to secure 
supply, he (Whitlam) refuses to take either course, your Excellency has 
constitutional authority to withdraw his commission as Prime Minister". 
Barwick was severely criticised within and without the profession for 
this advice and the propriety of his rendering it while a serving Chief 
Justice: see David Marr, Barwick (George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1980) at 
pp. 284-285. It would be fair to note that Barwick CJ was not alone in 
the opinion he held. A distinguished trio of Melbourne legal personages, 
namely, Aickin QC, Gleenson QC and Professor P. H. Lane also opined that 
the Governor-General would be justified in dismissing a government that 
was unable to get supply: see 49 Australian Law Journal p. 650; see also 
Keith Aickin, Biography in Graham Fricke, Judges Of The High Court 
(Hutchinson, Australia, 1986) at pp. 204-205. 
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Whitlam. 52 But the principal Australian constitutional writers of the day 
questioned the propriety of the decision. 53 In their view: 
"In the events which happened it is possible to 'argue that by his 
intervention the Governor-General, far from giving effect to the 
intention of the Constitution, positively frustrated its express 
provisions ..... the proposition that a supply deadlock should be 
resolved by the resignation of the Prime Minister ..... rests entirely on 
an unwritten convention which, so far as the present writers can 
discover , was invented for the purpose in hand in 1975. There is no 
precedent. for itit. 54 
52. See his Foreword to Matters For Judgment, op. cit. p. xiv. See also his 
Dilemma Of Democracy (Collins, London, 1978) chapter headed "The Power 
Of Dissolution" at p. 190 et. seq. 
53. They are listed in Gough Whitlam's, The Truth Of The Matter, op. cit. 
pp. 124-125. 
54. Professors Colin Howard & Cheryl Saunders quoted in Whitlam, ibid. Lord 
Hailsham and other proponents of the Governor-General'y-sreserve powers 
argue that British constitutional convention would dictate that the 
Prime Minister advise that Parliament be dissolved. They quote the 
precedent set by Prime minister Asquith in 1909 when his budget was 
blocked by the unelected House of Lords: see Lord Hailsham, ibid. But 
the appropriateness of the British experience is questionable because of 
the Federal structure of the Australian Parliament and the elected 
status of its Senate, in addition to representation on it being on a 
state basis, all of which is said to dilute representative democracy in 
so far as the Senate is concerned: see Michael Coper, Encounters With 
The Australian Constitution (CCH Publication, 1987) pp. 252-256. --T-Fe 
opponents of the Governor-General's decision have argued powerfully that 
the dismissal of a Government that still commands confidence in the 
lower house on account of a blocked vote in the Upper House is inimical 
to parliamentary democracy. " ..... If the proposition that the Senate 
should have the power to block supply is really a claim simply that the 
opposition should have the power to force an election, it is anomalous 
that the exercise of the power should be confined to the occasions on 
which there happens to be a supply Bill to be blocked; logic demands 
that the power be available whenever the opposition judges that an 
occasion has arisen that warrants its use": see Encounters, op. cit. p. 
257. In clear political termsi Sir Richard Eggleston has debunked the 
convention claimed by the Governor-General: "There is surely something 
paradoxical in a situation in which a party leader can, by putting his 
opponent's supply bill in cold storage, secure that opponent's 
dismissal, and immediately thereafter, by promising to pass the supply 
bill, qualify for appointment as Prime Minister": quoted in LMS Cooray, 
op. cit. at p. 113. For the proponents of the Governor-General's reserve 
powers, the arguments of Dr. Eugene Forsey, a Canadian constitutional 
expert would seem to be the best: "The danger of royal absolutism is 
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More importantly, 'for our purposes, is the strong suggestion that the Governor 
General had acted out of political, considerations. In Whitlam's own 
assessment: 
" ..... the crisis of 1975 was essentially not only a constitutional 
crisis but also a political crisis; that the action of the Governor- 
General can be understood only in political terms, not in constitutional 
terms at all; and that his action represented not only a gross 
perversion of 'the Constitution and its conventions but a gross 
misreading of the political realities. The Governor-General had no right 
whatsoever to make a political assessment, even if it had been correct. 
There was a political crisis entirely capable of a political solution. 
Although the constitutional, anomalies would remain, the political 
resolution was imminent". 55 
The principal complaint of the oppositionists was that the Governor-General 
had not given enough time to the Labour Government to find a political 
solution but had sullied his office by descending into the arena and behaving 
contd... 
54. past; but the danger of Cabinet absolutism, even of prime ministerial 
absolutism, is present and growing. Against that danger the reserve 
power of the Crown, and especially the power to force or refuse 
dissolution, is in some instances the only constitutional safeguard ..... if a Prime Minister tries to turn parliamentary responsible government 
into unparliamentary irresponsible government then only the Crown can 
stop him": quoted in George Winterton, Parliament, The Executive And The 
Governor-General (Melbourne University-Press, 1983) at p. 153. For a 
discussion of British political conventions governing dissolution of 
Parliament, see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules 
and Forms of Political Accountability (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984T-p-. 
35 et. seq.; Ivor Jennings, CAFI-net Government 3rd Edn. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980) p. 412 et. seq; a-R, -J. A. G. Griffith & M. Ryle, 
Parliament: Functions, Practice And Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1989) p. 42-43. In Malaysia, the withholdi-ng of consent to a dissolution 
of Parliament is one of the matters in which the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
has a personal discretion: see Article 40(2). 
55. The Truth Of The Matter, op. cit. p. ix-x. There is also a strong view 
that Sir JoHn had acteEprematurely since supply was not to run out till 
end November 1975: see Encounters, op. cit. p. 268-269. In this regard, 
the advice given by ChiFFýJustice Barwick has also been castigated as 
"fundamentally political" because it was designed to provide support 
publicly for Kerr's plan of action and it failed to discuss alternative 
courses of action: see Barwick, op. cit. pp. 275-276. 
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partisanly. In the conclusion of one Australian constitutional writer: "The 
Senate ý was, manipulated in a partisan way by the opposition coalition to 
restrict, harass and finally bring down the Whitlam goverhment with Governor- 
General Kerr's assistance". 56 
A constitutional crisis is implicitly a 'political crisis. In the 
prescient observation of Sir Owen Dixon of the Australian High court: "The 
constitution is a political instrument. It deals with government and 
governmental powers.... it is not a question whether the considerations are 
political, for nearly every consideration arising from the Constitution can be 
so described.... to. 57 
However, what constitutionalism aspires for is that political expediency 
should not be allowed to'override constitutionally provided remedies or that 
constitutional powers should not be exercised solely to attain political 
objectives. In his illuminating book on the subject, Professor Nwabueze 
described constitutionalism as the limiting of the arbitrariness of political 
power, in essence a limitation on government. 58 He identifies the dilemma of 
constitutionalism as the frequent use made of the doctrine of state necessity 
in recent years in the emergent states. 59 He, concludes that there is a 
56. Brian Galligan, Politics Of The High Court: A Study Of The Judicial 
Branch Of GovernmenF'In Australia (University of Queensland Press, -St. 
Lucia, Queensland, 1987) at p. 224. It is proper to note that views in 
Australia varied widely as to the propriety of the Governor-General's 
actions depending on one's biases, predilections and sympathies: see 
Encounters, op. cit. p. 244. 
57. Nelbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth [1947) 74 CIR 31 at p. 82., 
58. B. O. Nwabueze,, -Constitutionalism In The Emergent States (C. Hurst & Co., 
London, 1973) at p. 1. 
59. Ibid p. xi. 
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tendency in the new democracies to use the concession of emergency powers in 
the constitution not only by using them for purposes for which they are not 
intended but also by using them to suspend constitutional government 
altogether. 60 He draws the entirely justified parallel between the Nigerian 
constitutional crisis 'in 1962 and the Sarawak crisis in 1966 in Malaysia. 
Nigeria like Malaysia had a federal system of government. 61 The declaration 
of an emergency in Western Nigeria in 1962 bore an uncanny resemblance to the 
Sarawak situation. It was also brought about by political squabbles within 
the ruling party. Acting on representations in writing by a majority of the 
legislators in the House of Assembly, the Regional Governor dismissed the 
Premier, Chief Akintola from office and appointed Chief Adegbenro in his 
place. Chief Akintola refused to accept his dismissal and physically held on 
to his office-room as also did his ministers who were supportive of him. He 
commenced legal action to have his dismissal declared unlawful. In yet 
another similarity with the Sarawak case, the Nigerian Supreme Court held his 
dismissal to be unconstitutional and reinstated him. The decision was however 
reversed by the ý Privy Council which held that the crucial wording in 'the 
Nigerian Constitution that read "unless it appears to him (the Governor) that 
the Premier no longer commands the support- of a majority of the members of the 
House of Assembly" entitled the Governor to act on material other than a vote 
60. Ibid P. 174. 
61. The 1966 military coup in Nigeria overthrew the federal based 
constitution and introduced rule by decree: see Nwabueze, op. cit. p. 
196 et. seq. The Military take-over was initiall-y--a-T-the provincial 
level but the Army's influence and threat was so pervasive that the 
civilian goverment at the Centre voluntarily handed over power to the 
military: see Nwabueze, op. cit. at p. 203. 
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of confidence in the House. 62 The immediate cause of the emergency, however, 
was not the vicissitudes of the litigation, but the disruption of the sitting 
of the Assembly by Akintola's supporters who, although a-minority, succeeded 
in aborting the Assembly by their uproar. Thus the Assembly was precluded 
from expressing its support for Akintola's successor. In a technical sense, 
therefore, there was an impasse. 
The remedy employed in both Nigeria and Sarawak was to declare an 
emergency. The choice of action was questionable and the lack of an adherence 
to the principles of constitutionalism in both was obvious. A blind eye was 
turned to the remedy given within the respect ive Constitutions themselves. In 
Sarawak, Article 7 of the State Constitution had provided that if the Chief 
Minister loses the confidence of the members of the Council Negri "then, 
unless at his request the Governor dissolves the council Negri, the Chief 
Minister shall tender the resignation of the members of the Supreme Council". 
Ningkan rightfully held that there was no obligation on his part to resign in 
the absence of a vote against him in the Assembly. He instead offered to 
advise dissolution of the Assembly, something that he was constitutionally 
entitled to exercise as an option, in the circumstances. Harley Ag. C. J. 
commented on this as "a political solution" which may be "the only way" to 
avoid multiple legal complications. 63 It is trite that in a parliamentary 
democracy, dissolution and elections are unobjectionable as remedies. Thus in 
the Australian constitutional crisis of 1975, the Governor General purported 
62. Adegbenro v. Akintola [1963] 3 AER 544; (1963] AC 614. This phrase which 
is absent in the Sarawak Constitution was pivotal in the Malaysian Court 
not following the Privy Council and ruling that Ningkan's dismissal was 
bad: see Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj Openg [1966] 2 MLJ 187. 
For a close analysis of the two cases, see SM Thio, Dismissal of Chief 
Ministers (1966) 8 Mal. L. R. 283. 
63. Stephen Kalong Ningkan, op. cit. at p. 195E. 
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to act on an established convention in dismissing the Whitlam Government 
because of the latter's refusal to recommend dissolution and pave the way for 
a general election after failing on the budget in the Senate. In Kelantan, 
likewise, the way was cleared for the holding of elections after the Menteri 
Besar, quite constitutionally, recommended dissolution to. the Regent. The 
latter, however, withheld proroguing the assembly in circumstances where it 
has been suggested that he was under some form of advicement from the Federal 
Government not to act. 64 A provision in the State Constitution, similar to 
the one in Sarawak, clearly provided for state elections as the way out of the 
constitutional impasse. The necessity to declare an emergency to break the 
impasse in both states was therefore questionable. Referring to the ýSarawak 
situation, one constitutional writer described it as "a manipulation of the 
rules for the dismissal of the Chief Minister and the dissolution of the 
65 legislature". The Kelantan emergency was slammed by the Opposition Leader 
as. a blatant abuse of emergency powers in "a conflict between political 
parties and personalities". 66 over in Nigeria, referring to the West Nigerian 
emergency, Professor Nwabueze described it as "ill-motivated and made for a 
purpose other than that envisaged by the Constitution", 67 in obvious reference 
to the moves to oust Chief Akintola from the premiership. 
But the fact that there was available some other constitutional means of 
resolving the crisis does not by itself render the proclamation of emergency 
bad. The attitude of the court is to leave the choice of the remedy to the 
64. See Raja Tun Azlan Shah (as he was then) in The Role Of Constitutional 
Rulers (1982) JMCL 1 at p. 10. 
65. Yash Ghai, The Politics Of The Constitution: Another Look At The Ningkan 
Litigation (1986) 7 Sing. L. R. 147 at p. 171. 
66. Lim Kit Siang, Time Bombs In Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1978) at p. 250. 
67. Nwabueze, op. cit. p. 176. 
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executive government. That, at least, appears to be the position taken by 
Privy Council in the Ningkan case: II(I)t is not for their lordships to 
criticise or comment upon the wisdom or expediency of the steps taken by the 
Government of Malaysia in dealing with the Constitutional situation which had 
occurred in Sarawak, or to inquire whether that situation could itself have 
been avoided by a different approach". 68 This hands-off approach of the Privy 
Council may be castigated as a clear instance of judicial abdication in the 
face of the obvious manipulation of the constitution to achieve a political 
objective. 69 Where the constitution itself has provided the solution for the 
crisis, as was the case in both Sarawak and Kelantan, it would have been 
thought that the failure to resort to these remedies would prima facie stand 
as reason to doubt the bona fides of the emergency especially in the absence 
of civil disorder or commotion. But the judicial self-restraint shown by the 
Privy Council is emblematic of the approach taken by third world courts 
generally in matters relating to national security ie. it is a matter for the 
judgment of the executive. 70 The Ningkan case is as strong a case as one 
could make out to impugn an emergency. The political objectives behind the 
action were obvious. There was also, as the Privy Council acknowledged, the 
68. Per Lord MacDermot in Ningkan v. Government of Nalaysia [19701 AC 379 at 
p. 391 C. D. 
69. For criticism of the judicial method employed in the House of Lords and 
the Privy Council in deciding only so much as is necessary to decide the 
case, see I. S. Dickinson, The Continuing Reluctance Of The Judiciýry 
(1990) 140 NLJ 1071: 9 ..... There would appear to be a 
R-rong argument in 
favour of bodies such as the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council dealing in their judgments with the entire case 
laid before them ..... 
in the interests of the development of the law or 
of legal certainty ...... (p. 1072). 
70. In Malaysia, a recent reiteration of this stand is found in Ninister of 
Home Affairs v. Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 295 SC endorsing what Lord 
Parker Ci said as long ago as in 1916: nThose who are responsible for 
the national security must be the sole judge of what the national 
security requires": The Zamora (1916) 2 AC 77 at p. 107. 
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absence of "the usual signs and symptoms of a grave emergency" - no 
disturbances, riots or strikes, no extra troops gr police had been placed on 
duty; no curfew or other restrictions on movement-had been found necessary; 
and the hostile activities of Indonesia had already endedt, 71 - but the Privy 
Council was not convinced. Further, the reliance by the Board on fanciful 
possibilities of, a threat to security. is wholly inexplicable. on this, they 
said security questions were essentially matters for the judgment of the 
responsible ministers based on their knowledge and experience. They added 
that although the Indonesian Confrontation was over "it was open to the 
Federal Government, and indeed its duty, to consider the possible consequences 
of a period of unstable government in a State that, not so long before, had 
been facing the tensions of Confrontation and the subversive activities 
associated with ita. 72 The reasoning is altogether astonishing. If the 
perceived threat to Sarawak was the remnants of the Indonesian Confrontation, 
there was already the 1964 Emergency declared for that very purpose which was 
still In force. Moreover, the principal legislation made under the 1964 
Emergency, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964, gave a, plentitude of 
emergency powers to the Cabinet to combat the security threat posed by 
Indonesia's aggression. Indeed the Government Explanatory Statement to the 
Bill amending Sarawak's Constitution pursuant to the (ie. Sarawak) emergency, 
which was reproduced in the judgment, 73 made specific mention of the 
continuance of the 1964 emergency and termed the new emergency "as a distinct 
emergency additional to the emergency already proclaimed". It was also 
71. Ibid P. 389. 
72. Ibid P. 391D-F. 
73. lbid pp. 390-391. 
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specifically described as being made "in order to deal with the present (ie. 
Sarawak) crisis". In the writer's opinion, it defies logic to justify the 
Sarawak emergency on the basis of the Indonesian Confrontation when the 1964 
emergency specifically proclaimed to'combat it was still in force. 
The Privy Council judgment in Ningkan's case remains a classic example 
of judicial abstinence. The judgment would have rested on surer grounds if it 
had limited itself to "the constitutional breakdown argument". 74 The argument 
that there was a need for a stable government and the possibility Of disorder 
and instability based on intelligence reports furnished to the executive 
government is usually unassailable before the courts. 
Likewise in Nigeria, when the emergency was declared in the western 
region in circumstances similar to that in Sarawak, there was no civil 
disorder or commotion. Professor Geoffrey Sawer from Australia wrote a 
personal account of his own observation of the situation in Western Nigeria at 
the material time. of the official reason given by 'the Centre for the 
emergency, that the legislature was pa ralysed and that the disturbances in the 
assembly could be communicated to the people outside leading to a breakdown in 
law and order, he wrote: 
"The present writer happened to be in Ibadan (capital of Western 
Nigeria) during the week commencing with the declaration of emergency 
and is in a position to cast considerable doubt on the fears expressed 
by the 
" 
Cqytre. Ibadan was certainly 
I 
in a state of profound 
peace.... 
74. Ibid p. 391D. 
75. Geoffrey Sawer, Emergency Powers'In Nigerian And Malaysian Federalism 
(1964) 6 Mal. L. T. - 83 at p. 90. The Police acknowledged that there was 
no outbreak of civil disorder but that "unless f irm Police action was 
taken widespread disorder will probably take place": Evidence given by 
the Deputy Inspector General of Police, see Williams v. Hajekodunmi (No. 
3) [1962] 1 All N. L. R. 418,427-28. 
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It will take much to impugn the recitation of facts (usually of a threat 
to security) declared in a proclamation, as was done by the Australian High 
Court in the Communist Party case'76 when it rejected the statement in the 
Preamble to the Communist Party Dissolution Act, 1950 that the Communist Party 
of Australia was a threat to the security of the country. In holding that 
this legislative determination was beyond the power of the Australian 
Parliament to pass as a defence measure, the Court observed that "it could not 
allow the opinion of Parliament to be the decisive factor, that is to 
determine the matter finally and conclusively, without deserting its own duty 
under the Constitution". 77 
However, the Australian case stands on its own against the general 
current of authorities pointing the opposite direction. In matters relating 
to security, whether from an internal or external source, the courts are 
unlikely to second-guess the perception of the government of the day that a 
threat to law and order was imminent. In Re A Sreeramulu, 78 strikes by 
government servants leading to an agitation for a separate state by a regional 
community was held sufficient for the President of India to invoke his 
emergency powers and sack the elected state government and impose President's 
Rule. In Rao Birinder Singh's case, 79 the absence of civil unrest was not 
held to be an inhibiting factor in decreeing President's rule because of the 
large number of cabinet appointees made by the incumbent government to seduce 
away possible defectors. . 
76. Australian communist Party v. Commonwealth [1951] 83 CLR 1. 
77. Per Mctiernan J. at p. 207. 
78. AIR 1974 AP 106. 
79. AIR 1968 P&H 441. 
k 
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In the end, the decision to invoke and exercise emergency powers is 
evidently and intrinsically a political decision. The role and function of 
constitutional law is peripheral to this decision. In third world countries, 
the politicisation of the emergency powers in the constitution is all 
pervasive. A generally reticent judiciary that proceeds on the basis that the 
government is bound to act in the best interests of the nation8O compounds the 
problem. The pathway is thus cleared for political expediency to govern, and 
constitutionalism to take a backseat. 
80. See Barakbah LP in Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia (1968] 1 MLJ 119 at 
p. 122E. 
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PART IV 
THE USE OF EMERGENCY POWERS AND EMERGENCY RULE 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY: SUBSTANTIVE 
AND FORMALISTIC REQUIREMENTS 
Introduction 
Article 150(l) and (2) in their present forml read as follows: 
"If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order 
in the Federation or any part thereof is threatened, he may issue 
a Proclamation of Emergency making therein a declaration to that 
effect". 
(2) "A Proclamation of Emergency under Clause (1) may be issued before 
the actual occurrence of the event which threatens the security, 
or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any 
part thereof if the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that there 
is imminent danger of the occurrence of such event". 
on a first reading of the article the following features are noticeable: 
(1) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong proclaims the emergency; 
(2) he must be satisfied that a grave emergency exists; 
(3) the grave emergency relates to the security or the economic life 
or public order in the Federation or any part thereof; 
(4) he could act before the actual occurrence of the event if he is 
satisfied of the imminent danger of their occurrence; and 
(5) he issues a Proclamation of Emergency by declaring the existence 
of a grave emergency on all or any of the grounds stated. 
1. The amendments to Article 150(1) have been dealt with in Chapter V. 
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Thus unlike the Australian Constitution which is silent on the exercise 
of emergency powers, 2 the Malaysian Constitution purports to define and limit 
the power to declare a state of emergency. The words in Article 150(l) and 
(2) are said to be "words of limitationt, 3 or "qualifying words,, 4 which must be 
satisfied before it can be said there was a valid exercise of the power to 
proclaim an emergency. The study therefore focusses on these qualifying words 
and the question of justiciability of a proclamation of emergency. In this 
respect we need to examine two sets of words in the Articles. The f irst is 
"if the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied", and the second, the words "a 
grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life or public 
order ..... is threatened". Because the "satisfaction" question is tied up 
with the justiciability question, and would entail consideration of matters 
like the political question doctrine and the effect of the ouster provisions 
in Article 150(8), it is proposed to deal first with what constitutes "a grave 
emergency". 
A"Grave Emergency" 
It may be noted at the outset that the term "emergency" itself is not 
defined 'in the Constitution. For one seeking a definition the invariable 
reference would be to the words of Lord Dunedin in Bhagat Singh v. King 
Experor. 5 where he said: "A state of emergency is something that does not 
2. See generally H. P. Lee, Emergency Powers (The Law Book Co., Australia, 
1984) at pp. 4 et. seq. In Australia, emergency situations are dealt with 
at State level by the enactment of state legislation. 
3. Per H. T. Ong F. J. in Ningkan v. Government of Nalaysia [1968] 1 MLJ 119 
at p. 126E. 
4. Per Azmi CJ in Ningkan, Ibid at p. 124 D-E. 
5. (1931] 58 IA 169. 
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permit of any exact definition: It connotes a state of matters calling for 
drastic action". 6 This bland definition was applied some forty years later by 
the Privy Council in the Ningkan case7 when construing th6 word "emergency" in 
Article 150(l). In repelling the argument that there' was no actual or 
threatened outbreak of violence or breach of the peace in Sarawak, the Privy 
council said "the natural meaning of the word itself is cap able of covering a 
very wide range of situations and occurrences including such diverse events as 
wars, famines, earthquakes, floods, epidemics and the collapse of civil 
government". 8 Lord MacDermot, who delivered the opinion, was of the view that 
the word "emergency" as used in Article 150(l) cannot be confined to the 
unlawful'. use or threat of force. 9 It was however acknowledged that the 
"emergency" must be grave and must threaten the security or economic life of 
the Federation or any part of it. The word "grave" imports an element of 
degree. It'follows that it is not every threat that constitutes an emergency 
but a "grave" threat. This refers to magnitude and how imminent, serious or 
6. At p. 172. 
7. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Nalaysia [1970] AC 379. 
B. At p. 390 D-E. 
9. Ibid. See, contra, Jeffrey Tan Eng Heong, Emergencies And The Sleeping 
Judicial Giant (1984) Vol. V Sing. L. R. 145 at p. 147: "A review of the 4 
instance-s wHe-n an emergency has been proclaimed in Malaysia, indicates 
the necessity of aggression or violence to be present before a 
proclamation is made - admittedly, those situations called for drastic 
measures of which only Article 150 could satisfy". This opinion is 
clearly at variance with the Privy Council judgment. Moreover, the 
comment that the four instances of emergency in Malaysia were 
accompanied by acts of aggression or violence is not supportable by the 
facts: see discussion in Chapter VI of the four emergencies. There was 
no outward manifestation of any civil disorder or violence in the 
Sarawak and Kelantan emergencies. The point at least was conceded 
before the Privy Council in the Ningkan case, ante, insofar as the 
Sarawak emergency was concerned. 
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Widespread is the threat to security, economic life or public order. It 
should therefore exclude from its signification a mere occurrence of public 
disorder or the outbreak of violence in localised parts of the country which 
could be handled by police action. However, the question of degree or 
magnitude, like the event said to give rise to the-emergency, is a matter for 
the Cabinet and the courts are unlikely to review the sufficiency of the 
factors upon which the Proclamation was made, particularly, on the question of 
magnitude alone. 
In this connection, the Privy council was right when it refused to 
equate an emergency with the unlawful use or threat of force. Article 14910 
deals specifically with Parliament's power to deal with the threat of 
organised violence by any or any substantial body of persons. 
10. The Privy Council observed that Article 150 was wider in terms than 
Article 149: Ibid. at p. 390 C. Article 149(1) reads as follows: 
"(1) If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or 
threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or outside 
the Federation - 
(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to fear, 
organised violence against persons or property; or 
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or any 
Government in the Federation; or 
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different 
races or other classes of the population likely to cause violence; 
or 
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of 
anything by law established; or 
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning of any 
supply or service to the public or any class of the public in the 
Federation or any part thereof; or 
(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, the 
Federation or any part thereof, 
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is 
valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions 
of Article 5,91 10 or 13, or would apart from this Article be outside 
the legislative power of Parliament; and Article 79 shall not apply to a 
Bill for such an Act or any amendment to such a Bill. 
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It is also significant that Article 150(l) defines an emergency by 
reference to effect. Therein lies its width. Thus any event if it has the 
effect of threatening the security or economic life of the Federation or any 
part of it could amount to an emergency no matter what its character. The 
thrust of the provision is similar to the provisions of the United Kingdom 
Emergency Powers Act, 1920. Section' 1(1) of the Act reads: 
"If at any time it appears to Her Majesty that there have occurred or 
are about to occur, events of such a nature as to be calculated, by 
interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or 
light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any 
substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life, Her 
Majesty may, by proclamation (hereinafter referred to as ?, proclamation 
of emergency), declare that a state of emergency exists". 
The provision does not define the "events" amounting to an emergency but makes 
the classification according to its effect, or whether they cause the'type of 
interferences enumerated. Thus it has been said that the power to issue a 
proclamation under the said section is limited in three important respects. 
First, the "events" which occasion the emergency must interfere with the 
"supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light or with the mean's of 
locomotion". The second and third limitations arise from the necessity for' 
the "events" in question depriving the community or 'any substantial portion of 
the community of the essentials of life. 12_ In the result, the twelve 
contd... 
10. (2) A law containing such a recital as is mentioned in Clause (1) 
shall, if not sooner repealed, cease to have effect if resolutions are 
passed by both Houses of Parliament annulling such law, but without 
prejudice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the power 
of Parliament to make a new law under this Article". 
11. Halsbury's Statutes 4th Edn. Vol. 48 p. 759, as amended by the Emergency 
Powers Act, 1964. 
12. See Gillian S. Morris I Strikes In Essential Services (Mansell Publishing Ltd., London, 1986) at p. 52. 
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occasions when the Act had been invoked have all been industrial disputes, 
involving strikes or other forms of industrial action taken by trade unions. 13 
We may also refer to the jurisprudence developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) in relation to the definition of an emergency. It has 
risen in the context of the derogation provision of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, Article 15(l), which reads: 
"In time of war or other- public- emergency threatening the life of the 
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law". 14 
The term "other public emergency threatening the life of the nation" has been 
considered in a number of cases. In Lawless v. Ireland, 15 a case involving 
preventive detention in Ireland, the Court defined "public emergency" as "an 
exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of 
which the State is composed". 16 The Court held that the Irish state was 
justified in declaring a public emergency on the basis of the activities of 
the illegal Irish Republican Army, and in particular as a result of a bomb 
incident on the Northern Ireland 
_ 
border in July 1957.17 The Lawless 
13. Ibid. pp. 50-51. See also Gillian S. Morris, The Emergency Powers Act 
1920 (1979) PL 317 at p. 318. For a discussion of the use of the 
orFinary criminal law to deal with obstructive industrial action without 
resort to the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, see Peter Wallington, 
Policing the Miner's Strike (1985) 14 IIJ 145. 
14. Basic Documents on Human Rights Ed. Ian Brownlie (Clarendon Press, 
oxford) at p. 247. 
15. (1961) 1 E. H. R. R. 15 
16. Op. cit. at para. 28. 
17. For a criticism of the decision, see P. D. Higgins, OThe Lawless Case" 
(1962) Camb. L. J. 234. 
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definition was followed by the Commission in the First Greek Case. 18 The case 
arose from the coup by the Colonels in Greece in 1967. The Commission 
declined to permit derogation on the basis that the, facts'did not establish a 
public emergency. The Greek Government sought to justify the'emergency under 
the twin heads of a communist takeover and public disorder. The first was 
dismissed by the Commission as evidentially unsubstantiated, and the second as 
not being existent to a point beyond police control. 19 In the later case of 
Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 20 involving a point similar to Lawless, the 
Commission proceeded on the basis that "a public emergency" was not disputed. 
It noted: 
"The degree of violence, with bombing, shooting and rioting, was on a 
scale far beyond what could be called minor civil disorder and it is 
clear that the violence used was in many instances planned in advance by 
factions of the community organised and acting on paramilitary lines. 
To a great extent the violence was directed against the security forces, 
which were severely hampered in their function to keep or restore the 
public peace". 21 
These decisions of the European bodies show emphasis on two factors: 
first, the degree of disruption caused by civil disorder must be such that it 
threatens the very existence of the nation; secondly, if there is large scale 
18. [1969] 12 Y. B. E. C. H. R. 
19. See pp. 73-76, paras. 158-65 for the findings of the Commission. 
20. [1976] 19 Y. B. E. C. H. R. 512. 
21. At pp. 584-86. See also David Bonner, Ireland v. United Kingdom [1978] 
27 ICLQ 897 and Michael O'Boyle, Torture And Emergency Powers under the 
ghTs--. Ireland European Convention of Human B: l(- v. United King ox The 
. [1977] 71 AJIL 674, for a perceptive analysis of t. FE decision of both 
the Commission and the Court. For a criticism of the Court's decision 
not to review the British Government's policy and the choice of means in 
combating terrorism in Ireland, see Colin Warbrick, The European 
Convention of Human Rights And the Prevention of Terrorism (1983) 32 
ICLQ 82 at pp. 115-116. 
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violence or organised terrorism there is every likelihood of ,a court or 
tribunal accepting the existence of an emergency. Thus the existence of 
organised terrorism in Lawless and Ireland passed muster-under Article 15(1) 
but not the mere occurrence of civil disorder and riots, though widespread, in 
the First Greek case. It was held in the latter case that what. was needed was 
police remedial action and not an emergency. 
The Threat to Security 
The threat to security was given as a reason in the declaration of all 
the four emerg'encies. 22 In the Ningkan case in the Privy Council it was 
established that the threat to security need not be attended by the presence 
of violence or the threat of violence or public disorder. The Privy Council 
accepted that the responsible Government may found its apprehension upon 
intelligence reports and that would be a sufficient basis for declaring an 
emergency. At the Federal Court, H. T. Ong FJ. dealt squarely with the 
usecurity" question in terms that suggest that it falls beyond the pale of 
judicial review. His opinion is significant because he had dissented from the 
majority on the question of justiciability. Moreover, on the purpose of the 
emergency, he unequivocally held that it had as its primary objective the 
removal of Ningkan as Chief Minister: 
"my view, rightly or wrongly, is that this primary objective is not 
necessarily incompatible with a genuine concern - whether on adequate 
grounds or not is not for me to say - felt by the cabinet as regards the 
security situation in the State ......................................... 
22. See Appendix B for the reproduction all four Proclamations of Emergency. 
See also Chapter VI for the discussion of the circumstances surrounding 
the four declarations of emergency. 
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Sarawak naturally cannot be compared with more advanced countries.... in 
which political squabbles pose no problems imperiling national. security. 
It may very well be true that political instability in Sarawak could 
possibly have serious repercussions on the security of the State, 
although some may quite honestly consider it 'improbable or far 
fetched.... I am unable to say that the Cabinet advice to 23 
His Majesty 
was not prompted by bona fide considerations of security". 
Moreover, there was express reference to an affidavit of the Home Affairs 
Minister who deposed without more to the Communist threat of exploiting the 
situation in Sarawak. It demonstrated a judicial reluctance to review the 
responsible Government's appraisal of the security situation. 24 The' Communist 
threat was a mere assertion. It could not have carried much force because in 
the Privy Council the security threat was perceived to come from another 
source, silicet, the remnants of Indonesia's Confrontation towards Malaysia in 
1964-65.25 In the First Greek Case,, the European commission refused to act on 
the mere assertion by the respondent Government of a Communist threat to 
takeover the government as justifying the Colonel's coup or the emergency that 
followed the coup. The Commission observed that the two pieces of evidence 
produced by the Greek Government were slender and that no Communist takeover 
23. [1968] 1 MLJ 119 at p. 128 G-H. 
24. The Affidavit read: "I would be guilty, and I will be failing in my duty 
if, for example, I were to wait for three months, and during those three 
months the Communists got the upper hand through political means, 
because we know that one of the objectives of the Communists is to erode 
the fabric of the Government, to go into the political parties, and we 
have a great deal of evidence there on this Communist threat to 
Sarawak": Ningkan, ibid, lines A-B. 
25. (1970) AC 379 at p. 391: "(A)Ithough the Indonesian Confrontation had 
then ceased, it was open to the Federal Government, and indeed its duty, 
to consider the possible consequences of a period of unstable government 
in a State that, not so long before, had been facing the tensions of 
Confrontation and the subversive activities associated with it". For a 
criticism of this hypothesis by the Privy Council, see discussion in 
Chapter VII under heading "The Four Emergencies: A Conspectus". 
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of the government by force could be anticipated. An arms caches that was 
found was described as negligible and the Communists "plan of action" did not 
involve an imminent overthrow of lawful government. 26 
The commission's decision may be considered as being ahead of its times 
as regards the treatment of the security question. Its robustness may be 
explained by its supra-national character. In contrast, the deference shown by 
the national courts to the Executive on matters of security is of long 
vintage. in The zamora [1916] Lord Parker C. J. set the rule: "Those who are 
responsible for the national security must be the sole judge of what the 
national security requires". 27 As recent as 1977 the view seemed to prevail 
in England, reading Lord Denning in Hosenball: 
"But this is no ordinary case. It is a case in which national security 
is involved: and our history shows that, when the state itself is 
endangered, our cherished freedom will have to take second place". 28 
But the rapid development of judicial review in the United Kingdom over the 
past two decades29 would seem to suggest a loosening of the "immunity" given 
to national security questions. In council of civil Service Unions v. 
Minister for the Civil Service, 30 the House of Lords held that where the 
government seeks to rely on reasons of national security in Judicial 
26. Supra, no. 23 at pp. 72-76, paras. 154-165. 
27. [1916] 2 AC 77 at p. 107. 
28. R v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Exparte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 
766 at p. 778. 
29. Described by Lord Diplock as the greatest achievement of the English 
courts in his judicial lifetime: see IRC v. Federation of self-Employed 
And Small Businesses Ltd [1981] 2 AER 93 at p. 106 g-h. 
30. (1984] 3 AER 935. 
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proceedings, a mere assertion to that ef f ect would not suf f ice and that the 
Courts would require evidence that the decision or action was in f act taken 
for reasons of national security. Lord Scarman wrote as follows: 
"My Lords, I conclude, therefore, that where a question 'as to the 
interest of national security arises in judicial proceedings the court 
has to act on evidence. In some cases a judge or jury is required by 
law to be satisfied that the interest is proved to exist; in others, the 
interest is a factor to be considered in the review of the exercise of 
an executive discretionary power. once the factual basis is established 
by evidence so that the court is satisfied that the interest of national 
security is a relevant factor to be considered in the determination of 
the case, the court will accept the opinion of the Crown or its 
responsible officer as to what is required to meet it, unless it is 
possible to show that the opinion was one which no reasonable minister 
advising the Crown could in the circumstances reasonably have held. 
There is no abdication of the judicial function, but there is a 
commonsense limitation recognised by the judges as to what is 
justiciable; and the limitation is entirely consistent with the general 31 development of the modern case law of judicial review". 
The application of the decision in Ruddock32 signals the present attitude of 
English judges on the plea of national, security. It leans towards a closer 
judicial evaluation of the question. It was a case involving Aelephone 
tapping on grounds of national security. In rejecting the argument that the 
Secretary of State by long policy maintains his silence before the courts on 
what are the matters of national security involved, Taylor J. said: 
"Counsel for 
, 
the Secretary of State does not challenge here the 
jurisdiction of the court to decide the issues raised. He bases his 
submission on a plea to the court's discretion. In effect, the plea 
amounts to this: the Secretary of State invariably maintains silence in 
the interests of national- security on issues such as are raised here. 
The court in its discretion should do likewise, and since making 
findings to decide the case may break that silence, -the court should, 
in 
Lord Scarman's phrase, abdicate its judicial function. I cannot agree 
with that, either as a general proposition or in this particular case. I 
do not accept that the court should never inquire into a complaint 
against a minister if he says his policy is to maintain silence in the 
31. At p. 948 b-d. 
32. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. Exparte Ruddock [1987] 2 AER 
518. 
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interests of national security. To take an extreme and one hopes 
unlikely example, suppose an application were put before the court 
alleging a warrant was improperly issued by a Secretary of State against 
a political opponent, and suppose the application to be supported by the 
production of a note in the minister's own hand acknowledging the 
criteria did not apply but giving instructions that the phone be tapped 
nevertheless to see if anything discreditable could be learnt. It could 
not be sensibly argued that the department's invariable policy of 
silence should require the court meekly to -follow suit and decline to 
decide such a case. At the other extreme, I recognise there could occur 
a case where the issue raised was so sensitive and the revelations 
necessarily following its decision so damaging to national security that 
the court might have to take special measures (for example sitting in 
camera or prohibiting the mention of names). Conceivably (although I 
would reserve the point) in an extreme case the court might have to 
decline to try the issues. But in all such cases, cogent evidence of 
potential damage to national security flowing from the trial of the 
issues would have to be adduced, whether in open court or in camera, to 
justify any modification of the court's normal procedure. Totally to 
oust the court's supervisory jurisdiction in a field where ex hypothesi 
the citizen can have no right to be Consulted is a draconian and 
dangerous step indeed. Evidence to justify the court's declining to 
decide a case (if such a course is ever justified) would need to be very 
strong and specific". 33 
A change is also visible in the attitude of the Australian High Court to the 
question. In a case involving the powers of. surveillance of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation 
. 
(ASIO) , the court held that questions 
whether intelligence is relevant to security and whether a communication of 
intelligence is for purposes relevant to security may be determined by the 
court. 34 The complaint was that the inquiries made by the ASIO of the 
plaintiff organisation was not related to security. "Security" was defined 
under the relevant statute35 as the protection of the country from espionage, 
sabotage, subversion, terrorism, whether within or without. 36 In rejecting a 
33. At pp. 526-527. 
34. The Church of Scientolog7 v. Woodward (1983-84] 154 CLR 25. 
35. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act, 1979. 
36. Section 4. 
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demurrer that the complaint was not justiciable, Mason J. (as he then was) 
said: 
"It is one thing to say that security intelligence is not readily 
susceptible of judicial evaluation and assessment. It is another thing 
to say that the courts cannot determine whether intelligence is 
"relevant to security" and is "for purposes 5elevant to security". 
Courts constantly determine issues of relevancy3 ....................... Intelligence is relevant to security if it can ýe*a*s*o*;; Ll, 
y***b*'e**c*o*nsidered to have a real connexion with that topic, 
judged in the light of what is known to ASIO at the relevant time. This 
is a test which the courts are quite capable of applying". 38 
The position in Malaysia is ambivalent. The progressive decisions in 
this field from England and Australia may not take root yet despite the 
Berthelsen decision. 39 It was a case involving the expulsion of a foreign 
journalist by the Home Affairs Ministry by revoking his professional visit 
pass on the ground that his presence was prejudicial to the security of the 
country. Leave to commence judicial review was refused at first instance. The 
High Court reasoned that because it involved a matter of national security it 
would be futile to give leave as the court should not go behind the decision 
of the executive. on appeal, the Supreme Court gave leave and proceeded to 
quash the expulsion order as a violation of the rules of natural justice. The 
Court ruled that the appellant had a legitimate expectation that his 
employment pass would not be cancelled without an opportunity first to, make 
37. Op. Cit. p. 59-60. 
38. Ibid. p. 61. See also the Australian case of A and Ors v. Hayden (1985] 
LRC (Const) 365, regarding disclosure of the names of officers of the 
ASIO in court proceedings. Gibbs Ci said: "When the executive seeks a 
special privilege or immunity on grounds of national security, the court 
will not defer without question to the judgment of the executive as to 
what the national security requires" (p. 367). 
39. John Peter Berthelsen v. Director General of immigration [1986] 2 CLJ 
409; [1987] 1 MLJ 134. 
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representations. The Supreme Court adopted the "evidential approach" taken by 
the House of Lords in the Council of civil service Union's case. But unlike in 
that case, Abdoolcader SCJ saw no threat to national security involved in 
"consultations": 
"The position is wholly different in the matter of the instant appeal: 
we are unable to envisage what dire consequences of catastrophic 
magnitude would or possibly have ensued if the appellant had been 
accorded a right to make representations ..... We would add that in any 
event adequate evidence from responsible and authoritative sources would 
be necessary on the security aspect and no reliance can be placed in 
that regard on a mere ipse dixit of the first respondent (Director 
General of Immi ration) to that effect in the notice of 
cancellation ..... ". 
go 
The Berthelsen decision was a controversial one. It is cited as one of the 
cases that led to the confrontation between the judiciary and the executive in 
1988.41 The judicial upheaval that followed saw the dismissal of three Supreme 
Court judges. The Supreme Court that was composed after this crisis is 
evidently cast in a more conservative mould. Its view on security questions 
was given in a preventive detention case, Minister of Home Affairs v. Karpal 
Singh, 42 where it fully endorsed Lord Parker CJ's opinion in The Zamora, ante, 
40. At p. 418 para. 15. 
41. See Andrew Harding, The Malaysian Judiciary Crisis 
- 
Of 
-- 
1988 (1989) 
Commonwealth Judicial Journal Vol. 8 No. P. 3. See also M7-s. Frank, 
Markowitz, Mckay & Roth, The Decline In the Rule of Law In Singapore And 
Malaysia (A Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of thii 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York) at p. 12: "Beginning in 
1988, Prime Minister Mahathir, who had earlier praised the independence, 
competence and integrity of the judiciary in Malaysia, became highly 
critical of it. His shift in attitude followed the Supreme Court's 
decision in J. P. Berthelsen v. Director General of Immigration". A like 
opinion is expressed in H. P. Lee, "A Fragile Bastion under Siege - The 
1988 Convulsion In the Malaysian Ju3i"clary (1990) Vol. XXI No. 3 INSAF 18 
TE -p. 20: "Dissatisfaction with the judiciary started to simmer rapidly 
when the Prime Minister was clearly stung by the decision of the Supreme 
Court in J. P. Berthelsen v. Director General of Immigration & ors". (see 
same article in [1990] 17 Melbourne U. L. R. 386). 
42. (1988] 3 MLJ 295. This was one of the controversial cases pending appeal 
during the crisis: see Frank et al, op. cit. pp. 15-16. 
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given in the wake of the -First World War, that matters of national security 
are best left to the judgment of the Executive. This view would seem to 
reinstate the pre-Berthelsen position in Malaysia that the ipse dizit of the 
Executive would be sufficient to render security matters non-justiciable. on 
current judicial attitudes, the decisions in Ningkan and Karpal Singh appear 
to foreclose any challenge to an emergency as not being warranted on security 
grounds. 
The Threat To Economic Life 
Only in the Kelantan emergency was "threat to economic life" given as a 
ground for declaring an emergency. 43 Thus unlike the "security' ground, there 
has been no opportunity for our courts to judicially analyse what would 
constitute a threat to the economic life of the Federation. As a result, it 
would be a matter of speculation whether the courts would give that question 
the same blanket of immunity as they have done to the "security" ground. 44 
However, given the circumstances behind the Kelantan crisis, it is 
difficult to comprehend how the events there could have amounted to a threat 
to the economic life of the State. 45 It was principally a struggle between two 
Political parties for control of the State Government. By all accounts, there 
was no disruption of civil life or interruption of supplies justifying the 
conclusion that the economic life of the state was imperilled. In all 
43. See Appendix B where the Proclamation is reproduced. 
44. Tun *Suffian records that a number of cases filed challenging the 
Kelantan emergency never reached the courts: see his lectures delivered in India under the title, Malaysia-India: Shared Experiences In the Law 
(AIR Publication, Nagpur, India, 1980) at p. 83. 
45. See discussion on the Kelantan emergency in Chapter VI. 
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probability, barring the printers devil, the draftsman of the Proclamation had 
merely reproduced the provisions of Article 150(1) impsissima verba in 
drafting the Proclamation or had deliberately supplied an additional ground 
to better defend the Emergency should it be challenged. 
The question for present purposes is what would amount to a threat to 
economic life justifying a proclamation? The width of the provision leaves 
little room for reading limitations or restrictions into its application. It 
can apply in times of natural disasters like floods or drought or other 
calamities that cause damage to industry or agriculture like widespread crop 
failures. It can be invoked if the country's principal foreign exchange 
earners like rubber, palm oil or tin face collapse in the overseas market. 46 
In India, there is a specific provision that authorises declaring a financial 
emergency: see Article 360(1), which reads: 
"If the President is satisfied that situation has arisen whereby the 
financial stability or credit of India or any part of the territory 
thereof is threatened he may by a Proclamation make a declaration to 
that effect". 
During the period of such an emergency the Central Government is authorised to 
give directions to any State to observe "such canons of financial propriety" 
as specified in the directions. It is also not unknown in developing countries 
for a national economic recovery to be under taken as an emergency action. For 
example, Nigeria declared a 15 month National Economic Emergency under a 1985 
Decree that enabled the President to issue orders and make regulations to 
revamp the Nigerian economy. The overriding powers given to the President 
enabled him to give directions to the public and private sector of the 
economy, to procure the aid of the Armed Forces Ruling Council and to make 
46. For example, Ecuador declared an emergency in 1981-82 because of the 
decline in the price of its oil causing an economic crisis: see 
Chowdhury, infra, p. 19. 
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regulations for the development or stabilisation or for the correction of 
distortions in the economy. 47 In November 1987, the President of Sierra Leone 
proclaimed a state of "public economic emergency" in the country. The 
Proclamation declared that "it appeared to the President that a situation of 
economic crisis exists in the country which if allowed to continue may lead to 
a state of public emergency". The Proclamation was inherently vague and 
ambigous. It was challenged in legal proceedings on the basis that the 
constitutional provision under which the President acted was silent on an 
"economic" emergency. But the argument was rejected by the Sierra Leone 
Supreme Court which reasoned that the provision which spoke of "a situation" 
leading to a public emergency was a matter for the sole determination of the 
President and he was therefore within his power to declare an emergency for 
reasons of the economy. 48 
A continuous state of underdevelopment as an emergency situation is 
essentially a third world phenomenon. The International Law Association (ILA) 
has done focus study on the subject. 49 The studies revealed the indivisibility 
of economic and social rights, and civil and political rights. 50 They also 
47. See Nigeria, National Economic Powers Decree, 1985 (1987) Vol. 1 CLB 18. 
48. See the case of The State v. Adel Osman & Ors. (1988] IRC (Const. ) 212. 
In the United States, during the period of economic recovery from the depression, the Governor of Texas purported to declare martial law in the State to control oil production. on a challenge as to the validity 
of his action, the Supreme Court held that he had exceeded his 
authority: Sterling v. Constantin 287 U. S. 378 (1932]. 
49. See Subrota Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a state of Emergency: The 
Paris Minimum standards of Human Rights Norms in A state of Emergency (Printer Publishers, London (1988)) pp. 17 
50. Four important reports are available from the four biennial conferences 
on the establishment of a New International Economic order: Belgrade (1980), Montreal (1982), Paris (1984) and Seoul (1986): Chowdhury. Ibid. 
p. 18-19. 
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highlighted the relationship between depressed economic conditions and 
lawlessness. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that violence 
and unrest in the rural areas of Guatemala were closely connected with the 
situation of extreme poverty existent there. The concern of international 
bodies has been with the derogation of human rights in the-name of emergency 
measures taken to combat economic depression. For example, the economically 
motivated state of emergency in Ecuador as a result of the declining price of 
its oil saw emergency restrictions on the unrelated areas of the rights of 
assembly and expression. The ILA has stated that given the time involved in 
the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, it deprecates 
economic underdevelopment as per se justifying the declaration of a state of 
emergency. 51 
The most likely threat to the economic life of Malaysia may come from 
interferences with supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community. The implicit recognition of this is given in the principal 
emergency statute enacted under Article 150, namely, the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Act, 1979.52 By section 2(l), the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is empowered 
to make emergency regulations having the force of law which "he considers 
desirable or expedient" for'securing, inter alia, the "supplies and, services 
essential to the life of the community". In addition thereto, his specific 
rule-making powers cover the making of provisions for: (a) trading, storage, 
exportation, importation, production and manufacture, and (b) supply -and 
distribution of food, water, fuel, light and other necessities. 53 It is 
51. Chowdhury. Ibid pp. 18-19. 
52. Its precursor was the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 
1969 which in turn was modeled on the Emergency, (Essential Powers) Act, 
1964. 
53. Section 2(2), clauses (m) and (n). 
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axiomatic that a crisis in any of these areas, if of sufficient magnitude to 
be considered grave, could be considered a threat to economic life. The 
causative effects are infinite, but in terms of those credted by human agency, 
the most likely source is obstructive industrial act ion. The British 
experience in the use of emergency powers under their Emergency Powers Act, 
1920 is instructive. The definition of an emergency under that statute covers 
events that interfere with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel 
etc, or deprive the community or any substantial portion of it with the 
essentials of life. The phrase wessentials of lifew is not defined but the 
British Government used it specifically on three occasions to justify 
proclaiming an emergency on the ground that the economy was damaged. 54 This 
was done in respect of the 1948 and 1949 dock strikes and the 1966 seamen 
strike. 
Likewise, any form of industrial action in Malaysia that causes 
interference with supplies and service to the public, if sufficiently grave, 
could be considered "economic sabotage" and grounds for an emergency. 
55 The 
Industrial Relations Act, 1967 lists out a wide range of services both in the 
54. See Gillian Morris, Strikes In Essential Services, op. cit. note 12 at 
p. 52. The learned author, however, EYEF-e-sthe view that the 
interpretation given by the Government was not justified as being 
"inordinately wide": ibid. In Cornelius P. Cotter's, Constitutionalizing 
Emergency Powers: The British EUerience (1953) Stanford Law Review 382, 
it is observed that proclamations of emergency under the Emergency 
Powers Act were issued on five occasions, all involving worker's 
strikes: (1) the 1921 coal strike, (2) the London tramways strike, 1924, 
(3) the General Strike, 1926 (4) the 1948 Dock strike, and (5) the 1949 
Dock strike (pp. 398-402). 
55. The mordant observation by GTS Sidhu in his, Emergency Powers under 
Article 150 (1990) INSAF Vol. XXI No. 1 at p. 80 that even a strike by 
worker-s-wo-uld justify proclaiming an emergency may have more than a ring 
of truth to it. The New Zealand case of Hewlett v. Fielder (1951] NZLR 
755 provides an example of resort to emergency powers to deal with a 
nation-wide dock strike. 
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public and private sectors that are considered essential services. 56 
Theoretically, it is possible that a major interruption of these services may 
provide grounds for an emergency as threatening the ec6nomic life of the 
country. The likelihood of services and supplies being interrupted by strike- 
action, however, is remote. The Industrial Relations Act, 1967 is tightly 
drafted against widespread strike action by trade unions. There are several 
control mechanisms against wild-cat strikes and, additionally, the continuance 
of a strike action becomes illegal once the dispute is referred -to the 
Industrial Court or, with regard to a public sector dispute, where the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong has referred or refused to refer the dispute to the court or 
to a special panel created by the Minister of Human Resources. 57 
In the past, when there were disputes in essential services, the 
Government had not resorted to its emergency powers. The closest instance 
occured in February 1979 when there was a dispute in the national airlines 
over a collective agreement. A widespread work-to-rule involving technical 
staff and cabin crew crippled flight schedules and caused the Government to 
close the airlines for two days. The Government invoked its powers under the 
Internal Security Act (ISA) to preventively detain eighteen persons, namely 
union officials, without resort to the provisions of the Industrial Relations 
Act to deal with the situation. 58 This was the first time that the ISA was 
56. See the Schedule to the Industrial Relations Act, 1967. The essential 
services listed are banking, electricity, fire, port, airport, postal, 
radio and telecommunications etc. 
57. See the present writer's, The Control And Regulation of Strikes And 
Lock-outs in malaysia (1991)- 2 CLJ iii. 
58. The Internal Security Act, 1960 is a law passed under Article 149 of the 
Federal Constitution which enables the making of special law to deal 
with subversion or organised violence or the threat of it from any body 
of persons. 
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used to deal with purely an industrial dispute. It resulted in considerable 
pressure being applied by the International Transport Workers Federation for 
the release of the detainees. It's Asian representative located in Malaysia, 
was one of those detained. There was for some time a boycott of the handling 
of Malaysian Airline planes by affliated workers in Lond on and Australian 
airports. The detained union officials'were shortly released except for two 
who were kept in detention for a period of about 76 days. 59 
The airline strike experience illustrates that inspite of the provisions 
of the Industrial Relation Act, the Government could resort to its emergency 
powers to deal with a crippling labour strike that threatens supplies or the 
economic life of the community. 
The Threat to Public Order 
"Public order" as a ground for an emergency is of recent origin. It was first 
introduced in the 1981 amendments to Article 150 and now constitutes the third 
basis, in addition to "security" and "economic life", upon which an emergency 
can be proclaimed. 60 It is of wider import than the previous head of "internal 
disturbance" which was deleted from Article 150 by the 1963 amendments. 
The absence of a definition of the term "public order" in the 
Constitution leaves it open for a wide application. Unlike in Britain where 
the Offences constituting a threat to public order are contained in a single 
59. Interview with P. Kuppusamy, one of the two detainees. Mr. Kuppusamy was 
an ex-airline staff who at the material time was acting as an adviser to 
the airlines union: see also New Straits Times, 22 February 1979. He is 
presently a legal practitioner in Kuala Lumpur. 
60. See the discussion in Chapter V on the Constitution (Amendment) Act A514 
of 1981. 
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statute, the Public order Act 1986,61 in Malaysia they are found variously in 
a number of statutes eg. the Penal Code, the Police Act 1967 and the Minor 
Offences Ordinance 1950. The offences therein are a Z: odification of the 
traditional common law offences relating to public order, I ike breaches of the 
peace, disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly or procession . However, in the 
constitutional sense a threat to security would have a wider context. This 
emerges from the considerable Indian jurisprudence on the subject. It has been 
said by the Indian Supreme Court that offences against public order may be 
divided into two categories: (a) major offences affecting the security of the 
State, and (b) minor offences involving breaches of purely local significance: 
62 63 see Romesh Thappar v. State of madras, and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi. 
In Romesh Thappar's case, public order was defined as an expression of wide 
connotation. It was said to signify the state of tranquility prevailing among 
members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations 
enforced by the Government which they have instituted. 64 In the later case of 
Superintendant Central Prison V. Ram Nanohar Lohia, 65 the Indian Supreme Court 
described "public order" as synonymous with public safety and, tranquility, and 
the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in 
contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war 
affecting the security of the state. It has also been observed that, "public 
61. However, see criticism of the statute in David Bonner and Richard Stone, 
The Public order Act, 1986: Steps In the Wrong Direction? (1989) PL 202. 
62. AIR 1950 SC 124. 
63. AIR 1950 SC 129. 
64. At p. 127. 
65. AIR 1961 SC 633 at 637. 
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order" is not just'"law and order"; it has a wider connotation than "law and 
order". In Ram Nanohar Lohia v. State of Bihaz-. 66 the Supreme Court neatly 
described the difference as not a mere disturbance of law and order. It 
observed that the contravention of law always affects law and order but before 
it can be said to affect public order it must affect the community or the 
public at large. Likewise the expression "in the 'interest of public order" 
has been described as distinguishable from the expression "for the maintenance 
of law and order". "Law and order" is of local significance and refers 
invariably to disorder of comparatively lesser gravity. The expression "in the 
interest of public order" was thus read to include acts' which are not only 
acts which disturb the security of the State but also acts which disturb 
public tranquility or are breaches of the peace: see Hadhu Limaye v. S. D. H. ' 
)j0n. qhyr. 67 In Ram Bali v. State of W. Bengal, 68 the 'Indian Supreme Court ruled 
that "public order' is an elastic concept which is also Wider than the 
"security of the State". 
The Indian approach has considerably influenced the Malaysian courts in 
their appraisal of the term "public order". However, because of its recent 
origins in Article 150, none of the cases deal with the term in the context of 
our present discussion. The Romesh Thappar definition was followed by the 
Malaysian Court in Re Tan Boon Liat69 dealing with preventive detention under 
the Emergency (Public order and Prevention of Crime) ordinance, '1969. The 
Ordinance provides for detention without trial where a person is said to act 
66. AIR 1966 SC 740 at 758. 
67. AIR 1971 SC 2486 at 2495. 
68. AIR 1975 SC 623. 
69. [19761 2 MLJ 83. 
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in a manner prejudicial to public order. Abdoolcader J. (as he then was) said 
that the term was not necessarily antithetica 1 to disorder but that danger to 
human life and safety and the disturbance to public tranquility must 
necessarily fall within the purview of the expression. 70 The court adopted 
what was said in Romesh Thappar on public safety as ordinarily meaning the 
security of the public and their freedom from danger. 71 Although Re Tan Boon 
Liat is a preventive detention case, there is every likelihood that the 
treatment given in that case to the term "public order" will be adopted by a 
Malaysian court in any future case that discusses the term in the context of 
Article 150. - 
The inclusion of "public order' in Article 150, inspite of the presence 
of the all embracing term "threat to security" would suggest strongly that 
"public-order" was intended to have a wider signification than "security". The 
description given in the Indian case of Ram Bali with regard to these two 
terms provides support for this hypothesis. In the result, a purely, local 
disturbance in a part of the country, which ordinarily would not amount to a 
threat to the security of the whole nation, could nevertheless be a ground for 
declaring an emergency. Thus, if "public order" had been present as a ground 
in Article 150 during the Sarawak Emergency, the occurrence of the several 
demonstrations in the capital would have provided sufficient cause for 
declaring an emergency, without resort to the "security" ground. 72 
70. At p. 86 D-F. 
71. For "public safety" as a ground for declaring an emergency, see the West 
Indian case of Christopher Maximea v. Attorney Ceneral [1974] 21 W. I. R. 
548. 
72. In the discussions above it was pointed out that there was a certain 
degree of confusion as to the source of the so-called "threat to 
security". In the Federal Court, H. T. Ong F. J. saw it as emanating from 
the Communists but the Privy Council spoke of the danger emerging from 
the remnants of Indonesia's Confrontation that had only recently ended. 
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The introduction of "public order" as a ground for an emergency has 
considerably broadened the scope of Article 150. Given the disinclination of 
the Courts to review the satisfaction of the Executive a! ý to the sufficiency 
of the facts upon which public order is said to be threatened, the declaration 
of an emergency on "public order" grounds is virtually placed beyond the pale 
of challenge. 
The "Imminent Dangern Power under Article 150(2) 
The amendment of Article 150(2) in 198,73 has left no room for doubt that it 
was the intention of Parliament to enlarge the powers of the Executive to 
declare an emergency and perpetuate it without early Parliamentary sanction. 
74 
The new Article 150(2) enables a proclamation of emergency to be issued even 
before the actual occurrence of the event which is said to threaten 
"security", "economic life" or "public order", if there is "an imminent 
danger" of its occurrence. "Imminent dangern is therefore the touchstone for 
determination of whether an emergency under Article 150(2) is justified. 
The obvious purpose behind the new clause (2) is to enable an emergency 
to be declared as a preventive measure. 75 It is no longer necessary for the 
73. see the discussion in Chapter V. 
74. The deleted Article 150(2) required the Executive to summon Parliament 
"as soon as it is practicable" if an emergency was proclaimed when 
Parliament was not sitting. 
75. Preventive action in cases of imminent hostilities is not unknown. As 
Dixon J. said in the Australian Communist Party case [1950] 83 CLR 1 at 
199: "It would, I think, be an error to draw a definite line between a 
period after the commencement of actual hostilities and the period 
before they commence. It is inappropriate to the altered character of 
war and the changes that appear to have taken place in the manner of 
commencing war. Imminence of war will enlarge the application of the 
fixed concept of defence". 
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Government to rely upon the occurrence of some event or the outbreak of some 
incident, which may be said to constitute a threat to security, economic life 
or public order. It would be sufficient if the Government had intelligence 
reports upon which it based its belief that there was a threat to the nation. 
The reliance on intelligence reports was explicitly recognised by the Privy 
Council in Ningkan's case. 76 However, that decision was delivered before the 
present set of amendments. It would follow that the objective behind the 
amendment was merely to make the position explicit; but more importantly, it 
is to declare as a constitutional imperative that emergency powers may be 
invoked not responsively but preventively. 
The ability to rely on intelligence reports to declare an emergency, 
without reliance on any outward manifestations of threat or disorder, makes a 
legal challenge to the vires of an emergency nigh impossible. In an emergency 
declared under clause (2), the intelligence reports upon which the Government 
acted would be of central importance. The crucial question from an evidential 
standpoint is, would they be admissible in a court of law? In Ningkan itself, 
the Privy Council seemed to suggest that it was not obligatory for the 
Government acting on informations and apprehensions to make them known to the 
person challenging the proclamation. 77 Ningkan, however, should not be taken 
as having said the last word on the subject. The transcript of Counsel's 
arguments in the Privy Council does not'show that the point was argued with 
any focus. 78 The observation of the Privy Council on this subject may 
76. Ningkan v. Government of Nalaysia (1970] AC 379 at p. 390: 11 ... (The) 
steps taken by the responsible Government may be founded on informations 
and apprehensions which are not known to, and cannot always be made 
known to, those who seek to impugn what has been done". 
77. Ibid. 
78. See Counsels' arguments reproduced in [1970] AC 379 at pp. 383-386. 
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therefore be taken as obiter dicta. The admissibility of intelligence reports, 
which undoubtedly would form part of the cabinet papers upon which the 
satisfaction of the Cabinet was based to declare an emergency, raises the 
vexed question of crown privilege79 and security-question immunity from 
scrutiny. 
In a practical sense, the two considerations merge where the 
intelligence reports sought production are security related. There has been an 
impressive development in many jurisdictions towards disclosure and scrutiny 
over the last two decades. In England, the break-through was in Conway v. 
Rizroex-Bo where the circumscribed-protectionist approach in Duncan v. Cummel- 
Laird Co. Ltd8l was discarded. The recent decisions of the House of Lords in 
Burmah Oil Co Ltd V. Bank of England82 and Air Canada v. Secretary of State 
for Trade83 have expanded on the change made in Conway v. Rimmer. In the Air 
Canada case, production was sought of the ministerial documents upon which the 
Policy was formulated to increase the landing charges at London airport. The 
current judicial thinking on the claim of privilege was given by Lord Scarman 
as follows: 
"Faced with a properly formulated certificate claiming public interest 
immunity, the court must first examine the grounds put forward. If it is 
a "class" objection and the documents (as in Conway v. Rimmer) are 
routine in character, the court may inspect so as to ascertain the 
79. Crown privilege is a rather imprecise description of the immunity sought 
by the Government against the production of certain class of documents 
in court as being injurious to the public interest: see criticism of the 
term "crown provilege" levied by Lord Reid in Rogers v. Secretary of 
State [1972] 2 AER 1057 at p. 1060 c-e. 
80. (1968] 1 AER 874 HL: (19681 AC 910. 
81. [1942) 1 AER 587 HL; [1942] AC 624. 
82. (1979] 3 AER 700. 
83. [1983] 1 AER 910. 
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strength of, the public interest in immunity and the needs of - justice 
before deciding whether to order production. If it is a "contents" 
claim, eg. a specific national security matter, the court will 
ordinarily accept the judgment of the minister. But if it is a class 
claim in which the objection on the face of the certificate is a strong 
one, as in this case where the documents are minutes and memoranda 
passing at a high level between ministers and their advisers and 
concerned with the formulation of policy, the court will pay great 
regard to the minister's view (or that of the senior official who has 
signed the certificate). It will not inspect unless there is a 
likelihood that the documents will be necessary for disposing fairly of 
the case or saving costs. Certainly, if, like Bingham J in this case, 
the court should think that the documents might be "determinative" of 
the issues in the action to which they relate, the court should inspect, 
f or in such a case there may be grave doubt which way the balance of 
public interest falls (see Bursah Oil Co Ltd v. Bank of England [1979] 3 
All ER 700 at 725-726,734 [1980] AC 1090 at 1134-1135,1145). But, 
unless the court is satisfied on the material presented to it that the 
documents are likely to be necessary for fairly disposing of the case, 
it will not inspect for the simple reason that unless the likelihood 
exists there is nothing to set against the public interest in immunity 
from production". 84 
The position taken in England is similar to the liberal approach developed in 
Australia since the epochal decision of the High court in Sankey v. WhitlaM85 
which was relied upon by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Scarman in deciding the 
Burmah Oil Co Ltd case in the House of Lords. It was an exceptional case where 
criminal information was laid against the then Prime Minister Mr. Whitlam and 
his colleagues of criminal conspiracy in seeking certain foreign loans. The 
case on conspiracy was based on the production of certain government 
documents. Lord Scarman found the following passage in Gibbs Ag ci's judgment 
helpful: 
"For these reasons I consider that although there is a class of 
documents whose members are entitled to protection from disclosure 
irrespective of their contents, the protection is not absolute, and it 
does not endure for ever. The fundamental and governing principle is 
that documents in the class may be withheld from production only when 
84. At p. 924 C-g. 
85. (1978] 142 CIR 1. 
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this is necessary in the public interest. In a particular case the court 
must balance the general desirability that documents of that kind should 
not be disclosed against the need to produce them in the interests of 
justice. The court will of course examine the question with especial 
care, giving full weight to the reasons for preserving the secrecy of 
documents of this class, but it will not treat all such documents as 
entitled to the same measure of protection - extent of protection 
required will depend to some extent on the general subject matter with 
which the documents are concerned. If a strong case has been made out 
for the production of the documents, and the court concludes that their 
disclosure would not really be detrimental to the public interest, an 
order for production will be made. In view of the danger to which the 
indiscriminate disclosure of documents of this class might give rise, it 
is desirable that the government concerned, Commonwealth or State, 
should have an opportunity to intervene and be heard before any order 
for disclosure is made. Moreover no such order should be enforced until 
the government concerned has had an opportunity to appeal against it, or 
test its correctness by some other process, if it wishes to do so (cf. 
Conway V. Rimmer)m. 86 
The High court ruled that except for the Loan Council documents, the other 
government papers were subject to production. 
The positive development towards disclosure in England,, Australia and 
elsewhereB7 has led to the hope that the reservation expressed in Ningkan's 
case about disclosure of intelligence reports may now be overridden. 88 
However a number of factors militate against this desirable conclusion. In the 
first place, the cases have themselves recognised that security-related 
cabinet papers would in all probability still be protected against disclosure. 
In the Air Canada case, both Lord Scarman and Lord Fraser seemed prepared to 
give protection against disclosure more easily to this class of documents. 
Lord Scarman said: "If it is a "contents" claim eg. a specific national 
security matter, the court will ordinarily accept the judgment of the 
86. At p. 4 3. 
87. Eg. in the USA, the Supreme Court decision in Nixon etal v. United 
States 418 U. S. 683 [1975]. 
88. See H. P Lee, Emergency Powers (Law Book Co Australia, 1984) at p. 284. 
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minister". 89 In his judgment Lord Fraser spoke of the immunity given generally 
to Cabinet papers: " ... while'Cabinet documents do not have complete immunity, 
they are entitled to a high degree of protection agdinst disclosure". 90 
Secondly, the position in Malaysia, as in India, 91 is statutorily governed by 
the Evidence Act 1950. The following are the relevant provisions: 
"Section 123: No one shall be permitted to produce any unpublished 
official records relating to affairs of state, or to give any evidence 
derived therefrom, except with the permission of the officer at the head 
of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold permission as he 
thinks fit, subject, however, to the control of a Minister in the case 
of a department of the Government of Malaysia, and of the Chief minister 
in the case of a department of a State Government. 
Section 163: When a party calls for a document which he has given the 
other party notice to produce, and the document is produced and 
inspected by the party calling for its production, heIs bound to give 
it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so and if it 
is relevant". 
Indian decisions dealing with the identical provisions above have tended to 
concentrate on the right of the court to inspect the document. But otherwise 
there is the reiteration that the foundation of the law is the same as in 
England. The judgment in the leading case on the subject, State of Utter 
Pradesh V. Raj Narain'92 however, seems to suggest that Indian courts would be 
prepared to exclude production on a mere class-basis and not content basis. 
The court said: "It is not that the contents contain material which it would 
be damaging to the national interest to divulge but rather that the document 
would be of a class which demanded protection. To illustrate the class of 
89. Op. cit at p. 924 d-e. 
90. Ibid at p. 915 c-d. 
91. The Evidence Act of Malaysia is in pari materia with the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1878. Indian decisions on the subject are therefore of high 
persuasive value in the Malaysian courts. 
92. AIR 1975 SC 865. 
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documents would embrace Cabinet papers, Foreign office dispatches, papers 
regarding the security of the State and high level inter-departmental 
minutes". 93 For our purpose it is significant to note that the Indian approach 
has been adopted by the Malaysian Court in Sapuran Kaur v. B. A. Rao, 94 a case 
involving production of the report of a committee of inquiry into a hospital 
death. The court acknowledged the new developments in the other jurisdictions 
and seemed prepared to follow them. But in reconciling the competing claims of 
the public and private interest, Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as he then was) fell back 
on the class-basis exclusion posited by the Indian courts: "Where, there is a 
danger that disclosure will divulge, say, State secrets in military and 
international affairs or Cabinet documents, or departmental policy documents, 
private interest must give wayw. 95 
93. Ibid. This view may be contrasted with Lord Fraser's opinion in the Air 
Canada case, supra, that even Cabinet documents would not be protected 
from disclosure if the case is about the misconduct of a Cabinet 
minister: op. cit. p. 915C. It is a matter of surmise whether the 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in SP Gupta V. Union of India AIR 1982 
SC 149 (popularly called "the Judges case" because it involved the non- 
consensual transfer of High Court judges) liberalised the position 
inspite of the strong emphasis placed by Bhawati J. on the open 
government concept. The impugned document there was not security-related 
unlike the document in the Raj Narain case, supra which was a book 
listing out the security precautions to be taken when the Prime Minister 
is on tour. 
94. [1978] 2 MLJ 146. 
95. Ibid. The Malaysian decision may have defined the position too narrowly 
in comparison to the developments elsewhere if it is understood to say 
that Cabinet papers as a class are excludable from production. The 
correct position, it is submitted, with regard to the developments on 
the subject, and under a provision similar to the Malaysian Evidence Act 
is from the unlikely jurisdiction of Tonga in the decision of their 
Supreme Court in Pohiva v. Prime Minister of Tonga [1988] LRC (Const) 
949. It was a case where a public servant was suing the government for 
wrongful termination of his services, a decision which was taken by the 
Cabinet. In that connection he sought production of the Cabinet papers 
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There is no room for undue optimism that the burgeoning trends elsewhere 
in the Commonwealth towards open government96 and limiting the claims 'of 
privilege would impel the Malaysian courts towards directing disclosure of the 
intelligence reports upon which the Government acted under Article 150(2). It 
is axiomatic that without the intelligence reports no court of law will be 
able to determine if there was "imminent danger" posed by the possible 
occurrence of the events. 
"Imminent danger" is part of the emergency jurisprudence evolved-i under 
the European convention of Human Rights. It was a determinant factor in both 
the Lawless case97 and the First Greek case. 98 -In Lawless, the Irish 
contd.... 
95. on his dimissal. Martin C. J. ruled in favour of production after 
referring to the new developments elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The 
court also considered that in Tonga, the Cabinet makes decisions on 
matters which in other countries may be delegated to minor government 
officials: 
"Such a wide variety of functions cannot all attract the same degree of immunity. I put the test in relation to Cabinet papers in this way: What 
is the possible prejudice to the executive if they are disclosed? What 
damage would it do to the machinery of government? The answer in the 
circumstances of this case must be: none at all. What is sought are the 
documents considered by the Cabinet and decisions of the Cabinet. That 
decision is at the very heart of this action. It relates solely to the 
Plaintiff as an individual. I cannot at this stage see that it would involve any important policy considerations, but if I am wrong about 
that it will appear inspection by the court and such documents may be 
excluded". (p. 956b-d). 
96. A reversal of trends in Malaysia is discernible in the passing of the 
Official Secrets (Amendment) Act 1986 which further enlarged the 
category of documents protected by the official Secrets Act 1972: For a 
scathing criticism of the amendments see, (1986) INSAF Vol. XIX No. 4 
(Editorial), and Bar Council of Malaysia Memorandum reproduced in INSAF, 
supra., pp. 12 et. seq. 
97. see note 20, supra. 
98. See note 18, supra. 
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Government had declared the emergency on 5 July 1957 the day after violent 
incidents took place in Northern Ireland. Moreover, evidence was given that 
the majority of the 100'IRA prisoners in detention were to be released 
shortly. Thus the Commission, as did the Court, held that the threat of 
violence and disturbance was imminent. In contrast, in the First Greek case, 
the emergency declared by the Colonels on 21 April 1967 after seizing power 
was held to be unjustified on an evaluation of the evidence tendered by the 
respondent government. A judicial appraisal was possible in both cases because 
of the evidence made available to the tribunal. 
It should be noted however that the "imminent danger" contemplated under 
Article 150 is for preventive purposes whereas the inquiry before the European 
bodies was related largely to post-incident emergencies. Thus the European 
tribunals were enquiring into whether the incidents relied upon by the 
respondent governments "threatened the life of the nation" under Article 15(1) 
Of the European Convention. Notwithstanding this distinction, the exacting 
approach taken by the European court should serve as a positive guideline to 
any national court engaging in a like inquiry. The cannon of construction 
propounded by Lord Maugham in Liversidge v. Anderson" that emergency 
legislation enacted to ensure the public safety should be interpreted to 
promote rather than defeat its efficacy should, in the writers opinion, be 
given the death knell, together with the fate suffered by the case itself in 
the subsequent rights-based jurisprudence that developed in English 
administrative law. 100 Thus "imminent danger" should be read restrictively as 
99. (1941] 3 AER 338. 
100. In the subsequent cases of IRC V. Rossminster (1980] AC 953 (Lord 
Diplock) and Exparte Khavaja [1984] AC 74 (Lord Scarman), the House of 
Lords accepted that the majority in Liversidge v. Anderson were wrong 
and that Lord Atkin's dissent in Liversidge reflected the correct law. 
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as demanding a convincing degree of proof, rather than expansively, if only 
because of the complete change in legal character to constitutional government 
that is brought about by a proclamation of emergency. 
The Satisfaction Of The Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
Under Article 150(l) a proclamation of emergency is made if the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong "is satisfied" that a grave emergency exists. Two questions 
arise in relation to this: 
(a) Does the Yang di-Pertuan Agong have a personal discretion in the 
matter?; and 
(b) Is the satisfaction justiciable? 101 
The constitutional requirements of declaring an emergency may conveniently be 
discussed under the above headings. 
contd... 
100. The Malaysian adherence to the majority judgment in Liversidge's case 
(see Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector General of Police (1988] 1 MLJ 
293; (1988] IRC (Const) 477) suggests merely a judicial preference, 
without profering any convincing reason why the express rejection of the 
majority judgment by the House of Lords is not being recognised. In 
contrast, the Singapore Court of Appeal recognised the inconsistency 
that will follow by this posture and discarded the subjective test 
propounded by Liversidge: see ChIng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs 
[19891 1 MLJ 89. The decision was subsequently overruled by legislative 
amendments in Singapore that reinstated the subjective criteria. similar 
amendments were made in Malaysia. 
101. The justiciability question is discussed in Chapter IX. 
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(a) Does the Yang di-Pertuan Agong Have a Personal Discretion? 
The suggestion that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may exercise a personal 
discretion in declaring an emergency was first espoused in writing by 
Professor Hickling. 102 He relied on certain passages in the. majority judgments 
of the Ningkan case in the Federal Court. 103 The reliance was on the remarks 
of Barakbah LP and Azmi Ci that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is "the sole judge" 
of whether the security or economic life of the country was threatened. The 
Lord President had said: 
"In my opinion the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the sole judge and once His 
Majesty is satisfied that a state of emergency exists it is not for the 
court to inquire as to whether or not he should be satisfied". 104 
In his judgment Azmi Ci said: 
"In my view therefore notwithstanding the qualifying words the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong in the exercise of his power under Clause (1) of Article 
150 must be regarded as the sole judge of that. He alone could decide 
whether a state emergency whereby the security or economic life of the 
Federation was threatened, did exist". 105 
Professor Hickling therefore concluded that this authoritive dicta strongly 
supports the belief that a personal discretion rests in His Majesty, requiring 
as a condition precedent his subjective satisfaction that events justifying a 
state of emergency exist. 106 
202. R. H. Hickling. The Prerogative In Malaysia (1975) 17 Mal. L. R. 207 at 
222-223. 
103. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Malaysia [1968] 1 MLJ 119 per 
Barakbah LP and Azmi CJ. 
104. At p. 122D. 
205. At p. 124 D-E. 
106. Hickling says: "Such great powers have no doubt been entrusted to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong with the certain feeling that they will be 
reasonably exercised" (p. 221). He makes the further intriguing 
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The viewpoint gained further currency from the contents of an Affidavit 
submitted to the High Court by the former Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak in 
1975 in connection with the case of N. Hadhevan Naif- v. Government of 
Malaysia. 107 In his Affidavit the Prime Minister had deposed: 
"I refer to para. 12 of the affidavit of N. Madhevan Nair and state that 
owing to the grave emergency threatening the security of the country 
during the May 13 incident, I personally presented the said ordinance to 
His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong at Istana Negara for his 
consideration and approval. Having considered the said Ordinance and 
after being satisfied that immediate action was required for securing 
PuBI-1c satety, the defence of Malaysia, the maintenance of public order 
and of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, His 
Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong approved the promulgation of the said 
ordinance accordingly". 108 (exphasis added) 
The words emphasised lent credence to the belief that it was the Government's 
own stand that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has a personal discretion in the 
matter. 109 The argument was that His Majesty could, if not personally 
contd ..... 106. observation: "A shrewd Head of State can read and interpret a 
Constitution as well as, and sometimes better than his legal advisers; 
and in the end the brutal facts of political reality will prevail". The 
desirability of some sort of check to executive authoritarianism has 
found currency in Australia and Canada, the suggestion being that it be 
vested in reserve vice-regal powers. Dr Eugene Forsey of Canada has 
written: "The danger of royal absolutism is past; but the danger of 
Cabinet absolutism, even of prime ministerial absolutism, is present and 
growing. Against that danger the reserve power of the Crown, and 
especially the power to force or refuse dissolution, is in some 
instances the only constitutional safeguard... if a Prime Minister tries 
to turn parliamentary responsible government into unparliamentary 
irresponsible government, then only the crown can stop him": see George 
Winterton, Parliament, The Executive And The Governor-General (Melbourne 
University Press, 1983) at p. 153. 
107. [1975] 2 MIJ 286. The case was a challenge to the validity of the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ord. No. 1 of 1969 made by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong after Proclaiming a nation-wide state of emergency on 15th 
May, 1969. 
108. At p. 288 I. 
109. See Lim Kit Siang, "The Wayang Kulit" Debate (1983) ALIRAN Quarterly 
Vol. 3 N0.3,9 at 12. 
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satisfied that events call for an emergency, refuse to issue a Proclamation 
notwithstanding the advice tendered by the Cabinet. It, is obvious that the 
Government must itself have nursed some doubts on the queýtion because of the 
subsequent attempts made to amend the provision and substitute "the 
satisfaction" of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for that of the Prime Minister. 110 
Thus the proposed amendment, which was eventually aborted, read: "If the Prime 
Minister is satisfied ....... It was evident that the Government was acting to 
remove all ambiguity that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could not act on his own 
in proclaiming a state of emergency. 
Unlike the position in India, 111 where a realistic debate prevails over 
the powers of the President in declaring an emergency, a closer scrutiny of 
the question in Malaysia admits of no doubt. In the writer's opinion the 
majority in Ningkan and Hickling were decidedly wrong in the view they 
propounded. The Hickling view and its reliance on the majority judgments for 
110. The Constitution (Amendment) Act A566 of 1983. The amendments and the 
unprecedented constitutional crisis it created are discussed in 
Chapter V. 
111. The Indian provision (Article 352(l)) reads: "If the President is 
satisfied that a grave emergency exists where the security of India or 
any part of it is threatened .... he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect ...... The subjective form in which the 
provision is worded has engendered disparate opinions from the Indian 
Courts as to whether the President has a personal discretion in the 
matter or could act on his own. For example, in P. Venkataseshamma v. 
The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1976 AP 1, the view was expressed that 
"A proclamation to the effect that a grave emergency exists may be made 
by the President upon his own satisfaction" (p. 9) (emphasis added). 
Further in the significant suprqme Court ciise of State of Rajasthan v. 
Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361, dealing with another emergency 
provision which is similarly worded requiring the satisfaction of the 
President (Article 356), the court spoke of the satisfaction of the 
President as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power 
(para. 144 p. 1416). The contrary view has been that the President of 
India as a constitutional head is like the British sovereign, bound to 
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foundation was effectively rebutted by another academic-112 Professor 
Jayakumar argues that by reason of Article 40 and case-law, including the 
Ningkan judgments relied upon by Hickling, the Agong does'not have a personal 
discretion in the matter. In his analysis of the majority opinions, the phrase 
"sole judge" was used in relation to the question 'whether the Agong's actions 
under Article 150 were reviewable. 113 His reliance on other case law, before 
contd ..... 111. act on the advice of a council of ministers. Thus in Ram Jawaya v. State 
of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549 at 556, the Supreme Court declared: "The 
President has thus been made a formal or constitutional head of the 
Executive and the real executive powers are vested in the Minister or 
the Cabinet". See also the more recent case of Samsher Singh v. Punjab 
AIR 1974 SC 2192, where the Supreme Court ruled that the President's 
"satisfaction" is in reality the satisfaction of his Council of 
Ministers. The disputation of this view arises from the fact that the 
Presidency of India is an elective post and not an appointment: see 
discussion generally in K. V. Kuriakose, The President of India: Status 
And Position (1987) Vol. XIV Indian Bar Review 237. The position in IndiE 
currently--would seem to have been settled by the Constitution (44th) 
Amendment Act, 1978 which by a new clause (3) requires that the 
President should not act in proclaiming an emergency unless the decision 
of the Cabinet that such a proclamation be issued has been communicated 
to him in writing. Thus Basuls commentary reads: "This satisfaction, 
however, is not a personal satisfaction of the President but that of his 
Council of Ministers ..... This has not only been affirmed but, buttressed by the new provision in clause (3)": see Basuls Commentary 
On The Constitution of India Vol. IV Sixth Edn. p. 197. 
112. Professor S. Jayakumar , Emergency Powers In Malaysia: Can the Yang Di- 
Pertuan Agong Act In His Personal DisH-etion And Capacity7 (1976) 15 
Mal-. L. R. 149; see also his "Legal Aspects of Emergency Powers In 
Malaysia" (1970) Law Times 27 aE-28. 
113. At p. 154. It may be noted, as was done by Ong FJ. (p. 125 E-F) that it 
was the Government's case itself that it was on Cabinet advice that -the 
Yang Di-Pertuan Agong proclaimed the Emergency. In Ong FJ Is words "This 
fact was never denied and no attempt was ever made by the Cabinet to 
disclaim responsibility" (Ibid). It would be reasonable to assume 
therefore that no argument was advanced by counsel for the Government 
that the Agong had acted on his personal satisfaction. The remarks by 
the majority could not therefore relate to the proposition contended for 
by Professor Hickling that the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong has a personal 
discretion on being satisfied whether to declare an emergency. 
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and since the Ningkan decision in the Federal Court, is however, more 
compelling. For example, in the Ningkan litigation at the earlier stage, 114 
Pike CJ repelled the argument that an action could not be brought challenging 
the proclamation under Article 150 because the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is immune 
from suit. In his judgment he said, inter alia, that the Agong is bound to act 
on the advice of the Cabinet and that his powers under the provision cannot be 
analogous to the prerogative powers exercisable by the British sovereign. 115 
In the later case of N. Kahdevan Nair v. Government of Malaysia, 116 Chang Min 
Tat J. (as he then was) was emphatic that emergency rule does not displace the 
Yang Di-Pertuan Agong as a constitutional monarch bound to act at all times on 
the advice of the Cabinet. 
The most convincing argument, however, comes from Article 40(l). The 
provision reads: 
"In the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or federal law 
the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong shall act in accordance with the advice of the 
Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the 
Cabinet, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution; but shall be 
entitled, at his request, to any information concerning the government 
of the Federation which is available to the Cabinet". 
Jayakumar argues correctly that as a matter of interpretation, unless it is 
specified elsewhere in the Constitution that he may act on his own, His 
Majesty is bound to act on all other matters on the advice of the Cabinet. 117 
In this regard, reference may be made to Article 40(2) that enumerates three 
matters in which the Agong has a personal discretion: the appointment of the 
114. Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj Openg (No. 2) [1967] 1 MLJ 46. The case was 
concerned with the Defendant's application to strike out the pleadings 
on the ground of the Agong's immunity from action under Article 32(l). 
115. At p. 47F. 
116. [1975] 2 MLJ 286 at 289. 
117. Op. cit. p. 150. See also Abdoolcader J. in Herdeka University Bhd v. 
Gove. rnment of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356; on appeal (19821 2 MLJ 243. 
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Prime Minister, the dissolution of Parliament, and the convening of a meeting 
of the Conference of Rulers. The omission of the emergency power under the 
listing provides a compelling argument that the constitutional scheme did not 
intend that the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong should have a personal discretion in the 
matter. Nevertheless, since the Hickling-Jayakumar debate, there has come the 
decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor. 118 Lord 
Diplock said in relation to the power of His Majesty to make laws under 
Article 150(2), but, which undoubtedly is of wider application, the following: 
"Although this, like other powers under the Constitution, is conferred 
nominally upon the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong by virtue of his office as the 
Supreme Head of the Federation and is expressed to be exercisable if he 
is satisfied of a particular matter, his functions are those of a 
constitutional monarch and except on certain matters that do not concern 
the instant appeal, he does not exercise any of his functions under the 
Constitution on his own initiative but is required by Article 40(l) to 
act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. So when one finds in 
the Constitution itself or in a Federal law powers conferred upon the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong that are expressed to be exercisable if he is of 
opinion or is satisfied that a particular state of affair exists or that 
particular action is necessary, the reference to his opinion or 
satisfaction is in reality a reference to the collective opinion or 
satisfaction of the members of the Cabinet, or the opinion or 
satisfaction of a particular minister to whom the Cabinet have delegated 
their authority to give advice upon the matter in question". 119 
Although a debate had previously ranged on the subject, there can be no doubt 
now that the Privy council opinion settles the point firmly that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong does not have a personal discretion under Article 150(l) but has 
at all times to act on cabinet advice; 120 
118. [1979] 1 MLJ 50; [1980] AC 458. 
119. At P. 52 B-E. 
120. The writer shares the opinion expressed by Professor H. P. Lee that the 
Privy council decision settles the question once and for all: see H. P. 
Lee Emergency Powers In Malaysia, in The Constitution of Malaysia: 
Further Perspe s And Developments Ed. Suffian, Trindade & H. P. Lee 
(OUP, 1986) at p. 142. 
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The Act of Proclamation: Formalities And Significance 
Clause (1) of Article 150 requires the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, if 
satisfied that a grave emergency exists, to "issue a Proclamation of Emergency 
making therein a declaration to that effect". Ex facie the provision does not 
require that the Proclamation be issued in any particular form or specify a 
requirement for its publication. It may be contrasted with the emergency 
provisions of some Commonwealth countries where the stipulation is made that 
the Proclamation shall be by way of publication in the gazette. Such a 
requirement has ensured that a state of emergency is not brought about by a 
mere broadcast on radio or television. For example, Section 2(1) of the 
Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1971 of Trinidad And Tobago provides that the 
Governor-General "may by Proclamation in the Royal Gazette declare a State of 
Emergency". In Kelshall v. Pitt etal, 121 the High Court of that country had to 
consider whether the radio broadcast by the Prime Minister on the night of 
October 19,1971 that a state of emergency had been declared was sufficient. 
This question had direct bearing on the validity of a preventive detention 
order made that same evening. Under the relevant law the detention could only 
be lawful if it was made in the course of a public emergency. As events went 
the Proclamation was published in the Gazette the next day, October 20, and 
released to the public only on October 22. The High Court had little 
hesitation in concluding that the Proclamation came into force only when the 
publication in the Gazette was made and consequently the detention order was 
invalid. 122 
121. [1971] 19 W. I. R. 136. 
122. Malone C. J. was of the view that the essential requirement was the 
making of the Proclamation public and that publication in the Gazette 
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Another instance of an oral announcement of a state of emergency was in 
1988 in the African state of Lesotho. On 25 February 1988, the Minister of 
Defence and Internal 'Security of Lesotho broadcast over radio a state 'of 
emergency on account of the increased incidences of crimes, house-breaking, 
theft of motor vehicles and stock-theft. The necessary publication of the 
proclamation in the Government Gazette was not effected until 5 April 1988. 
Section 3(1) of the- Emergency Powers Act 1982 provided that "the Prime 
Minister may, by Proclamation in the Gazette, 'declare that a state of 
emergency exists". The issue whether certain detentions made after 'the 
broadcast but- before, the publication in the Gazette were valid came up for 
consideration, in the case of The Law Society of Lesotho v. Minister of Defence 
& Internal Security. 123 Under the statute concerned, a detention without trial 
could not be effected otherwise than under a state of emergency. The High 
Court of Lesotho held, in reliance on the provision quoted, that a declaration 
of emergency ý could only be made by proclamation in the Gazette and not 
otherwise. Cullinan C. J. -ruled that the'police actions taken under the 
authority of the verbal declaration of a state of emergency was unlawful and 
that the Emergency took effect only when published in the Gazette and not 
before. 
The result in these cases were predictable because of the express 
requirement for a publication in the Gazette. In so far as Article 150(l)- of 
contd... 
122. was the normal way. However "if that was impossible, the alternative is to plaster it on buildings etc". Section 4(1) of the Ordinance in 
consideration there provided: "If at any time it is impossible or impracticable to publish in the Royal Gazette any proclamation it shall be lawful to publish the same by notices thereof affixed to public buildings or distributed, amongst the public or by oral public 
announcements" (at p. 150 H-I). 
123. [19881 LRC (Const) 226. 
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the Malaysian Constitution is concerned, the question is whether a verbal 
declaration of a state of emergency would suffice? The question is relevant to 
determine the validity of emergency action taken during the interlude between 
the oral announcement of an emergency through the public media and its 
official publication in the Gazette. An instance of this happened during the 
sudden outbreak of racial hostilities in Kuala Lumpur on May 13,1969. The 
riots had occurred soon after the announcement of the results of the . general 
elections, leading to the declaration of a state of emergency on May 15,1969. 
However, on the night of May 13 itself, the caretaker Prime minister Tunku 
Abdul Rahman had gone on radio and television to announce to the nation: 
"Trouble has broken out in Kuala Lumpur and Security Forces have taken 
control of the situation and many places considered a security risk. I 
have no choice now but to declare a State of Emergency in Kuala Lumpur, 
and if necessary, to declare a State of Emergency throughout 
Malaysia". 124 (emphasis added). 
However, the official announcement of a Proclamation of Emergency by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong was only on May 15,1969. The Proclamation was published on 
the same day in the Goverment Gazette. 125 What then was the status of the 
Tunku's announcement? It is evident that the Tunku could not have intended his 
announcement on the night of May 13 to operate as a declaration of 
emergency. 126 Quite apart from the obvious fact that a Proclamation of 
124. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13: Before And After (Utusan Melayu Press 
Ltd., Kuala Lumpur, October 1969) at p. 90. 
125. P. U. (A) 145/69. See Appendix B for a reproduction ofýthe Proclamation of 
Emergency. 
126. There was undoubtedly a great degree of uncertainty during the two days 
or so after the outbreak of racial riots. There is every possibility 
that what the Tunku had intended to announce was that Kuala Lumpur had 
been placed under curfew and was in the control of security forces. 
Elsewhere in his book he writes that on the afternoon of May 14, he 
summoned the Solicitor General to his home to draft the various legal 
notifications, to declare a State of Emergency throughout the country: 
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Emergency could'only be made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a conjoint reading 
of Clause (1) and Clause (3) of Article 150 makes it clear that a Proclamation 
of Emergency has to be formally issued in document form and published. The 
words of significance in this regard in Clause (1) are "issue a Proclamationif 
and "making therein a declaration". Further, the requirement under Clause (3) 
for the proclamation to be laid before both Houses of Parliament affirms the 
view that the Proclamation must be in document form. 127 It is 'obvious also 
that the Malaysian Government takes the view that the Proclamation must be in 
document form and published. All the Proclamations in respect of the four 
emergencies have been in document form and published in the Gazette. 128 The 
Proclamations have all taken effect from the date of publication in the 
Gazette and, save for the circumstances surrounding the 1969 Emergency as 
discussed, there has been no hiatus between the announcement of an emergency 
and its formal publication in the Gazette. 
contd... 
126. Ibid p. 99. The confusion of those days is borne out by the fact the 
original copy of the principal emergency law promulgated by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong on May 15, called the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
ordinance No. 1 of 1969, was lost and never recovered: see Kahadevan 
Nair v. Covernment of Nalaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 286 at 289 B-C, where the 
Court accepted as "not unreasonable" the reason proferred by the 
Government for the loss of the document that "May 15 was a day of great 
confusion". See also affidavit of the then Attorney General, Tan Sri 
Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin, reproduced in the judgment of the Penang High 
Court in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1978] 1 MLJ 30, who deposed 
that it had been misplaced (p. 33A-B). 
127. The Proclamation of Emergency is a legal instrument and by the 
Interpretation And General Clauses Ordinance, 1948 which also governs 
the interpretation of the Constitution (see Article 160(l) read with the 
Eleventh Schedule) the Proclamation must be published in the Gazette: 
see definition of "subsidiary legislation" in section 2(88) of the 
Ordinance which includes a "proclamation". By Section 22(l) all 
subsidiary legislation takes effect only upon publication in the 
Gazette. 
128. See Appendix B. 
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A further question is whether there is a requirement under Clause - (1) 
for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's satisfaction to be stated in the Proclamation 
or for a specification in the Proclamation of the nature of the emergency. 
Clause (1) carries the phrase that the Yang -di-Pertuan Agong make a 
"declaration to that effect". This provision corresponds . closely with 
the 
Indian provision, Article 352(l), which carries those words: 
"If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the 
security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened 
whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by 
Proclamation make a declaration to that effect ..... ". (emphasis added). 
The Indian Supreme Court considered the words "to that effect" in the case of 
P. L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India129 as to whether it imposed a requirement 
that the President's satisfaction should be recited in the Proclamation and, 
further, whether there should be a prescription of the type of aggression 
faced by the country. Sarkar C. J. said: 
"The Article requires only a declaration of emergency threatening the 
security of India by one of the causes mentioned. The words "to that 
effect" can have no other meaning. The power to make the declaration can 
no doubt be exercised only when the President is satisfied about the 
emergency, but we do not see that the Article requires the condition 
precedent for the exercise of the power, that is, the President's 
satisfaction, to be stated in the declaration. The declaration shows 
that the President must have satisfied himself about the existence of 
the emergency for in these matters the rule that official acts are 
presumed to have been properly performed applies ...... Then it was said that the Proclamation should have stated the direction from which the 
external aggression which it mentioned was apprehended. We nd nothing 
in the Article to require the Proclamation to state this". 
Should a question of like nature arise in Malaysia in the future, it is likely 
that the Indian decision dealing with a similar provision would be followed. 
129. AIR 1967 SC 243. 
130. At p. 245 (para. 3). 
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Be that as it may, the format adopted in the f our Proclamations of Emergency 
in Malaysia contain as a common feature a statement of the "satisfaction" of 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 131 
The due authentication of the instrument of Proclamation by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong by the impressing of the public seal may be proved by production 
of the original or by evidence aliunde. The High Court in N. Kahadevan Nair v. 
Government of Kalaysia132 was concerned not with the authentication of the 
Proclamation of Emergency on May 15,1969 but of the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) ordinance No. 1 of 1969 promulgated on the same day. The Court ruled 
unequivocally that in the absence of the original copy, the matter was open for 
judicial inquiry, and that evidence aliunde by way of affidavit evidence may 
be admitted to prove the fact of due authentication. The principles laid down 
in that case would undoubtedly apply to any challenge in the future to the 
want of due authentication of a Proclamation of Emergency. 
Clause (3) requires that the Proclamation of Emergency be laid before 
both Houses of Parliament. The question in this regard is whether the 
requirement is mandatory or directory. The point was considered by the Federal 
Court in Lim Woon Chong & anor v. Public Prosecutor. 133 The Court found as a 
matter of fact that the Proclamation of Emergency of 15 May 1969 was laid 
before the Senate (the Upper House) contrary to the contention of the 
Appellants there. The Government's argument, nevertheless, was that the 
requirement was merely directory. The correctness of this view is doubtful. 
131. See Appendix B. 
132. [1975] 2 MLJ 286. 
133. [1979] 2 MLJ 264. 
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The opinion expressed by Harun J. (as he then was) in Inspector General of 
Police V. Lee Kim Hoong134 that the requirement under Clause (3) is mandatory 
would seem to be the better and more supportable view having regard to the 
rationale and purpose behind the requirement of laying the Proclamation 
before Parliament. The learned Judge stated that the object.. of Clause (3) "is 
for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to give an account, as it were, of all things 
done by him during their (Parliament's) absence". 235 The reason proferred, 
however, does not sufficiently state the value and importance of Clause (3). 
The provision reads: 
"A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under Clause 
(2B) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not sooner 
revoked, shall cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by both 
Houses annulling such Proclamation or ordinance ..... ". 
The Reid Commission Report, and the whole scheme of the Constitution, makes it 
abundantly clear that parliamentary rule is the norm and emergency rule the 
exception. As Lee Hun Hoe C. J. had remarked in Mahan Singh v. Covernment of 
Nalaysia, 136 an "emergency is temporary in nature". That being the case, and 
for the obvious reason that it is inimical to constitutional government that 
emergency rule should be perpetuated indefinitely, it is submitted that the 
laying before parliament is imperative to enable the elected representatives 
of the people to express their opinion as to whether the Emergency 'was 
134. (1979] 2 MLJ 291. 
135. At p. 292C-D. The decision was reversed on appeal (Ibid) but on the 
factual ground that the concession by the Government in the High Court 
that the Emergency (Essential Powers) ordinance No. 1 of 1969 was not 
laid before Parliament was erroneous. Additional evidence was admitted 
on appeal to prove the laying of the ordinance before Parliament. 
136. [1975] 2 MLJ at 165B. 
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justified and whether it should be continued. The only logical conclusion 
therefrom is that the requirement is mandatory. 137 
In both Lim Woon Chong and Lee Kim Hoong the courts accepted proof of 
the laying before Parliament by reliance on parliamentary papers (eg. the 
Votes and Proceedings List) and an affidavit of the Clerk of Parliament. In 
the later case, Suffian LP recommended gazetting the laying of the 
Proclamation before Parliament to avoid any doubts that Clause (3) has been 
complied with. 138 It is implicit in this recommendation that Suffian LP was 
also of the view, -like Harun J. before him, that the requirement of laying 
before Parliament is mandatory. 
137. The principal test to determine whether a legislative requirement is 
directory or mandatory is the object and purpose behind the 
prescription. In the field of public law the requirement for a public 
authority to follow the statutory requirements where individual rights 
or the public interest is likely to be affected could rarely be 
directory. Lord Hailsham remarked in London & Clydeside Estates Ltd v. 
Aberdeen District Council [1979] 3 AER 876 at 881b: "I am content to 
assert a general principle to the effect that where Parliament 
prescribes that an authority with compulsory powers should inform the 
subject of his right to question those powers, prima facie, the 
requirement must be treated as mandatory". See also more recently, Re T 
(a minor) [1986] 1 AER 817. However, see the recent decision of the High 
Court in Ipoh in Public Prosecutor v. Lee Ah Ha [1989] 1 HLJ 120, that 
the requirement under Section 47(4) of the Internal security Act 1960 of 
laying before Parliament of the proclamation of a security area by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong is directory and not mandatory. See also the South 
African case of Metal & Allied Workers Union v. State President [1986] 4 
SA 358, where the Appeal Court at Durban held that non-compliance with 
the requirement of the principal legislation that emergency regulations 
must be laid before Parliament within 14 days after promulgation did not 
render them "automatically invalid". 
138. At p. 293F. In the Indian case of Baburao v. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 
440, the Supreme Court ruled that it was not legally required that the 
resolutions of both houses of Parliament approving the Proclamation of 
Emergency be published in the Government Gazette, and that its 
appearance in the published Parliamentary Debates was sufficient. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE JUSTICIABILITY OF A PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY 
Introduction: The Early Privy Council Cases 
The justiciability question under Article 150(1), particularly in the 
view taken by the Malaysian courts in the Ningkan case and its affirmation 
subsequently by the Privy Council, has been influenced by some early Privy 
council decisions on the subject. These cases originating from colonial India 
and Africa had reached the Privy Council as the apex court in a colonial legal 
system. They were decided at a time when Britain was actively combating 
indigenous forces opposing colonisation. It is hard to say to what extent the 
essential characteristic of these cases as political cases, providing in 
substance an affront to British colonial rule, influenced the judgment of the 
Board. 1 The principal cases in this respect were Bhagat Singh v. King 
The Privy Council has, in some of the cases decided during the colonial 
period, expressed, quite unjudiciously, its rather poor opinion of the 
ability of the colonial peoples to manage themselves. An example is 
Ncleod v. St. Aubyn [1899] AC 549, where the Privy Council felt it was 
entirely justified that the obsolete offence of scandalizing the courts 
should remain extant in the West Indian Colony of St. Vincent because 
"it must be considered that in small colonies, consisting principally of 
coloured populations, the enforcement (of) contempt of court for attacks 
on the Court may be absolutely necessary to preserve in such community 
the dignity of and respect for the Court" (Lord Morris at 561). Next, 
the people of the African colony of Sierra Leone were described in the 
headnotes of the Appeal Cases report of a case involving professional 
misconduct of a solicitor from that Colony in the following terms 
(although the term itself is not found in Lord Warrington's judgment): 
"In a country which is only partially civilized it is necessary to 
induce the inhabitants to resort to the courts for the settlement of 
their disputes rather than to personal violence": WEA Hacauley v. Judges 
of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone [1928] AC 344. Nothing that is said 
here, however, off-sets the immense contribution made by the Privy 
Council to the development of a coherent system of justice in the former 
colonies or the immense prestige it has always enjoyed with the peoples 
there. Decisions like that of Lord Atkin in the Nigerian case of Eleko 
v. covernment of Nigeria [1931] AC 662, a habeas corpus case, that no 
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Experor2 and King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma. 3 Both cases dealt with 
emergencies declared by the British-India Colonial Government under a 
provision of the Government of India Act (section 72) that authorised the 
Governor General to promulgate ordinances in cases of emergency for the peace 
and good government of British India. In Bhagat Singh the accused were tried 
for waging war against the British Sovereign and in Benoari Lal Sharma the 
charge was one of rioting. In both, the accused persons disputed their 
conviction by special courts set up by emergency ordinances promulgated by the 
Governor General under section 72. We may now consider the impact these cases 
had on the Ningkan decision both by the Malaysian Federal Court and later - the 
Privy council. 
The Ningkan Case 
The obvious differences, and the milieu in which these cases were 
decided, were not taken into account by the majority in the Federal Court in 
Ningkan Is case. Both Barakbah LP and Azmi Ci made an uncritical adoption of 
contd. 
I. interference by the executive with the liberty of the subject is, 
according to British jurisprudence, permissible unless legally 
justified, struck a strong blow for the development of a human rights 
jurisprudence in the colonial courts. 
2. [1931) L. R. Vol. LVIII IA 169. 
3. [1945] AC 13. There is also the little known decision of the Privy 
Council in Chittambaram v. Emperor from Burma reported only in the 
Indian reports, AIR 1947 PC 85, where it was held, (Lord Wright 
speaking) that in the absence of any suggestion that the Governor acted 
other than in good faith in declaring an emergency, the declaration 
cannot be challenged. Another Privy Council decision was Tilonko, v. 
Attorney Ceneral Natal (1907) AC 93, which arose from the Colony of 
Natal, Africa. The argument of the appellant that his trial and 
conviction by the military court was unjustified because the civil 
courts were functioning and there was no proclamation of martial law was 
brushed aside by Lord Halsbury LC who declined to look into the 
question. 
277 
the Privy Council cases including the term "sole judge" used in the report of 
Bhagat Singh's case. 4 The judgments in the Ningkan case would seem to be the 
only expressed opinion locally on the subject, together with a later case'5 
6 since the Privy Council subsequently left open the question. The reasoning of 
the majority is given in what the Lord President said: 
"In an act of the nature of a Proclamation of Emergency, issued in 
accordance with the constitution, in my opinion, it is incumbent on the 
Court to assume that the Government is acting in the best interests of 
the State and to permit no evidence to be adduced otherwise. In short, 
the circumstances which bring about a Proclamation of Emergency are non 
justiciable .......... In my opinion the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
is the 
sole judge and once His Majesty is satisfied that a state of emergency 
exists it is not for the Court to inquire as to whether or not he should 
have been satisfiedn. 7 
It was only Ong J (as he then was) who took the position that the Privy 
Council cases do not support the stand of the Lord President and the Chief 
Justice. He saw-it first as an abdication of the judicial function to refuse 
to decide on the bona fide of the Proclamation. He then expressed the view 
that section 72 of the Government of India Act under which the two Privy 
Council cases were decided was quite'different in context and terms from 
Article 150: 1 
4 The term is found only in the headnotes of the Law Reports and not in 
the body of Lord Dunedin's judgment. 
5. Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik [1971] 2 MLJ 108. It was a sedition 
case. In the context of the amendment made to the Sedition Act, 1949 by 
Emergency ordinance No. 45 of 1970 passed after the Proclamation of an 
Emergency on 15 May 1969, Raja Azlan Shah J. (as he then was) remarked 
in obiter "Counsel has not challenged the validity of the proclamation. 
Indeed the proclamation is not justiciable" (see Bhagat Singh v. King 
Emperor and King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma)" (p. 113 F-G). 
6. Lord MacDermott for the Board expressly declared that they were leaving 
open the justiciability question (1970] AC 379 at 392 A-B. 
7. Op. cit. at p. 122 
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"Again with respect, I do not consider the ratio decidendi in those 
cases applicable herein because section 72 of Schedule IX of the 
Government of India Act, 1935, is manifestly not in pari materia with 
article 150 of the Federal Constitution, nor is the constitutional 
position of the Malaysian Cabinet comparable or similar to that of the 
Governor-General of India. Hence it is quite erroneous to argue by 
analogy from the Government of India Act to our Constitution as if those 
authorities were unquestionably conclusive. The plain fact is that the 
Governor-General of India, in the words of Viscount Simon L. C. in King- 
Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sharma & Ors. (at p. 21) was not required by 
section 72 "to state that there is an Emergency, or what the. Emergency 
is, either in the text of the ordinance or at all, and assuming that he 
acts bona fide and in accordance with his statutory powers, it cannot 
rest with the courts to challenge his view that an Emergency exists. " on 
the other hand, the inbuilt safeguards against indiscriminate or 
frivolous recourse to emergency legislation contained in article 150 
specifically provide that the emergency must be one "'whereby the 
security or economic life of the Federation or of any part thereof is 
threatened. " If those words of limitation are not mElaningless verbiage, 
they must be taken to mean exactly what they say, no more and no less, 
for article 150 does not confer on the Cabinet,, an untrammelled 
discretion to cause an emergency to be declared at their mere whim and 
fancy. According to the view of my learned brethren, however, it would 
seem that the Cabinet have carte blanche to do as they please -a 
strange role for the judiciary who are commonly supposed to be bulwarks 
of individual liberty and the Rule of Law and guardians of the 
Constitution". 8 
In his convincing dissent Ong J. touched upon, but did not develop, the 
qualification laid by Lord Simon himself in Benoari Lal Sharma Is case viz. 
that the Governor must act bona f ide and in accordance with his statutory 
powers. 9 Pike C. J. in an earlier round of the Ningkan case read the two Privy 
Council cases as not shutting out judicial review altogether. In his view "if 
the declaration appears ex facie to have been made in the manner required by 
the statute and the bona fides of the making of the declaration is not 
a 
Op. Cit at p. 126 B-G. For a supporting view, see Visu Sinnadurai, 
Proclamation of Emergency - Reviewable? (1968) Vol. 10 Mal. L. R. 130. 
Professor Sinnadurai also makes the vali distinction that Oe Governor- 
General of India exercises a prerogative power, unlike the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong who is obliged to act on the advice of the Cabinet 
(p. 132). 
9. Op. cit at p. 21. 
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impugned, it is not open to the Court to enquire into it". 10 It was a tiny 
opening in the blanket of immunity thrown around a Proclamation by Benori Lal 
Sharma's case. Barakbah LP failed to recognise it, but Azmi CJ reasoned it 
away in the following terms: 
"At f irst sight it could be suggested particularly f rom the f irst part 
of the above passage in Benoari Lal Sharma Is case the Court could still 
go into the question of the bona fide of the Governor General, but in my 
view it is clear that the question whether an emergency existed at the 
time when an ordinance was made and promulgated was still a matter on 
which the Governor-General was the sole judge and that, therefore, no 
Court may inquire into it". 11 
With respect, the reasoning of Azmi CJ failed to meet the argument. It was 
never disputed that the Governor-General or the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, as the 
case may be, should be the rightful judge of whether an emergency existed. The 
question is whether he had acted bona f ide or ultra vires. This is not to say 
that the Court could inquire into the sufficiency of the reasons upon which he 
acted. But if the proclamation was wholly capricious or fanciful or was 
declared for an unauthorised purpose, it stands to reason that its bona fide 
Is impugnable. 12 The Privy council has consistently kept this corridor open. 
10. (1967] 1 MLJ 46,47-48. 
Op. cit p. 124A-B. For a criticism of the basis of Azmi Ci's 
distinguishing of Benoari Lal Sharma Is case, supra, see S. Jayakumar, 
Emergency Powers In Malaysia, Development of the Law 1957-77 (1978) 1 
MLJ ix at xiv. 
12. An example would be the proclamation of martial law in the Phillipines 
by President Marcos in 1972 upon the dubious assertion that there was a 
plot to assassinate his Defence Minister. No one other than the 
President seemed to have had knowledge of it. As Chief Justice Teehankee 
described it: n(A) tragic development in Phillipine political history 
occurred in 1972, when Mr. Marcos, on the seventh year of his presidency 
and no longer eligible constitutionally to run for a third term as 
President, declared martial law after faking a supposed ambush of his 
defence minister (in which nobody suffered even a scratch). Avowedly to 
"save the Republic" he invoked the commander-in-chief clause of the 
Constitution and took absolute command of the nation": Rt. Hon. Claudio 
Teehankee, The Return of Constitutional Democracy in the Philippines 
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In the later case of chittambaramD from Burma, the Board held that the 
Proclamation of Emergency was not challengeable in the absence of any 
suggestion that the Governor had acted other than in good faith. In Ross- 
Clunis v. Papadopoullos & Ors, 14 the Privy Council had to consider the import 
of the words "satisfy himself" in an emergency legislation in Cyprus that 
authorised the Commissioner to impose sanctions in the form of penalties upon 
the people of any area whose inhabitants he believes were responsible for the 
commission of certain offences. In holding that the test was a subjective one, 
Lord Morton nevertheless made this observation: 
"[Their Lordships] think that if it could be shown that there were no 
grounds on which the (Commissioner] could be so satisfied, a Court might 
infer either that he did not honestly form that view or that , forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts". 
There is no record of any of these cases having been cited to the Board 
in the arguments in Ningkah's case. The argument, nevertheless, had 
significantly focused on theJusticiability question. 16 The Goverment's case 
bef ore the Board was that the validity of theý proclamation was not 
justiciable, and that an investigation by the Court, including on the question 
of bona fides, -would be to render the question as to whether an emergency 
contd ..... 12.1988 Tun Abdul Razak Memorial Lecture (1988) 2 MLJ xxxviii at x1ii. For 
a contrary view, see Justice Enrique Fernando of the Philippines Supreme 
Court who delivered the Inaugural Tun Abdul Razak Memorial Lecture in 
Kuala Lumpur on the subject, Governmental Powers And Human Rights In 
Times Of Emergency: A Brief Survey Of The Malaysian And Philippine 
reproduced in (1978) 1 MLJ cxv111 at p. cxxvi et. seq. 
Justice Fe-rnando was a serving judge under President Marcos. 
13. supra n. 3. 
14. [1958] 2 AER 23 PC. 
15. At p. 33 A-B. 
16. See Counsel's arguments reproduced in [1970] AC 379,383-386. 
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exists to be determined by the judgment of the Court and not the judgment of 
His Majesty. The riposte for the appellant Ningkan was that the authority to 
declare an emergency was exercised for an improper reason, namely to dismiss 
the appellant from office, and that rendered the proclamation, invalid. In -the 
face of this pointed joinder of issues on-the justiciability question, one 
would have thought that the Privy Council would have made a determinative 
ruling on the question. Instead, the Privy Council declined to rule on the 
justiciability issue, which was the principal argument before it, and instead 
decided the whole case on the assumption that the issue is in law 
justiciable. 17 It held in the circumstances of the case that the' appellant had 
failed to prove his claim on the allegation of malafides. On the 
Justiciability issue, Lord MacDermott said: 
"The issue of justiciability raised by the Government of Malaysia led to 
a difference of opinion in the Federal Court, the Lord President of 
Malaysia and the Chief Justice of Malaya holding that the validity of 
the proclamation was not justiciable and Ong J. holding that it was. 
Whether a proclamation under statutory powers by the Supreme Head of the 
Federation can be challenged before the Courts on some or any grounds is 
a constitutional question of far-reaching importance which, on the 
present state of the authorities, remains unsettled and debatable. 
Having regard to the conclusion already reached, however, their 
Lordships do not need to decide that question in this appeal. They do 
not, therefore propose to do so, being of opinion that the question is 
one which would be better determined in proceedings which made that 
course necessary". 18 
The Ningkan case was a lost opportunity. The Privy Council failed to resolve 
the unsettled state of authorities on the subject. Thus it will be useful to 
look at some of these cases telling on the subject including the significant 
decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor" to 
decide the question. 
17. Ibid p. 389H. 
18. Ibid pp. 391-392. 
19. (1979] 2 MLJ 50; [1980) AC 458 
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A Survey of Judicial Views 
The majority in the Federal Court in Ningkan's case were not alone in the view 
they took that His Majesty was the sole judge of a proclamation and that a 
Proclamation was conclusive and non-justiciable. The juristic thinking behind 
this school of thought stems from the belief held early in English 
constitutional law that acts of the royal prerogative in times of emergency 
were not justiciable. Lord Upjohn had occasion to deal with it in Burmah Oil 
Co Ltd v. Lord Advocate: 20 
"It is clear that the crown alone must be the judge of the precise 
emergency and exact point of time when it is necessary to exercise the 
prerogative in order to defend the country against apprehended 
invasion ....... As a matter of common sense when the Crown 
is satisfied 
that an emergency exists its prerogative power to requisition goods and 
to take possession of land for the benefit of the country arises .... . 
This approach has been adopted by several Commonwealth courts without, 
however, making the distinction that the emergencies that came before them 
were under statutory powers. The case of Dean v. Attorney General of 
Queensland2l is in point. Under the Transport Act, 1938 of the state of 
Queensland in Australia the Governor in Council was authorised where it 
appears to him that the peace, welfare, order, good government or the public 
safety of the State was imperilled, to declare by Proclamation that a state of 
emergency exists. In anticipation of civil disorder because of the tour of 
Queensland by the South African Rugby Union football team, the Governor 
declared a state of emergency to cover the football grounds and related places 
for the duration of the tour. The Proclamation was challenged on a number of 
20. [1964] 2 AER 348. At p. 397 A-C. For a discussion of the scope of 
justiciability under the statutory power to declare a state of emergency 
in Britain under the Emergency Powers Act, 1920, see Gillian Morris The 
Emergency Powers Act, 1920 (1979) PL 317,318-321. 
21. (19711 QD. R 391. 
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grounds, inter alia, that the Act did not authorise the declaration of an 
emergency for the reasons given by the Governor. The Supreme Court at Brisbane 
rejected the argument holding that "it is not for the Court to question the 
validity of any opinion formed by His Excellency in Council. The Court is 
concerned with the question of legality not with fact". 22 Inspite of the 
apparent ambiguity in this pronouncement, the principle laid down would seem 
clear enough that if the statutory formalities are met, the Court will not 
review the opinion formed by the Governor. 
Another case in this series is Hewlett v. Fielder23 decided in New 
Zealand. The Public Safety Conservation Act, 1932 of New Zealand authorised 
the Governor General to declare a state of emergency "if at anytime it appears 
to him" that action is taken or contemplated by any person or body of persons 
whereby the public safety or public order is likely to be imperilled. on 
February 21,1951 the Governor-General proclaimed a state of emergency 
throughout New Zealand following the refusal of the waterside workers of the 
country to work overtime. Pursuant to the declaration, the Waterfront Strike 
Emergency Regulations, 1951 was made. The instant case arose out of a 
challenge to those Regulations on ground, inter alia, that a strike situation 
did not authorise the issue of a proclamation. The Auckland Court rejected the 
argument holding that, the Governor General had "an absolute discretion", 
saying: 
22. At pp. 404-405. Professor HP Lee in his analysis of emergency powers in 
Australia believes that Dean's case could be construed as not precluding 
judicial review on ground other than the determination of whether an 
emergency in fact exists. He observes elsewhere, however, that at the 
material time there was prevalent in the Australian Courts a trend to 
protect vice-regal proclamations and other acts by a vice-regal immunity 
doctrine: HP Lee, Emergency Powers (The Law Book company Ltd. Sydney, 
1984) at pp. 256,268-69. The vice-regal immunity doctrine was rejected 
by the Australian High Court in the later case of The Queen v. T00hey; 
Exparte Northern Land Council [1980-81] 151 CLR 170. 
23. [1951] NZIR 755. 
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"The question whether the proclamation was necessary or reasonable is 
one that is not open ..... for, by the use of the words ..... 
"If at 
anytime it appears to the Governor General", an absolute discretion is 
given, which cannot be challenged except on the ground last dealt with - 
ie. that th subject matter of the Proclamation is outside the ambit of 
the power". 
34 
The opening given by the Court that there could be challenge on the ground of 
vires does not detract from the holding that on a: proper subject matter the 
view formed by the Governor-General that a state of emergency was required is 
not justiciable. 
A more restrictive approach was taken by the Supreme Court of Sierra 
Leone in The state v. Adel Osman. 25 The declaration by the President of Sierra 
Leone of a public economic emergency under a provision that authorises him to 
declare an emergency whenever "a situation exists that could lead to a state 
of public emergency" was challenged on the ground that it was not an 
authorised subject matter. The Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of a 
definition of "a situation" it lies "in the sole power and discretion of the 
President to determine a situation, which at any given time in his estimation 
deserves a declaration by Proclamation of a state of public emergency". 
26 A 
similar view was taken in the Nigerian case of FRA William v. Majekodunmi 
(No. 2) per Ademola C. J. F.: 
"That a state of public emergency exists in Nigeria is a matter 
apparently within the bounds of Parliament, and not one for this Court 
to decide. once that state of emergency is declared, it would seem that 
24. At p. 760 (lines 30-40). In a later case, decided under the Education 
Act, 1914 that authorised the Governor-General to make regulations in 
furtherance of the objectives of the Act if "in the opinion of the 
Governor-General" the regulations are necessary, the Auckland Court held 
that the words do not give the Governor-General a complete and 
unexaminable discretion: Reade v. Smith [1959] NZER 996. The report, 
however, does not show that its earlier decision in Hewlett's case was 
cited to the Court. 
25. [1988) LRC (Const) 212. 
26. At p. 220. 
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according to the Constitution, it is the duty of the Government to look 
after the peace and security of the State, and it will require a very 
strong case against it for the Court to act". 27 
In this connection reference may also be made to the dicta of Dumbutshena C. J. 
in the Zimbabwe case of Patriotic Front - ZAPU v. Minister of Justice: 
to ..... (The) President may by proclamation declare a state of emergency 
affecting any part of Zimbabwe on the whole country. This is a question 
of national security. Judges are not qualified to take decisions that 
concern the security of the State. The Executive is better placed to 
form an opinion or judgments on matters concerning the security of the 28 State". 
These decisions are of interest as originating from courts of developing 
countries where tensions, overt or covert, often exist between the Executive 
and the Judiciary. They may be contrasted with the more robust approach taken 
by the courts in two other African jurisdictions. First is the Ugandan High 
Court in Namwandu v. Attorney General. 29 The case did not involve a direct 
challenge to the proclamation of an emergency. A state of emergency then 
extant was relied upon by the Government to defend a claim against it in 
damages following an incident where some soldiers of the Ugandan army had 
killed civilians. one of the defences raised was a claim of immunity from suit 
under a constitutional provision that precluded a court from granting any 
remedy or relief in respect of "anything done or omitted to be done during and 
consequent upon the state of public emergency declared on 22 May 1966". In a 
judgment, which surely must rank as one of the most unique amongst judicial 
27. [1962] 1 All N. L. R. 328,336. 
28. [1986] LRC (Const) 672,683 c-d. The case dealt largely with the 
customary prerogative of the President, and held that it was not beyond 
judicial review. See discussion of this decision, together with other 
"prerogative" cases, in Clive Walker, Review Of The Prerogative: The 
Remaining Issues (1987) PL 62. 
29. [1972] EA 108. 
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decisions anywhere concerning emergencies, the Kampala Court ruled that the 
defence was not available because, inspite of the proclamation, there was no 
real emergency. Saldanha J. said: 
"A state of public emergency was declared, on 23 May 1966. It is common 
knowledge that the Government extended the period of emergency from time 
to time, not because there was any real emergency, but for purposes of 
expediency, so as to enable them to keep in force emergency regulations. 
It is not in dispute that while there was a state of emergency in this 
sense at the time when the incident occurred, there was no real 
emergency, but, on the contrary, stability throughout the 
country . ........ This incident occurred during a period when there was a fictitious state of emergency in law but no real emergency in fact". 30 
The characterisation of the continued state of emergency as fictitious 
necessarily entailed a refusal by the Court to accept the proclamation as 
conclusive. A similar refusal but under different circumstances was made by 
the Lesotho High Court in Law society of Lesotho v. Minister of Defence and 
Internal Security. 31 In this case the King had proclaimed a state of emergency 
purporting to act under the Emergency Powers Act, 1982. The Act provided that 
the Prime Minister could declare a State of Emergency with the approval by 
resolution of the Assembly. Following a military takeover of the Government in 
1986, the office of Prime Minister was abolished, and the Assembly also ceased 
to exist. By an Executive order passed by the Military Government the 
executive and legislative powers were vested in the King who was to act on the 
advice of the Military Council. The instant case arose out of the detention 
during the emergency of certain lawyers representing detainees in court. The 
Law Society picked up the cudgels on behalf of the detained lawyers and 
challenged the validity of the Emergency. The High Court ruled that the 
30. At p. 111. 
31. [1988] LRC (Const. ) 226. 
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Emergency Powers Act had become inoperable because it envisaged a 
complimentary role for the Prime Minister and the Assembly. Since both had 
become non-existent, the declaration of emergency by thd King was null and 
void because there is "no power in any authority under the Act to declare an 
emergency". 32 
It would not be incorrect to say that these two cases are exceptional. 
The general trend of decisions from Africa show a marked deference to the 
executive fiat, whether it be an elected or a military government. The courts 
have themselves come to realise it. This was reflected in the lament of 
Ademola C. J. in the Nigerian case of Wang & Ors v. Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters Lagos, 33 when construing the decrees of the Military Government 
of Nigeria precluding judicial review, that "the law courts of Nigeria must as 
of now blow muted trumpets". 
The approach taken generally by courts in other jurisdictions, however, 
is to move towards favouring some form of review over the power to declare an 
emergency. India provides an example. The relevant Indian provision34 is 
similar to the Malaysian provision. The earlier approach is exemplified in P. 
Venkataseshamma v. The State of Andhra Pradesh35 where the Court declared: 
32. At p. 238. After this judgment was delivered, the Emergency Powers Act, 
1982 was repealed and replaced by the Emergency Powers Order 1988 'which 
provided that the King may, by proclamation in the Gazette declare a 
state of emergency; the order itself declared that a state of emergency 
existed with effect from 24 February 1988 when the first Proclamation 
which was voided by the Court was made: Ibid pp. 227-228. 
33. [1986] LRC (Const) 319 at 330i. 
34. Article 352(1) reads: "If the President is satisfied that a grave 
emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the 
territory thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or 
armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that 
effect 
35. AIR 1976 AP 1. 
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"Whether or not there is a real emergency and whether the President was 
justified in making a proclamation under Article 352, is a matter which 
is not within the preview of the Court. The Proclamation of em3rgency 
under Article 352 enjoys immunity from attack in a Court of law". 6 
This approach was reminiscent of the view taken by the majority in the Federal 
Court in Ningkan's case. In a series of decisions since, the Indian Supreme 
Court has edged away from the terse position taken by the Andhra Court. In a 
landmark decision, called the Privy Purse's case, 37 the Supreme Court decried 
the notion that the President of India held an exalted position that rendered 
his actions immune from review by the courts. shah J. ruled that the exercise 
of powers by the President was justiciable: 
"The President is not invested with any political power transcending the 
Constitution, which he may exercise to the prejudice of citizens. The 
powers of the President arise from and are defined by the Constitution. 
Validity of the exercise of those powers is always amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the courts, unless the jurisdiction is by precise 
enactment excluded. Power of the Supreme Court ..... cannot-be ýF assed 
under a claim that the President has exercised political power". 
In the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 39 the Supreme Court was concerned 
with the President's powers under Article 356 to impose Presidential Rule in 
any state where he is satisfied that the state cannot be run in accordance 
with the provisions ofýthe Constitution. The court ruled that the satisfaction 
was subjective and may not be reviewed from the standpoint of the correctness 
or adequacy of the facts and circumstances on which the satisfaction of the 
Government was based. However, the Court, ruled that review was not excluded 
and may be open in certain circumstances: 
36. Ibid. 
37. H. K. Hadhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530. The case was 
concerned with the constitutionality of the Indian Government's action 
in abolishing the privy purses of the royal families. 
38. At para. 143. 
39. AIR 1977 SC 1361. 
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11 ... (I)f the satisfaction is malafide or is based on wholly extraneous 
and irrelevant grounds, the Court would have jurisdiction to examine it, 
because in that case there would be no satisfaction of the President in 
regard to the matter in which he is required to be satisfied. The 
satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent to the exercise 
of power ..... and if it can be shown that there is no satisfaction of the President at all 4o the exercise of the power would be 
constitutionally invalid". 
In the later case of Minerva Kills Ltd. v. Union of India, 41 Bhagwati J. 
expanded on the justiciability question. The case was concerned generally with 
the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution. However, Bhagwati J., in 
obiter, dealt also with the extent to which the Court can review the 
constitutionality of a proclamation of emergency issued under Article 352(1): 
"There is no bar to judicial review of the validity of a proclamation of 
Emergency issued by the President ..... But the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme court does not extend further than saying 
whether the limits on the power conferred by the Constitution on the 
President have been observed or there is a transgression of such limits. 
The Court cannot go into the question of correctness or adequacy of the 
facts on which the satisfaction of the Central Government is based. The 
satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent ..... (I)f it can be shown there is no satisfaction of the President at all, the exercise 
of the power would be constitutionally invalid. where therefore the 
satisfaction is absurd or perverse or mala fide or based on a wholly 
extraneous or irrelevant ground, it would be no satisfacýion at all and 
it would be liable to be challenged before a Court... n. 4 
In all these cases, as in the early Privy council cases'43 the door for 
challenge on mala fide grounds was kept open. There is no justification 
therefore, on precedent and authority, for the view taken by the majority in 
the Federal Court' in Kingkan's case that a Proclamation of Emergency was 
40. per Bhagwati J. at p. 1414-1415 (para. 144). 
41. AIR 1980 SC 1789. 
42. Paras. 103-105, pp. 1837-1838. 
43. Except for Bhagat Singh v. King Emperor AIR 1931 PC 111. 
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conclusive and not impugnable on any ground. The disinclination of the Privy 
Council, when Ningkan's case went on appeal, to rule on the justiciability 
question spoke against the stand of the Federal Court rather than in favour of 
it. 
Malafides as a ground of challenge has always been available and has 
come a long way since its occlusion under the royal prerogative cases. For 
example, the Australian High Court had'ruled in an early case: "(It) is not 
open to impute mala fides with respect to the issue of a royal Proclamation, 
which is the act of the'King by himself or his representativen. 44 Now the 
consideration is not whether mala fides is available as a head , of challenge 
but with functional matters in relation to it like the burden of proof and the 
standard to be discharged in bringing the challenge. This is inextricably 
linked with what is the proper meaning of "malafidell or "acts of bad faith". 
Malafide as a head of challenge may exist independently of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, 45 and the Diplock categorisation of grounds of challenge of 
administrative decision-making in council of civil service unions v. minister 
for Civil Service. 46 
44. Duncan v. Theodore [1917], 23 CLR 510; affirmed on appeal by the Privy 
Council [1919] 26 CLR 276. The decision may no longer be considered as 
stating the correct law in Australia since the decision in Re Toohey 
(1980-81] 151 CLR 170 which ruled in favour of the justiciability of 
vice-regal acts. 
45. Based on Lord'Greene M. R. Is classic judgment in Associated Provincial 
Picture Homes Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 AER 680, that a 
patently unreasonable' decision may be vitiated in law. In that case, 
Lord Greene himself said: "Bad faith, dishonesty - those, of course, 
stand by themselves": at p. 682. 
46. [1984] 3 AER 935 per Lord Diplock: "Judicial review has I think 
developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the 
steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently 
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A decision may be said to be mala fide when it is made for an improper purpose 
or is the product of an abuse or misuse of power. In Cannock Chase District 
Council v. Kelly, 47 the English Court of Appeal said, per Megaw LJ: "(It) 
seems to me that an unfortunate tendency has developed of looseness of 
language in this respect, that bad faith ar, as it is somet imes put, "lack of 
goodfaith", means dishonesty; not necessarily for a financial motive, but 
still dishonesty ......... It must not be treated as a synonym for an honest, 
though mistaken, taking into consideration of a factor which is in law 
irrelevant". This attempt at a definition by the Court of Appeal appears 
stringent and unduly restrictive if by those words Megaw Li intended to 
exclude from the categorisation of mala fide acts, actions taken for an 
Unauthorised purpose which may not be actuated by dishonesty, personal gain or 
malice. The wider definition in the Calcutta case of Ram Chandra Chaudhari v. 
Secretary to Government, West Benga, 48 that mala fides did not necessarily 
involve malicious intent is more consonant with decisions that have in England 
and elsewhere vitiated executive action for misuse or abuse of power. 49 
contd ..... 46. classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is 
subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 
"illegality", the second "irrationality" and the third "procedural 
impropriety": at p. 950 h-j. 
47. (1978) 1 AER 152 at p. 156 d-f. 
48. AIR 1964 Cal 265. 
49. Eg. Nunicipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell (19251 AC 338 (in 
furtherance of an ulterior object); Congreve v. Home Office [1976) 1 AER 
697 (misuse of power); Laker Airways Ltd v. Department of Trade [1977] 2 
AER 182 (discretion exercised for ulterior purpose); Wheeler V. 
Leicester County Council [1985] 2 AER 1706 (use of statutory power to 
further a political policy). 
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Lord Diplock, speaking in dissent, in McEldowney v. Forde50 said in respect of 
the subjective power given to the executive to enact emergency legislation 
that an improper purpose may be obtained by a honest misconstruction of the 
words: 
"The relevant inquiry which the court hag to make when subordinate 
legislation made under words of delegation of this kind is challenged is 
not whether his belief was justified but whether it existed. The absence 
of such belief may connote mala fides on the part of the maker of the 
subordinate legislation ie. that he has used the delegated power with 
the deliberate intention of achieving an effect other than that 
described in the words of delegation, but it does not necessarily do so. 
He may have honestly misconstrued the words of the statute describing 
the effect to be achieved and for this reason have failed to form the 
relevant belief". 51 
The absence of "a belief" or, in the language of the emergency provisions we 
have considered so far, - "of satisfaction" - is what the Indian Supreme Court 
in the Rajasthan case and the Hinez-va Hills case spoke of _ 
as a condition 
precedent. Thus, as the Privy Council said in the Ross-Clunis case'52 if it 
could be shown that there were no grounds on which the satisfaction could be 
honestly formed, the proclamation may be impugned. 
The major hurdle to clear under a ground of attack based on mala fide is 
the burden of proof that has to be discharged. 53 The Indian Supreme Court in a 
number of cases has dealt with this question. In E. P. Royappa v. State of 
54 Tamil Nadu, the Court spoke of the burden as being a heavy one to discharge 
50. (1971] AC 632. 
51. At p. 660 D-F. 
5;. [1958] 2 AER 23,33. 
53. The Privy Council in Ningkan's case was emphatic that the burden lay on 
the person challenging the proclamation: (1970] AC at 390 B. 
54. AIR 1974 SC 555. 
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and that it demands proof of a high order of credibility. In G. S. Rawjee v. 
State of Andhra Pradesh, 55 realising the difficulty of those making the 
allegation of malafides being able to fully appraise the Court of all the 
circumstances relevant for a proper determination, the Court called on those 
against whom allegations are made to come forward and place before the Court 
either their denials or their version of the matter. It signalled a move not 
to allow wrong-doing by officialdom to go unchecked by default. Thus in Pratap 
Singh v. state of Punjab, 56 the Supreme Court made the significant 
observation: 
"The dif f iculty (of establishing the state of a man Is mind) is not 
lessened when one has to establish that a person in the position of a 
minister apparently acting in the legitimate exercise of power has, in 
fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate 
aim. We must, however, demur to the suggestion that mala fide in the 
sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence, 
that is it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown 
from the notings in the file which preceded the order. If bad faith 
would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a 
reasonable and inescapable inference from proved fact". 57 
The approach of the Indian supreme court, however, is at variance with that 
of the Privy council in Ningkan's case. Ningkan was a paradigm case of an 
emergency being declared with an ulterior objective in mind. The Privy Council 
acknowledged that it was not unreasonable for the appellant Ningkan to have 
concluded that the emergency was in reality designed to remove him f rom 
office; but it was insufficient to satisfy the Privy Council. The Board 
observed: 
"That the appellant (Ningkan) regarded the Federal Government's action 
as aimed at himself is obvious and perhaps natural; but he has failed to 
55. AIR 1964 SC 962 at 969-70. 
56. AIR 1964 SC 72. 
57. AT para. B. 
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satisfy the Board that the steps taken by the Government, including the 
Proclamation and the impugned Act, were in fraudem legis or otherwise 
unauthorised by the relevant legislation". -58 
It is difficult to appreciate what further proof-the Privy Council required to 
establish mala fide other, than the undisputed sequence of events that 
demonstrated compellingly that the real objective was the removal of Ningkan 
from office: first, the successful court case which reinstated Ningkan to 
office, 59 and next, -an emergency that provided the umbrella for his removal. 
This was especially so as the security threat alleged by the Government was 
never properly identified. The emphasis before the Federal Court in this 
respect was the communist threat, whereas, before the Privy Council, it was 
the remnants of the Indonesian Confrontation. Thus the Privy Council was 
prepared to accept the mere assertion of the relevant government of a threat 
to its security, as opposed to the overwhelming evidence provided by the 
uncontroverted facts that the real motivation behind the Emergency was the 
removal of Ningkan from office. The Privy council's approach has placed an 
unattainable standard of proof on persons challenging the bona fides of a 
Proclamation; a Proclamation of emergency would not carry a "brand of 
invalidity on its forehead"; 60 its invalidity will have to be established by 
facts aliunde. The admissibility of external evidence to review the propriety 
58. [1970] AC at 391F. 
59. Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Tun Abang Hj. openg [1966] 2 MLJ 187. The 
judgment was delivered on 7 September 1966, and the Proclamation of 
Emergency was declared on 14 September 1966, after a week of intense 
political manoeuvring: see discussion in Chapter VI on the Sarawak 
Emergency. One academic termed the events as "the clearest example of 
the manipulation of the constitution to create conditions to justify the 
proclamation of an emergency": Yash Ghai, The Politics of the 
Constitution: Another Look At the Ninqkan LitigatIon (1986-F77 ýSsing. L. R. 
147 at 161. 
60. Per Lord Radcliffe in Smith v. East Elloe RDC (1956] 1 AER 855 at 871 H 
in the context of ministerial orders being impugned before the courts. 
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of emergency measures was accepted by Lord Pearson in NcEldowney v. Forde, 61 
and would reflect the correct position today notwithstanding the archaic view 
taken by Barakbah LP in Ningkan's case. 62 The approach of the Indian supreme 
Court in Pratap Singh's case that mala fide is a matter of inference from 
surrounding facts is a realistic approach that cotimends itself and is evident 
from the cases where a finding to that effect was made. In HuniciPal council 
of Sydney v. Campbell. 63 the Privy Council held that an acquisition of land by 
the local authority was actuated by improper motive after examining the 
surrounding circumstances that showed that a previous attempt at acquisition 
had failed. It deserves reiteration,, however, that the evidence needed to 
establish mala fides must'be cogent and convincing befitting the seriousness 
of the allegation. 64 
In summary, the 'trend in case-law show a leaning in favour of 
justiciability, and not to treat the Proclamation as sacrosanct'or conclusive. 
In the words of Gibbs Ci. in the landmark Australian case of Re Toohey: "(NO) 
convincing reason can- be suggested for limiting the ordinary power of the 
Courts to inquire whether there has been a proper exercise of a statutory 
power by giving the crown a special immunity from review. If a statutory power 
is granted to the Crown for one purpose, it is clear it is not lawfully 
exercised if it is used f or another. The Courts have the power and duty to 
ensure that statutory powers are exercised only in accordance with law". 65 
61. [1971] AC at 657 A-C. 
62. [1968] 1 HLJ at 122E: "(It) is incumbent on the court to assume that the 
Government is acting in the best interest of the State and to permit no 
evidence to be led otherwise". 
63. [1925] AC. 
64. See the cases of Yeap v. Covernment of Kelantan [1986] 1 MIJ 482 PC, 
and Covernment of Nalaysia v. Jagdis Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 SC. 
65. [1980-81] 151 CIR 170 at 193. 
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It is equally clear that a decision does not enjoy any special immunity 
from review because it is a decision of the Cabinet. 66 In so far as Malaysia 
is concerned, the Ningkan cases cannot be said to have sp6ken the last word on 
the justiciability question. A look should also be taken of the later decision 
67 of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor, which although 
not concerned directly with the justiciability of a proclamation of emergency, ý 
dealt with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's law-making power during a state of 
emergency and the declaration of the whole of Malaysia as a security area 
under the Internal Security Act 1960. The Privy Council pronounced in clear 
terms that the actions taken by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as a constitutional 
monarch are subject to judicial review as in reality being the actions of the 
Cabinet. In dealing with the power of proclamation of an area as a security 
area under the Act aforementioned, the Privy Council observed: 
"The power to proclaim an area as a security area with the consequences 
that this will entail is a discretionary one. It is for the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong (again, in effect, the cabinet) to form an opinion whether 
public security in any area of Malaysia is seriously disturbed or 
threatened by the causes referred to in the section, and to consider 
whether in his opinion it is necessary for the purpose of suppressing 
organised violence of the kind described. But, as with all discretions 
conferred upon the executive by Act of Parliament, this does not exclude 
the jurisdiction of the court to inquire whether the purported exercise 
of the discretion was nevertheless ultra vires either because it was 
done in bad faith (which is not in question in the instant appeal) or 
because as a result of misconstruing the provision of the Act by which 
the discretion was conferred upon him the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has 
purported to exercise the discretion when the conditions precedent to 
its exercise were not fulfilled or, in exercising it, he has taken into 
consideration some matter which the Act forbids him to take into 
consideration or has failed to take into considergbion some matter which 
the Act requires him to take into consideration". 
66. See South Australia v. O'Shea [19871 61 ALJR 477; see generally the 
informative article by M. C. Harris, The Courts And the Cabinet: 
"Unfastening The Buckle" (1989) PL 251. 
67. [1980] AC 458; [1979] 2 MLJ 50. 
68. At p. 472. 
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The Privy council also spoke in terms of the Agong's satisfaction being a 
condition precedent, the absence of, which would make the declaration unlawful. 
As regards the failure of the Agong to revoke a proclamation when it was 
called for, the Privy council said that the Cabinet was amenable to an order 
of mandamus: 
"In their Lordships' view, however, the discretion whether and when to 
revoke a security area proclamation is not entirely unfettered. The 
proclamation is lawful because it is considered by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to be necessary to make an area a security area for the purpose, 
not of suppressing violence by individuals generally but of suppressing 
existing or threatened organised violence of the kind described in the 
section. once he no longer considers it necessary for that particular 
purpose it would be an abuse of his discretion to fail to exercise his 
power of revocation, and to maintain the proclamation in force for some 
different purpose. If he fails to act the Court has no power itself to 
revoke the proclamation in his stead. This, however, does not leave the 
Courts powerless to*grant to the citizen a remedy in cases in which it 
can be established that a failure to exercise its power of revocation 
would be an abuse of his discretion. Article 32(l) of the Constitution 
makes the Yang di-Pertuan Agong immune from any proceedings whatsoever 
in any Court. So mandamus to require him to revoke the proclamation 
would not ýlie against him; but since he is required in all executive functions to act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet, mandamus 
could, in their Lordships' view, be sought against the members of the 
cabinet requi%g them to advice the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke the 
proclamation .9 
The decision in Teh Cheng Poh may be taken as supplying the omission in 
Ningkan Is case where the, Privy Council declined to rule on whether a 
proclamation was justiciable. The Government's argument before the Board in 
Teh Cheng Poh Is case was similar to that in Ningkan, viz. that a proclamation 
under Article 150 was conclusive as to the existence of an emergency. 70 But 
69. At p. 473. For a decision from another commonwealth country where the 
Teh Cheng Poh decision was not followed and Lord Diplock's dicta on 
mandamus was described as "startling", see the Cayman Island's case of 
In Re Fedele [1988] LRC (Const) 879,883e. But see the Canadian case of 
Air Canada V. -Attorney General of British Columbia [1988] LRC (Const) 
38, where the Supreme Court applied Lord Diplock's dicta to hold that 
mandamus may lie against the Attorney General to tender the requisite 
advice for the issuance of a fiat. 
70. See Counsel's arguments reproduced at p. 463 E-F. 
.1 
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the tenor and reasoning of Lord Diplock's judgment shows an emphatic 
repudiation of the notion that a proclamation is conclusive or- that it is 
immune from review. Since that decision, the Federal Codrt had occasion to 
hold affirmatively that actions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong'although couched 
in the subjective language of a discretion was ' not immune from judicial 
review. Under Section 6(1) of the University and University Colleges Act, 1971 
the Agong is authorised to establish a national university if he "is 
satisfied" that it is in the national interest to do. The provision came for 
71 consideration in the Kerdeka University Bhd case, where Suffian, LP held: "In 
the past such a subjective formula would have barred the Courts from going 
behind His Majesty's reasons for his decision to reject the plaintiff's 
application; but, as stated by the learned Judge (Abdoolcader J. ) 
administrative law has since so far advanced such that today such a subjective 
formula - no longer excludes judicial review if objective facts have to be 
ascertained before arriving at such satisfaction and the test of 
unreasonableness is not whether a particular person considers a particular 
course unreasonable, but whether it could be said that no reasonable person 
could consider that course reasonable". 72 
In the result, on the current state of Malaysian case authorities, the 
leaning in favour of justiciability is clearly discernible and may be taken as 
concluding the issue if not for certain statutory changes in 1981. We shall 
examine below these and certain other factors constituting an impediment to 
justiciability. 
71. Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia [1982) 2 MLJ 243. 
72. At p. 246 G-I. 
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The Impediments To Justiciability 
The impediments to judicial review of a Proclamation of Emergency under 
Article 150 are two-fold: 
(a) the juristic principle called "the political question" doctrine; 
and,, 
(b) the ouster of the Court's jurisdiction under Article 150(8). 
(a) The Political Question Doctrine 
Two superior Courts of distinction have suggested that matters like the 
declaration and termination of a state of emergency or executive action during 
an emergency are not suitable for judicial determination. Lord Pearson in 
McEldowney v. Forde73 observed with regard to the power of ministerial rule- 
making during an emergency: 
"The Northern Ireland Parliament must have intended that somebody should 
decide whether or not the making of some proposed regulation would be 
conducive to the "preservation of the peace and maintenance of order". 
obviously it must have been intended that the Minister of Home Affairs 
should decide the question ..... The Courts, cannot have been intended to decide such a question, because they do not have the necessary 
information and the decision is in the sphere of politics, which is not 
their sphere". 74 
The Indian Supreme Court in Bhut Nath Kate v. State of West Benga175- observed 
with regard to whether a real emergency exists: 
"In our view, this is a political, not justiciable issue and the appeal 
should be to the polls and not to the Courts ....... (It is) a pragmatic response by the Court to the reality of its inadequacy to decide such 
issues and to the scheme of the Constitution which has assigned t ?6 each 
branch of government in the larger sense a certain jurisdiction". 
73. [1971] AC 632. 
74. At p. 655 D-E. 
75. AIR 1974 SC 806. 
76. Per Krishna Iyer J. at 811 (paragraph 16). 
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Some academic writers have also expressed the view that cases like the 
dismissal of Ningkan77 in Sarawak and its twin in Nigeria, Adegbenro v. 
Akintola, 78 were not really suitable for judicial resolution. 79 
The political question doctrine is a juristic technique that enables the 
Court to decline to adjudicate on a dispute on the ground that the subject- 
matter is not fit for judicial determination either because it lies outside 
the judicial domain or because there are not available judicially manageable 
standards to decide the issue. It has its origins in the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers. It has been described as "a creature of the 
theory of separation of powers"80 which purports to keep the executive, 
77. [1966] 2 MLJ 187. 
78. [1963] 3. AER 544; [1963] AC 614. 
79. See K. J. Keith, The Courts And The Conventions of the Constitution 
(1967) 16 ICLO 542 who submits that R should not have been assumed iH 
both cases that because the relevant rules were to be found in the 
Constitution that the issues were fit for judicial determination. The 
writer relies on the subsequent political action taken to nullify the 
decisions as bearing out his proposition. He advances the approach taken 
by the United States Supreme Court in the nineteenth century case of 
Luther v. Borden 48 U. S. (7 How) 1 [1849] that it is inexpedient for a 
court to determine who should rightfully govern a state. As regards 
Harley Ag. C. J. 's decision in the Ningkan case, Keith provides the 
interesting information that Harley's reliance (at p. 195) on the passage 
from de Smith's book (The New Commonwealth And Its Constitutions at p. 
87) had failed to note that in the part preceding the paragraph quoted, 
de Smith had himself queried "it would be surprising if a Malaysian 
Court could be persuaded to investigate whether the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong has acted in strict conformity with ministerial advice, despite 
the absence of an exclusionary clause" (p. 546, foot-note (181)). See 
also Geoffrey Sawer, Political Questions (1963-64) Vol. XV University of 
Toronto Law Journal__4_9aT_54-56, who relying on Luther v. Borden, 
suggests that the American "political questions" doctrine deserved to be 
argued in the Nigerian case. For a criticism of Sawer's view on ground 
of inconsistency, see B. O. Nwabueze, Judicialism In Commonwealth Africa 
(C. Hurst & Co London, 1981 Ed. ) at p. 42. See also the discussion 
follows there that the Luther v. Borden doctrine is extinct or obsolete. 
80. Rajeev Dhavan, Justice on Trial: The Supreme Court Today (Wheeler 
Publishing Co. Ltd., Allahabad, 1980) p. 150. 
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legislative and judicial functions of the state separate and independent of 
each other. The doctrine has seen its development and fruition largely in 
American Constitutional law. Thus there is little if not'no discussion of it 
in the texts on British Constitutional Law where non-justiciable areas have 
been pigeon-holed under established heads of ' exclusion. 81 The British 
technique has been adopted in the Commonwealth countries, and even in 
Australia where a written constitution and a federal system of government puts 
it closer to the American model. 82 The Australian approach, adopting English 
judicial methods, is also largely the juristic thinking of the Malaysian 
courts. Thus certain fields have always been recognised as being outside the 
sphere of judicial intervention, like foreign relations and treaty 
obligations; 83 defence policy and armaments; 84 matters falling within the 
purview of the legislature, 85 and matters of pure administration not giving 
81. Geoffrey Sawer, op. cit. p. 49-50. See also Alex Castles, Justiciability: 
Political Questions, in Locus Standi (Ed. Leslie Stein) TL--aw Book Co. 
Australia, 1979) A- 225-26. 
82. P. E. Nygh, The Doctrine of Political Questions Within A Federal system 
(1963) 5 Mal. L. R. 132. 
83. Eg. Republic of Italy V. Hambros Bank [1950] 1 AER 430; see also the 
Australian case of South Australia V. Commonwealth [1961] 108 CLR 130, 
involving treaty obligations within a federation. See also the American 
case of Sarnoff v. Shultz 409 U. S. 929 (1972] where the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in a petition where the legality of the Vietnam war 
was involved. 
84. Eg. Chandler v. DPP [1962) 3 AER 142 per Lord Radcliffe: "If the methods 
of arming the defence forces and the disposition of those forces are at 
the decision of Her Majesty's Ministers for the time being, as we know 
that they are, it is not within the competence of a court of law to try 
the issue whether it would be better for the country that the armament 
or those dispositions should be different" (p. 151 C-D). 
85. See Hj. Salleh Jaffarudin v. Datuk Celestine Ujang [1986] 2 MLJ 412 SC. 
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rise to any legal questions. 86 Likewise it is accepted that it is not in the 
province of the judiciary to question the wisdom or necessity to pursue a 
particular, policy or pass a certain legislation. In *Loh Kooi Choon v. 
Government 'of Nalaysia, 87 the Federal Court, adopting English decisions on 
point, 88 observed: 
"The question whether the impugned Act is "harsh and unjust" is a 
question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and 
therefore not meet for judicial determination. To sustain it would cut 
very deeply into the very being of Parliament. our Courts ought not to 
enter this political thicket ..... Those who find fault with the wisdom 
or expediency of the impugned Act, and with vexatious interference with 
fundamental rights, normally must address themselves to the legislature, 
and not the Courts; they have their remedy at the ballot box". 9 
86. Eg. Attorney General Fiji v. DPP (1983] 2 AC 673, a remarkable case 
involving a dispute between the Attorney General and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions over an administrative directive issued by the 
former affecting the latter, per Lord Fraser: "(Their) Lordships are not 
concerned with questions of whether the issue of the directions are 
necessary or expedient. These are political questions which are not 
justiciable 
..... The sole question for the Courts 
is whether the 
directions are validly made in accordance with the Constitution" (p. 678, 
C-D). As to when a non-statutory departmental circular may be subject to 
judicial review, see Gillick v. West Norfolk Area Health Authority 
[1985] 3 AER 402, involving a controversial circular issued by the 
Health Department on the giving of advice to girls under 16 on 
contraceptives, which was challenged on sufficiently identifiable legal 
grounds. See also discussion of the Gillick decision from a larger 
perspective in Simon Lee's, Law And Morals (OUP, 1986) pp. 48-63, and 
Judging Judges (Faber & Faber, London, 1988) pp. 73-87. 
87. [1977] 2 MLJ 187. 
88. Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of compositors (1913] AC 107,118. 
See the more recent cases of Pickin v. British Railways Board [1974] AC 
765,789 A-B and Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (1980] 1 WLR 142,157. See 
generally, the present writer Constitutional Supremacyý Emergency 
Powers and Judicial Attitudes (; 
%31 
-JMCL 69,80-81 on the stand of the 
Malaysian courts on the justiciability question. 
89. At p. -188 D-H, per Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as he then was). For a case 
stating that the court is not concerned with the political, social or 
economic desirability of a project, see the Australian case of 
Australian National Aizways v. Commonwealth [1945] 71 CLR 29. See also 
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In addition to these areas, Malaysian courts have also recognised that matters 
of royal succession and accession to the throne are non-justiciable. 90 
It follows that the political question doctrine operates outside this 
arena of traditionally excluded areas of judicial review. Under American 
constitutional law, where it has seen its fullest 'development, the doctrine is 
explained as raising "an issue whose settlement has been, entrusted by the 
Constitution to another'branch of the government, -or that the problem is in a 
field where the judges have no special competence, or that as a practical 
matter the issue is one with which the judicial process cannot cope". 91 The 
principal proponent of this doctrine of judicial self-restraint was Justice 
Felix Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court. He coined the phrase 
*political thicket"92 which has since been used in several jurisdictions where 
reference has been made to the doctrine. 93 According to his thesis: "(It) is 
hostile to a democratic system to involve the'judiciary in the politics of the 
contd... 
89. Abdoolcader J. (as he then was) in the Malaysian case of Merdeka 
University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356, where he 
observed: "(The) court's powers to make declarations is confined to 
matters justiciable in the courts and limited to legal and equitable 
rights and does not extend to moral, social or political matters" (at 
p. 366A). 
90. See Dato Menteri Othman v. Dato Ombi Syed AM (1981] 1 MLJ 29 FC 70; 
Daeng Baha Ismail v. Tunku Mahmood Iskandar [1987] 1 MLJ vi. For an 
African parallel, but ruling in favour of justiciability, see Marealle 
v. The Changga Council (1963] EA 131. 
91. See Walter Murphy & C. Herman Pritchet, Courts, Judges And Politics: An 
Introduction To The Judicial Process (3rd Ed. Random House, New York) it 
p. 223. 
92. Colegrove v. Green 328 U. S. 549 [1946]. 
93. In Malaysia, Loh Kooi Choon 
, 
v. Government of Malaysia (1977] 2 MLJ 187, 
188; In India, State of Rajasthan v. Union of India A 1977 SC 1361, 
1414. 
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people". 94 The Frankfurter doctrine, while conceptually defensible, soon fell 
out-of-step with the surge of activism generated by the Warren Court. In his 
lifetime, Frankfurter saw his thesis denuded of much of -its content. In the 
seminal case of Baker v. Carr95 the United States Supreme C ourt overruled the 
Frankfurter thesis and set out the test as being whether the question 
"textually demonstrates a constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department". 96 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court 
further narrowed the application of the doctrine97 and in the important 
"executive-privilege" case of the United States v. Nizon98 it decided in 
favour of justiciability without even mentioning the doctrine. 99 
The common law courts outside the United States, fortunately, never got 
tangled with the political question doctrine. The courts in Australia, India 
and Malaysia, applying English judicial methods, have approached issues with a 
political flavouring purely as to whether it presents a legal question capabl6 
94. Colegrove v. Green, op. cit. 
95. 369 U. S. 186 [1982). The de cision was Frankfurter's last major case 
before retirement: see H. N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 
(Basic Books, New York, 1980) pp. 197. For an interest ing discussion of 
the impact of the Baker v. Carr decision that it does not "affirm the 
essence of what was denied in Colegrove v. Green", see Alexander Bickel, 
The Least Dangerous Branch: 
- - 
The Supreme Court At The Bar of Politics 
Ty are university Press, 1962ý pp. 195. 
96. Op. cit p. 217. 
97. Powell v. McConvack 295 U. S. 486 [1968]. 
98. 41 L. Ed. 2d. 1039 (1973]. 
99. For a discussion of the doctrine in the context of security-related 
questions, see Edwin B. Firmage, The War Powers And The Political 
Question Doctrine (1977) Vol. 49 Univ. of Colorado Law Review, 65. For a 
compelling argument that the doctrine is an unnecessary complication 
that has "misled lawyers and courts", see Louis Henkin, Is There A 
Political Question Doctrine? (1976) 85 Yale Law Journal 597,622. 
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of adjudication. 100 on constitutional matters, where disputes arose out of the 
working of a written constitution, the approach has been as stated bY Dixon J. 
of the Australian High Court: 
"The constitution is a, political instrument. It deals with government 
and government powers ..... It is not a -question whether 
the 
considerations are political, for nearly every consideration arising 
from the Constitution can be so described, but whether they are 
compelling". 101 ýi 
This perceptive approach found adherence in India. In State of Rajasthan v. 
Union of India, Bhagwati J. dealt in extenso with the American doctrine in, the 
context of a challenge to the decision by the President to take-over *' the 
administration of a state: ý 
11 (It was) urged that having regard to the political nature of the 
problem, it is not amenable to judicial determination and hence the 
Court must abstain from inquiring into it. We do not think we can accept 
this argument. of course, it is true that if a question brought before 
the Court is purely a political question not involving determination of 
any legal or constitutional right or obligation, the Court would not 
entertain it, since the Court is concerned only with adjudication of 
legal rights and liabilities. But merely because a question has a 
political complexion, that by itself is no ground why the Court should 
shrink from performing its duty under the Constitution if it raises an 
issue of constitutional termination. Every constitutional question 
concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no 
constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political. A 
constitution as a matter of purest politics is a structure of power and 
as pointed out by Charles Black in "Perspectives in constitutional Law": 
100. Eg. a claim whether a Minister was suitable to continue in office does 
not raise any legal question for adjudication: Sukumaran v. Union of 
India AIR 1986 Kerala 122; Periasamy slo Sangili V. Dato Samy Vellu 
(1990] 2 CLJ 282. 
101. Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth [1947] 74 CIR 31f 82. In Britain, 
working with an unwritten constitution, it is the function of judicial 
review of administrative action that has drawn the strongest criticism 
of judges as being political: see eg. JAG Griffith, The Politics Of The 
Judiciary (3rd Ed. 1984) 11 ... The simple thesis that 
the Judiciary 
Zannot, under our system, act neutrally but must act politically" 
(Preface); Ronald Dworkin,, Political Judges And The Rule Of Law (1978) 
Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence, Proceedings of the Bri Academy 
London, OUP p. 260: "A judge who decides on political grounds, of course, 
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"constitutional law" symbolizes an intersection of law ý and 
politics, wherein issues of a political power are acted on by 
persons trained in the legal tradition, working in judicial 
institutions, following the procedures of law, thinking as lawyers 
think". 
It will, therefore, be -seen that merely because a question has a 
political colour, the Court cannot fold its hands in despair and declare 
"Judicial hands off". So long as a question -arises whether an authority 
under the constitution has acted within the limits of its power or 
exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed it would 
be its constitutional obligation to do so. It is necessary to assert in 
the clearest terms, particularly in the context of recent history, that 
the constitution is Suprema lex, the paramount law of the land, and 
there is no department or branch of Government above or beyond it. Every 
organ of Government, be it the executive or the legislature or the 
judiciary, derives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act 
within the limits of its authority. No one howsoever highly placed and 
no authority howsoever lofty can claim that it shall be the sole judge 
of the extent of its power under the Constitution or whether its action 
is within the confines of such power laid down by the Constitution. This 
Court is the ultimate interpreter of the constitution and to this Court 
is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the power conferred 
on each branch of Government, whether it is limited, and if so, what are 
the limits and whether any action of that branch transgresses such 
contd ..... 101. is not deciding on grounds of party politics ..... But the political 
principles in which he believes, like, for example, the belief that 
equality is an important political aim, may be more characteristic of 
some political parties than others". For a spirited defence of the 
judges, see Lord Hailsham's speech in a House of Lords debate: "They 
(those opposing judges) are under the curious illusion that the judges 
are not already in politics. Lord Diplock, as one of the authors of the 
Anisminic decision, practically abolished an Act of Parliament about the 
Foreign Compensation Commission. What about Gouriet?... What about the 
Laker dispute? How about the Tamqside education dispute? What about the 
decision invalidating Mr. Roy Jenkins' policy on wireless licences? How 
about the various decisions of this House and the Court of Appeal on the 
Race Relations Act? And what about their recent decisions on the trade 
union legislation?.... If they (the judges) assume jurisdiction they are 
in politics; if they decline jurisdiction they are in politics. All they 
can hope to be is impartial... N: 396 H. L. Deb. 1382 (Nov 29,1978), 
reproduced in HWR Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (The Hamlyn 
Lectures, Stevens, London, 19801 -pp. 76-77. NB: Lora Hailsham was 
mistaken in stating that Lord Diplock sat in th6-House on the Anissinic 
decision. Diplock L. J. (as he then was) gave the decision in the Court 
of Appeal'in the Anisminic case and was reversed by the House of Lords. 
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limits. It is for this Court to uphold the constitutional values and to 
enforce the constitutional limitations. That is the essence of the rule 
of law. "102 
The fact that an issue arises out of a political dispute, or would determine 
the outcome of a political contest is no bar to judicial resolution if it 
presents a legal, question for adjudication., The Malaysian Court had to decide, 
in one case whether the appointment of a person as Chief Minister, after the 
revocation of the appointment of another, raised a justiciable issue. The 
Court correctly ruled in favour of justiciability, and perceptively observed: 
"The mere fact that a litigant seeks the protection of a political right 
does not mean that it presents a political question. Whether a matter 
raises a political question; whether it has been committed by the 
Constitution to another branch of government is itself a matter for 
judicial determination because the Constitution has made the Courts the 
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. The Courts accordingly cannot 
reject a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 
"political" exceeds constitutional authority.... (The) primary issues of 
the appointment and revocation.... are legal and justiciable question 
clearly withii3 the competence of judicial consideration and 
determination". 103 
In the specific area of justiciability of a proclamation of emergency, 
as to whether the doctrine operates to preclude review as suggested by Lord 
102. State * of Rajasthan v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 1361, r 1412-13. For a 
criticism of the decision for assuming without discussion that the 
doctrine applies in India, see H. M. Seervai, constitutional Law of India 
3rd Ed. Vol. II (Tripathi, Bombay, 1984) pp. 2205 et. seq. Seervails-t-Fe'sis 
is that in the absence of a complete separation of powers in India where 
the Executive dominates the Legislature, unlike in the United States, 
there is no room for application of the doctrine. In the earlier case of 
I. C. Colak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643, Subba Rao Ci 
rejected the notion that the amending power of Parliament involved 
political questions: "The wide proposition that the power to amend is a 
sovereign power, that the said power is supreme to the legislative 
power, that it does not permit any implied limitations and that 
amendments made in exercise of that power involved political questions 
and that, therefore, they are outside judicial review cannot be 
accepted". (paras. 36-39). 
103. Tun Adnan Robert v. Tun Mustapha (1987] 1 HIJ 471,485; also reported as 
Mustapha v. Mohammad in [1987] LRC (Const) 16,45. 
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Pearson104 and Krishna Iyer J. 105, it would seem that the march of authorities 
has since subsumed this viewpoint. In India, there is the dicta of Bhagwati J. 
in the later case of Minerva Hills Ltd. v. Union of' IndiaIO6 where he 
observed: 
"There is no bar to judicial review of the validity of a proclamation of 
Emergency issued by the President under Article 352 Clause (1). Merely 
because a question has a political complexion, that by itself is no 
ground why the Court should shrink from performing its duty under the 
constitution, if it raises an issue of constitutional determination. It 
would not therefore, be right for the Court to decline to examine 
whether in a given case there is any constitutional violation involved 
in the President issuing a Proclamation of Emergency under Clause (1) of 
Article 35211.107 
More compelling is the decision of the Privy council in Teh Cheng Poh v. 
Public Prosecutor. 108 The case, inter alia, dealt with the justiciability of 
emergency regulations passed by the Malaysian Government, and the proclamation 
of the whole of Malaysia as a security area wherein the illegal possession of 
firearms was made a capital offence. In a benchmark decision, Lord Diplock cut 
through the cobwebs of uncertainty surrounding the position of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong acting under his emergency powers following the Ningkan 
cases, 109 and ruled that the actions of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong were 
104. NcEldowney v. Forde, see n. 73.. supra. 
105. Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal, see n. 75, supra. 
106. AIR 1980 SC 1789. 
107. At p. 1793. 
108.1980 AC 458; 1979 2 MLJ 50. 
109. This refers to the tortuous path taken by the Ningkan cases in court 
where -justiciability of the proclamation came up for determination in two separate proceedings; first, before Pike CJ in Borneo, (1967) 1 MLJ 
47, where it was ruled that the Proclamation was reviewable on ground of 
bona fide; and later, before the Federal Court sitting in its original 
jurisdiction, (1968) 1 MLJ 119, which ruled that the Proclamation was 
not justiciable. 
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amenable to judicial review as being in actuality the decisions of the 
Cabinet. On the failure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke a security area 
proclamation where the conditions necessitating it had siAce disappeared, Lord 
Diplock stated in strong terms that it would be an abuse of discretion not to 
revoke the proclamation, and that mandamus would lie to compell the Cabinet to 
tender the appropriate advice. The decision of the Privy Council was a strong 
vote in favour of justiciability. It was a declaration that judicial remedies 
would lie for abuse of emergency powers. It was of equal significance that no 
argument was advanced by the Government that the issues that came up for 
consideration were not justiciable as being political questions. 
The political question doctrine has rightly been cribbed and limited in 
its application. It has the potential of becoming a judicial alibi for the 
courts to decline to adjudicate on controversial cases involving government 
policy. 110 In third world countries, given the precarious position generally 
held by the rule of law, this could well amount to judicial abdication. The 
fears expressed by Professor Nwabueze of Nigeria bear full examination: 
110. Judicial concern that the Courts should not interfere with matters of 
policy may sometimes be taken to extraordinary lengths. This can be seen 
in the decision of the Malaysian Courts in two immigration cases 
involving detention and incarceration of persons without a Malaysian 
passport for overstaying. In Andrew slo Thamboosamy v. superintendent of 
Pudu Prison [1976] 2 MLJ 16, Suffian LP said: 
"Under the Immigration Ordinance, only the Executive has power to 
release the appellant. Whether or not the Executive should do so 
is a matter of policy for them. They have information and sources 
of information not available to the Court and are moved by 
political economic, social and cultural consideration which the 
Court is not vell equipped to apply, and judges should be slow to 
embarrass them into any course of action". 
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"When the (political question) doctrine is extended so as to shelter 
violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals, then 
the door is thrown wide open to the judiciary's abdication of its 
responsibility as the guardian of the constitution and of the rights of 
the individual against governmental interference. The easy escape from 
duty that it offers is too tempting and too dangerous to be conducive to 
constitutionalism. For constitutionalism requires that political no less 
than judicial action should be governed by rules. To admit an 
uncontrolled discretion in a Court to decline, on political question or 
other grounds, to decide justiciable cases is to overthrow the rule of 
law. Jurisdiction must be assessed or declined in accordance with rules 
of law, not discretion". 111 
The Ouster Clauses: Article 150(8) And Section 12 of the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Act, 1979 
Clause (8) was first introduced into the scheme of Article 150 in 1981 
together with the other radical changes discussed previously. The cause of 
these changes was the landmark decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng 
Poh's case delivered on December 11,1978. The decision shook the Malaysian 
Goverrment and threw into disarray the whole corpus of emergency laws made by 
contd... 
110. In the present writer's opinion this reasoning, with respect, would seem 
to be out of step with the current trends in administrative law. The 
reliance on "political economic, social and cultural" considerations in 
making a detention order must surely be exceptional: See the House of 
Lord's decisions in Khawaja v. secretary of State [1983] 1 AER 765 for 
the Court's duty to examine the records in immigration, repatriation and 
detention cases, and Wheeler v. Leicester City Council [1985] 2 AER 
1106, for vitiation of a decision which was based on grounds of 
political policy. The decision in Andrew's case has since been followed 
in Re Neenal [1988] 2 MLJ 299. In the later case the court said that in 
these matters recourse should be had to the appropriate authorities and 
not the Courts (per Hashim Yeop Sani J (as he then was)). For a 
discussion of these and other cases reflecting the judicial trends in 
Malaysia on administrative law cases, see the present writer's, 
Administrative Law And The Citizen (1983) CLJ 65,70-71. 
111. Nwabueze, op. cit. p. 39. 
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the Yang di-Pertuan Agong since 20 February, 1971 after Parliament had sat. 112 
The Malaysian Government's immediate reaction was to re-enact the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 into the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Act, 1979 and to validate all the emmergency laws made under the 
Ordinance after Parliament had sat. It was the obvious intention of the 
Government by the enactment of exclusionary clauses to forestall any form of 
judicial review of the proclamation of an emergency or its continuance or the 
validity of emergency laws, as was suggested strongly by Lord Diplock in Teh 
Cheng Poh's case. The exclusionary clauses are clause (8) of Article 150 and 
Section 12 of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979. They read as 
follows: - 
"Clause (8): 
Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution 
(a) the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong mentioned in Clause 
(1) and Clause (2B) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be 
challenged or called in question in any court on any ground; and 
(b) no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine any 
application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, on any 
ground, regarding the validity of - 
(i) a Proclamation under Clause (1) or of a declaration made in 
such Proclamation to the effect stated in Clause (1); 
(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation; 
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B); or 
(iv), the continuation in force of any such ordinance" 
Section 12: 
"No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine any 
application or question in whatever form, on any ground, regarding the 
validity or the continued operation of any proclamation issued by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong in exercise of any power vested in him under any 
ordinance promulgated, or Act of Parliament enacted, under Part XI of 
the Federal Constitution. " 
112. See discussion in Chapter V on the background and scope of the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act A514 of 1981. 
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The effect of Section 12 may first be considered. Whilst it might have been 
the intention of the draftsman that Section 12 should operate as a 
comprehensive exclusionary clause, the express words of the provision suggest 
otherwise. 113 The words "under any ordinance promulgated, or Act of Parliament 
enacted under Part XI of the Federal Constitution" are words of limitation. 
The Federal Court in Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor, 114 rightly 
observed: "(It) only precludes the courts from questioning the validity of 
proclamations issued under Acts or ordinances based on Part XI of the 
Constitution, not that- of proclamations of emergency - issued under the 
Constitution". 115 Thus Section 12 is at present confined only to proclamations 
of a security area under section 47 of the Internal Security Act, 1960 because 
that is the only'statute under Party XI of the Constitution that presently 
authorises the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to issue proclamations. Notwithstanding 
its limited field of operation, section 12 is a pointed attempt - to override 
the suggestion by Lord Diplock, in Teh Cheng Poh's case that mandamus may lie 
to compell the cabinet to tender advise to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke 
the proclamation of a security area if its continuance is no longer 
justifiable. 116 The words "on any ground" make the provision of wide 
113. Authors Sheridan & Groves make a scathing criticism of the drafting of 
the Act. They observe: "(The) whole of the draftsmanship of the Act is 
so ghastly that trying to interpret it is probably a waste of time": see 
Sheridan & Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia, 4th Edn (Malayan Law 
Journal, Singapore, -19-8-7FT-p-. 394. 
114. [1980] 1' MLJ 70. 'See also the earlier case of Lim Woon Chong v. Public 
Prosecutor [19791 2 MLJ 264 for the expression of a similar opinion (per 
Suffian LP at 266 F-G). 
115. At p. 74C-D. For a case dealing with the application of the Act as a 
whole, see Su Ah Ping v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 75. 
116. [1980] AC 458 at p. 473; [1979] 1 MLJ 50. 
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application within its field of operation, and any challenge to the validity 
of a proclamation would encounter an insurmountable hurdle unless the 
challenge is on the ground of ultra vires. 
The restrictions inherent in Section 12 are however absent in Clause 
(8). There can be little doubt that Clause (8) was intended to, and does, 
cover a wide sphere of emergency measures. In its sweep it covers the 
proclamation and duration of an emergency, and the enactment and continuance 
of an emergency ordinance. If the words are given their literal meaning, there 
will undoubtedly be a complete foreclosure of judicial review. 'In the view of 
one academic writer, Clause (8) raises serious implications as to the state of 
constitutionalism in Malaysia because the Cabinet will be given carte blanche 
authority to do as they please. 117 The learned author argues that clause (8) 
has consigned all questions concerning emergency powers to the absolute 
discretion of the Government, and may lead to an eclipse of constitutional 
government. 118 This undoubtedly is a legitimate observation if Clause (8) is 
treated as a complete outster clause. The question in law for our present 
purposes is whether Clause (8) achieves its intended objective of completely 
ousting judicial review? 
A salutory principle that the Courts have emphasised consistently is 
that statutory provisions seeking to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts 
will always be construed strictly and not as a matter of natural intendment. 
117. See H. P. Lee, Emergency Powers In Malaysia in Trinidade & Lee, The 
Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives And Developments, - (OUP, 
Singapore, 1986) at p. 150. The learned author suggests that Clause (8) 
as an amendment to Article 150 may be challenged by applying the "basic 
structure" principle evolved by the Indian Supreme Court (Kesavananda 
Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1373) that there is an implied 
limitation in the power of Parliament not to amend the Constitution by 
altering its basic features. 
118. Ibid. at p. 151. 
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It was stated by the Privy council in secretary of State v. mask & Co. 119 as 
follows: 
"It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil 
Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must 
either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well 
settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the.. Civil courts have 
jurisdiction to examine into cases where the'provisions of the Act have 
not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in 
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure". 120 
The modern statement on privative clauses may be taken as given in the 
landmark decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd v. The Foreign 
Compensation Commission. 121 In that case, - decisions of a tribunal called the 
Foreign Compensation commission were sought to be protected by a finality 
clause that read: 
"The determination by the Commission of any application made to them 
under this act shall not be called in question in any court of law". 
Lord Reid, who gave the first speech, spoke of a well established principle 
that a* provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court must be 
construed strictly, and that if such a provision is reasonably capable of 
having two meanings, that meaning must be taken that preserves the ordinary 
jurisdiction of the Court. 222 
119. AIR 1940 PC 105. 
120. Per Lord Thankerton at 110. 
121. [1969] 1 AER 208; 1969 2AC 152. The decision was described by Lord 
Diplock as a landmark in the development of administrative law in 
England: see O'Reilly v. Ifackman [1982] 3 AER 1124 at 1129. 
122. At p. 213B. See also the interesting decision of the Tanganyika Court of 
Appeal in Harealle v. The Chagga Council [1963] EA 131, decided before 
the Anisminic case, that spoke of giving a restrictive meaning to words 
limiting the jurisdiction of the courts (per Gould J. A. at 137). 
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However, the significance of the Anisminic case lies in the clear 
statement by the Law Lords that an ouster clause does not protect 
jurisdictional errors. The expression of this principle by Lord Reid and Lord 
Pearce deserve full examination. Both judges took a common approach in dealing 
with the question; first, that only a real determination was protected and not 
a determination that was in law a nullity. Next, they expatiated on when a 
determination, although ex facie a valid determination, could nevertheless be 
classified a nullity in law. Dealing with these steps, Lord Reid first said: 
11 (Determination) means a real determination and does not include an 
apparent or purported determination which in the eyes of the law has no 
existence because it is a nullity. or, putting it in another way, if one 
seeks to show that a determination is a nullity, one is not questioning 
the purported determination - one is maintaining that it does not exist 
as a determination. It is one thing to question a determination which 
does exist; it is quite another thing to say that there is nothing to be 
questioned ...... A person aggrieved by an order alleges that it is a f orgery or that the person who made the order did not hold that 
qualification or appointment. Does such a provision require the court to 
treat that order as a valid order? It is a well established principle 
that a provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be 
construed strictly - meaning, I think, that, if such a provision is 
reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken 
which preserves theýordinary jurisdiction of the court .................. 
:.: ...................................... : -.: ............ ii; iýiýr*y*-p*r*o*v*is1ons 
which seek to limit the ordinary Jurisdiction of 
the court have a long history. No case has been cited in which any other 
form of words limiting the jurisdiction of the court has been held to 
protect a nullity. If the draftsman or Parliament had intended to 
introduce a new kind of ouster clause so as to prevent any exquiry even 
whether the document relied on was a forgery, I would have expected to 
find something much more specific than the bald statement that a 
determination shall not be called in question in any court of law. 
Undoubtedly such a provision protects every determination which is not a 
nullity. But I do not think that it is necessary or even reasonable to 
construe the word "determination" as including everything which purports 
to be a determination but which is in fact no determination at all. And 
there are no degrees of nullity. 23 
In dealing with the same question, Lord Pearce said: 
123. At pp. 212 - 213. 
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"It has been argued that your Lordships should construe "determination" 
as meaning anything which is on its face a determination of the 
commission including even a purported determination which has no 
jurisdiction. it would seem that, on such an argument, the court must 
accept and could not even enquire whether a purported determination was 
a forged or inaccurate order which did not represent that which the 
commission had really decided. Moreover, it would mean that, however far 
the commission ranged outside their jurisdiction or that which they were 
required to do or however far they departed from natural justice, their 
determination could not be questioned. A more reasonable and logical 
construction is that by "determination", Parliament meant a real 
determination, not a purported determination. on the assumption, 
however, that either meaning is a possible construction and that, 
therefore, the word "determination" is ambiguous, the latter meaning 
would accord With a long established line of cases which adopted that 
construction". 124 
On when decisions would amount to a nullity, it is sufficient if we look only 
at the clear statement on this by Lord Reid: 125 
"It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts 
without jurisdiction that its decision is a nullity. But ý in such cases 
the word "jurisdiction" has been used in a very wide sense, and I have 
come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in 
the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on 
the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although the 
tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed 
to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature 
that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad 
faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may 
have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements 
of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the 
provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the 
question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted 
to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was 
required to take into account. or it may have based its decision on some 
matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to 
take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it 
decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of 
these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as 
it is to decide it rightly". 126 
124. At p. 237 F-I. 
125. Lord Pearce says much the same thing: see pp. 234-235. 
126. At pp. 213 - 214. 
317 
The approach taken in the Anisminic case of a strict construction of 
ouster clauses, and the description of the errors that make a decision a 
nullity, has been fully adopted in Malaysia. It has largely been considered in 
the context of the privative or "no-certiorari" clause of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1967 that seeks to protect decisions of the Industrial court 
from judicial review. In a Malaysian appeal to the Privy Council on the 
provision, 'the Board recorded that the Anisminic decision ensured that the 
finality clause did not preclude review for jurisdictional errors. 127 A catena 
of cases since that decision, many of them decisions of the supreme Court, 
have kept abreast with the developments in English administrative law and 
recognised that an ouster clause will not prevail against Anisminic 
errors. 128 Moreover, it has even been said that the time has come to recognise 
the view propounded by Lord Denning in Pearlman v. Governors of Harrow 
Schoo1129 of obliterating the distinction between errors within jurisdiction 
and those without jurisdiction. 130 
The decision in point, for our purposes, is Re Tan Boon Liat 8 Allen et 
al131 decided under 'the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention' of crime) 
Ordinance, 1969. The case concerned certain detention orders made by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong acting under powers given by the Ordinance. The detainees 
12 7. See South East Asia Firebricks Ltd v. Non-Nettalic Union [1980] 2 AER 
689; [1980] 1 HLJ. 
128. See Hotel Equatorial v. Hotel Union [1984] 1 MLJ 363; Inchcape Malaysia 
Holdings v. RB Gray [1985] 2 MLJ 297; Sabah Banking Employees Union v. 
Sabah Commercial Banks Association [1989] 2 MLJ 284. 
129. [1979] QB 56. 
130. Per Mohd. Azmi SCJ in Enesty Sdn. Bhd. v. Transport Workers Union [1989] 
2 MLJ 284. For a contrary view, see the High Court decision of Viking 
Askim Sdn. Bhd. v. Union [1991] 1 CLJ 552. 
131. [1977] 2 MIJ 108. 
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challenged the detention orders in habeas corpus proceedings as being ultra 
vires the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's powers. It was'contended that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong had acted without reference to a body called the Advisory Board 
which is to consider all representations made to it by the detainees and 
recommend- on their continued detention within three months of receipt of the 
representations. ý Section 6 (2) of the ordinance carried a finality clause to 
the effect that "every decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong thereon shall be 
final and shall not be called, into question in any court". Suf f ian LP applied 
the Anisminic principle and ruled that the ouster clause did not apply: "(The) 
section applies only to real-decisions, not- to ultra vires decisions, of His 
132 Majesty and here clearly His Majesty's decision was ultra vires". 
An ultra vires exercise of power or a mala fide exercise of it prevails 
against the effect of an ouster clause. An event like the declaration of an 
emergency in Lesotho by the King, in February 1988 under a provision that 
empowered only the Prime minister in consultation with the legislative 
assembly to declare an emergency would be invalid, 133 and cannot be protected 
by a finality clause. In the words of Mason J. of the Australian High Court: 
"The approach of the courts to the construction and application of 
privative clauses is instructive. The privative clause is the 
conventional expression of the legislative intention that a decision 
shall not be challenged in the courts. Yet, notwithstanding the wide and 
strong language in which these clauses have been expressed, the courts 
have traditionally refused to recognise ýý2t they protect manifest 
jurisdictional errors or ultra vires acts". 
132. At p. 109 H-I. 
133. See the facts given - in Law Society of Lesotho v. Ninister of Defence 
[1988] LRC (Const) 226. 
134. Church of Scientology v. Woodward (1980-82] 154 CLR 25 at 55-56. 
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A decision which is ultra vires or made without jurisdiction would not 
be "a real- determination" in Anisminic terms and cannot be protected by an 
ouster clause. Re Tan Boon Liat, ante, shows that the rule is the - same no 
matter how high the personage whose action is challenged. A similar statement 
comes from the unlikely jurisdiction of Fiji in a case decided in the 
aftermath of the'1987 military coup that destroyed the democratic polity of 
the country. '135 The deposed Prime Minister, Dr Bavadra, filed a legal suit 
challenging the validity of the decision of the Governor-General made on the 
day of the coup to declare an emergency and dissolve Parliament. The action 
was sought to be struck out on the ground that the actions of the Governor- 
General, as the representative of the Queen, were not justiciable. In 
dismissing the application, Rooney J. of the Fiji Supreme Court held that- a 
cause of action was disclosed because "anything done in the Queen's name which 
is contrary to law is a nullity" and it is a principle that applied to , any 
"purported exercise of the prerogative by Her Majesty's Governor-General which 
is subsequently found by the courts to be unlawful and unconstitutional". 136 
The Anisminic approach, however, is not universally, accepted by third 
world courts. It will be realistic to distinguish between the treatment given 
in cases involving a highly controversial issue of significance and one which 
is merely a journeyman's case. The reality behind judicial attitudes, 
especially of judges in developing countries, where the relationship between 
the executive and the judiciary does not rest on a firm foundation, is to 
135. For a narrative account of the coup on 14 May 1987, see Kenneth Bain, 
Treason At Ten: Fiji At the Crossroads (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 
1988). For-a Te-agal analysis of the constitutional issues presented by 
the coup, see Yash Ghai, A Coup By Another Name? The Politics of 
Legality, The Contemporary Pacific, SepteiEe--r1990, p. 12 etseq. 
136. Bavadra v. Attorney Ceneral (19881 LRC (Const) 13 at 23. 
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avoid making decisions that will embarass the Executive. The release of a 
detainee whose continued incarceration is not pivotal to the Government's 
perception of 'security, like in Re Tan Boon Liat, ante; doesý nevertheless 
strike a note of optimism and should not have its value minimised. - But one 
cannot conclude from it that the Malaysian courts-will show equal robustness 
in overcoming, clause (8) involving the validity of a proclamation of 
emergency. As one academic writer, who studied the Ningkan litigation, 
observed: "(The) past record of the Malaysian judiciary may- have encouraged 
the Government to believe that the role of the judiciary is that of docility 
and submission to its willn. 137 -tl 
one philosophic, explanation given as to why courts should abstain from 
thwarting executive 'actions in areas involving law and ý politics is the 
likelihood of the decision, in matters of high constitutional or political 
importance, being reversed by remedial legislation or the decisions rendered 
ineffective by being nullified. 138 The first Ningkan decision in Sarawak 
reinstating the dismissed Chief Minister was effectively nullified by the 
Proclamation of an Emergency seven days later paving the way for his eventual 
removal. The emergency accomplished- what- could otherwise only be achieved by 
137. See letter dated 19, May 1990 from Yash Ghai (Sir YK Pao Professor of 
Public Law, University of Hong Kong) to the Editor, ROCKET, published in 
the ROCKET Vol. 23/5,1990 at p. 3. 
238. See K. J. Keith, 'The Courts And The'Conventions of the Constitution, 
(1967) 16 ICLQ 542 who has propounded the view that the Ningkan case and 
the Nigerian case of Adebenro v. Akintola, ante, are not suitable for 
judicial resolution because of their high political import. He wrote: 
"The writer does not conclude that the Nigerian and Sarawak courts 
should have refused to consider these cases. But the ....... 
immediate 
political action (which must have been a possibility at the time of 
litigation) to nullify the decisions surely establish that the question 
of justiciability should have been carefully and anxiously considered, 
and that it should not have been assumed that the issues were fit for 
judicial determination simply because the relevant rules were to be 
found in the Constitution" (p. 549). 
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way of an appeal to the Federal Court with the attendant possibility of 
failure. The Swaziland case of Ngwanya v. Deputy Prime Ninister139 is a case- 
study of executive action to nullify an unfavourable court decision. The 
petitioner Ngwanya was elected to the Swaziland Parliament much to the 
displeasure of . the ruling party. Soon thereafter he was the subject of a 
deportation order signed by the Deputy Prime Minister on the ground that he 
was not under the Constitution "a person who belongs to Swaziland". Ngwanyals 
challenge in the High court failed, 'and whilst an appeal was pending to the 
Court of Appeal, the Government amended the Immigration Act to make, it 
compulsory for such complaints to be dealt with by a special tribunal whose 
decision was appealable to the Prime Minister. The decision of the Prime 
Minister was to be final and not subject to review by a court of law. The 
Court of Appeal held that the amendment to the Immigration Act was ultra vires 
the Constitution as confiding a judicial power on the Executive and held 
Ngwanya's deportation unlawful. Soon after the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
the King staged a coup by abrogating the separate existence of the Parliament 
and the Judiciary and vesting all power in himself. Thus the coup achieved 
what the court had said could not be done. similarly, in Lesotho, the 1988 
emergency proclaimed by the King in the absence of the Prime Minister, who was 
earlier deposed in a coup, and which was declared by the High Court to be 
invalid for want of power, was nullified by an Order issued by the Military 
Council. The Council by'the order repealed the statute that only empowered 
the Prime Minister to declare an emergency ! and, substituted it with an 
139. Swaziland Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1973. See account of the case in T. 
Akinola Aguda, The Judiciary In A Developing Country. (Ed. Marasinghe & 
Conklin, Essays on Third World Perspectives In Jurisprudence, MLJ 
Publication, Singapore, 1984) pp. 150-151. 
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Ordinance that authorised the King to exercise the power. The order proceeded 
to declare that a state of, emergency existed from the time of the first 
proclamation which was invalidated by the court. 140 
It is not surprising, therefore, ' if in some African jurisdictions, the 
courts bow to the clear pronouncement of the statutory exclusionary clause and 
abstain judicially from interfering. The reasoning in Anisminic that a 
finality clause only protects "real determinations" has found no adherence in 
these courts. The approach is one of pure statutory construction. A case in 
point is the Nigerian decision of Wang & ors v. Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters, Lagos. 141 It was a case concerning a decree issued by the 
Military Goverment of Nigeria that authorised preventive detention. The 
relevant decree contained also a finality clause that stated "No suit or other 
legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything done or intended 
to be done in pursuance of this decree". A further provision suspending the 
fundamental rights chapter of the Nigerian Constitution carried the rider: 
"(A)ny question whether any provision (of the, Constitution) has been or is 
being or would be contravened by anything done or proposed to be done in 
pursuance to this Decree shall not, be inquired into in any court of'law". In 
the face of these provisions, the Lagos Court of Appeal ruled that a habeas 
corpus petition did not-lie. The Court reasoned: "(W)hile the language of the 
Decree does not use express words ousting the jurisdiction of the court, it 
cannot be said that the words used .... are not a bar to bring legal 
proceedings against any person for anything done or intended to be done in 
140. See Editor's Note in report of The Law society of Lesotho v. Minister of 
Defence [1988] LRC (Const) 226. 
141. (1986] LRC (Const) 319 
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pursuance to the Decree". 142 The exceptional part of the judgment is Ademola 
Ci's abject acceptance that the Military Government has effectively silenced 
the law courts on matters of safeguards and liberties: "(on) the question of 
civil liberties, the law courts of Nigeria must as of now blow - muted 
trumpets". 143 
These African decisions, whilst illustrative of the tensions attendant 
to judicial decision-making in nascent democracies, must be regarded as 
standing on their own. They do not follow the growing trend in many 
Commonwealth countries of seeking greater accountability of the Executive. 
The attitude and approach of the Indian Supreme Court on this question is 
probably the most instructive. The Indian Court has , looked at finality 
clauses, even in the Constitution, as purely an administrative law question. 
Thus a finality clause could be overriden on purely Anisminic grounds even if 
it is designed to protect constitutional actions by the head of state like 
proclamations of emergency and the like. Article 356 of the Indian 
Constitution that authorises the President by proclamation to take over the 
administration of a state where there has been a break-down in government 
carried clause (5), 144 that read as follows: (The) satisfaction of 
the President ... shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in 
any court on any ground". In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 145 the 
142. At p. 330 a-b 
143. Ibid at (i). For a decision that explains the legal status of the 
military decrees as collectively forming the grundnorm or fundamental law Of Nigeria, see Nigerian Union of Journalists v. Attorney Ceneral of Nigeria [1986] LRC (Const) 1. 
144. Repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978. 
145. AIR 1977 SC 1361 
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Supreme Court considered the justiciability of the President's satisfaction 
under the provision and held that the finality clause did not preclude review: 
"The satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent ý to the 
exercise of power under Article 356 clause (1) and if it can be shown 
that there is no satisfaction of the President at all, the exercise of 
the power, would be constitutionally invalid. of course by reason of 
clause (5) of Article 356, the satisfaction- of the President is final 
and conclusive and cannot be assailed on any ground but this immunity 
f rom attack cannot apply where the challenge is not that the 
satisfaction is improper or unjustified, but that there is no 
satisfaction at all. In such a case it is not the satisfaction arrived 
at by the President which is challenged but the existence of the 
satisfaction itself 11.146 
This reiterates what was -said in Anisminic that a real determination is 
protected but not a determination which, is a, nullity. The Indian Constitution 
in Article 352, dealing with emergencies, had also a finality clause. It was 
later repealed by the - 44th Amendment in 1978. Clause (5), with minor 
dif f erences, was in pari materia with the Malaysian Clause (8). It is likely 
that the latter, introduced in 1981, was modeled on the former. The Indian 
provision read as follows: 
"(5) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, - 
(a) the satisfaction of the President mentioned in clause (1) 
and clause (3) shall be f inal and conclusive and shall not 
be questioned in any court on any ground; 
(b) subject to the provisions of clause (2), neither the Supreme 
Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction to 
entertain any question, on any ground, regarding the 
validity of 
(i) a declaration made by Proclamation by the President to 
the effect stated in clause (1); or 
(ii) the continued operation of such proclamation" 
146. Per Bhagwati and A. C. Gupta J. J. at pp. 1414-1415 (para. 144). In A. k. 
Roy v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 710, the Supreme Court held that the 
repeal of clause (5) by the 44th Amendment in 1978 opened the door to 
judicial review of the grounds of the President's satisfaction itself. 
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The exclusion clause was considered by Bhagwati J. in Minerva Hills Ltd v. 
Union of India: 147 
"The satisfaction of the President is a condition precedent to the 
exercise of power under Article 352 clause (1) and-if it can be shown 
there was no satisfaction of the President at all, the exercise of the 
power would be constitutionally invalid. where therefore the 
satisfaction is absurd or perverse or mala fide or based on a wholly 
extraneous and irrelevant ground, it would be no satisfaction at all and 
it would be liable to be chal i enged before a court, notwithstanding 
clause (5)(a) of Article 352". 1 8 
The scope of challenge as stated in this case, although narrow, was 
nevertheless significant. 
In summary, one can glean from the cases that judicial review may still 
lie inspite of a finality clause where there has been a total want of 
authority to act e. g. the Lesotho case where the King declared the emergency 
instead of the Prime Minister who only was authorised by the relevant 
statute; 149 or for any ultra vires acts e. g. where the satisfaction on record 
was not that of the relevant person150 or was for an unauthorised reason; 151 
or where the satisfaction is mala fide, 152 absurd or perverse. 153 
147. AIR 1980 SC 1789 
148. At paras. 103-105 
149. See the Law Society of Lesotho case [1988] LRC (Const) 226 
150. See, by analogy, the Singapore case of ChIng Suan Tze v. Minister of 
Home Affairs (1989] 1 MLJ 69, where a detention order was struck down 
because the satisfaction required was that of the President and not that 
of the Permanent Secretary of the Home Affairs Ministry who seemed to 
have acted. 
151. e. g. The argument that failed in The State (Sierra Leone) v. Adel Osman 
(1988] LRC (Const) 212, that there was no provision in the relevant 
statute to declare an "economic emergency". 
152. e. g. The argument of fraudem legis raised in the Ningkan case [1970] AC 
379, that the Proclamation of emergency was done in bad faith with the 
ulterior motive of removing Ningkan from office. 
153. e. g. The emergency in Lesotho in 1988 was declared because of an 
increase in the incidences of house-breaking, armed robbery, motor- 
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The Anisminic principle and its restatement by the Australian and Indian 
courts is an example of judicial resistance to sanctioning uncontrolled 
government power and to maintain the constitutional checks and balances that 
is needed in any parliamentary democracy. If the courts decide to "blow muted 
trumpets" as suggested by the Nigerian court in Wang's case, ante, there will 
truly be "the eclipse of constitutionalism" as feared by one academic writer 
when considering the impact of the newly introduced Clause (8) of Article 150 
excluding judicial review of emergency actions. 154 
contd.... 
253. vehicle and stock-theft, all matters that could have been dealt with by 
adequate policing: see Law Society of Lesotho case [1988] LRC (Const) 
226. 
154. H. P. Lee, op. cit. p. 151 
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CHAPTER X 
THE DURATION AND CONTINUANCE OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY 
Introduction 
In Mahan Singh v. Government of Nalaysia, l Lee Hun Hoe C. J. (Borneo) 
observed with reference to the 1969 Emergency: "(An emergency) was temporary 
in nature; it ceased to exist once Parliament annulled the Proclamation". But 
in truth the 1969 emergency has been one long uninterrupted moment. Like the 
1964 Emergency, declared to meet the Indonesian Confrontation which was never 
revoked although the event itself passed into oblivion, the 1969 Emergency has 
to date not been revoked. The Kelantan emergency in 1977 was the only 
emergency that was officially revoked by repeal of the Emergency Powers 
(Kelantan) Act, 1977.2 Thus the Emergencies that were declared subsequent to 
the 1964 Emergency (in 1966,1969 and 1977) have all been overlapping 
emergencies. 
A permanent or perpetual state of emergency presents a profound 
challenge to constitutionalism in any country professing democratic values. In 
Malaysia, the return to parliamentary rule, after the 1969 Emergency was made 
on 20 February 1971 but the Emergency itself was never revoked. Thus the 
Government retained the capacity to make and enact emergency laws under 
Article 150(2)3 and under the principal emergency legislation called the 
1. (1975] 2 MLJ 155 at 165 B-C. 
2. P. U. (A) 46 Gazette 12.2.78. 
3. The provision was amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act A 514 of 
1981. 
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Emergency (Essential, Powers) ordinance No. 1 of 1969.4 
The Duration of Emergencies 
A perpetual state of emergency raises the question . whether the real 
purpose for continuing an emergency is to enable rule by decree. An African 
court went so far as to characterize such a state of affairs as "a fictitious 
emergency". In the Ugandan case of Namwandu v. Attorney General, 5 Saldanha J. 
observed: 
"A state of public emergency was declared on 23 May 1966. It is common 
knowledge that the Government extended the period of emergency from time 
to time, not because there was a real emergency, but for purposes of 
expediency, so as to enable them to keep in force emergency regulations. 
It is not in disputq that while there was a state of emergency, in this 
sense at the time when the incident occurred, there was no real 
emergency, but, on the contrary, stability throughout the country ....... 
--* there was a fictitious state of emergency in law but no real 
emergency in fact". 6 
The decision was an exceptional one. The trend in case law, in the 
Commonwealth, past and present, does not support the approach of the Ugandan 
court. The cases show that save in exceptional cases,, of clear proof to the 
contrary, the judiciary does not sit in judgment of the executive's statement 
of belief that there is a need to continue the emergency., '41 
The early cases that dealt with the question were war-cases purporting 
to define when hostilities end. The cases arose mostly out of the exercise of 
the war-power to enact emergency legislation although the war had abated. The 
4. Emergency laws made under this ordinance after Parliament had sat on 20 
February 1971 were struck down as invalid by the Privy Council in Teh 
Cheng Poh v., Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458; [1979] 2 MLJ 50. After 
this decision the ordinance was re-enacted as an Act of Parliament and 
called the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979. 
5. [1972] E. A. 108. 
At P. 111 G-I. 
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first set of cases were those that dealt with the effect of the armistice that 
was signed to end the First World War. The war had seen for the first time the 
creation of an elaborate legislative armoury in several countries conferring 
arbitrary power on the executive to prosecute the war. An example was the 
Defence of the Realm Act, 1914 in Britain. In The King v. Governor of Wormwood 
Scrubbs Prison'7 the question was whether the power of preventive detention 
under the defence regulations made under the 1914 Act could still be exercised 
after the hostilities had ceased. Lord Reading Ci said the question whether 
the emergency continued to exist or not was for the Executive alone to decide. 
He held: 
"As the Executive has not seen fit to revoke the proclamation it 
continues in force, unless the war is at an end. But the war is not at 
an end; we are still in a state of war. Though the war with Germany has 
come to an end the termination of the war has not yet been declared". 8 
In his supporting judgment, Avory J. held that procedurally and substantively 
the proclamation based upon a special military emergency could only be revoked 
by an order in Council. 9 
In the United States, a similar question arose at-about the same time. 
In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co, 10 the issue was whether 
Congress retained the power to enact a war-time legislation after the 
cessation of hostilities with Germany. The War-Time Prohibition Act, 1918 
making it unlawful to sell or transport alcohol was enacted after the 
armistice with Germany was signed. The contention of the challengers was that 
with demobilization the war emergency was removed and that when the emergency 
7. [1920] 2 KB 305. 
a. At p. 312. 
9. At p. 315. 
10.251 U. S. 106 [1919) 
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ceased the statute became void. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who wrote for the 
Supreme Court, said that, of the war power upon which the very life of the 
nation depends, a wide latitude of discretion must be accorded. He held: 
"(It) would require a clear case to justify a court in declaring that 
such an act, passed for such a purpose, had ceased to have force because 
the power of Congress no longer continued. In view of facts of public 
knowledge ..... that the treaty of peace 
had'not yet been concluded, that 
the railways are still under national control by virtue of the war 
powers, that other war activities have not been brought to a close, and 
that it cannot even be said that the manpower of the nation has been 
restored to a peace I ooting, we are unable to conclude that the act has 
ceased to be valid". 
Proof in clear and cogent terms that the war danger had elapsed was 
emphasised by the Privy council as a precondition before judicial intervention 
was permissible. In a Canadian appeal, Fort Frances Pulp & Power Company Ltd 
v. Manitoba Free Press Company Ltd, 12 the Privy Council had to consider the 
validity of legislation passed by the Dominion Parliament of Canada after the 
cessation of hostilities on a subject matter which during peace time was 
ordinarily reserved for the provincial legislature. Viscount Haldane said: 
" (Very) clear evidence that the crisis had wholly passed away would be 
required to justify the judiciary, even when the question raised was one 
of ultra vires which it had to decide, in overruling the decision of the 
Government that exceptional measures were still requisite". 'l 
The Board went on to observe that although actual war had ceased "the effect 
of war conditions might still be operative". 14 , 
At p. 111. See, however, the subsequent case of Chastleton Corpoz-ation 
v. Sinclair 264 U. S. 543 (1924], dealing with'the post-war operation of 
rental controls introduced during the war, where the Supreme Court held 
that "it was open to the court to inquire whether the exigency still 
existed upon which the continued operation of the law depended" (p. 548). 
12. [19311 AC 695. 
13. At p. 706. For a discussion of Canadian cases dealing with emergencies, 
including those in this area, see Herbert Marx, The Emergency Power And 
Civil Liberties In Canada (1970) 16 McGill L. J. 39. 
14. At p. 708. In the later Privy Council case of the Co-operative Committee 
on Tapanese Canadians v. Attorney General for Canada [19471 AC 87 at 101- 
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The Fort Frances criteria were not followed in Australia. In the case of 
The King v. Foster, 15 the Australian High Court observed that the ef f ects - of 
war "will continue for centuries" and therefore opted for stricter proof of 
the need for the continued operation of war-time legislation. 16 The court held 
that the continued existence of a formal state of war, af ter the enemy has 
surrendered, is not enough in itself to bring or retain within the 
Commonwealth legislative power over defence the same wideýfield of control as 
fell within it while the country was engaged in conflict with 'powerful 
enemies. The test propounded was: "unless the Court could see with, reasonable 
clearness how it is incidental to the defence power to prolong the operation 
of a war measure, it is the duty of the Court to pronounce the enactment 
beyond the legislative power". 17 This admirably reasonable proposition was 
followed in the later case of Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd v. ' KcTavish, 18 
where the Court spoke of the post-war period when -such legislation could 
validly operate as "any reasonable period of transition required for winding 
up the arrangements of war". 19 
contd... 
14. Lord Wright made a similar observation: "(V)ery clear evidence that an 
emergency has not arisen or that the emergency no longer exists, is 
required to justify the judiciary, even though the question is, one of 
ultra vires, in overruling the decision of the Parliament that 
exceptional measures were required or were still required". see also the 
decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference As To The Validity 
Of The Wartime Leasehold Re5ulations (1950] SCR 124 for the observation 
that the Court will not tind that there is no emergency "unless the 
contrary is very clear". 
15. [1949] 79 CIR 43. 
16. At p. 83. 
M At p. 84. 
18. [1951] 85 CIR 30. 
19. At p. 47. In the earlier case of Dawson v. The Commonwealth [1946] 73 
CIR 157, the High court of Australia ruled that the defence power 
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However, Australian decisions may be distinguished since there is under 
the Australian Constitution no requirement for the defence power to be invoked 
only pursuant to a declaration. In this regard, the Malaysian position is 
closer to the English and Indian -experience. In the Governor of Wormwood 
Scrubbs Prison's case, Avory J. took the rigid position that a proclamation of 
emergency brought about by official pronouncement could only be ended by an 
order in Council and there was no room for a judicial assessment, independent 
of that, that emergency conditions had ceased. 20 In the case of Willcock v. 
Nuckle, 21 after the Second World War, a special bench of seven judges of the 
Court of Appeal in England, considered whether the National Registration Act, 
1939, which was passed at the outbreak of the war, continued in force after 
the emergency created by the war had long lapsed. It was acknowledged that 
there was no order in Council as contemplated by the statute to declare that 
the emergency was at an end. The judges were unanimously of the view that the 
Act continued in force because of this technicality. But grave disquiet was 
expressed by the judges that legislation intended to meet an emergency was 
continued inspite of the emergency having ceased. Lord Goddard C. J. observed: 
contd... 
19. includes not only a power to prepare for and to prosecute the war, but 
also a power to wind-up after a war and to restore a condition of peace 
as gradually as the particular circumstances may require. See also 
Austz-alian Textiles Proprietary Ltd v. Commonwealth (1946] 71 CLR 161. 
20. Supra, note 7. 
21. [1951] 2 AER 367. See the Indian case of Pannalal v. State of H. Yderabad 
AIR 1954 Hyderabad 129 which held that emergency legislation cannot be 
allowed to outlast the emergency that brought it forth. See also the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Chastleton Corp. v. 
Sinclair 264 U. S. 543 [1924], where it was held that it was competent 
for the, court to inquire whether the exigency that justified a 
particular law continued to exist. 
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"To use Acts of Parliament, passed for particular purposes during war, 
in times when the war is past, except that technically a state of war 
exists, tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers, which is a 
most undesirable state of affairs". 22 
A similar opinion was expressed by Devlin J: 
"I think it would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the 
impression that the continuance of the state of emergency had become a 
sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging 
legislation initiated in different circumstances and for different 
purposes". 23 
The decision in Willcock's case inspired an influential article by a 
former Chief Justice of Malaya doubting the validity of the continued state of 
the 1969 emergency in Malaysia. 24 The article was written shortly after the 
majority decision of the Federal Court in Khong Teng Khen, s25 case was 
delivered. That case for the first time dealt with the law-making power of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong under the 1969 Emergency after Parliament had re- 
convened on 21 February 1971. The case arose out of a dispute over the mode of 
the trial of certain accused persons charged with illegal possession of 
firearms under the Internal Security Act. After the accused persons had been 
committed for trial, the Attorney-General certified under the Emergency 
(Security Cases) Regulations, 1975 that the offences were security offences 
and therefore to be tried under the special rules of evidence provided for 
under the Regulations. The latter was made under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) ordinance No. 1 of 1969 which itself was dependent for its life upon 
the continued state of emergency in the country. The defence objected to the 
22. At. p. 369E. 
23. At p. 370 G. 
24. Tan Sri Ong Hock Thye, Is The 1969 state of Emergency Still An Existing 
Fact? (1976) Vol ix INSAF, 3. 
25. [1976] 2 MIJ 165. 
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certification and caused the trial judge, Wan Hamzah J. (as he then was), to 
state certain questions of law for the opinion of the Federal Court regarding 
the constitutionality of the Regulations. The principal question was whether 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could exercise his law-making powers once Parliament 
had sat, and whether the Regulations made in 1975 were invalid. The learned 
judge was himself of the view that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was not 
authorised to legislate once Parliament had sat. 26 The Federal Court, by a 
majority (Suffian LP; Wan Suleiman FJ), held that Article 150(2), limiting the 
law-making power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, did not apply to the 
Regulations because they were made under the ordinance and not under the 
Constitution. The decision was subsequently overruled by the Privy Council in 
Teh Cheng Poh's case27 which stated that there was a-logical fallacy in the 
Federal Court's reasoning. The Privy Council held that the ordinance, which 
was itself dependent upon the emergency under Article 150 for its continued 
life, could not give a right to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to make laws 
independent of Article 150: "that would be tantamount to the Cabinet lif ting 
itself up by its own boot-straps" (per Lord Diplock). 28 
The former Chief Justice also denounced the views expressed by 'the 
majority judges in Khong Teng Khen's case as regards the continued state of 
the emergency in the country. For example, Wan Suleiman FJ had observed: "The 
ultimate right to decide if an Emergency exists or had ceased to exist 
therefore remains with Parliament, and it is not the function of any court to 
26. At p. 172 E-G (reproduced in the dissenting judgment of H. S. Ong FJ in 
the Federal Court). 
27. See note 23, supra. 
28. [1980] AC 458 at 468-69; (19791 2 MLJ 50. 
335 
decide on that issue". 29 In response, H. T. Ong wrote: "A state of emergency is 
a fact which, at any given date, either exists or does not exist" and observed 
that the restoration of diplomatic and friendly relationd between Indonesia 
and Malaysia ended the Confrontation just as effectively as if there were a 
Proclamation of its termination. 30 The learned writer also concluded that the 
emergency proclaimed on May 15,1969 had died a natural death, and in 
consequence, that the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 was 
no longer operational. 
The impact of the article in legal circles was significant. It provided 
the impetus, and the arguments, for the first challenge ever to the legality 
of the continued state of emergency in the country under the emergency 
proclaimed on 15 May 1969. The challenge was made in Johnson Tan v. Public 
Prosecutor. 31 In that case, the contention was that the Essential (security 
Cases) Regulations, 1975 were invalid because the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 had lapsed by force of changed circumstances. It was 
contended that the 1969 emergency, although valid at the time it was 
proclaimed, had by 1975 ceased to be valid because of the change in 
circumstances viz. that another general election had been held and the country 
had returned to normalcy. The arguments succeeded at first instance. . 
In a 
judgment that adopted the reasoning contained in the former Chief 
article, Harun T (as he then was) held: 
29. OP. cit. at p. 177 F-G. 
30. OP. cit. at p. 5. 
31. [1977] 2 MLJ 66. See also the later case of Chong soon Koy v. Public 
RrOsecutor [1977) 2 MLJ 78, where a similar argument was raised, and 
rejected by the Federal Court. 
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"It will be ridiculous in the extreme to prosecute any person to-day for 
an offence under the Internal Security Act with reference to the 1964 
Proclamation (to deal with Indonesian confrontation). In Willcock v. 
Muckle, Lord Goddard C. J., at p. 851 said: "This Act (the National 
Registration Act, 1939) was passed for security putpose; it was never 
passed for the purposes for which it was apparently being made. To use 
Acts of Parliament passed for particular purposes in wartime when the 
war is a thing of the past - except for the technicality that a state of 
war exists - tends to turn law-abiding subjects into lawbreakers, which is a most undesirable state of affairs". 
In the same case, Devlin J, at p. 853 said: - 
"I think that it would be unfortunate if the public were to receive the 
impression that the continuance of the state of-emergency had become a 
sort of statutory fiction which was used as a means of prolonging 
legislation initiated under different circumstances and for different 
purposes". 
If I am correct in holding that the 1964 Proclamation has lapsed, the 
question arises whether the same can be said for the 1969 Proclamation. 
on the facts it is clear that the tragic events of May 13,1969 and the 
weeks that followed are a thing of the past. The occasion for which the 
Proclamation P. U. (A) 148 (declaring all areas in the Federation as 
security areas for the purposes of ISA) was made was for particular 
purposes which no longer exist, at least not on February 9,1976, when 
this alleged offence was committed. It is now more than seven years 
after these unhappy events and I must hold that the 1969 Proclamation 
has also lapsed. In the Petition of the Earl of Antrim and Eleven Other 
Irish Peers, Lord Reid at page 1149 said: "A statutory provision becomes 
obsolete if the state of things on which its existence dH ended has 
ceased to exist so that its object is no longer attainable". 
on appeal, the judgment was reversed. Suffian LP held that the 1969 
proclamation had not lapsed and was still in force. He relied on Clause (3) of 
Article 150 which read: "A proclamation of emergency and any ordinance 
promulgated under Clause (2) ... if not sooner revoked, shall cease to have 
effect if resolutions are passed by both Houses of Parliament annulling such 
proclamation or ordinance". Suffian LP interpreted the clause as follows: 
"In my view these words mean ...... that a proclamation of emergency 
ceases. to have effect only 
32. Harun J's judgment has never been reported. The only published record-of 
it are the extracts reproduced in Suffian LP's judgment (in the appeal 
court) at pp. 67-68, ibid. 
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(a) if revoked or 
(b) Parliament by resolution annuls itlo. 33 
He held further that the law of Malaysia is the same as that in England and 
India, that whether a Proclamation of Emergency should or should not be 
terminated is not for the courts but for the executive to decide. In his 
supporting judgment, Raja Azlan Shah F. J. (as he then was) summed up the 
arguments-of the challengers as follows: 
"The forefront of the argument raised before us on behalf of all the 
accused is that the 1975 regulations are void because ordinance No. 1 of 
1969 under which the regulations were made, and a fortiori the 
Proclamation of Emergency of 1969, the basis of the said ordinance, have 
lapsed by effluxion of time. It is said that seven years have gone by 
since the 1969 Proclamation, that circumstances have since changed for 
the better and that we are now living in happier times, and therefore 
the ordinance and consequently the Proclamation have outlived their 
purpose and must be considered repealed by effluxion of time. That is 
tantamount to saying that the Ordina ce and the Proclamation can lose 3 their force without express repeal". 
ý 
He also concluded that the Proclamation ceases only by revocation or express 
annulment by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. In this regard it may be 
noted that, the Government has never accepted the proposition that conditions 
had changed justifying the withdrawal of the Emergency. In moving the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Bill, 1979 in Parliament on January 17,1979, the 
Law Minister gave statistics of the number of security-based incidents in the 
country during the 1970's, and said: 
"Some people may claim that everything appears to be peaceful and normal 
- that there does not appear to be a state of emergency; that there is 
no more need for the existence of the Proclamation of Emergency or the 
Proclamation of the Security Area. That this appears to be so is not 
owing to the non-existence of the state of emergency but to the efforts 
of the government and the security forces in keeping the state of 
33. At p. 68. 
34. At p. 7 3. 
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emergency under control. Let it be known that there are still hidden 
dangers lurking around and within our midst simmering under the 
surface". 35 
35. Speech by the Honourable Minister of Law, Datuk Seri Hamzah Abu Samah in 
the Dewan Rakyat, Malaysia, on January 17,1979, reported in (1979) 1 MLJ 
lxx. According to the Law Minister (at p. lxxiii): 
"In the period from the 15th May, 1969 to the 4th November, 1975 [i. e. 
from the promulgation of the Emergency (Essential Powers) ordinance, 
1969 to the day immediately before the coming into force of the 
Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations, 1975] to be referred 
to as the first period and from the 5th November, 1975 to the 31st 
December, 1978 (the second period), casualty and other figures are as 
follows, bearing in mind that the first period is over a span of more 
than six years whereas the second period covers slightly more than three 
years: 
Security forces casualties 
First period 
Second period 
civilian casualties 
First period 
Second period 
. 2o8 killed, 556 wounded 187 killed, 363 wounded 
'120 killed, ', 24, wounded 
48 killed, 54 wounded 
Communist terroristlunderground casualties 
First period 466 killed, 5645 arrested or captured, 885 
surrendered (including 628 returnees 
during operation Sri Aman in Sarawak). 
Second period 99 killed, 2848 arrested or captured, 45 
surrendered. 
Incidents 
First period 379 contacts, 771 ambushes, shootings, 
booby-traps and flag hoistings. 
second period 114 contacts, 404 ambushes, shootings, 
booby-traps and flag hoistings. 
Communist terrorists sightings and discovery of communist 'terrorists 
camps, resting places and food dumps 
First period 4725 sightings, 366 camps, 625 resting 
places, 328 food dumps. 
Second period 2519 sightings, 195 camps, 333 resting 
places, 232 food dumps. 
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. 
It was obvious that the Federal court in Johnson Tan Is case had rejected 
the proposition advanced in the former Chief Justice's article that an 
emergency could lapse by ef f luxion of time or changed - circumstances - The 
article was nevertheless cited in the arguments before the Privy Council in 
Teh Cheng Poh's case advancing the same proposition. 36 In this case a twin- 
headed argument was put forward, to declare the Emergency (Security Case) 
Regulations, 1975 invalid. The first was that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could 
not in 1975 exercise his powers of law-making under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) ordinance No. 1 of 1969 because the conditions of the emergency had 
lapsed; the second, on which the case was ultimately won, was that the Agong 
had lost the power of law-making once Parliament had sat. The first argument 
contd... 
35. Weapons, ammunition and explosives seized by security forces 
First period - 1097, weapons, 35750 rounds of ammunition, 
578 explosives. 
Second period - 343 weapons, 23053 rounds of ammunition,, 
2214 explosives. 
Weapons, ammunition, explosives and e4uipment lost by security forces 
First period - 153 weapons, 2417 rounds of ammunition, 17 
explosives, 2 wireless equipment. 
Second period - 53 weapons, 1445 rounds of ammunition, 5 
explosives, 2 wireless equipment. 
From the 15th May, 1969 to the 31st December, 1969 a total of- 532 
operations have been carried out by our security forces against the 
communist terrorists and subversive anti-national elements. The 
terrorists and these elements pose a very grave and continuous threat to 
the security and economic life of our country and there can be no 
abatement of the existing state of emergency. To relax it or remove it 
would be tantamount to an abdication of our duty as . the elected 
representatives of the people to safeguard the security of the nation 
and uphold the trust placed in us by the people to do what is right. " 
36. see arguments of Counsel reproduced in [1980] AC at 461. 
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had a profound effect on the status of the emergency in Malaysia. The Privy 
Council was'obviously conscious of this fact, - and of the other fact that by 
the time the appeal came before them the right of appeal* from Malaysia on 
matters of the Constitution had already ceased. 37 Thus the Privy Council 
judges here, like their predecessors in Ningkan's' case, deftly side-stepped 
the question and declined to answer it. Lord Diplock said: 
"Since'' they (their Lordships), have held the Essential (Security Cases) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1975 to be invalid upon the ground that they 
were made after the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's power to make, them had 
expired, it is unnecessary to decide whether or not they were invalid on 
the alternative and more far-reaching ground advanced by the defendant; 
namely, that by the time the regulations were made the emergency 
proclaimed an may 15,1969, was over and the emergency proclamation of 
that date had ceased to be in force. As their Lordship's jurisdiction to 
advise His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the effect of any 
provision of the Constitution had been withdrawn from January 1,1978, 
except in appeals that were already pending on that date, they do not 
think it appropriate to express opinions on questions of law falling 
within this category unless they are ssential for the decision of an 
appeal that was pending on that date". 8 
The refusal of the Privy Council to answer the question affirmatively could be 
construed as a reluctance to endorse the ratio decidendi of the Federal 
Court's decision in Johnson Tan's case. However, the difficulty in making this 
conclusion lies in that there is no record of Johnson Tan's case having been 
cited in the arguments before the Privy Council. 39 The ommission is puzzling 
because it was the Government's argument before the Board that it was not 
appropriate for the courts to look behind a proclamation of emergency to 
determine whether or not an emergency exists, and that such questions, if at 
37. Appeals on constitutional matters ceased as of 1 January 1978. 
38. Op. cit at p. 470 F-G; at p. 54 F-H. 
39. Op. cit. n. 37. 
341 
all, should be left to the local (ie. Malaysian) courts to decide. Johnson 
Tan Is case was the obvious authority in support of this proposition. 
The position has, however, not remained static. As part of the 
legislative measures taken to reinstate the armoury of emergency laws struck 
down by the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh Is case, the Government amended 
Article 150 in 1981 to, inter alia, include an exclusionary clause that also 
sought to preclude judicial review of the - continuance of a state of 
emergency. 40 Article 150 Clause (8)(b)(ii) and (iii) read as follows: 
"No court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain or determine any 
application, question or proceedings, in whatever form, on any ground, 
regarding the validity of 
M ................. 
(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation. 
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B)". 
The width of this exclusionary clause is obvious. Whilst the principle in the 
Anisminic case'41 restating the acknowledged rule of construction that 
provisions ousting judicial review would be construed strictly, is ' of 
relevance, its practical application in the context of this provision is 
limited. A material point of distinction is that, unlike in the case of a 
challenge to the issuance of a Proclamation of Emergency (which may call into 
question the propriety of the exercise of a power on Anisminic grounds42 or 
40. The amendments were effected by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, A514 
of 1981. A full discussion of the amendments is found in Chapter VI. 
41. Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 AER 208 HL; 
[1969] 2 AC 152. 
42. See Lord Reid at p. 213-214; Lord Pearce at p. 234-35. 
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for Wednesbury' unreasonableness), 43 these principles do not fit the mould 
where 'the challenge is a failure to exercise a power, namely to revoke the 
continued state of emergency. The relevant principles in this regard would be 
those governing the grant of an order of mandamus. Lord Dip lock himself in Teh 
Cheng Poh's case, in the context of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's failure to 
revoke a security area proclamation under the Internal Security Act, 1960 
where the situation called for it, observed that the proper remedy is for an 
order of mandamus against the Cabinet to tender the appropriate advice to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke the proclamation. 44 Any court faced with an 
application for a mandamus directed at the Cabinet to tender advice to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong ý to revoke the proclamation of emergency would find 
Clause (8) (b) (ii) -a dif f icult hurdle to clear in the absence structurally of 
the availability of Anisminic or Wednesbury grounds to aid the effort. 45 It is 
obvious that Clause (8)(b)(ii) was inserted in Article 150 ex abudanti cautela 
by the draftsman. The amendment was merely declaratory of the current attitude 
of the Malaysian Courts as seen in Johnson Tan's case not to review the 
decision of the executive to continue the Emergency. 
43. Per Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury 
Corporation [1947] 2 AER 647, that a patently unreasonable decision may 
be vitiated in law. 
44. Op. cit. at p. 473. 
45. There is additionally the restritive provisions of the specific Relief 
Act, 1950, governing the grant of mandamus, namely, Section 44(l) which 
reads: 
"44. (1) ýA Judge may make an order requiring any specific act to be 
done or forborne, by any person holding a public office, whether of a 
permanent or a temporary nature, or by any corporation or any court 
subordinate to the High Court: 
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India, with a noted activist judiciary, most of the times, has likewise 
taken a similar approach. one of its foremost judicial activists, Krishna Iyer 
himself took this view in Bhut Nath Kate v. state of West Bengal: 
"It was argued that there was no real emergency and yet the Proclamation 
remained unretracted with consequential peril to fundamental rights. In 
our view, this is a political, not justicýable issue and the appeal 4 should be to the polls not to the courts". 
In the earlier case of PL Lakhanpal v. Union of India, 47 the Indian Supreme 
Court was faced with the submission that to continue the emergency three years 
contd... 
45. Provided that - 
(a) an application for such an order be made by some person 
whose property, franchise, or personal right would be 
injured by the forebearing or doing, as the case may be, of 
-the said specific act; 
(b) such doing or forbearing is, under any law for the time 
being in force, clearly incumbentýon the person or court in 
his or its public character, or on the corporation in its 
corporate character; 
(c) in the opinion of the Judge the doing or forbearing is 
consonant to right and justice; 
(d) the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal 
remedy; and 
(e) the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a Judge - 
(a) to make any order binding on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong; 
(b) to make any order on any servant of any Government in 
Malaysia, as such, merely to enforce the satisfaction of a 
claim upon that Government; or 
(c) to make any order which is otherwise expressly excluded by 
any law for the time being in force. " 
46. AIR 1974 SC 806 at 811 (para. 16). See also the cases of Ghasi Ram v. 
State AIR 1966 Rajasthan 247, and K. K. N6di v. Union of India AIR 1976 
Calcutta 20. 
47. AIR 1967 SC 243. For a criticism of the continuation of the emergency 
brought about by the 1962 border war, and a discussion of the cases that 
have considered this question, see G. O. Koppell, The Emergency, The 
Courts And Indian Democracy (1966) Vol. 8 J. of Indian Law Institute, 
287. In the significant case of Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 
SC 381 at 403, the Supreme Court observed: "How long the Proclamation of 
Emergency should continue and what restrictions should be imposed on the 
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after the India/China border war in 1962, which was the occasion for its 
imposition, and after hostilities had ceased, was "a fraud on the 
Constitution". The court declined to determine the question and reasoned as 
follows: 
"We were told that the President in his * address to Parliament in 
February this year did not state that the Emergency continued to 
exist ..... However that may be, Article 352 itself by Clause (2) 
provides that a Proclamation issued under Clause (1) may be revoked by a 
subsequent Proclamation and shall cease to operate at the expiration of 
two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been 
approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. This clause also 
states that the Proclamation shall be laid before each House of 
Parliament. It has not been stated that the House of Parliament did not 
approve of the Proclamation within the period of two months. It would 
appear, therefore, that the only way a Proclamation ceases to have 
ef f ect is by one of the events mentioned in this clause. None of , them 
has happened. Nothing contained in an address by the President to the 
Houses of Parliament can operate to terminate the Proclamationto. 48 
The approach taken by the Indian Courts accord with that of the Federal ý Court 
in Johnson Tan's case. It is unlikely that there would be any change in the 
attitude of the Malaysian courts in the - future on - this question given the kind 
of case-support it receives from other comnonwealth jurisdictions for the 
position it has taken. 
contd... 
47. fundamental rights of the citizens during the pendency of the emergency, 
are matters which must inevitably be left to the executive because the 
executive knows the requirements of the situation and the effect of 
compulsive factors which operate during periods of grave crisis, such as 
our country is facing today. " - 
48. At p. 245 (para. 4) per Sarkar C. J. In Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India 
AIR 1980 SC 1789, Bhagwati zT. also observed: "Neither Article 352 nor 
any other Article of the Constitution contains any provision saying that 
a proclamation of Emergency validly issued under Clause (1) shall cease 
to operate as soon as the circumstances warranting its issuance have 
ceased to exist". 
345 
Overlapping Proclamations of Emergencies 
A further area relating to prolonged emergencies is that of successive 
proclamations or overlapping proclamations of emergency. The f irst nationwide 
emergency that was - declared in the country af ter independence was on 3rd 
September 1964 arising from Indonesia's 'Policy of Confrontation. The 
Proclamation of this Emergency was never expressly revoked although the 
circumstances that led to it had long lapsed. Thus when the Sarawak. Emergency 
was declared on 14 September 1966 it technically overlapped the 1964 Emergency 
within the territorial limits of Sarawak. The Proclamation relating to the 
Sarawak Emergency itself was silent on the fact that it was an overlapping 
proclamation. 49 But it was evident that the Government was uncertain'' as to 
whether the 1964 Emergency was sufficient for its purposes in Sarawak in 1966. 
Thus the Expla natory Statement that accompanied the Emergency (Federal 
Constitution - and Constitution of Sarawak) Amendment Bill, 1966 carried the 
following statements: - 
"Paragraph 2: There is already in force a proclamation of emergency 
issued on September 3,1964 in respect of the whole 
Federation, the occasion for which is a matter of 
public knowledge. 
"Paragraph 3: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong in exercise of his powers 
under Article 150 of the Constitution, has on 
September 14,1966 issued a further proclamation in 
respect of Sarawak only, in order to deal with the 
present crisis as a distinct emergsncy additional to 
the emergency already proclaimed". 
49. P. U. 339A Gazette Tambahan No. 45A, 14 September 1966. see also Appendix 
B. For example, the Proclamation for the Kelantan Emergency expressly- 
declared that it was in addition to the 1969 Emergency: see P. U. (A) 358 
8 November 1977 (see also Appendix B). 
50. Bill dated 19 September 1966, Government Gazette dated 19 September 
1966. 
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It is implicit in this Statement that the Government was of the opinion that 
the 1964 Emergency, and more particularly the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Act, 1964 may not have been adequate to deal with the Sarawak crisis. When the 
crisis went to the court in Ningkan's case, 51 the Privy Council held that 
Article 150, as it then stood, did not preclude successive. proclamations of 
emergency for different reasons. Lord Macdermot said that inspite of "the 
continuing existence of earlier emergency proclamations" the powers under 
Article 150 "were in being and not spent". 52 A different view was taken by the 
Privy Council in the later case of Teh Cheng Poh where Lord Diplock proceeded 
on the implied revocation theory. The question arose in the context of whether 
the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964 enacted after the 1964 Emergency, 
was still extant for purposes of legitimating the Security Cases Regulations 
1975 made under the 1969 Emergency. The Board had struck down the Regulations 
as invalid. The Privy Council reasoned as follows: 
"It has not been contended on behalf of the Attorney-General that the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964 was still in force in 1975 so as 
to constitute an alternative source from which the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
could derive authority to make Essential Regulations. Their Lordships 
agree that after the emergency proclamation on May 15,1969, no reliance 
can any longer be put upon the Act., From its long title and recitals it 
is manifest that powers conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under 
section 2 were intended to be exercisable only for the duration of the 
previous emergency proclaimed on September 3,1964. It does not appear 
that the proclamation of that'emergency was ever expressly revoked nor 
was it annulled by resolutions passed by both Houses of Parliament under 
Article 150(3) of the constitution. The power to revoke, however, like 
the power to issue a proclamation of emergency, rests in the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong, and the Constitution does not require it to be exercised 
by any formal instrument. In their Lordship's view, a proclamation of a 
new emergency declared to be threatening the security of the Federation 
as a whole must by necessary implication be intended to operate 53 as a revocation of a previous proclamation, if one is still in force". 
51. (1970] AC 379. 
52. At p. 399 F-H. 
53. (1980] AC at 469 F-H. There has been some controversy as to what the 
Privy Council, actually decided in this context i. e. whether it meant 
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This was the f irst time that the implied revocation theory was said to be 
applicable to emergencies under -Article 150. This development led to the 
insertion of ýan express provision on overlapping ptoclamations in the 
amendments made to Article 150 by the Constitution (Amendment) Act A514 of 
1981. A new Clause (2A) was added to Article 150, 'which reads: 
"The power conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by this Article shall 
include the power to issue different Proclamations on different grounds 
or in different circumstances, whether or notýthere is a Proclamation or 
Proclamations already issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause 
(1) and such Proclamation or Proclamations are in operation". 
It will be noted that the thrust of, the provision is to declare the right of 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to issue successive Proclamations of emergency* and 
not to save emergencies that are moribund or had lapsed by effluxion of time. 
Thus it is obvious that the 1981 amendments which were expressly enacted to 
overcome the unpalatable parts, from the Government's standpoint, of the Privy 
Council's judgment in Teh Cheng Poh's case was nevertheless prepared to accept 
that the 1964 Emergency, although not expressly revoked or annulled, was for 
all practical purposes extinct. There is also the implicit acceptance of the 
implied revocation theory in that Clause (2A) talks of the power to issue 
successive proclamations "on different grounds or in different 
circumstances". The words "different grounds" and "different circumstances" 
would be read disjunctively, so that, even if the ground for the successive 
emergency is the same as the earlier one it would be valid if the 
circumstances occasioning it are different. Thus even-if this provision had 
contd... 
53. that a Proclamation confined to one state can never be revoked by a 
Proclamation declared for all Malaysia or vice versa. The view point 
expressed by Mls Sheridan & Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia (4th 
Edn) (MIJ Publication, Singapore, 1987) at pp. 39-6-, that "the question is 
whether the later proclamation is inconsistent with the continued 
operation of the earlier one" is, it is submitted, the correct 
interpretation. 
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been extant before the 1969 Emergency was declared, it would not have made a 
difference to the power of the Government to declare a second emergencyý on 
security grounds just because there was already in ekstence ýan earlier 
emergency (ie. the 1964 Emergency) on security grounds; the basis for the 
emergencies may have been the same i. e. a 'security threat, but the 
circumstances occasioning them may be different: the 1964 Emergency was 
declared under the threat of external aggression whereas the 1969 Emergency 
was on the basis of internal disturbances and riots. In short, the new 
provision ensures that the Government's power to proclaim , successive 
emergencies is not hampered or hindered by an earlier emergency declared for a 
special purpose. 
The 1981 amendments also sought to overcome any form of challenge to 
emergency legislation on the ground that they were outliving the emergency 
itself. By Clause 8(2)(iii) it is provided that: "No court shall have 
jurisdiction to entertain or determine any application, question or 
proceedings, in whatever form, on any ground, regarding the validity of: - 
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B). 11 
Although the provision makes express reference to "an ordinance" it would be 
read as including emergency regulations as well. 54 An argument broadly along 
these lines was raised in the case of Jaffanese Cooperative SocietY Ltd V. 
Bank Negara Nalaysia. 55 The case concerned remedial action taken by Bank 
Negara Malaysia (Central Bank) under the Emergency (Protection of Depositors) 
Regulations, '1986 to 'place an ailing cooperative under receivership. The 
54. The courts have in the past refused to countenance any argument that 
sought to distinguish emergency "regulations" from emergency 
"ordinances": see Nahdevan Nair v. Government of Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 
286 at 292; Osman v. Public Prosecutor [1968] 2 MLJ 137. 
55. [1989] 3 MLJ 150 SC. 
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Regulations were made in 1986 by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Act, 1979 to stem the run on many cooperatives which were 
functioning as illegal deposit-takers and were unable to'meet their deposit 
liabilities. It was argued by the challengers that the regulations could not 
be invoked because the conditions existing at the time when the Regulations 
were made were no longer existent. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of 
the High Court that a distinction existed between the making of the 
Regulations and the exercise of powers under it. The reasoning was that so 
long as the parent legislation (i. e. the Emergency Act) remained in force, the 
regulations may be invoked and applied with the force of law. 
The argument that emergency legislation cannot outlast the emergency 
that brought it forth is a proposition that has succeeded in some 
jurisdictions. In Pannalal Lahoti v. State of Hyderabad, 56 the State High 
Court in India ruled that the Hyderabad Defence Regulations were operative 
only during the period of the emergency for which it was promulgated and 
deemed to have lapsed without any express repealment. Misra Ci said: 
"(It) may be pointed out that a temporary legislation must terminate 
either on a specified date or on the happening of a specified event. But 
if the date or the event is not specified, it cannot be allowed to 
outlast the emergency that brought it forth. The Hyderabad Regulation 
having been made to meet the situation created by declaration of war 
against Germany must be deemed to have come to an end when the emergency 
ceased to existw. 57 
The Australian cases like, Rv. Foster, 58 also support the proposition that war 
56. AIR 1954 Hyderabad 129. 
57. At p. 135 (para. 30). See contra the case of Rattan Lal V. State AIR 1969 
J&K 5, which took the opposite view that it is not f or the executive to 
determine if the limited period for which the emergency regulations were 
made had expired. 
58. [1949] 79 CIR 43. 
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measures cannot survive the war itself and will be given a life only for a 
reasonable war period after the war. 
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments found 'in these cases, a 
Malaysian court would find itself ham-strung by precedents and constitutional 
amendments that point the opposite direction. Johnson Tan's case is in point. 
Even in Teh Cheng Poh's case in relation to whether a security area 
proclamation could be revoked by the court where the circumstances for it have 
ceased, Lord Diplock said: 
"Apart from annulment by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament it 
(the security area proclamation) can be brought to an end only by 
revocation by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. If he fails to act the court 
has no power itself to revoke the proclamation in his stead. This, 
however, does not leave the court powerless to grant to the citizen a 
remedy in cases in which it can be established that a failure to 
exercise his power or revocation would be an abuse of his discretion. 
Article 32(l) of the constitution makes the Yang di-Pertuan Agong immune 
from any proceedings whatsoever in any court. So mandamus to require him 
to revoke the proclamation would not lie against him; but since he is 
required in all executive functions to act in accordance with the advice 
of the cabinet, mandamus could, in their Lordship's view be sought 
against the members of the cabinet requiring them to advice the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to revoke the proclamation"45 
A compelling argument may be advanced that the Diplock reasoning is applicable 
also to the question whether a court has jurisdiction to decide on the 
continuance of a proclamation of an emergency when the circumstances that 
necessitated it have ceased to exist. However, a court examining the question 
will find the exclusion clause barring judicial review, namely clause 
8(b)(ii), a rather insurmountable hurdle to clear. The intention of Parliament 
is clear. The determination of when an emergency should cease is to be left to 
the sole decision of Parliament, which in practical terms, is the executive 
Government of the day. 
59. Op. cit. p. 473F-H. 
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The prolonging of an emergency beyond the circumstances that brought it 
forth raises profound questions as to the state of constitutionalism in the 
country. The reasoning of Wan Suleiman FJ in Khong Teng Khen's case60 may be 
defensible in justifying the proclamation of an emergency, but if a 
Proclamation is not revoked when the crisis is over, necessity or salus populi 
ex suprema lex ceases to be a justification. The omission to revoke the 
Proclamation when it is called for would raise questions of abuse of a 
discretionary power. The Diplock solution6l of an application for mandamus 
directed at the Cabinet to advise revocation of the Proclamation may be a 
judicial remedy of use in theory only. No one would be prepared to wager the 
success of a forensic'effort of that magnitude. 
60. Op. cit. at p. 77 G-H. "Those having misgivings about the sweeping powers 
which become vested in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (and in effect, in the 
Executive) during an emergency can find solace in that the very 
institutions of Parliamentary democracy may be destroyed overnight if 
not for the emergency powers. " 
61. See Teh Cheng Poh's case, ante. 
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t4"AnMT4n VT 
EMERGENCY LAWS AND THE FEATURES OF EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT 
Introduction 
Except for the short period of three over years between 1960 and 1964, 
Malaysia has continuously been under emergency rule. The fact of an emergency 
government, however, is not manifest, and an observer may well be excused for 
thinking that the country is in & state of normalcy. ýThe latter is arguably 
the true state of affairs. There is no outward manifestation of troop movement 
or of the army being on alert or of roadblocks and curfews. The country 
continues to prosper under an impressive 8% economic growth rate. The 
confidence in the political stability of the country-by both the foreign and 
local investor belies the legal state of affairs. It is the Government's 
position that the prevailing calm and peace is the product of emergency rule. 
In moving the adoption of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Bill, 1979 in 
Parliament on 17 January, 1979, the Law Minister said: 
"Let it be known that there are still hidden dangers lurking around and 
within our midst, simmering under the surface ..... The Proclamation of Emergency in 1969 has had to continue and will have to continue because 
it cannot be gainsaid that there has existed and still does exist a 
grave emergency whereby the security and economic life of the country 
has been and continues to be threatened". 1 
The impact of emergency rule is probably felt only in the law and order arena, 
visibly in the use of emergency legislation like the Emergency (Security 
Cases) Regulations, 1975 in firearms cases. There is also the political 
1. See speech reproduced in (1979) 1 MLJ lxx at lxxiii. 
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offence of sedition governed by the Sedition Act, 1960 as amended by the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) ordinance No. 45/1970 which came into force on 
August 10,1970.2 The amendment widened the offence of sedition to include 
questioning the special privileges accorded to the Bumiputras under Article 
152 of the Federal Constitution. 3 By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1971 
which came into force on March 10,1971 the offence of sedition was also 
extended to apply to speeches in Parliament. 4 The eniargement of the sedition 
law was the direct result of the 1969 riots. It was designed to curb the 
resort to inflammatory and racially inciting speeches for political gains. In 
the opinion of the Government the amendments paved the way for the return to 
parliamentary rule- on February 21,1971. In Mark Koding's case, Suffian LP 
spoke of it as "the resumption of parliamentary democracy". -5 But a 
2. Sedition is the articulation of a view proscribed by the state 
authorities. The trial of the offence squares with Becker's definition 
of a political trial: "the perception of a direct threat to established 
political power is a major difference between political trials and other 
trials" (Theodore Becker, Political Trials, The Bobbs-Merril Co. Inc., 
Indianapolis, 1971, at p. xi). The pr'oscription of the expression of 
certain views may be justified for law and order purposes but it becomes 
part of the apparatus upon which the existing power strýcture in a 
country is built. For example, British colonial rule in India was 
regularly characterized by the trial of the Indian nationalistic leaders 
for the offence of sedition: see A. G. Noorani, Indian Political Trials 
(Sterling Publisher, New Delhi, 1978). The viewpoint is held that even 
in a developed democracy the trial of certain offences involving 
official secrets, conspiracy, public order etc. are politically 
motivated and those trials would be political trials: see Peter Hain's, 
Political Trials In Britain (Pelican Books, 1985). For a discussion of 
the police perspective in the political process of maintaining law and 
order, see Tom Bowden, Beyond The Limits Of The Law (Penguin Books, 
1978). 
3. See Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
4. For a case dealing with the validity of the amendment, see Mark Koding 
v. Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120. 
5. At p. 123B. 
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constitutionalist will find that description less than accurate if it be noted 
that the return to parliamentary rule was not accompanied by a revocation of 
the Proclamation of Emergency or the abrogation of emergency laws. 
Malaysia is today in the constitutionally exceptional position of having 
two legal regimes functioning simultaneously providing thereby an option ' to 
the Government in office at anytime to'act under one or the other. There is 
the civil law system comprised of the ordinary laws made by Parliament. There 
is also the corpus of emergency laws made under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) 'Act, 1979 and its precursor, the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
ordinance No. 1 of 1969., In the paragraphs that follow we shall examine how 
the two systems purport to co-exist and the essential features of emergency 
government that distinguishes it from ordinary civil government. 
Government: The Creation of 
tion of Executive Power 
Article 150 itself is silent as to the formation of an emergency 
government and the form it should take. This is explained by the Reid 
Commission Report which did not contemplate that the organic structure of 
government should be changed by an emergency. It was only envisaged that the 
Federal Goverment should possess more powers to deal with an exigency both 
administratively and legislatively. It was to include the power to give 
directives to the State Governments and to enact legislation that may infringe 
the Constitution. 6 
Bodies And 
6. See Reid Commission Report, Paragraph 175, p. 76. 
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Until the present Emergency declared on 15 May 1969 there was no change 
in the apparatus or, structure of government as a result of an emergency. The 
1964 Emergency, brought about. by the Indonesian -confrontation, was 
distinguished only for the enactment by Parliament of the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Act, 1964 which armed the Government with special legislative powers 
to combat the emergency. 7 There was, however, no change in the structure and 
apparatus of government. There was still Cabinet rule and Parliament met and 
functioned as usual. The real change in the form and-system of government came 
with the 1969 Emergency. There was created the office of Director of 
Operations, and a special body called the National operations Council, which 
for all practical purposes effectively governed the country for the period 
that it was in existence. When the Kelantan Emergency was declared in 
November, 1977 a similar apparatus was adopted with the appointment of a 
Director of Government and a special body called the state-Advisory Council. 
The special apparatus created during the 1969 Emergency, which 
functioned for 21-months after the Proclamation may be seen as a role-model of 
the type of emergency government that could be adopted should a similar 
exigency arise in the future. It therefore merits a, closer scrutiny.. 
According to the then Attorney General, the 1969 Emergency was different 
from the previous emergencies because during the anti-communist Emergency and 
the Indonesian Confrontation , Emergency the people were united against an 
external enemy. In 1969 the people were divided amongst themselves. It was 
possible "for parliamentary rule to continue in the first type of situation 
7. Eg. Emergency (criminal Trials) Regulations, 1964: see Eng Keock CheDg 
v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 18 which dealt with the validity of 
the Regulations. 
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but not in the second". 8 However, the practical reason that called for a 
special type of government during the 1969 Emergency was that Parliament stood 
dissolved when the Emergency was proclaimed and could not'be convened because 
of the suspended elections. The country was under a caretaker cabinet at that 
time. But this by itself would not explain t4e special governmental machinery 
that was created to combat the destructive forces unleashed by the -race-riots 
of May 1969. The problems were of a dimension never encountered before by the 
country. It was not one of law and order only but threatened the future of 
democracy itself. It was a watershed in the constitutional life "of the 
country. The situation was so grave that soon after the riots broke out, the 
Minister of Home Affairs Tun (Dr) Ismail declared: "Democracy is dead in this 
country". 9 
The caretaker Government had to act swiftly to reassert its authority. 
On 2 August 1969, the General officer' Commanding (the Army), Peninsula 
Malaysia, took an oath on behalf of his officers and men, pledging loyalty and 
support to the Tunku and his government. According to one political writer it 
was a turning point: 
"This may well have saved the day both for the Tunku and his supporters 
(as well as the Chinese), because at that time, when parliament was 
suspended and a state of emergency had been declared, in the final 
analysis, power rested withtthe mýlitary, and whoever controlled the 
military, controlled the coun ry". 1 
Initially, the Government acted under its existing armoury of laws to meet the 
civil unrest. For example, on 13 May itself, soon after the outbreak of 
See Foot-note (30) of Milne & Mauzy's Politics And Government in 
Malaysia (Federal Publications, 1978) at p. 84 quoting Attorney Gener-aT-, 
Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin. 
9. See Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of 
- 
Sino-Malay 
Relations (Heineman Asia Pablication, 1986 Reprint) at p. 73. 
10. Ibid at p. 78. 
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violence, the Minister of Home Affairs invoked his powers under the Public 
Order (Preservation) Ordinance, -1958 and declared the riot-torn areas as being 
win a state of danger to public order". 11 on 14 May, - the declaration was 
enlarged to cover the whole of West Malaysia. 12 Pursuant to the declaration 
the police were vested with, a- plenitude of powers to restore law and order 
including the imposition of curfew and the prohibition of assemblies. 23 But it 
was evident that the 'Government -was of the opinion that the 'problems 
manifested by the race-riots were far greater than that of mere law and order. 
The Government was right in this perception. As a leading oppositionist of 
that time acknowledged: "After the May 13 riot of 1969, it became -clear' to 
many people that the pre-election (May 10,1969) mode of conducting politics 
cannot be allowed to continue. A number of politicians agitated along communal 
lines using offensive and inflammatory -language,, distorting issues beyond 
recognition ..... The need for an agreement on fundamentals was obvious". 
14 The 
P. U. (A) 162/69. The initial areas covered by the order were the police 
districts of Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya, Kuala Langat, Klang, Kuala 
Selangor, Kuala Kubu Bharu, Rawang and'Kajang. Section 3(l), under'which 
the Minister acted, reads as follows: - 
"If in the opinion of the Minister public order in any area in 
Malaysia is seriously disturbed or is seriously threatened the 
Minister may, if he considers it to be necessary for the purpose 
of maintaining or restoring public order in the area so to do, 
proclaim in that area of a state of danger to public order. " 
The ordinance was revised in 1983 as the Public order (Preservation) 
Act, 1958 (Act 296). 
12. P. U. (A) 163/69. 
13. See generally the police powers listed in Part III of the Act, Sections 
4 to 22. 
14. See Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas, The Rukunegara And The Return To Democracy 
in Malaysia (1971) Vol. 4 No-. 2 Pacific Community (Tokyo) 800 at 801- 
802. 
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Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958, or for that matter the Internal security 
Act 1960, were law and order statutes and in that respect were corrective 
rather than curative. It may be attributing more prescience than properly due 
to say that the Government had, in the uncertain hours after the outbreak of 
violence on may 13, settled upon an emergency under Article 150 as the only 
means to resolve the larger issues at stake. It is more likely that the Tunku 
and Tun Razak15 saw the need to arm the Government with overriding legal 
powers without being hobbled or curbed by legal restraints. Almost 
immediately, the uncompleted elections in Sabah and Sarawak had to be stopped, 
and in the other States the legislative assembly was not to be convened. Thus 
on 15 May, together with promulgating the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 suspending the elections, 16 a Directive was issued 
under Article 150(4) by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to all the States not to 
summon the legislative assemblies until such date as may be determined by the 
Agong. 17 A proclamation of emergency under Article 150 provided the legal 
basis for swift action without legal restraints. Emergency government was 
considered a more palatable option that military or martial rule although the 
role of the military during the 21 months that followed was noticeably greater 
than under civilian rule. 18 
15. The Deputy Prime Minister, and later Director of operations. He was the 
central figure in the 21 months of emergency rule without a Parliament. 
16. Section 7. 
17. P. U. (A) 147/69. 
Is. The Chief Executive officer appointed under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) ordinance No. 2 of 1969 was the Army Commander in Chief, and the 
Regional Army Commanders were all appointed to the State Operation 
councils. 
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In his affidavit submitted to the High Court in Mahdevan Nair's case, 19 
Tun Razak deposed that on May 15 he had personally taken the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for 
his signature. The Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as "Ordinance No. 111) 
was structured on the format of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964 
passed by Parliament during the Indonesian Confrontation Emergency. Like its 
precursor, it authorisedthe Yang di-Pertuan Agong to promulgate emergency 
regulations having the force of law. However, the principal legislation of the 
21 month emergency rule under the National Operations Council was the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 2 of 1969 (hereinafter called 
"Ordinance No. 2") made on 17 May. It provided the basis and the framework of 
the emergency government of that period. Its most significant feature was the 
creation of the post of a Director of operations and the formation of a 
cabinet-like body called the National operations Council (NOC) to assist the 
Director in his functions. The establishment provision, Section 2 read as 
follows: 
112. (l) The executive authority of Malaysia referred to in Article 
39 of the Constitution and all powers and authorities conferred on the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong by any written law are hereby delegated to a 
Director of operations who shall be a person designated by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong. 
(2) The Director of operations as designated under sub-section 
(1) shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister and 
shall exercise and be responsible for the exercise of the executive 
authority of Malaysia and of the powers and authorities referred to in 
sub-section (1); and Article 40 of the Constitution shall not apply to 
the exercise of 
- 
the executive authority and the exercise of the powers 
and authorities referred to in sub-section (1)". 
Section 3 provided that the Director "shall be assisted by a council known as 
the National operations Council" to consist of such persons as the Director 
19. (1975] 2 MLJ 286 at 288-89. 
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may appoint "in his absolute discretion". Additionally, by Section 4, the 
Director of operations was to be assisted by a Chief Executive officer who was 
to be appointed by the Director "in his absolute discretion". The special 
emergency bodies created at federal level were reproduced at state level by 
the formation of State Operations Committees and District operations 
Committees (see Sections 5 and 6). 
on the same day as the promulgation of Ordinance No. 2 i. e. 17 May, the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong appointed the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Haji Abdul 
Razak as the Director of operations "to exercise the executive authority of 
Malaysia under Article ' 39 of the Federal Constitution and all powers and 
authorities conferred upon the Agong by any written law". 20 The enormity of 
the authority vested in the Director of operations was obvious on the face of 
the instrument of delegation itself. It was made complete by Seption 8 of 
Ordinance No. 2 which also vested in the Director the legislative powers of 
making emergency regulations conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under 
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 1. The observation of Chang Min Tat J. in Wdevan 
Nair's case2l that under emergency rule the legislative power shifts from 
Parliament to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, when transposed to the legal, position 
obtaining during the 21 months after the Proclamation, meant that all 
legislative and executive power now vested in one person, the Director of 
Operations. This feature when considered with the fact that Parliament was 
dissolved and could not be reconvened, 22 and coupled further with the fact 
20. P. U. (A) 150/69. On 12 June 1969, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong designated 
Tun Dr. Ismail, the Minister of Home Affairs, as the person to exercise 
the powers and functions of Tun Razak as Director of operations, in the 
event of the latter's illness or incapacity: see P. U. (A) 185/69., 
21. [1975] 2 MLJ'at 289. 
22. The elections which were yet to be completed in Sabah and Sarawak were 
suspended by a Directive issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under 
Article 150(4): see P. U. (A) 147/69. 
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that all key executive appointments were made by the Director in "his absolute 
discretion", left no room for doubt as to the omnipotence of his power. In the 
circumstances, one may well ask: what then was the function of the Prime 
Minister and of his Cabinet and Ministers during this period? We may now 
examine this question. 
Tun Razak's appointment was evidently done at the behest of the- Tunku. 
The latter himself explained: 
"(The) primary duty of the government was to save lives and property. I 
realised as for myself that owing to my eye trouble and the work 
involved I, would not be able, or expected, . 
to tackle the task 
efficiently of administering the country and overseering the Emergency 
at the same time. 
So I obtained the approval of His Majesty, to appoint Tun Abdul Razak, 
who was both Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, to be the 
Director of the proposed National operations Council. He was the right 
man, younger and more active, full of vim and vigour, and better suited 
to the arduous task of restoring the country to normalcy in view of his 
vast experience in handling the portfolios of both Defence and National 
Development ..... The best man suited to carry out the major task was Tun Razak. It was my belief that with the assistance of members of the 
Cabinet, of the Security Forces, of Government service and of all good 
citizens, our job could be achieved in good time. 
I was therefore prepared to step down a rung or two to give Tun Razak 
full authority to carry on with this important task, but I still 
remained Prime Minister, and thus responsible for the prosecutigg of the 
Emergency, Tun Razak being in continuous consultation with me". 
The Tunku Is explanation may be understandable f rom the standpoint of why Tun 
Razak was chosen to fill the post, but it does not explain why it was 
necessary to create this omnipotent post and vest in a single person all 
legislative and - executive authority. It was obvious that, in some relevant 
quarters, May 13 reflected the Tunku's misjudgment of the mood of the people 
and of his decline. He had lost the considerable Chinese electoral support 
23. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13: Before & After (Utusan Melayu Press, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1969) at pp. 100-101. 
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that he had always had in previous elections. At the same time, and probably 
more importantly, he was opposed by a strong body of young Malay intellectuals 
within his own party-who were strongly of the opinion that the Tunku was not 
doing enough to fulfill Malay aspirations. The May 13 outbr eak and-the failure 
of the ruling party for the f irst time to attain a two- third majority in 
Parliament advanced 'the political stature of this group. ihe call for the 
Tunkuls resignation was now openly spoken and written about. In the first" few 
months of the Emergency-it gained a pitch that called for the authorities to 
openly warn the agitators of reprisals and'a banning of the publications as 
prejudicial to public security. 24 Thus it must have been realised in the first 
days of the May, 13 outbreak that some person other than the Tunku was needed 
for the immediate task of restoring law and order and to guide the country 
under conditions of neo-martial law. Hence the creation of the post of 
Director of operations; an appointment which is not provided for under the 
Federal Constitution. The insertion of the requirement in section 2(1) of 
Ordinance No. 2 that the Director "shall act in accordance with the advice of 
the Prime Minister" was to reconcile the two principal offices which then 
existed in the administration of the country. The Tunku correctly observed 
that he was prepared "to step down a rung or two" to give Tun Razak "full 
authority". 25 
24. The Minister of Home Affairs, Tun (Dr. ) Ismail said over television on 2 
August 1969: "1 must warn the extremists and others as well that if the 
anti-Tunku campaigns or activities are carried out in such a manner as 
to cause undue fear and alarm among members of any community I will not 
hesitate to exercise my powers under the law against those responsible": 
reproduced in Leon Comber, op. cit. p. 78. A series of inflammatory 
articles critical of the Tunku were banned by the Internal Security 
(Prohibition of Documents) Orders Nos. 11 & 12 of 1969 made on 11 
October 1969 and 15 October 1969 respectively: see P. U. (A) 429/69 and 
430/69. 
25. See the Tunku's May 13: Before & After op. cit. p. 101. 
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A comprehensive look at the delegation of powers to the Director would 
disclose that the requirement of acting on the ý advice of the Prime Minister 
was substantively not as significant as it may first appear. The Tunku was 
right when he said that he had to step down a rung or two'but was not correct 
when he described Tun Razak's appointment as Director of the National 
operations Council (NOC). The'NOC, by section 3 of Ordinance No. 2, was formed 
to assist the Director in his functions and not the other way. The scheme of 
Ordinance No. 2, by creating the post of Director of Operations and vesting 
the powers that it did in him, left no room for doubt that the Director was to 
assume the governance of the country. Section 2(1) delegated to him not only 
the executive authority under Article 39 of the Constitution but also all 
powers and authorities conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by any written 
law. In this connection, the terms of Article 39 are significant: 
"The executive authority of the Federation shall be vested in the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong and exercisable, subject to the provisions of- any 
federal law and of the Second Schedule, by him or by the cabinet, but 
Parliament may by law confer executive functions on other persons". 
In essence, by the said section 2(1), the Director was to assume singly the 
functions of the Cabinet. He was to be assisted for this purpose by the NOC 
and a Chief Executive Officer. In Mahan Singh v. Covernment of Nalaysia, 26 the 
delegation of powers under section 2 was challenged as not being a delegation 
but an abdication of powers by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. In rebuffing this 
challenge, Suffian LP said: 
"If His Majesty may delegate part of his power, he may delegate all of 
it, and there is no question of abdication in the instant case; after 
promulgating ordinance No. 2 of 1969. His Majesty remained Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong, still retained such power as he might have wished to 
exercise... o. n. 
27 
26. [1975) 2 MLJ 155. This report is the decision of the Federal Court. The 
case went on appeal to the Privy Council and the decision was reversed 
but not on the constitutional grounds argued in the Federal Court: see 
[1978] 2 MIJ 133. 
27. At p. 161 F-G. 
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The judgment may be criticised as having, unfortunately, confused power for 
position. It was not the contention there that the Director assumes the 
position of the Yang di-Pertuan but whether it wds constitutionally 
permissible for His Majesty to so completely delegate away all his executive 
powers. If Suffian LP had intended to say that the Agong still retained some 
vestige of executive power that conclusion would also be open to doubt. By 
Section 2(2) of ordinance No. 2 it was stipulated that Article 40 of the 
Federal Constitution was not to apply to the exercise of executive authority 
by the Director. Article 40(1) reads, as follows: 
"In the exercise of his functions under the Constitution or federal law 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall act in accordance with the advice of the 
Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the 
Cabinet, except as otherwise provided by this Constitution; but shall be 
entitled, at his request, to any information concerning the government 
of the Federation which is available to the Cabinet". 
The exclusion of Article 40 meant that the Director was not obliged to act on 
Cabinet advice. In his supporting judgment in Mahan Singh's case, Lee Hun Hoe 
C. J. (Borneo) observed that the only control on the Director was that he must 
act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. 28 This was for all 
purposes, probably, the more accurate position. 
Thus, the real question was,, what was meant by the phrase "shall act in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister" in Section 2(1)? Did it in 
substance provide a check and control on the powers exercised by the Director? 
one of the principal draftsman of the Emergency Ordinances explained the 
purport of this requirement in a paper presented shortly after the creation of 
the Post of Director: 
"The fact that he (the Director) has to act in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister does not necessarily mean that he has to 
28. At P. 164A. 
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refer for the advice of the Prime Minister every matter that he is going 
to deal with or every action that he is going to take. This, however, 
simply meansý that in the absence of any advice to the contrary by the 
Prime Minister, the Director of operations is free to exercise his 
powers and authority at his own discretion according to what he thinks 
is best f or the country although it is of course open to him on his own 
initiative to consult - and obtain advice from the Prime Minister on 
certain major policy matters. If the Prime Minister is consulted by the 
Director of Operations, the Prime Minister may give his advice summarily 
there and then or may reserve the matter f or his own further 
consideration or for discussion with his Cabinet colleagues. In any 
event the Prime Minister is not bound to consult his Cabinet colleagues 
since he can advice the Director of operations summarily; and whatever 
advice the Prime Minister gives to the Director of operations, that 
advice is binding on the latter". 29 
The interpretation proferred by the draftsman places less value on ý the 
requirement for "advice" than the plain meaning of the words themselves. The 
suggestion is that the Director was not duty bound to seek advice but where 
such advice is given he is bound to act in accordance with it. As events went, 
Tun Razak was in virtual charge of the administration of'the country during 
the 21 -months of NOC rule. 30 As some political commentators observed: 
"The Tunku remained as a multi-4acial symbol, but, increasingly, 
important policy decisions; such as the pace of return towards 
parliamentary democracy, a9d the re-orientation of foreign policy bore 
the imprint of Tun Razak". 3 
Initially, the task of the Emergency Government was to restore law and 
order. It's first actions confirmed this. The Chief Executive officer (CEO) 
appointed under section 3 by the Director was the Chief of the Armed Forces 
29. See Tun Salleh Abbas, Government Under the 1969 Emergency, Paper 
prepared on 4 June 1969, and reproduced in his constitution, Law & 
Judiciary (Malaysian Law Publishers, Kuala Lumpur, -19-841-)-p. 62 at p. 67-. 
30. See Dr Chandra Muzaffar, Freedom In Fetters (ALIRAN Publication, June 
1986, Penang) at pp. 328-329. 
31. Milne and Mauzy, Politics And Government In Malaysia (Federal 
Publication, 1978) at p. 89. 
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Staff. 32 The appointment was made on 17 May 1969 on the day that the Director 
was. himself appointed. The appointment of the General commanding the Army as 
CEO and the placement of the regional army commanders in the state Operations 
Councils emphasized -the -law and order approach of the Emergency Government. 
For example, the first set of laws made by the Director in the exercise of his 
delegated legislative power under Section 8 of ordinance No. 2 was the 
Essential ' (Disposal of Dead Bodies And Dispensation of Inquests And Death 
Inquiries) Regulations'. 1969.33 By these Regulations made on 18 May 1969 the 
Police were authorised to dispose off the bodies of persons killed as a result 
of the disturbances and to dispense with the holding of an inquest or a death 
inquiry. The "disturbances" were defined by the Regulations as the acts of 
violence for the suppression of which the Proclamation of Emergency was 
declared on 15 May 1969. At the same time, other public order remedial 
measures were taken which considerably enhanced the power of the police and 
army authorities to undertake restorative action. On 13 May 1969, on the 
immediate outbreak "of violence in and around Kuala Lumpur, the Minister of 
Home Af fairs declared the whole of Malaysia to be in "a state of danger to 
public order". 34 This was done under Section 3(1) of the Public order 
(Preservation) ordinance, 1958 by which the police were authorised to impose 
curfews, cordon-off areas, erect barricades and barbwires at any place for the 
purposes of restoring public order. on 15'May 1969 the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
acted under Section 47 of the Internal Security Act 1960 to proclaim the whole 
32. P. U. (A) 151/69., 
33. P. U. (A) 153/69. 
34. P. U. (A) 163/69. 
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of Malaysia as a security area for the purposes of the Act. 35 The effect of 
this was, to render any person caught in possession of unlicenced firearms 
anywhere in the country liable for the death penalty. In addition to the 
enlargement of his law enforcement powers, the Director, in the first days of 
his appointment, also exercised the powers reserved for the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong and called out the reservists in the armed forces. 36 The swift 
enforcement action had its desired effect and within weeks law and order was 
generally restored throughout the country. The process of rehabilitating a 
wounded nation, and of preventing a repetition of the tragic events, then 
began. 
In the twenty-one months of NOC rule, it was frequently asked whether 
the Cabinet was a redundant body. A Cabinet had been appointed by the, Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong at the instance of the Prime Minister after the riots and 
Ministers were designated specific civil portfolios. In theory the likelihood 
of conflict or misunderstanding arising between the two bodies was there but 
in reality, it was diminished by the fact that the key persons in the NOC, like 
the Director (Tun Razak), the Minister of Home Affairs, Tun Dr. Ismail, and 
the others, I. e. Tun Tan , Siew Sin (Minister of Finance) and Tun V. T. 
Sambanthan (Minister of Works) were also members of the Cabinet. However, it 
will be inaccurate to say that the NOC was concerned only with public order 
questions and that the civilian administration of the country was left to the 
Cabinet. On 21 May, 1969, the CEO in the exercise of his powers under Section 
4(2) of Ordinance No. 2 appointed a Chief of Civil Affairs to assist him in the 
35. P. U. (A) 148/69. For a judicial consideration of the effect of. a security 
area proclamation, see the judgment of the Privy council in Teh Cheng 
Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1980) AC 458; [1979] 2 MLJ 50. 
36. See P. U. (A) 154/69 and 155/69. 
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discharge , of his functions. 37, The then Solicitor General who was one of the 
architects of the emergency laws explained the need f or the appointment of 
Cabinet Ministers in these terms: 
"(D)espite completeness of powers vested in the Director of Operations, 
there are still a large number of statutory powers conferred by written 
law on different, Ministers. For example, under the Education Act, powers 
of the Minister of Education are still exercisable by that Minister, and 
under the Internal Security Act, powers of the Minister of Home Affairs 
are still left there to be exercised by him ..... Hence it is necessary to appoint Ministers, legally speaking, solely for the purpose of 
enabling these Ministerial statutory powers to be exercised and not 
essentially for the purpose of convening the Cabinet". 38 
On the question of accountability, the learned Solicitor General wrote: 
"The answer (to whom are the Ministers responsible) is that they must 
exercise these powers in such a way as to accord with the policy and 
guide or directions which the Director of operations is entitled to 
issue from time 1 to time. The authority of the Director to issue directions to the Ministers is founded on Section 2(l) of the ordinance 
No. 2 which delegates "the executive authority of Malaysia referred to 
in Article 39n to the Director. This executive authority is none other 
than the conglomeration or sum total of all powers which are vested in 
different persons and authorities by written laws in Malaysia". " 
Tun Salleh was firmly of, the view that the Cabinet was subordinate to the 
Director of Operations by virtue of Ordinance. No. 2. He was also of - opinion 
that it was not necessary for the Cabinet to meet unless the Prime Minister 
thought it useful to consult the Cabinet before advising the Director on any 
particular matter. 
It was thus abundantly clear that the civil administration of the 
country was also f irmly in the hands of the Director of operations during the 
twenty-one month period. - on the day of, the appointment of the Chief of Civil 
Affairs, the CEO issued a circular to the civil service intituled "Chief 
37. The person appointed to the post was the Minister for Law and Attorney 
General, Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin: see P. U. (A) 168/69. 
38. See Tun Salleh Abbas, op. cit. pp. 67-68. 
39. Ibid. 
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Executive Officer's order No. 1 dated 21 May 1969" which defined the function 
and powers of the Civil Affairs Chief as follows: 
................ the Chief of Civil Affairs shall be, responsible for co- 
ordinating all matters relating to civil administration and 
notwithstanding any powers and authorities conferred on any ministries 
or Departments by any written laws for the time being in force, the 
Chief of Civil Affairs is hereby empowered to issue policy instructions 
generally relating thereto and in particular on the following: - 
Finance including fiscal policies; 
Education; 
(iii) National development, rural and industrial; 
(iv) Trade and Commerce; 
(v) Transport; 
(vi) Lands and Mines and Forest; 
(vii) Service and Establishment including recruitment, promotion and 
discipline in the Federal and State Services; 
(viii) Labour and industrial relations; 
(ix) Immigration and National Registration. 
ministries requiring policy decisions on matters for which they 
are responsible are directed to refer such matters to the Chief of civil 
Af fairs f or decision. A Civil Af f airs Secretariat has been set up at 
Federal House, Jalan Hishamuddin, Kuala Lumpur. 
All existing rules, regulations and circulars affecting Government 
administration continue to operate but will be subject to this order and 
any directives which may from time to time be issued by the chief of 
Civil Affairs". 40 
The governance of the civil service itself was dealt with by the Director ý and 
the NOC and not by the Cabinet. On 17July 1969, the Director made the 
Essential (General orders, Chapter D) Regulations, 196941 which introduced a 
40. Ibid. at p. 69. 
41. See P. U. (A) 273/69. The Public Officers (Conduct And Discipline) 
(General orders, Chapter D) Regulations, 1968 were suspended for the 
duration of the Emergency. 
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fresh set of disciplinary rules in the civil service, including the notorious 
Regulation 44 which provided for the compulsory retirement of a civil servant 
in the public interest. 42 on 9 October 1969, the Director legislated in the 
field of employment law by enacting the Essential (Employment) Regulations, 
196943 and on 21 October 1969 he made the Essential (National Land Code) 
Regulations, 1969 in the area'of land law and tenure. 44 '' ,I 
- .- The relationship between the NOC and the Cabinet was symbiotic. Subject 
to, ýthe advice of the Prime Minister, the Director, of operations and the NOC 
had the final say in the governance of the country. The retention of the post 
of -- Prime Minister and a Cabinet was, by hindsight, a symbolic move which 
contributed substantially to, the, restoration of, confidence in the country both 
domestically and internationally. From its first steps in - restoring ' public 
order, the NOC moved-towards grappling with some of the deep-rooted problems 
facing the country that had manifested itself in the race riots of May 1969. 
This- was largely- the problem of ethnic divisiveness and. the promotion of 
inter-racial harmony. A National Consultative Council (NCC) was set up and 
given this task. The Tunku devoted a major part of his time, until his 
retirement from office in September, 1970, in promoting, goodwill and harmony 
amongst the races. The NOC, and the cabinet co-existed Auring this period 
without any crisis or disagreement which could , have arisen from the 
overlapping functions. In the words of the - political- commentators Ralph Milne 
& Diane Mauzy: 
4?. See Nahan Singh's case, supra. 
43. See P. U. (A) 409/69. 
44. See P. U. (A) 414/69. 
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It was not possible to draw a strict line separating their (the NOC and 
the Cabinet) activities. Although, theoretically, the NOC was meant to 
be concerned only with decisions regarding the Emergency and related 
matters, the number of related matters was very large, so great was the impact of the crisis. There was inevitably some duplication between the 
NOC and the Cabinet, but Tun Razak sat on both, and he and the Tunku 
were in frequent communication. It was only when attempts were made to 
define the relationship betw en the two bodies -. too closely that 49 contradictions were apparent". 
On 20 February 1971 Parliament was reconvened after the suspended 
elections in Sabah and Sarawak were completed. Evidently it was only after the 
ruling party was confident of a two-thirds support in Parliament through the 
vote of the Sarawak United Peoples Party (SUPP) that did it decide to end the 
NOC rule and revert -to parliamentary rule. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong repealed 
Ordinance No. ,2 on 19 February 1971 by the promulgation of the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 77 of 1971.46 By this Ordinance the NOC was 
abolished together with the State operation Councils, as was also the special 
appointments of a CEO and the Chief of Civil Affairs. However, the post of 
Director of Operations was retained with the qualification that the post was 
to be filled by the Prime Minister. The retention of the post, of Director was 
significant in many respects. By September, 1970 the Tunku had resigned as 
Prime Minister and was succeeded by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, who 
was also at the material time the Director of operations. Thus the need to 
bifurcate the executive'authority of the Federation was no longer present 
since the Director of operations had become the Prime Minister. The repeal of 
Ordinance No. 2, however, did not diminish the power and authority of the 
Director. By Section 2(2) of Ordinance No. 77 the legislative powers 
45. Politics And Government in Malaysia, op. cit. p. 86. 
46. P. U. (A) 62/71. 
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exercisable previously by the Director was' now delegated to the Director in 
the person of the Prime Minister. 47 Thus the constitutional position that 
obtain ed when Parliament reconvened in February 1971 wat in a substantive 
legal sense no different from what it was bef ore. The difference arguably was 
the outward removal of the features of the twenty-ýone months rule in the form 
of the NOC and the high profile played by the Police and the Army Commanders 
who had served at federal and state levels in the emergency government. In 
oth 
- 
er respects, the Director of operations continued to govern in the form of 
the Prime Minister supported by a Cabinet instead of the NOC. In the months 
that ensued the Director was not referred to publicly by that appellation but 
called the Prime Minister so that 
I for all outward purposes the post had ceased 
to exist. 48 
In constitutional terms, therefore, it is debateable whether the 
reconvening of Parliament on 20 February 1971 was in every sense a return to 
Parliamentary democracy. It was strictu sensu a conditional return to a 
Parliamentary system whilst keeping intact the ready apparatus of an emergency 
government. This was made Possible by the non-revocation of the Proclamation 
Of Emergency and the non-repeal of Ordinance No. 1. The condition for 
47. Ordinance NO. 77 has never been repealed and technically remains in force. The full import of this feature has, however, never been studied. 
48. But until the decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Rrosecuto. r, which clarified the positiont it would have been technically Possible for the Prime Minister, as Director of operations, to exercise his legislative powers notwithstanding the presence of Parliament by reason of the terms Of Ordinance No. 77: see [1980] AC 458; (1979] 2 MLJ 50- The decision held that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong had lost his legislative 
Powers to make emergency laws once Parliament had reconvened on Pebruary 20 1971. The reasoning would apply a fortiori to the powers Of the Director of OPerations who would be exercising the legislative Powers delegated to him by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
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reconvening Parliament was clearly enunciated by the then minister of Home 
Affairs, Tun (Dr) Ismail, in March 1970 in London: 
"The return to parliamentary democracy will now depend entirely on the 
results of the general elections in Sarawak and Sabah. If the Alliance 
(the ruling party) fails to get the two-third majority necessary for 
approving amendments to the Constitution then we will have to negotiate 
with the opposition about support in our wish to isolate in the 
Constitution the several contentious communal problems. If they do not 
agree, then I do not see how we can recall' Parliament. The blame for 
this will rest on the Opposition. If on the other hand, the Alliance 
gets the two-third majority, then the blame for any delay in returning 
to parliamentary democracy will rest with usei. 49 
The political message that this statement conveyed was obvious. As events 
went, the election results in Sabah and Sarawak gave the ruling Alliance Party 
the two-third majority they sought in Parliament. Thus the Constitution 
(Amendment) Bill, '1971 was passed in March 1971 amending Article 10 (Free 
Speech) to curb the public discussion of racially sensitive issues both in and 
outside Parliament. 50 In his speech at the first session of Parliament on 23 
February 1971, the Prime Minister,, Tun Razak announced that the free-wheeling 
- political style of the, past was over: 
49., Quoted in Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas, The politics of Coalition In Malaysia 
(1972) Current History, 271 at 272. In his speech at the reconvening of 
Parliament on 23 February 1971, the Leader of the Opposition criticised 
strongly the conditions under which Parliament was resumed: 
"(W)e strongly deplore the Sword of Damocles which the Government 
has hung over the reconvening of Parliament with their oft- 
repeated threats that Parliament will be disbanded if it does not 
provide the necessary two-thirds majority vote to amend the 
Constitution. No member of Parliament with self-respect will allow 
this political blackmail to deter him from saying or doing what he 
believes in..... ": see speech by Mr. Lim Kit Siang, Parliamentary 
Debates, 23 February 1971 at p. 73. 
50. The Constitution Amendment Act A30 of 1971 which came into force on 10th 
March, 1971 added a new clause (4) to Article 10 which read: 
...... Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any 
matter, right, status, position, privilege or sovereignity or 
prerogative - established or protected by the provisions of Part III 
(citizenship), Article 152 (Malay Language), Article 153 (special 
privileges) or Article 181 (sovereignity of the Rulers) otherwise than 
in relation to the implementation thereof as may be specified in such 
law". 
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"The disturbances of May 1969 mark the darkest period in our national 
history. By dint of purdent and imaginative policies, we have carefully 
moved ourselves away from the abyss which then confronted us. Today life 
has generally returned to normal. But we shall be eAremely foolish and 
irresponsible if we forget the lessons of 13 May. It is easy for us to 
do nothing now and to hope that somehow things will turn out all right. 
But a country cannot be governed upon hopes. If we do.. not act, or if we 
do not take precautions now, we shall stand condemned before our people 
as failing in our duty. Surely, everyone wants to ensure that the 
tragedy of 13th May will never ever be repeated in this country. such a 
calamity, if it should occur, would be more widespread and more 
catastrophic in its consequences. We have already paid a heavy price for 
the irresponsibility and indiscipline of a small group of people who 
were out to bring trouble and chaos. We cannot take chances now because 
what is at stake is the very survival of our nation". 51 
In constitutional terms, May 1969 is a watershed in the parliamentary 
life of Malaysia. The Parliament that was dissolved on 20 March 1969 for the 
purposes of the general elections on 10 May 1969 was never to regain its 
former pre-eminence. It lost its status as the sole legislative body for the 
country. The continued retention of parallel emergency powers by the 
Government by the non-repeal of the Proclamation of Emergency enables the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, which in substanceis the Cabinet, to also, exercise 
legislative powers in the form of emergency laws on account of the continued 
emergency. 
52. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates, 23 February 1971 at p. 53. For a 
criticism that the NOC rule of 21 months was prolonged for political 
purposes by the Alliance Party to regain its strength, see Dr. Syed 
Hussein Alatas: "The reason given by the Government for the 21 month 
emergency rule in Malaysia were the condition of the country and the 
need to bring about a consensus for amending the constitution. These two 
reasons were not valid. The real reason was the, condition of the UMNO 
which was not yet ready to return to normal rule because of its own 
internal crisis", The Politics of Coalition in Malaysia, op. cit. p. 271. 
See -also Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, Freedom In Fetters, op. cit. p. 328: "(It) 
was the Alliance (the ruling paFrEycalled the Alliance Party), or more 
specifically a group within UMNO, that benefited from the aftermath of 
May 13th. To repeat, it is doubtful whether the Alliance would have 
recouped in such remarkable manner, or Tun Razak and his loyalists 
assumed leadership when they did, if it had not been for the 21-month 
suspension of parliamentary democracy. " 
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It is apparent that the Emergency Government that functioned for 21 
months would be the role-model for fashioning any future emergency government. 
In fact the framework of the NOC-style government was adopted for Kelantan 
when an emergency was proclaimed in that State on 8 November 1977.52 By the 
Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 1977 the executive'authority of the State was 
taken over by the Federal Goverment and the legislative power of the State 
Assembly was assumed by the Ruler of the State. The Menteri Besar (Chief 
Minister) and his Executive Council were relieved of their powers. There was 
instead appointed a Director of Government who was to have "the direction, 
control and charge of the Government of the State" (Section 8). The Director 
was subject to the control and direction of the Prime Minister (section 7). In 
his speech in Parliament on 8 November 1977, when moving the Kelantan 
Emergency Bill, the then Prime minister Tun Hussein Onn stated that the 
Director would be his personal choice and answerable to him: 
"The executive authority (of the State) shall be exercised by an 
official of the Federal civil Service and to him shall be delegated the 
executive, functions and powers of the Menteri. Besar and Executive 
Council. We want to ensure this official succeeds. He shall be chosen by 
me personally and would be answerable to me, and would be subject to 
directions and orders from me. I would in turn be answerable to the 
cabinet for the administratiog of Kelantan and the cabinet in turn would 
be answerable to Parliament". 3 (English Translation) 
The scheme of the Act left- no room for doubt that, the administration was 
placed under the control of the Prime Minister who governed the State through 
the Director appointed by him. The similarity it bore to the 1969 model was 
apparent. In fact, in the debate in Parliament, the opposition Leader labelled 
52. See Chapter VI for a discussion of the circumstances leading to the 
declaration of an emergency in Kelantan. 
53. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates, 8 November 1977 at p. 4123. 
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e 
54 the emergency government in Kelantan as "an NOC-type rule". The Act itself 
was passed under ýxticle 150(5) of the Federal Constitution. By reason of this 
the suspension of the state Government and of the Legislative Assembly by an 
Act of the Federal Parliament was placed beyond the pale of constitutional 
challenge. 
RULE BY EMERGENCY LAWS: THE ECLIPSE OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
Emergency government is characterised more by authoritarianism than 
arbitrariness. The new rulers anxious to legitimate their government in the 
eyes of the people would attempt to project themselves as acting under the 
law. For example, under the Nigerian emergency following the military take- 
over, the basic law or grundnorm of the country was said to be contained in 
the plenitude of the military decrees passed by the Military Government. 55 
The issuance of decrees having the force of law is closely associated with 
military governments or juntas. In Malaysia, from the British period, the 
practice was not to issue decrees but to legislate formally to create the 
special power. For example, during the communist Emergency, 1948-1960, which 
was the fore-runner to the subsequent emergencies in Malaysia, the British 
Colonial Government was assiduous about obtaining legal backing for all its 
actions. They achieved this by the promulgation of emergency laws. These laws 
were formally enacted by the appropriate legislative body and duly published 
in the gazette. For example, the Legislative Council of the Federation of 
Malaya passed the Emergency Regulations ordinance 1948 on 7 July 1948 pursuant 
-1 
54. Ibid. pp. 4154 et. seq. See also speech reproduced in Lim Kit Slang, Time 
Bombs In Malaysia (May, 1978) p. 247 et. seq. 
55. See the case of the Nigerian Union of Journalists v. Attorney General of 
Nigeria [1986] LRC (Const) 1. 
377 
to which the ý British High commissioner of Malaya was empowered - to make 
emergency regulations to deal, with the, Emergency. He was authorised to act 
without recourse to the Legislative Council which was at'that time the sole 
legislative authority in the Federation. As one commentator of that time 
observed: "The scope and intensity of the Emergency Regulations effected a 
56 complete coercive embrace of the population". After independence, the 
British practice of administering an emergency through emergency laws was 
continued by the Malayan Government. The system adopted was the same, namely, 
of having a principal emergency statute under which power is delegated to an 
authority to make emergency regulations without reference to the legislature. 
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong replaced the High Commissioner as the law-making 
authority. Thus under the 1964 Emergency, the principal emergency legislation 
was the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964 passed by Parliament pursuant 
to which power was given to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to make emergency 
regulations. 57 However, under the 1969 Emergency, the principal emergency 
legislation, namely, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 
was made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong himself under Article 150(2) of the 
Constitution because Parliament was dissolved on 20 March 1969 for the general 
elections and was not in session when the Emergency was proclaimed on 15 May 
1969. Under Ordinance No. 1 the Yang di-Pertuan Agong delegated to himself the 
power to make emergency regulations having the force of law. On January 17, 
1979 as a result of the decision of the Privy council in Teh Cheng Poh Is 
56. See R. Dhu Renick, The Malayan Emergency: Causes And Effect, Journal of 
Southeast Asian History (1965) Vol. 6 No. 2 at p. 19. 
57. The principal -regýlation was the Emergency (Criminal Trials) 
Regulations, 1964 providing for an expedited criminal trial procedure 
which dispensed with a preliminary inquiry: see Eng Keock cheng v. 
- Public Prosecutor [19661 1 MLJ 18; Nohamed Sidin v. 
Public Prosecutor 
(1967] 1 MLJ 106. 
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case, 58 Ordinance No. 1 was re-enacted as an Act of Parliament and termed the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 with retrospective effect to 17 May 
1969. - It continues in force to this day. This legislatiorf was made under the 
express power given to Parliament under Clause (5) to enact legislation for 
the purposes of the emergency. 
We may now look at the emergency laws passed under the 1969 Emergency. 
Emergency ordinances Under The 1969 Emergency: - ' 
The present Emergency declared on 15 May 1969 is characterized by the 
multitude of emergency laws made under ordinance No. 1 of 1969. Until 
Parliament was reconvened on 21 February 1971 it was the sole source of 
legislative power in the country. It may be noted that the Parliament which 
had been dissolved on 20 March 1969 could not be reconstituted because of the 
uncompleted elections in Sabah and Sarawak when the emergency was proclaimed 
on 15 May 1969. Thereafter the elections were suspended and the convening of 
the State Assemblies was halted by a decree issued by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong under Article 150(4). 59 
Thus the 1969 Emergency presents the role-model for a study of how an 
emergency is administered through emergency laws. The first act of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong after Proclaiming the Emergency on 15 May 1969 was to enact 
the principal emergency legislation. This was ordinance No. 1 and ordinance No. 
enacted on 17 May but operational with effect from 15 May. Ordinance No. 1 
became the fountain-head for all subsequent emergency legislation. Under it 
58. The decision in this case was delivered on loth December, 1978: [1980] 
AC 458; [1979] 2 HLJ 50. 
59. P. U. (A) 147/69. 
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the-Yang di-Pertuan Agong was empowered to make subsidiary legislation, called 
emergency regulations, f or the purposes of the emergency. By ordinance No. 2, 
the,,, Yang di-Pertuan Agong established the framework' for an emergency 
government by creating the special office of Director of operations and a 
special cabinet-like body called the National Operations Council (NOC) to 
assist him. They governed the country for 21 months until Parliament was 
reconvened on 21 February 1971. During this period a total of 77 emergency 
ordinances was enacted under Article 150(2). 60, They covered a wide spectrum of 
matters from law and order subjects at one end to pure matters of 
administration like pensions and planning at the other. The initial set of 
Ordinances, made in the months of May and June, 1969, were primarily designed 
to combat the law and order problems created by the May 13 disturbances and to 
deal with the intercepted elections in Sabah and Sarawak. Ordinances Nos. 1 and 
2 were principally designed for this purpose. Ordinance No. 361 amended the 
Eighth Schedule to the Federal Constitution to provide for an indefinite 
postponement of the convening of Parliament. It was also designed to 
facilitate Treasury supply by providing for expenditure from the Federal and 
State Treasury pursuant to central Treasury Instructions and without - the 
requisite supply vote from the federal or state legislatures. ordinance No. 
462 made on 12 June 1969 contained a set of preventive detention laws, called 
the Emergency (Internal Security and Detention Orders) Regulations, 1964, 
60. See (1977)' 2 MLJ lii for a list of the emergency ordinances as prepared 
by the Librarian of the Attorney General's Chambers. A total of 92 
ordinances were enacted. Of them, 77 was enacted by the NOC Government 
which was in office until 19 February 1971: see Ordinance No. 77 
(P. U. (A) 62/71). 
61. P. U. (A) 170/69. 
62. P. U. (A) 186/69. 
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enacted'during the 1964 Emergency to continue in operation for the duration of 
the "present Emergency. By Ordinance No. 563 dated 25 June 1969, called the 
Emergency (Public order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinancd 1969, the power of 
preventive detention was given to police officers to detain persons who have 
acted or are likely to act in a manner prejudicial' to public order or for the 
preve'ý 64 ntion of crimes of violence. Under Ordinance No. 8,65 enacted on 2 
August 1969, the power to legislate in the States was given to the State 
Operations Committees'with the concurrence of the Director of operations. 
Under Article 150, as it then stood, there was no limit to the law- 
making power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong other than that found in Clause (2). 
The provision, before its amendment in 1981, read as follows: 
ý"If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is - not 
sitting,, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall summon Parliament as soon as 
may be practicable, ' and may, until both Houses of Parliament are 
'sitting, 
promulgate Ordinance having the force of law, if satisfied that 
immediate action is required". 
The restriction contained in Clause (2) was two-fold. The first, was the 
requirement that the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong be "satisfied" that "immediate 
action" by way of emergency legislation is required. This condition has not 
been challenged in any case during the time this provision was in force and 
any challenge would most, likely have failed. 66 There was, however, 
63. P. U. (A) 187/69- 
64. For a discussion of the scope of this law, see Yeap Hock Seng v. 
Ninister for Home Affairs [1975] 2 MLJ 279; Re Tan Boon Liat (1976) 2 
14LJ 83. ' 
65. P. U. (A) 307B. 
66. For a discussion of the scope of legal challenge to a decision based on 
the subjective discretion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, see Herdeka 
University v. Government of Nalaysia [1981] 2 MLJ 356; on appeal [19821 
2 MLJ 243. 
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a number of cases that have considered the second of the restrictive elements 
in Clause (2), namely, the period in which the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is 
authorised to make laws. This period was defined as "until both Houses of 
Parliament are sitting". In Khong Teng Khen v. Public Prosecutor, 67 the 
Federal Court had to consider whether the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could still 
exercise his law-making powers under Clause (2) after Parliament had 
reconvened on 21 February 1971. In answering the question in the affirmative, 
the court gave a literal meaning to the word "sitting" as "meaning sitting and 
actually deliberating". 68 As H. S. Ong F. J. said in his dissent, the absurdity 
of the literal meaning was that it could provide for week-end legislation by 
the Agong when Parliament is in recess. 69 The decision was mercifully 
overruled by the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor. 70 which 
held that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could not legislate under Clause (2) once 
Parliament had reconvened. Lord Diplock said: ý"The power to promulgate 
Ordinances having the force of law is expressed to be exercisable only until 
both Houses of Parliament are sitting. It lapses as soon as Parliament sits. 
Thereafter while the proclamation of emergency remains in force any further 
laws required by reason of the emergency are to be made by Parliament in the 
exercise of the legislative authority of the Federation vested in it by 
Article 44 of the Constitution". 71 Lord Diplock went on to say: 
67. (1976] 2 MLJ 166. 
68. At p. 169G. 
69. At p. 172 E-F. 
70. [1980] AC 458. 
71. At P. 466 E. 
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"So far as his '(the Yang di-Pertuan'Agong) power to make written laws is 
derived from Article 150 (2) of the Constitution itself, in which they 
are described as "ordinances", it comes to an end as soon as Parliament 
first sits after the proclamation of an emergency; he cannot prolong it, 
of his own volition, by purporting to empower himsdlf to go on making 
written laws, whatever description he may apply to them. That would be 
tantamount to the Cabinet lifting itself by its own bootstraps. If it be 
thought expedient that after Parliament had first sat.. the Yang d-Pertuan 
-Agong should continue to exercise a -power to make written laws 
equivalent to that which he was entitled during the previous period to 
exercise under Article 150(2) of the Constitution the only source from 
which he could derive such powers would be an Act of Parliament 
delegating them to him". 72 
, Following Ahe decision of the Privy council, Clause (2) was deleted by 
the "'Constitution (Amendment)'Act A514 of 1981 and replaced with a new Clause 
(2B) which reads: 
"If at any time while a'Proclamation of Emergency is in' operation, 
except when both Houses of Parliament are sitting concurrently, the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that certain circumstances which render it 
necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such 
ordinances as circumstances appear to him to require". 
The, amendment effectively reinstated the reasoning of the Federal Court in 
Khong Teng Khen Is case. " This is 'made abundantly clear by the new clause (9) 
which reads: 
"For the purpose of this Article the Houses of Parliament shall be 
regarded as sitting only if the members of each House are respectively 
assembled together and carrying out the business of the House". 
By Clause (9) the apparent limitation'in Clause (2B) is made illusory because 
it'"'is not- in th6-practice'of the Malaysian Parliament for both"Houses to' sit 
concurrently or be assembled together otherwise than for ceremonial purposes. 
In Khong Teng Khen's case, both Suffian LP and H. S. Ong F. J. made an 
observation 'relying on Ahmad Abdullah's book on "The Malaysian Parliament 
72. At pp. 468-469. The decision was delivered on 10 December 1978. On 17 
January 1979, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act was passed by 
Parliament delegating to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong the same powers of 
emergency law-making that he previously had. 
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(Practice and Procedure)" that "the two Houses do not sit continuously 
throughout a session". 
- The amendment also removed a further limitation on the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong's law-making power. This is in respect of the obligation under Clause 
(2) -, that Parliament should be summoned "as soon as may be practicable". The 
requirement enunciated the salutary principle that parliamentary rule is the 
norm and emergency government the exception. However, even previously, the 
interpretation given by the courts to this phrase had denuded it of any 
pra'ctical value. In Helan Abdullah v. Public Prosecutor, 73 the amendment to 
the Sedition Act by Emergency Ordinance No. 45 of 1970 was challenged on the 
ground that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could not have validly enacted the 
Ordinance because he had not, contrary to Clause (2), summoned Parliament "as 
soon as may be practicable". Ong CJ rejected the argument with a one-line 
response remarkable for its brevity: "I do not think this or any court is 
competent to decide when it was practicable for Parliament to be convened 
during an Emergency". 74 The question arose again in another sedition case, 
Public Prosecutor v. 0oi Kee'Saik. 75 This time the repudiation by the court 
was in even stronger terms placing the question beyond the pale of judicial 
review. Raja Azlan shah J. (as he then was) said: "His Majesty is again the 
sole judge of "when it is possible to summon Parliament and the matter is 
above judicial review ..... the long delay in summoning Parliament does not 
73. ' (1971] 2 MLJ 280. 
74. At p. 283 H. 
75. [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
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affect the validity of ordinance No. 45". 76 Given the pronouncements made in 
these cases, 77 the deletion of Clause (2) by the 1981 amendments was merely 
the removal of a restriction which in any event had proven to be illusory. 
Emergency Regulations 
The rule by emergency laws has its greatest impact in the power bestowed 
upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to make emergency regulations under the 
principal Emergency ordinance. The Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1964 
provided for this in section 2, following the model set by the Emergency 
Powers Ordinance 1948 under the pre-independence Federation of Malaya 
Government. This was carried over when the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Ordinance No. 1 was enacted on 17 May 1969 and later when it was re-made by 
Parliament as the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 on 17 January 1979. 
For our present purposes, we may conveniently look at section 2 of the 
1979 Act, which reads: 
"2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong may make any regulations whatsoever (in this Act referred 
to as "Essential Regulations") which he considers desirable or expedient 
for securing the public safety, the defence of Malaysia, 'the maintenance 
of public order and of supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community. 
(2) Without prejudiceýto the generality of the powers conferred 
by the preceding subsection, Essential Regulations may, so far as appear 
to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to be necessary or expedient for any of the 
purposes mentioned in that subsection - 
76. At p. 113 B. 
77. Eg. see their adoption in the subsequent case of Fan Yew Teng v. Public 
Prosecuto. r [1975] 2 MLJ 235. In both Ooi Kee Saik's case and Fan Yew 
Teng's case, the courts also considered the phrase "when Parliament is 
not sitting" in Clause (2) and read it as a requirement that Parliament 
should actually be in session and deliberating. 
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(a) make provisions of the 'apprehension, trial and punishment of 
persons offending against the regulations, and for the 
detention, exclusion and deportation of persons whose 
detention, exclusion or deportation appears to the Minister 
of Home Affairs to be expedient in the interests of the 
public safety or the defence of Malaysia; 
(b) create offences and prescribe penalties (including the death 
penalty) which may be imposed for any offence against any 
written law (including regulations made under this Act); 
(C) provide for the trial by such courts as may be specified in 
such regulations, of persons guilty of any offence against 
the regulations; 
(d) make special provisions in respect of procedure (including 
the hearing of proceedings in camera) in civil or criminal 
cases and of the law regulating evidence, proof and civil 
and criminal liability; 
(e) ' make provisions for the control of aliens; 
(f make provisions for directing and regulating the performance 
of services by any persons; 
(g) authorise - 
the taking of possession, control, forfeiture or 
disposition on behalf of the Government of Malaysia, 
of any property or undertaking; 
the acquisition, on behalf of the Government of 
Malaysia, of any property other than land; 
(h) authorise the entering and search of any premises; 
(i) "Prescribe fees or other payments; 
Provide' for amending' any written law, for suspending the 
Operation of any written law and f or applying any written law with or withoutýmodification; 
(k) , make provisions -for, the control of the harbours , ports and Of territorial waters of any State in Malaysia and of the 
movements of vessels; 
make provisions for the transportation by land, or water, 
and the control of the transport and movement of persons, 
animals and things; 
make provisions for trading, storage, exportation, importation, production, and manufacture; 
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(n) make provisions for the supply and distribution of food, 
water, fuel, light and other necessities; 
(0) provide for any other matter in respect of which it is the 
opinion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong desirable in the public 
interest that regulations should be made. 
(3) Essential Regulations may provide for.. empowering such 
authorities, persons or classes of persons as may be specified in the 
regulations to make orders, rules and by-laws for any of the purposes 
for which such regulations are authorised by this Act to be made, and 
may contain such incidental and supplementary provisions as appear to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to be necessary or expedient for the purposes 
of the regulations. 
(4) An Essential Regulation, and any order, rule, or by-law duly 
made in pursuance of such a regulation shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any written law, including 
the Constitution or the Constitution of any State, other than this Act 
or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any written law other 
than this Act. " 
By this provision the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is empowered to make emergency 
regulations if he considers them "desirable or expedient" (sub-section (1)) or 
"necessary or expedient" (sub-section (2)). These are considered to be words 
of the widest amplitude. Generally, it will not be possible to assail the 
regulations made under them on the basis that they were not desirable or 
necessary. 78 The Commonwealth courts have also consistently taken the view 
that it is not for the judges to review whether the relevant law-making 
authority was correct in making the conclusion that there was a necessity for 
the laws or whether it had acted upon sufficient information in enacting them. 
In R v. Comptroller General of Patents, 79 dealing with the validity of a 
certain Regulation made under the Defence of the Realm Act, 1939, Clauson LJ 
said: 
78. See Attorney General for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd. (1952] AC 427; 
see generally D. C. Pearce, Delegated Legislation (Butterworths, Sydney, 
1977) pp. 118 et. seq. 
79. [1941] 2 KB 306. 
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was argued that the'Regulation was not necessary or' expedient for 
securing the public safety ..... but it appears to me, as a matter of construction of the Act to be quite clear that the criterion whether or 
not His Majesty has power to make a particular Regulation is not whether 
that Regulation is necessary or expedient for the purposes named, but 
whether it appears to His Majesty to be expedient or necessary for the 
purposes named to make the Regulation ..... this Court has no jurisdiction to investigate the reasons or the advice which moved His 
Majesty to reach the conclusion that it was- necessary or expedient to 
make the Regulation". 
A similar approach was taken by Lord Pearson in NcEldowney V. Forde: 
"The Northern Ireland Parliament must have intended that somebody should 
decide whether or not the making of some proposed regulation would be 
conducive to the "preservation of the peace and the maintenance of 
order" ..... The courts cannot have been 
intended to decide such a 
question because they do not have the necessary information and the 
decision is in the sphere of politics, which is not their sphere". 80 
And Lord Guest in Akar v. Attorney General of Sierra Leone8l observed: 
'Emergency laws cannot be challenged on grounds that it was not reasonably 
justifiable for the situation". 
However, this is not to say, that emergency regulations may not be 
challenged under any circumstances. If the regulations are made even before an 
80. [1971] AC 632 at 655 D-F. 
Bl. [1969] 3 AER 384 at 395. 
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emergency is declared, 82 or by the'wrong authority, 83 or fall outside the 
authorised subject matter of law-making, 84 or are inherently vague or 
uncertain, 85 or 'are so unrelated to the object that they are unlikely to 
Both the law-making provisionsýof Article 150, namely, Clause (2B) and 
Clause (5), have as a condition precedent that a Proclamation of 
Emergency "is in operation" (Clause (2B)) or "is in force" (Clause (5)). 
Thus the fact of a Proclamation of Emergency having been made and not 
been revoked would be regarded as a condition of law-making, the absence 
of which will render the regulations invalid (see the Privy council in 
The Bribery Commissioners v. Rannasingbe [1964] 2 AER 785: "(The) 
legislature has no powers to ignore the conditions of law making that 
are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to make 
laws" (p. 792D)). However, see the Nigerian case of F. R. A. Williams v. 
Dr. N. A. Majekodunmi (1962] 1 All N. L. R. 413 where it was held that 
under their Federal Constitution (since abrogated by the military coup) 
Parliament has power to enact legislation to have effect during a period 
of emergency even though no emergency exists at the time of enactment. 
The correctness of this decision is however doubtful even as a matter of 
construction of their Constitution. The provision (section 65(1 and 2)) 
read: "Parliament may at any time make laws ..... for the purposes of 
maintaining or securing peace ..... during any period of emergency. Any 
provision enacted in pursuance of this section shall have effect only 
during a period of emergency". The Lagos Supreme Court held that 
subsection (1) enables Parliament to make the necessary laws at any-time 
whether there is an emergency on or not". The emphasis on the words "at 
any time" without reference to the context provided by the words "during 
any period of emergency" possibly explains the error made by the Court. 
83. see eg. Law society of Lesotho v. Minister of Defence & Internal 
Security [1988] IRC (Const) 226, where under the relevant law the wrong 
authority had declared an emergency and it was held not to matter that 
the office of the relevant authority had been abolished by the military 
government. See also the American case of Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 
385 Mich. 623,189 N. W. 2 318 [1971): only the 'Governor and not the City 
Mayor could declare martial law during a riot. 
84. See the South African case of Metal & Allied Workers Union v. State 
President of Republic of South Africa [1986] 4 SA 358 where it was held 
that certain parts of the Emergency Regulations made by the State 
President were invalid because he "had not limited himself to objects 
which have a bearing on public safety, the maintenance of public order 
or any other matter referred to in the empowering section". 
85. "A by-law must be certain in the sense that it must contain adequate 
- information as to the duties of those who are to obey" per Williams j. in Brunswick Corporation v. Stewart [1941] 65 CLR at 99. See also King 
Gee Clothing Co. Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth (1945] 71 CLR 184 per 
Dixon J. at 194. This ground was canvassed briefly without success in 
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fulfil their purpose, 86 the regulations may be struck down. In this regard the 
court: would be guided by the extent of discretion given to the law-making 
authority by the principal legislation. The Court of Appeal of the West Indies 
observed in an appeal from the island of St. Christopher, Nevis & Anguilla 
that there was a distinction between an instrument that authorises the 
Governor in an emergency to "take any measures that are reasonably justifiable 
for dealing with the situation" and one which merely authorises "the Governor 
to make such laws as he considers necessary or expedient". The Court said: 
"The one gives dictatorial powers to the Governor enabling him to act by 
decree and to issue orders which, once made in good faith are beyond 
challenge. The other makes justiciable by an objective test the measures 
-,, which the law authorises. What appears to the Governor to be necessary 
or expedient may not on an objective test be reasonably justifiable in 
the particular situation that exists. Many things have been done in ýqe 
name of expediency which are quite unjustifiable on the known facts". 
In NcEldowney v. Forde, 88 the House of Lords ruled that emergency law-making 
was a legislative and not an executive act. It would then follow that the 
courts, will not generally go behind what has been enacted, to inquire how an 
enactment was made, or whether it arose out of incorrect information or actual 
contd... 
85. the Malaysian case of The Jaffanese Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Bank 
Negara Nalaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 150 in respect of the validity of the 
Emergency (Protection of Depositors) Regulations, 1986 made by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong under the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979. 
86. Eg. The King v. The University of Sydney Exparte Drummond [1943] 67 CLR 
95, that the National Security (Universities Commission) Regulations 
were bad as being unrelated to the object of national security because 
it prevented qualified students who have not been called up from 
attending university. 
87. Per AM Lewis Ci in Charles v. Phillips and Sealey (19671 10 W. I. R. 423 
at pp. 433-34. 
88. Op. Cit. 
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I 
deception by someone on whom reliance was placed: see Hoani Tukino v. Aotea 
District Maori Land Board. 89 
Clause (6) of Article 150 And The Supremacy Doctrine 
The most important feature of emergency legislation, whether promulgated 
by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause (2B) or enacted by Parliament under 
Clause (5), is their overriding quality ie. they override the Constitution and 
are valid even if they are inconsistent with it. This underscores both the 
significance and potency of a continued state of emergency. It gives the 
Government the option of by-passing the Constitution by the enactment of 
emergency legislation. In short, emergency legislation could scuttle the 
doctrine of constitutional supremacy enunciated in Article 4 of the Federal 
Constitution. The provision reads: 
"This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law 
passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void". 
Article 4 is central to the meaning of the Constitution. It has been said 
that: "to misunderstand Article 4 is to misunderstand the whole document (ie. 
the Constitution) ". 90 The vitality of the supremacy provision has generally 
been appreciated by the Courts. In Ah Thian v. Covez-nment of Nalaysia, 91 
Suffian LP observed: 
"The doctrine of supremacy of Parliament does not apply in Malaysia.... 
Under our Constitution written law may be invalid on one of these 
grounds: 
B9. (19411 AC 308 PC. 
90. R. H. Hickling, 
iAn 
overview of Constitutional Changes In Malaysia: -1957- 
77 (Ed. Suf an, Lee & Trinidad, The- Constitution of Malaysia: Ifs- 
U-evelopment 1957-77) at p. 5. 
91. [1976] 2 MLJ 112 at 113. 
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(1) in the case of Federal written law, because it relates to a matter 
with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law, and in 
the case of State written law, because it relates to a matter with 
respect to which the State Legislature has no power to make law, 
Article 74; or 
(2) in the case of both Federal and State written law, because it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, Article 41; --or 
(3) in the case of State written law, because it is inconsistent with 
Federal law, Article 75". 
In Clause (6) of Article 150, the Constitution purports to make an 
express exception to Article 4. Clause (6) reads: 
"Subject to Clause (6A), no provision of any ordinance promulgated under 
this Article, and no provision of any Act of Parliament which is passed 
while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which declares that 
the law appears to Parliament to be required by reason of the emergency, 
shall be invalid on the ground of inconsistency with any provision of 
this Constitution". 
The objective behind giving emergency laws a super-quality is obvious. In Eng 
Keock Cheng v. Public Prosecutor92 Wylie C. J. (Borneo) interpreted Clause (6) 
as follows: 
"The true effect of Article 150 is that, subject to certain exceptions 
set out therein, Parliament has, during an emergency, power to legislate 
on any subject and to any effect, even if inconsistencies with articles 
of the Constitution (including the provisions for fundamental liberties) 
are involved. This necessarily includes authority to delegate part of 
that power to legislate to some other authority, notwithstanding the 
existence of a written Constitution". 
The Privy Council in Osman & anor v. Public Prosecutor93 made a similar 
observation. 
92. [1966] 1 14W 18 at 20-G. 
93. [1968] 2 MLJ 137 PC at 138F-H. In the subsequent case of Mahan Singh v. 
Government of Malaysia [1975] 2 MLJ 155, the point was raised but not 
considered by the Federal Court, on account of it not having been 
pleaded, that Clause (6) saves only laws but not executive acts, eg. 
executive decisions inconsistent with the Constitution. In the present 
writer's view, the point bears merit because Clause (6), like a finality 
clause, seeks to give immunity and should therefore be construed 
strictly. 
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t The superior status of emergency regulations is further assured by 
section 2(4) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 and its precursors 
in, Ordinance No. 1 of 1969 and the Emergency (Essential "Powers) Act 1964. 
Section 2(4) reads: - 
"An Essential Regulation, and any order, rule or by-law duly made in 
pursuance of such a regulation shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any written law, including 
the Constitution or the Constitution of any State, other than this Act 
or in any instrument having ef f ect by virtue of any written law other 
than this Act". 
The width of this provision is astounding. It seeks to insulate from challenge 
not only the subsidiary laws but any executive action in the form of "order, 
rule or by-law" duly made under them. There have been numerous challenges to 
the provision since it was first introduced under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Act, 1964. These challenges were generally made under two broad 
headings: first, that it was unconstitutional for Parliament to delegate to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong the power to enact regulations inconsistent with the 
Constitution, and secondly, that the scope of the provision was limited by the 
words "written law" and the phrase "other than this Act". The first of the 
propositions was considered and repelled in Eng Keock Cheng's case. The court 
held that the answer is to be found in Clause (6) of Article 150 and that the 
'Act having been declared to be required by reason of the emergency, none of 
its provisions can be held invalid on account of the effect of any provision 
in that written Constitution". 94 In the later case of Mahan Singh v. 
Government of Kajaysia95 there was an even more substantial challenge to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong's delegated power of law-making. It arose out of the 
94. OP. Cit. p. 20C. 
95. (19751 2 MLJ 155. - 
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delegation, in turn, by the Agong of his law-making powers to the Director of 
OPerations under the Emergency (Essential Powers) ordinance No. 2 of 1969. It 
was argued, f ol lowing Wylie C. J. (Borneo) Is observation ib Eng Keock Cheng Is 
case, ý6 that ordinance No. 2 achieved a complete delegation of power and it 
amounted to an abdication of powers and was therefore ultra vires the 
Constitution. Suffian LP made short shrift of the argument with the syllogism: 
Olf, His Majesty may, delegate part of his power he may delegate all of it". 97 
In his supporting judgment, Lee Hun Hoe C. J. (Borneo) was more comprehensive. 
He said: 
..... Ordinance No. 2 of 1969 was enacted pursuant to Article 150 and Clause (6) of that Article expressly provides for legislation that may 
override the provisions of the Constitution. The result is that in the 
case of any legislation enacted under a power which gave it validity 
notwithstanding inconsistency with the Constitution it would be otiose 
to consider whether such legislation would be inconsistent with any 
provision of the Constitution ..... It would be futile to argue that the delegation of powers by His Majesty or, for that matter, Parliament 
would be against the Constitution. The short answer to such an argument 
is provided by Article 150(6)". 98 
The second proposition may be considered by examining first how section 
2(4) stood under the precursor statute, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 
1964 passed during the Indonesian Confrontation Emergency. It then read as 
follows: 
"An Essential Regulation and any order, rule, or by-law duly made in 
-pursuance of such a regulation, shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any written law other than 
this Act or in any instrument having 6ffect by virtue of any written law 
other than this Act". 
96. - Op. Cit. at p. 20 ie. the Yang di-Pertuan Agong had "authority to 
delegate part of (the) power to legislate to some other authority" 
(emphasis aaaieid). 
97. Op. cit. at p. 161F. 
98. Op. cit. p. 164-165. 
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In - Osman & Anor v., Public Prosecutor, 99 it was contended that the Emergency 
(criminal Trials) Regulations, 1964 were ultra vires the constitution and that 
it , was not saved by sub-section (4) itself because the ph7rase ý "written law" 
therein does not include the Constitution. The Privy Council merely concluded 
that they "f ind nothing in the - context which requires them to give a dif f erent 
meaning to the words "written law" than that prescribed by the ordinance and 
they; do not consider that the words of Article 150(5) "any provision of this 
Constitution or of any written law" are any indication that the words "written 
law" Jn the Act were intended to have any different meaning to that stated in 
the, ordinance". 100 However, when ordinance No. 1 of 1969 was enacted after the 
Emergency was declared in May-1969, Section 2(4) was reproduced with the 
addition of the words "including the constitution or the Constitution of any 
State" after the words "written law". A repetition of the argument in Osman's 
r-ase was duly foreclosed. 
However, there are still the words "other than this Act", and its 
implication. on a plain reading of the words and, in their context, it was a 
reiteration of the basic rule of construction with regard to delegated 
legislation that they cannot conflict with the parent legislation. The only 
case. to have considered the effect of those words is Mohamed Sidin v. Public 
Prosecutor where, unfortunately, the arguments of the appellant were rather 
poorly formulated. 101 The challenge was again with regard to the Emergency 
(criminal Trials) Regulations 1964, to the effect that Regulations 4 and 5, 
-9-9. - (19681 2 MLJ 137. 
100. Ibid at p. 139 E-G. 
101. (1967] 1 MLJ 106. 
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which, enable the Public Prosecutor to decide whether an accused person should 
be tried by the -ordinary process or under the more stringent rules of the 
Regulations, were' ultra vires and offensive to the rightd of equal treatment 
provided by Article 8 of the Constitution. The Federal Court had previously 
ruled in the same case on a special reference that' the Regulations were not 
ultra vires Article 8. It was now'contended that the Regulations were 
discriminatory and, therefore, - ultra vires not of the Constitution but of ' the 
Act. , The basis of this argument was unfathomable because the anti- 
discriminatory provision (Article 8) is found only in the Constitution and not 
in the Act. The Federal Court rightly -dismissed the argument stating "we find 
102 it Idifficult to follow this line of reasoning". The inapposite manner in 
which the point was developed in Nohamed Sidin's case should not, however, 
diminish the inherent value of the words "othe .r than this Act" in the 
provision. They are words of limitation intended to limit the scope of 
protection provided by the sub-section. It would still be open to challenge 
subsidiary legislation ý under the Act if they exceed the bounds or traverse 
outside the authorised subject matters defined in Sections 2(1) and (2). 
-ýI The most -recent application of Section 2(4) was in The Bank Negara 
case. 103 The question arose in the context of the powers exercised , by Bank 
Negara (the Central- Bank) over'the assets of an insolvent deposit-taking 
financial institution under the Essential (Protection of Depositors) 
Regulations, 1986.104 These Regulations were made'by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
102. Ibid at p. 108D. 
103. Jaffanese Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Bank Negara Malaysia [19891 3 MLJ 
150. 
104. P. U. (A) 237/86. 
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as-1 emergency legislation in July 1986 under section 2(4) of the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Act 1979. The background to this law was the urgent need to 
immediately protect the interests of innocent depositors by freezing the 
assets of illegal and unauthorised deposit-taking cooperatives which had 
become unable to meet their deposit liabilities. The problem was widespread 
involving hundreds of thousands of people throughout the country. It was 
realised that the existing law, especially the Cooperative Societies Act 1948 
was inadequate to deal with the situation. 105 The Government felt that it 
would - be too late to wait for the next session of Parliament to pass new 
legislation. It accordingly invoked its emergency law-making powers under the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 to pass the Regulations. The Regulations 
authorized the Central Bank to, inter alia, freeze the assets of deposit- 
takers and their directors and to restrict the departure from jurisdiction of 
persons concerned with the affairs of deposit-taking bodies. Further, the 
Central Bank was authorized to assume control of the affairs of a deposit- 
taker and to place it under receivership. The Jaffanese Cooperative society 
being a shareholder of the Central Cooperative Bank Bhd. (CCB), one of the 
affected deposit-takers, sought to challenge the placement of a receiver over 
the , affairs of the CCB on the ground, inter alia, that the Regulations 
empowered the taking and/or disposition of the property, of a deposit-taker not 
on -behalf of 
the Government. The Supreme Court ruled that "the Regulations 
have effect under section 2(4) notwithstanding anything therein inconsistent 
105. For a background to the problem, see the Government White Paper dated 
November, 1986 titled "Report On The Deposit Taking Cooperatives", order 
Paper 50 of 1986. 
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with any written law including the Constitution or the constitution of any 
State"ý106 
I -'On a strict reading of Clause (6) of Article 150 it should be confined 
in, application to only "ordinances promulgated under" Article 150 and an "Act 
of Parliament which-is passed while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force". 
It, should follow that essential regulations made under Section 2 of the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Act 1979 would fall outside the protection of 
Clause (6). The Courts have, however, not read the provision in that limited 
fashion. They have extended the protection under clause (6) to "emergency 
regulations" as well. In Mahan Singh v. Government of Nalaysia, 107 it was held 
that the validity of the delegation of powers to the Director of operations to 
make the Public Officers (Conduct & Discipline) Regulations 1969 was protected 
by Clause (6). In Eng Keock Cheng's case, 108 likewise the Emergency (criminal 
Trials) Regulations, 1964 was upheld by the ultimate reliance on clause (6). 
This conclusion may be less assailable than the reasoning of the courts would 
suggest. The question really is whether Section 2(4) is itself ultra vires or 
invalid. Where a legislative provision is challenged as to, its vires it must 
be tested against the tenets of a higher law, namely, the Constitution. 
However, Section 2(4), which sanctions unconstitutional legislation or actions 
if done in the course of an Emergency is itself protected by Clause (6). Thus, 
there is little or no scope to assail the provision or what it protects other 
106o . Op. cit at pp. 153-54. 
107. (1975] 2 ISJ 155. 
108. [1966] 1 MLJ 18. 
I 
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than the argument that the essential regulation made under section 2 or any 
rule or by-law are themselves ultra vires the 1979 Act- This would be the 
effect of the words "other than this Act" in the provision itself. Further, if 
any delegated legislation is enacted by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, which does 
not reasonably relate to the subject-matters enumerated under Section 2(1) or 
(2), they would be ultra vires the Act and invalid. This limited scope of 
challenge, however, is open only to subsidiary legislation made under the Act. 
There is, of course, no limitation or restriction under Clause (6) to the 
scope of emergency legislation that may be passed by Parliament during an 
emergency. 
Clause (6A) of Article 150 
The only limitation on the overriding nature of emergency legislation 
, under Article 150 are those expressed in Clause (6A). The provision reads -as 
follows: - 
"Clause (5) shall not extend'the powers of Parliament with, respect to 
any matter of Islamic law or the custom of the Malays, or with respect 
to any matter of native law or custom in the State of Sabah or Sarawak; 
nor shall Clause (6) validate any provision inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Constitution relating to any such matter or relating 
to religion, citizenship or language". 
Clause (6A) was inserted in Article 150 on 16 September 1963 by the Malaysia 
Act, 1963. By Section 39 of the said Act the existing clauses (5) and (6) of 
Article 150 were substituted with new Clauses (5), (6) and (6A). The 
Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Act in bill-form in Parliament does 
not give any reason for the insertion of clause (6A). 109 
11 
109. See Goverment Gazette dated 13 August 1963. 
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The purpose of Clause (6A), however, is obvious. It is to place the 
subjects enumerated therein beyond the reach or touch of emergency 
legislation. They may be tabulated as follows: 
(1) Islamic law; 
_(2) the custom of the Malays, (3) native law or custom in Sabah and Sarawak; 
(4) the constitutional guarantees on: (i) religion (ii) citizenship, 
and (iii) language. 
The subjects reflect the fundamental concerns of the multi-racial and multi- 
religious communities of Malaysia. Except for the guarantee on citizenship, 
they relate to the personal law and beliefs of the Malaysian peoples. The 
matters on citizenship and language reflect the understanding upon which the 
Alliance Party under the first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj 
forged cooperation between the immigrant and the indigenous communities to 
work jointly and ha rmoniously towards independence. In short, the non-Malay 
residents of Malaya were given citizenship rights whilst the Malays were 
assured of the continuity of the Sultanate system, the special position of 
Islam and the status of the Malay language as the national language. of these, 
it may be noted that only the position of the Rulers is not entrenched in 
Clause (6A). There is no explicable reason for this especially since the Malay 
Rulers through the Conference of Rulers play a distinctive role in the 
constitutional system of the country. 
Be that as it may, the ef fect of Clause (6A) is that no ordinance 
promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause (2B), nor shall any Act 
of Parliament passed under Clause (5), alter the status of the subject matters 
extrenched under Clause (6A). Thus, any emergency legislation that is 
inconsistent with the present constitutional position obtaining in respect of 
the subject matters enumerated in Clause (6A) would be ultra vires and void. 
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This would be the true position inspite of the presence of the ambivalent 
wordst "extend the powers of Parliament". It refers to the fact that these 
subjects form part of the State List in respect of which the State 
legislatures only have authority to legislate. 210 It would follow that by 
Clause' (6A), this reservation may not be altered nor could the power be 
usurped by the Federal Government to regulate these matters by way of 
emergency legislation. As one academic writer observed, the rights Mentioned 
in Clause (6A) are more deeply entrenched in the Constitution than, any other 
rights. I 11 
Impact On Fundamental LibertieS 
At a conceptual level it has always been recognised that fundamental 
rights, should not impede governmental action during a state of emergency. 
Thus, international covenants have provided for the derogation of human rights 
during times of national emergency. Article 4 of the International Covenant On 
Civil And Political Rights reads: 
"In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the State Parties to 
,, 
the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation provided that such measures are not 
'inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do 
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin". 122 
110. See the Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution. 
M. See Shad S. Faruqi, Fundamental Liberties In Malaysia: An overview 
(1985) Vol. 18 No. 3 INSAF 50 at 54. 
112. See Brownlie's International Legal Documents. 
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Article 15(l) of the European Convention on Human Rights 195o likewise permits 
member states to derogate in time of war or other public emergencies, but only 
to the" extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 213 
When the Reid Commission draf ted the independence Constitution they 
provided for the encroachment of fundamental rights during times of emergency 
but only to the extent necessary to meet the exigency. The recommendation read 
as follows: 
"Neither the existence of fundamental rights nor the division of powers 
between the Federation and the States ought to be permitted to imperil 
the safety of the State or the preservation of a democratic way of life. 
The Federation must have adequate power in the last resort to protect 
these essential national interests. But in our opinion infringement of 
fundamental rights or of State rights is only justified to such an 
extent as may be necessary to meet any particular danger which threatens 
the nation. We therefore recommend that the Constitution should 
authorise the use of emergency powers by the Federation but that the 
occasions on which, and so far as possible the eitent to which, such 
powers can be used should be limited and defined". 14 
The Reid Commission was obviously influenced by the fact of the Communist 
Emergency of 1948 which was then in force. Under the Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance of 1948, the Colonial Goverment was empowered to abridge 
fundamental liberties to deal with the Emergency. The Ordinance provided for 
the right of detention without trial. It also authorised collective punishment 
ie. the punishing of the residents of a locality for consorting with communist 
insurgents. 115 
The Reid Commission had recommended that the special powers to handle an 
emergency should be of two types. The first was where identified organised 
113. Ibid. See also David Bonner, Emergency Powers In Peacetime (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1985) pp. 83 et. seg. 
114. Reid Commission Report, para. 172 pp. 74-75. 
115. See generally D. Rhu Rennick, The Malayan Emergency: Causes and Effect, 
(1965) Journal of Southeast Asian History Vol. 6 No. 2 p. 27 et. seg. - 
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violence was perceived from a body of persons, in which event the Government 
was empowered to enact special legislation to deal with that threat without 
declaring an emergency. 116 The second was wider in context and ambit ie. the 
power of the Government to declare a state of emergency where there was a 
threat to national security. 117 
The recommendations of the Reid Commission were adopted and incorporated 
in the Federation Constitution as Articles 149 and 150 respectively. In this 
review, it is proposed to examine only the features of the emergency 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution that authorise abridgement of 
fundamental rights and not undertake a case by case study of its infringement 
under times of emergency. 
In its original form, Article 150 only authorised the' infringement of 
fundamental rights. Clause (6) as it then stood read: 
"No provision of any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance 
of this Article shall be invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with 
the provisions of Part II and Article 79 1 shall not apply 
to any Bill for 
such law or any amendment to such Bill". 18 
116. Clause 137 of the Draft Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 
adopted later as Article 149 of the independence Constitution. 
117. Ibid. Clause 138, later adopted as Article 150 of the Federal 
Constitution. 
118. Part II of the Federal Constitution contains the fundamental liberty 
provisions. The fundamental rights contained in the Constitution may be 
tabulated as follows: Right to Life and Liberty (Article 5), Freedom 
from slavery (Article 6), Equality before the law (Article 8), Freedom 
of Movement (Article 9), Freedom of Speech And Association (Article 10), 
Freedom of Religion (Article 11), Property Safeguards (Article 13). Many 
of these rights are qualified rights giving the state the power to 
regulate them in the interests of state security and public morality. 
For a comprehensive review of fundamental liberties under the Malaysian 
Constitution, see Shad S. Faruqi, Fundamental Liberties In Malaysia: An 
overview (1965) INSAF Vol. 18 No. 3 p. 50; see also R. H. Hickling, Some 
AsRects Of Fundamental Liberties Under The Constitution of --T7e 
Federation of Mal, aya (1963) MLJ xliv. For a general discussion of FFe 
status of human rights in developing societies, see T. S. Fernando, Are 
The Maintenance Of The Rule Of Law And The Ensuring Of Human Righys- 
Possible In A Developinq Society (1968) 2 MLJ iii. 
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Under the 1963 amendments to Clause (6), 119 the provision was amended to 
enable infringement of any provision of the Constitution, subject to the 
limits prescribed in Clause (6A). In the result, the only'fundamental liberty 
which is protected today from the onslaught of emergency legislation is the 
freedom of religion under Article 11. Thus it has'-been rightly observed that 
"the right to religion -cannot be suspended in times of emergency". 120 
Under Article 149 
Both Article 149 and Article 150 fall under Chapter XI of the Federal 
Constitution which is captioned "Special Powers Against Subversiont Organised 
Violence, And Acts And crimes Prejudicial To The Public And Emergency Powers". 
Yet there are significant differences in the scope and application of the two 
provisions. Article 149 may first be considered. It reads: 
"149. (l) If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken 
or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or 
outside the Federation - 
(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to 
fear, organised violence against persons or property; or 
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
any Government in the Federation; or 
(c) to ýpromote feelings of ill-will and hostility between 
different races or other classes of the population likely to 
cause violence; or 
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, 
of anything by law established; or 
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning 
of any supply or service to the public or any class of the 
public in the Federation or any part thereof; or 
129. Act 26 of 1963 (the Malaysia Act). See Chapter V for a full discussion 
of these amendments. 
120. Shad S. Faruqi, op. cit. p. 54. 
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which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, 
the Federation or any part thereof, 
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is 
valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions 
of Articles 5,9,10 or 13, or would apart from this Article be outside 
the legislative power of Parliament; and Article 79 shall not apply to a 
Bill for such an Act or any amendment to such a Bill... 
(2) A law containing such a recital as is mentioned in Clause 
(1) shall, if not sooner repealed, cease to have effect if resolutions 
are passed by both Houses of Parliament annulling such law, but without 
prejudice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the power 
of Parliament to make a new law under this Article". 
The principal legislation passed under Article 149 is the Internal 
Security Act 1960 known everywhere by its acronym "ISA". It will not be 
incorrect to describe the history of Article 149 as being the history of the 
ISA. 
The ISA was passed in the session of Parliament on 21-22 June 1960 to 
coincide with the intended declaration of the cessation of the Communist 
Emergency on 31 July of the same year. The Bill was intituled "An Act to 
provide for the internal security of Malaya, preventive detention, the 
prevention of subversion, the suppression of organised violence against 
persons and property in specified areas of Malaysia, and for matters 
incidental thereto". There was little doubt that the principal, if not sole, 
reason proffered by the Government as a justification for the Bill was to 
combat the communist 'threat believed to be extant notwithstanding the 
revocation of the Emergency. In moving the second reading of the Bill in 
Parliament on 21 June 1960 the Deputy Prime* Minister, Tun Abdul Razak said: 
"Because the Emergency is to be declared at an end, the Government does 
not intend to relax its vigilance against the evil enemy who still 
remains as a threat on our border and who is now attempting by 
subversion to succeed where he has failed by force of arms. It is for 
this reason that this Bill is before the House. It has two main aims: 
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-. -firstly to counter subversion throughout the country and, secondly, to 
enable the necessary measures to be taken on the border area to counter 
. terrorism". 
121 
Given the' speech in Parliament as to the reason - for the ISA, the 
question is whether the ISA could be used for purposes other than to deal with 
the - threat of communist subversion? There is. on the f ace of the statute itself 
no discernible limitation or restriction which confines it to application only 
to' ýcommunist saboteurs. However, Article 149, pursuant to which the ISA was 
passed, requires Parliament to'identify the threat and adopt legislation 
appropriate to deal with that threat. This would be the proper import of the 
phrases in Clause (1): 'that action has been taken or threatened" and "any 
provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action". The question 
arose in the case of Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector General of Police. 222 
The Supreme Court held that the parliamentary speeches stating the objective 
of the law cannot govern its construction. The Court said: 
"The expression "that action" (in Article 149) in our view has no 
consequence to determine or limit the scope of the Act. The Act is valid 
and f rom the wording of the provisions of the Act 
" 
43se is nothing to 
show that it is restricted to communist activities . 
Theresa Lim Chin Chin's case arose out of the October 1987 mass arrest 
under the ISA of 106 persons in a police operation code-named "Operation 
Lallang". It was the most controversial use of the ISA since its enactment. 
The ISA was for the first time declared as not being used for the avowed 
121. Malaysian Parliamentary Debates, 21 June 1960, at p. 1185. The "evil 
enemy" referred to were the communist terrorists. 
122. (1988] 1 MLJ 293; [1988] LRC (Const). 
123. At p. 296F-G. Professor R. H. Hickling who drafted the ISA has expressed 
surprise that the power of detention (in his words: "deliberately 
interlocked with Article 149") could be used against non-communists: see 
Preface to his Essays On Malaysian La (Pelanduk Publications, 1991). 
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purpose of incarcerating communist subversives and sympathisers but to deal 
with those who were said to be de-stabilising the country. Those arrested were 
prominent politicians, including opposition politicians and government 
backbenchers, trade unionists, community workers, environmentalists, Chinese 
educationists, Church workers and Islamic teachers-. The Government White Paper 
on the arrests intituled "Towards Preserving National Security", carried the 
following observation: 
"The Internal Security Act 1960 in particular enables the authorities to 
prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to security, the 
maintenance of essential services or the economic life of Malaysia. The 
enforcement of this law is therefor not restricted to the communist 
threat alone ............................................................ 
jTh*e) *liberal* 
and'tolerant'attitude* (of 
*the'Government) 'was' exploii; 
W in 
an irresponsible manner by various quarters for their own selfish 
interests. Issues which are sensitive to the various communities were 
deliberately played up, thus creating racial tension .................... 
j&j "Government decided to act swiftly and firmly to con 
: W* 
situation in the interests of stability and the welfare of the people. 
From October 27 until November 14,1987, police arrested and detained 
for the purposes of investigation 106 persons under Section 73(l) of the 
Internal Security Act 1960 in connection with activities considered 
prejudicial to security. Assemblies and rall1gs were prohibited and the 
licences of four publications were revoked". 124 
It falls outside the scope of this study to enquire into the reasons and 
justification for "Operation Lallang". 125 However, what is of interest is the 
declared statement by the Government that the ISA would not be limited'in use 
124. Dated 14 March 1988; Extracts published in the New Straits Times of 24 
March 1988 pp. 2-3. 
125. The reasons prof erred in The White Paper have been criticised in some 
quarters on the basis that the arrests were mostly of government 
critics, and that the rising racial tensions of that period could have 
been curbed by timely preventive action: see ASIAWEEK November 6,1987 
PP. 51-52. See also the Amnesty Internat'lon--al-Report, Malaysia: 
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to the communist threat alone. It elicited a response in the form of an 
affidavit in habeas corpus proceedings from the first Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman whose administration had enacted the ISA. 
According to the Tunku, the ISA was "designed and meant to be used solely 
against the communists". The Tunku said: 
"My cabinet colleagues and I gave a solemn promise to parliament and the 
ý. nation that the immense powers given to the Government under the ISA 
would never be used to stifle legitimate opposition and silence lawful 
'dissent". 126 
In December, 1989 the issue arose again when'the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM) ' officially renounced their policy of armed struggle in Malaysia and 
signed a pact to that effect with the Government. The question then arose 
whether ý the ISA would now be withdrawn. The Prime minister, Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamed, gave quietus to the issue when he declared: 
"The ISA has been useful in avoiding racial flareups. The ISA was not 
merely to contain the communist menace. The situation had been tense (in 
ý-. -'1987) and it had nothing to do with communist activities. It was a racial problem and we were f orced to use the ISA, and the tension was 
immediately diffused". 127 
contd... 
125. Mckay & Roth, The Decline In The Rule Of Law In Singapore And Malaysia 
(Report of the Committee on InFe-rnational Human Rights of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York) pp. 32-37. Several local 
accounts critical of the detentions are also available: see, The Real 
Reason (Publication of the Opposition Democratic Action Party-, ---19-8-8-T-, - ýýýqned Web (CARPA 1988); Kua Kia Soong, Behind The Wire (Chinese 
Assembly Hall Publication, 1989). At the same-EUFF-EHere were detentions 
made in Singapore under its Internal Security Act identical in terms to 
the Malaysian statute. For a criticism of the Singapore detentions, see 
silencing All Critics (Human Rights Violations In Singapore: An Asia 
Watch Report, Seplt-eiEer 1989); The Rule Of Law And Human Rights In 
Malaysia And Singapore (A Report of the Conference held at the European 
Parliament, 9-10 March 1989 organised by KEHMA-s (The European Committee 
for Human Rights In Malaysia and Singapore, and the Rainbow Group, 
European Parliament; Published by KEHMa-s Belgium)). 
126. Dismissing The Writs, Far Eastern Economic Review 3 December 1987. 
127. The Star, December 2,1989 p. 1. See also the case of Tuang Pik King v. 
Henteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1989] 1 MLJ 301, where Edgar Joseph J. 
ruled that the ground of inciting racial sentiments fell within the 
scope of the ISA. 
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Thus, the ISA continues in -force today with its acknowledged purpose being 
much broader than "the threat" envisaged within the contemplation of Article 
149 when it was first enacted on 31 July 1960. 
A law passed under Article 149 is expressly authorised to override the 
fundamental guarantees contained in Article 5 (liberty of the person), Article 
9 (prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement), Article 10 (freedom of 
speech, assembly and association) and Article 13 (right to property). Thus, 
the ISA is a valid law although its preventive detention provisions are 
totally inimical to the freedom and liberty of the individual. The only 
safeguard for a detainee is the right of representation to an Advisory Board 
constituted under Article 151 whose recommendation in any event is not binding 
on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (effectively for this purpose, the 
Government). 128 The preventive detention provisions themselves confer little, 
if not, no safeguards to the detainee. These provisions are Sections 8 and 73 
of the Act. The latter is a remarkable provision that has probably no 
equivalent outside Malaysia and Singapore. It authorises the police to 
preventively detain a person who is suspected of being a threat to security 
for purposes of investigation. The provision reads as follows: 
228. Article 151 reads: 
15 1. " (1) Where any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance 
of this Part provides for preventive detention - 
(a) the authority on whose order any person is detained under 
that law or ordinance shall, as soon as may be, inform him 
of the grounds for his detention and, subject to Clause (3), 
the allegations of fact on which the order is based, and 
shall give him the opportunity of making representations 
against the order as soon as may be; 
(b) no citizen shall continue to be detained under that law or 
ordinance unless an advisory board constituted as mentioned 
in Clause (2) has considered any representations made by him 
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"73. (1) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain 
pending equiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe- 
(a) that there are grounds which would justify his detention 
under Section 8; and 
(b) that he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in 
any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any 
part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services 
therein or to the economic life thereof. 
(2) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain 
pending enquiries any person, who upon being questioned by the officer 
fails to satisfy the officer as to his identity or as to the purposes 
f or which he is in the place where he is f ound, and who the of f icer 
suspects has acted or is about to act in any manner prejudicial to the 
security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of 
essential services therein or to the economic life thereof. 
(3) Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a 
period not exceeding sixty days without an order of detention having 
been made in respect of him under section 8: 
Provided that - 
(a) he shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours except 
with the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of 
Inspector; 
(b) he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except 
with the authority of a police of f icer of or above the rank of 
Assistant Superintendent; and 
contd... 
128. under paragraph (a) and made recommendations thereon to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong within three months of receiving such 
representations, or within such longer period as the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong may allow. 
(2) 
. 
An advisory board constituted f or the purposes of this Article shall consist of a chairman, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and who shall be or have been, or be qualified to be, a ludge of the Supreme Court or a High Court, or shall before Malaysia. Day have been a judge of the Supreme Court, and two other members, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Lord President of the Supreme Court. 
(3) This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the national Interest". 
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(c) he shall not be detained for more than thirty days unless a police 
officer of or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported 
the circumstances of the arrest and detention to the Inspector- 
General or to a police officer designated by the Inspector-General 
in that behalf, who shall forthwith report the same to the 
minister. 
(4)-(5) (Repealed). 
(6) The powers conferred upon a police officer by sub-sections 
(1) and (2) may be exercised by any member of the security forces, any 
person performing the duties of guard or watchman in a protected place 
and by any other person generally authorized in that behalf by a chief 
Police officer. 
(7) Any person detained under the powers conferred by this 
-section shall be deemed to be in lawful custody, and may be detained in 
any prison, or in any police station, or in any other similar place 
authorized generally or specially by the Minister. 11 
The constitutionality of the provision was challenged in Theresa Lim Chin 
Chin Is case. The argument that - investigative preventive detention under 
Section 73 is unconstitutional was rejected by, the Supreme. Court. The Court 
ruled that the police detention under Section 73 was part of a single process 
leading to the order of detention under Section 8. Howeverl, what the Supreme 
Court would seem to have failed to appreciate was that a police detention 
under Section 73 need not result in a ministerial order of detention under 
Section 8. In that event, it was possible for a person to be detained and 
released, all under section 73, without being accorded the rights under 
Article 151 of making representations to an Advisory Board. It should then 
follow that a law that enables or authorises this is unconstitutional. The 
reasoning of the Supreme Court that it falls "within one scheme of preventive 
detention legislation" does not answer the contention that a detention that 
begins and ends under Section 73 would not enjoy the constitutional protection 
of Article 151. 
The principal provision providing for preventive detention, however, 
remains Section 8. Sub-section (1) reads as follows: 
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118. (l) If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any 
person is necessary with a view to preventing him f rom acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to 
the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life 
thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a detention 
order) directing that that person be detained for any period not 
exceeding two years. " 
The main question under section 8 (and also section 73) has always been 
whether the discretion of the detaining authority is to be evaluated on a 
subjective basis or objective basis. In this the ghost of Liversidge v. 
Anderson, 129 which has long been discarded in England, 130 and elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, 131 continues to rule in Malaysia. since the early decision of 
the Federal Court in Karam Singh v. Henteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, 132 the 
Malaysian courts have held that the discretion of the detaining authority is 
not reviewable on an objective criteria. In two recent cases, the Supreme 
Court was addressed on the fact that Liversidge's case and the subjective 
criteria approach has been expressly overruled in England. In Re Tan Sri Raja 
Ahalid Bin Raja Harun, 133 the Supreme Court declined to follow the trends 
elsewhere, stating: 
129. - (19421 AC 206. 
130. The courts of the highest authority in England ie. the House of Lords 
and the Privy Council have since rejected the majority decision in 
Liversidge Is case: see Nakkuda Al i v. Jeyara tne C 19 51 ] AC 6 6; IRC v. 
Rossminster [1980] AC 952; Khawaja v. Home Secretary [1984) AC 74. In 
Rossminster's case, Lord Diplock observed pointedly: "The time has come 
to acknowledge openly that the majority of this House in Liversidge v. 
Anderson were expediently and, at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong 
and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin was right" (p. 1011). 
131. Eg. in Pakistan, see Ghulam Jilani v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 
1969 SC 373, Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim 
Shorish Kashmiri PLD 1969 SC 14; in Zimbabwe, see Minister of Home 
Affairs v. Austin [1987] IRC (Const) 567; in South Africa, See Hurley v. 
Minister for Law And order (1985] 4 SA 709; 
132. (1969] 2 MLJ 129. 
133. [19881 1 MIJ 182. 
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"We would prefer to adopt a realistic rather than a pedantic approach on 
a matter such as this ..... Here we are dealing with an Act authorised and enacted under the special provisions of the Constitution, namely, 
__,, 
Part XI providing for "special powers against subversion, organised 
violence 134 and acts and crimes prejudicial to the p6blic, and emergency 
_, 
powers". 
It was, unfortunately, merely the statement of a conclusion- without any reason 
bei 
, 
ng proffered for it. Later, in Theresa Lis chin chin's case, the supreme 
Court sought to improve on its stand: 
"Thus, whatever these decisions have decided and developments of the law 
elsewhere, especially'in England relating to fairness of the process of 
executive decision-making, in the context of our case we are constrained 
by the following two propositions. First, we agree with the opinion of 
the Chief Justice that national interest is wider than national 
security ..... secondly, Section 16 of the ISA and Article 151 Clause (3) 
clearly authorise the executive not to disclose any information relating 
to national security". 135 
Probably, only the second of the propositions stated above merits comment. It 
is -obvious that the Court had confused the requirements of proof before a 
judicial tribunal for the test to be applied by it. 136 As Lord Atkin in his 
dissent in Liversidge's case pointed out: "(IF) the subjective theory is right 
and' (the Minister) has indeed unconditional power ..... it is enough for him, to 
say', he exercised the power". 137 Thus, it should follow that the absence of 
proof should not preclude judicial, review of the discretion of the detaining 
authority because the review cannot be dependent, upon whether or not the 
detaining authority, chooses to furnish particulars and reasons for the 
detention. 
134. At p. 186H and 187E. 
135. Op. cit. p. 297E-I. 
136. See the pointed criticism of the Supreme Court's reasoning by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs 
[1989] 1 MLJ 69 at 80. 
137. Op. cit. at p. 247. 
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_ 
The general reticence in the review position taken by the Supreme Court 
is seen further in the distinction sought to be made between "allegation of 
facts"*, and "grounds of detention". In Karpal Singh v. Henteri Hal Ehwal Dalam 
Negeri, 138 the Supreme Court ruled that "whilst the grounds of detention order 
are open to challenge on judicial review if alleged to be not within the scope 
of the, enabling legislation, the allegations of fact upon which the subjective 
satisfaction of the Minister was based are not". This has been the invariable 
approach of the Malaysian and Singapore courts since Karam Singh's case. 
However, the Singapore Court of Appeal in its 1989 decision in Chng Suan Tze's 
case139 termed the distinction "illogical" stating that allegations of fact 
are as much evidence of the matters taken into consideration as grounds of 
detention. It creates the absurdity of where, if the allegations of facts are 
vholly unrelated to the grounds of detention, the Court is powerless to strike 
down the detention because the latter is reviewable but not the former. In 
practical terms, the distinction is blurred, and leads to unnecessary 
casuistry. The decision in Re Tan Sri Raja Khalid, 140 where the detention was 
held to be unlawful, would not have been possible if the Court was not also 
convinced that the allegationg of fact do not support the grounds of 
detention. What the court had in fact stated was that the detaining authority 
vas, wrong to conclude that the allegations of fact constitute a threat to 
security as opposed to disclosing mere criminal conduct. In the subsequent 
case , of Ninister of Home Affairs v. 
Jamaluddin bin Othman,, 141 the Supreme 
138. (19881 1 MLJ 468. 
139. See note (213) supra. 
140. Op. Cit. 
141. [1989] 1 MLJ 418. 
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Court 
- ruled that the preventive detention of a Malay convert for propagating 
the, Christian religion among Malays was unlawful. The Court held that mere 
participation in meetings and seminars for the dissemination of Christianity 
among Malays, without more, could not be a threat to security. Again the court 
could not have come to this conclusion without reviewing on an objective basis 
the, allegations of fact. Thus, although the Court said that "the grounds for 
detention read in the proper context are insufficient to fall within the scope 
of the Act" it is patently obvious that the Court had decided that the 
allegations of fact do not support the belief that the detainee is a threat to 
security. 
The Singapore courts have generally kept in line with the Malaysian 
decisions an the reviewability of ISA detentions largely because of the 
identical nature of the two laws. Thus f or years the tepid decision of the 
Malaysian court in Karam Singh's case was adopted and applied in Singapore 
through the Court of Appeal decision in Lee Mau Seng v. Minister of Home 
Affairs. 142 In December 1988, the Court of Appeal overruled Lee Mau Seng in 
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs. 143 The decision was a veritable 
tour, de force and is admirable for the painstaking collection and discussion 
of English, Malaysian and other Commonwealth cases bearing on the subject. The 
Court held, in essence, that the subjective test adopted in Karam Singh's case 
and its progeny was no longer supportable and that the objective test should 
govern the determination by the courts of whether the matters relied upon by 
142. (1971] 2 MIJ 137; For a critical assessment of the judgment, see Rowena 
Daw, Preventive Detention in Singapore: A Comment On The Case Of Lee Mau 
Seng (1972) 14 Mar. -L. R. 276. 
143. [1989] 1 MLJ 69. 
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the executive fall within the object and purposes of the Act. 144 The' decision, 
however', had a short life. The Singapore Government acted swiftly to stem its 
impact: _, by legislative changes. First, the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1 of 
1989 was passed on 27 January 1989 providing for any question that arises in 
court 
-relating 
to any decision or'act done by the executive under any Act 
Passed under Article 149 (the Singapore equivalent) to be determined in 
accordance with any law passed by Parliament for this purpose. Thereafter, the 
Singapore Parliament amended the ISA on 30 January 1989 ý vide the Internal 
Security (Amendment) Act, 2 of 1989, by which, inter alia, it was declared that 
the law governing any review of executive action was that obtaining on 13 July 
1971 (ie. the date of the judgment in Lee Kau Seng's case). 145 
Malaysia followed suit. Inspite of the reaffirmation of the subjective 
test in Tan Sri Raja Khalid's case and in Theresa Lis Chin Chin it was evident 
that the Government was concerned that the ground-breaking precedent set by 
the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Chng Suan Tze's case may be followed by 
the Malaysian courts. Thus, by the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989, 
judicial review of preventive detention was sought to be severely restricted 
by the insertion of a new Clause 8B, which read: 
144. See also Sin Boon Ann, Judges and Administrative Discretion -A Look At 
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs [1989) 2 MLJ ci. 
145. The amendments were unsuccessfully 
&llenged in Teo Soh Lung v. 
Minister of Home Affairs [1989] 2 MLJ 449; [1990] 2 MLJ 129 (Court of 
Appeal). See also Vincent cheng v. Minister for Home Affairs (19901 1 
MLJ 449. For a general discussion of judicial review of preventive 
detention in Singapore after the 1987 arrests, see Yee Chee Wai et al, 
Judicial Review of Preventive Detention Under The Internal Security Act 
-A Summary Of Develo-p-m-e-nTs- (1989) 10 Sing. L. R. 66. See also, Tan Yock rl'rn-,. some Asp2cts Of Executive Detention In Malaysia And Singapore 
(1987)- 29 Mal. L. R. 237; H. F. Rawl ings-, --H-aFeas corpus And Preventi've 
Detention In Singapore And Malaysia (1983) 25 Mal. L. R. 324. 
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. "H. (1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no 
court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act 
. 
done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in 
the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, 
save in regard to any question on compliance Oith any procedural 
requirement in this Act governing such act or'decision. 
(2) The exception in regard to any question on compliance with 
any procedural requirement in subsection (1) shall not apply where the 
grounds are as described in Section 8A. 
8C. In this Act, "judicial review" includes proceedings 
instituted by way of 
(a) an application for any of the prerogative orders of 
mandamus, prohibition and certiozaz-i; 
(b) an application for a declaration or an injunction; 
(c) a writ of habeas corpus; and 
(d) any other suit, action or other legal proceedings relating 
to or arising out of any act done or decision made by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in accordance with 
this Act. " 
The Explanatory Statement that accompanied the Amendment Bill dealt with - the 
reasons for the amendments with refreshing candour: 
"The new Section 8B removes from judicial review all acts done and 
decisions made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in exercise 
of their, discretionary power under the Act except in regard to any 
procedural requirement governing such act or decision. The intention of 
,, this new section is to decisively reaffirm the principle that the 
subjective test applies in determining the proper exercise of 
discretionary power by the Minister as laid down in the case of 'Karain Singh v. Nenteri Hal Ehval Dalas Negeri, Nalaysia [1969] 2 MLJ 129, 
followed in the case of Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector General of 
Police (1988] 1 MLJ 293. This provision is necessary to avoid any 
possibility of the courts substituting their judgment for that of the 
Executive in matters concerning security of the country as has been done 
by courts in certain foreign countries which base their decisions on 
conditions totally different from Malaysials. In matters of national 
security. and public order, it is clearly the Executive which is the best 
authority to make evaluations of available information in order to 
decide on precautionary measures to be taken and to have a final say in 
such matteis; not the courts which have to depend on proof of 
evidenceit. 1 6 
146. D. R. 20/89; P. N. (U) 1542/89., 
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In tabling the Amendment Bill in Parliament on 23 June 1989 the Prime Minister 
Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad said: 
(The) interventionist role of judicial decisions and trends of foreign 
courts should not be copied because such action was against the concept 
of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary that was 
upheld in Malaysia 
If the courts can reverse the executive's decision, it would make it impossible for the executive to make any decision for fear that the 
courts would intervene. The ruling party would then be immobilised because it would then be waiting for týe decisions of the courts and the 17 result of, appeals to higher courts". 
The Bar Council in a Press Statement criticised the amendments in strong terms 
stating that the Malaysian Government was "taking the cue from Singapore". The 
Council further commented: 
"The effect of the amendments is to confer upon the Executive absolute 
power over the liberty of citizens, and the people, of this country. 
This is totally unacceptable and is repugnant to the basic concept of 
government by democracy". 148 
It is unlikely that the Malaysian Supreme Court would react differently 
from the Singapore court of Appeal (in Teo Soh Lung's case) when faced with a 
constitutional challenge as to the vires of the amendments. The reticent and 
non in terventionist approach generally of the Supreme Court149 in preventive 
detention case is unlikely to change in the forseeable future given the 
present trend of decisions. 
147. The STAR, June 24,1989 p. l. "PM on Why The Need to Remove Judicial 
Review". 
248. Press Statement dated 23 June 1989; portions (not the above) reproduced 
in The STAR, ibid. p. 4. 
149. Outside purely procedural questions concerning the detention (eg. Public 
Prosecutor v. Koh Yoke Koon [1988] 2 MLJ 301 SC, where the detention 
order was held unlawful because the detainee was detained at an 
- 
unauthorised place) the Supreme Court has generally repelled any 
challenge to a detention which calls for a judicial evaluation of the 
reasons for detention. For example, the staleness or remoteness of the 
incidents upon which the detention is ordered which generally is an 
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Under Article 150 
Preventive detention laws are not limited to Article 149. Under Article 
ISO, - ýhe Yang di-Pertuan Agong is also empowered under his general law-making 
I 
powers during an emergency to enact preventive detention laws, if he deems it 
necessary for the purposes of the emergency. A preventive detention law under 
Article 150 is likely to be more pervasive than one under Article 149 because, 
being an emergency law, it can generally override the Constitution, unlike a 
law under Article 149 which can only be inconsistent with some of the 
fundamental liberty provisions in Part II of the Constitution. During the 
present Emergency declared on 15 May 1969, two emergency laws relating to 
preventive detention were made. The first was ordinance No. 4, the Emergency 
(Internal Security) (Modification of Laws) ordinance 1969,150 which extended 
the ISA as an emergency law and substituted the Minister of Home Affairs as 
the detaining authority in place of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The second, and 
more importantly, was ordinance No. 5, the Emergency (Public order And 
contd... 
149. acceptable ground to invalidate the detention in other jurisdictions 
(eg. India, see Prasad Chaturvedi v. State of M. P. 1983 3 SCC 443; Vijay 
Narani Singh v. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14) has not been accepted by 
the Supreme Court: see Nenteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri v. Chua Teck 
(1990] 1 HLJ 104 SC. The court ruled that the argument on staleness goes 
to sufficiency or relevancy of the facts, "an inquiry outside the powers 
of the court; there is hardly any need to refer to any authority for 
this" (p. 105). But it would appear that the Supreme Court failed to 
consider the earlier decision of the Penang High Court in Yit Hon Kit v. 
Minister for Home Affairs [1988] 2 MLJ 638 at 645 et seq, on this very 
question where the argument had succeeded. The decision in Yit Hon Kit's 
case may now be considered to have been overruled sub silentio. NB: The 
decision in Koh Yoke Koon's case itself, supral has sinZe been 
legislatively overruled by the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1988 in 
so far as detention under that statute is concerned. 
150. P. U. (A) 186/69. 
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Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969,151 by which the Minister of Home Affairs 
is authorised to order the detention, for a period of up to two years, of any 
person who is "acting in any manner prejudicial to public order" or whose 
detention "is necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of 
crimes involving violence". 152 The provision - has been given a wide 
interpretation by the courts so as to cover even trafficking in drugs. 153 The 
test 'for detention is, like in the ISA cases, the subjective satisfaction of 
the Minister, which is therefore not open to judicial review save where mala 
fides is alleged, or that the grounds fall outside the scope of the Ordinance 
or that a condition precedent for making the detention order was not complied 
vith. 154 
The most controversial emergency legislation, however, has been the 
Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 (hereinafter referred 
to ESCAR). 155 The'Regulations were introduced to govern the mode of trial in 
criminal cases where the offence is classified as "a security offence". A 
"security offence" is defined in Regulation 2(l) as an offence against 
Sections 57 to 62 of the ISA (all relating to the unlawful possession of 
firearms, ammunitions or explosives in a security area). The Attorney General 
was also authorised to certify any offence under any written law as a 
"security offence", in which event, the trial of the offence was to be 
151. P. U. (A) 187/69. 
152. Section 4. 
153. See Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri v. Mohd. Zambri (1990] 1 MLJ 102 SC. 
254. See Athappen slo Arumugam v. Nenteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (1984] 1 MLJ 
67. 
155. P. U. (A) 362/75. 
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governed by the Regulations and not by the ordinary rules of criminal 
procedure. This apart, the other provisions were also considered harsh as 
removing the traditional safeguards afforded to a criminal accused. The 
introduction of the Regulations met with protest and drew strong criticism 
from the Bar Counci, 156 and international Human Rights Organisations. Between 
Ist August and 6th August 1982, the latter sponsored an International Mission 
of Lawyers headed by Barbara Calvert QC to visit Malaysia. The purpose of the 
visit .. was "to*examine the working of the national security legislation (of 
Malaysia)" including the Regulations. 157 The Mission listed the following as 
ýI 
the significant provisions of concern under the Regulations: 
"i. No matter what the age of the person alleged to have committed the 
offence, he or she will be tried under the procedures provided by ESCAR. 
Juveniles as was apparent in the case of a fourteen year old boy, Lim 
Hiang Seoh, are deprived of the protection afforded by the Juvenile 
Courts Act 1947. (See Regulation 3(3)). 
2. A security case must be tried by a High Court without a 
preliminary enquiry being held in the Magistrates court. (See 
Regulations 5 and 6). 
3. The Magistrate on a charge being preferred by the Public 
Prosecutor whose right it is to specify the charge has a mandatory duty 
to commit the accused to the High Court. (See Regulation 6(1)). 
4. The Public Prosecutor may specify the High Court to which the 
ýaccused is to be committed. (See Regulation 8). 
5. The accused is tried by a Judge alone not by a Judge with the 
assistance of assessors or by a Jury. The right to jury trial is 
abolished. (See Regulation 7). 
156. 
_ 
See unpublished monograph by Dato Param Cumaraswamy, Essential 
cases) Reaulations 1975 - Is The Rule of Law In JeoparU 
DelMred -At The Third Malaysia Law Conference, October 13-15,1975). 
See also Letter from the Bar Council To The Government, INSAF Vol. XIV 
No. 2 April 1981 at pp. 4-5; and, ESCAR: Legal And Procedural Problems, 
INSAF Vol. XV No. 3, October 1982 at pp. 46-47. 
157. See The Report Of The International Mission of Lawyers To MalaXsia 
(MimeUg-raph published by Marram Books, 101 Kilburn Square, London, 
1983). 
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6. Any number of offences whether or not of the same kind or 
committed as part of a series of acts may be tried together and any 
number of accused may be tried, together if the Public Prosecutor so 
certifies. For example, if A is alleged to be found in Penang in 
possession of grenades in January of 1980 and is alleged to have 
indirectly supplied B with supplies which raises a presumption that B 
has or will act contrary to public security in January of 1979, both 
offences and both A and B can be tried together. Supplies cover food or 
clothing. (see Regulation 10). 
7. Under Regulation 13 of ESCAR it appears to be mandatory for the 
-accused to enter his defence but this does not and it has been so held 
mean that he has to give evidence or make a statement. He has the right 
to remain silent. (See both Regulations 13 and 14 and Public Prosecutor 
v. Sihabudin bin Haji Salleh [1980] 2 Malayan Law Journal, 273). 
8. Witnesses may if the Court is satisfied that they are afraid to 
disclose their identity be permitted to give evidence so that neither 
the accused nor his Counsel can see the person. The evidence may be 
given if the Court so rules through an interpreter. (See Regulation 19). 
9. Evidence of accomplices or young persons need not be corroborated. 
(See Regulation 21(2)). 
10. The'admission of hearsay evidence, secondary documentary evidence 
and identification by photographs of the accused being shown to the 
identifier. (Regulations 21(3), (4) and (5) and Regulations 24(l) and 
11. No differentiation is made in the weight to be given to evidence 
whethe i's direct, hearsay or uncorroborated (Regulations 21(7) and 
25). "1 
The-,. Report concluded that the Regulations contravened the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in denying fair trial to an accused person. 159 
The controversial legislation led to a decision by the Malaysian Bar on 
18 October 1977 to advise lawyers to boycott ESCAR trials. The Bar's stand was 
conveyed in a letter to the Government in the following terms: 
158. Ibid. at pp. 38-39. The most controversial conviction under the 
Regulations was that of a 14 year old boy for illegal possession of 
firearms: see Lim Hang Seoh v. PP [1978] 2 MLJ 68. There was a public 
outcry over the death sentence imposed on the boy. The death sentence 
was later commuted by the Government to one of detention at a reform 
school until the age of 21. 
159. Ibid. at pp. 46-48. 
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"In these circumstances, most members of the Bar could not see what 
., 
service they could render to an accused person tried under the 
Regulations. Their appearance in court at these trials did not seem to 
have any significance beyond lending to the whole proceedings a 
semblance of respectability and impressing upon the world that to all 
intents and purposes the ritual of a proper trial had been observed and 
that the accused person had been property convicted and deserved the 
mandatory sentence passed on him. It is this that the Bar is against; 
-and it is in this context that one must consider the feeling of the Bar 
when deciding to pass the Resolution". 160 
The statistics available for the period 1976 - 1981 showed that 112 persons 
were brought to trial under the Regulations; of this 64 were found guilty and 
sentenced to death; 17 were acquitted but re-arrested and detained under the 
ISA. 161 
Generally, emergency laws may also override property rights. Article 13 
of the Federal Constitution, which declares that "No person shall be deprived 
of his property save, in accordance with law" would not ordinarily insulate 
private property from compulsory acquisition if sanctioned by law. What it 
does protect is expropriation by executive fiat. However, that protection may 
be lost under emergency laws as property rights are not entrenched under 
Clause (6A) of Article 150. The only decision to-date to consider the inroads 
that emergency laws can make into property rights is The Jaffanese Cooperative 
Society Ltd. v. Bank Negara Malaysia. 162 The case concerned the powers of the 
Central Bank under the Essential (Protection of Depositors) Regulations, 1986, 
a piece of emergency legislation made under. section 2 of the Emergency 
160. See letter published in INSAF Vol. XIV No. 2 April 1981 at p. 4. For a 
study of the implications of the boycott, see A. Rahim Said: The October 
Boycott: Its Causes, Consequences And Implications For Legal Rrac-flc-e- In 
Malaysia, INSAF Vol. XIV No. 1, January 1981 at p. 23 et seq. 
161. See ESCAR: Legal And Procedural Problems, INSAF Vol. XV No. 3 October 
1982 p. 48. 
162. [1989] 3 MLJ 150 SC. 
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(Essential Powers) Act 1979, to- freeze the property of deposit-taking 
institutions that are unable to meet their deposit liabilities. They also 
vested',, the Central Bank with wide powers, which in the instant case was used 
to appoint receivers and managers over an ailing cooperative and empowered the 
receivers to sell or dispose off or transfer the assets of the cooperative to 
a nominated rescuing body. The shareholders of the cooperative attacked the 
exercise of these powers as amounting to an acquisition of property which was 
not being done on behalf of the Government and therefore ultra vires. The 
Supreme Court repelled the challenge by simply stating that section 2(4) of 
the 19 79 Act provided for emergency regulations to have ef f ect even if they 
are inconsistent with the Constitution. 
If not for the overriding quality given to emergency laws by Article 
150(6), and if made under the 1979 Act by section 2(4) thereof, a law like the 
Protection of Depositors Regulations, 1986 would be unconstitutional as 
permitting deprivation of property without compensation. Reference may be made 
to-the decision of the Indian Supreme court in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. sholapur 
Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. 163 In that case the Court had to consider an 
emergency measure passed specially to save an ailing labour-intensive textile 
company by enabling the Government to pass the properties and effects of the 
163. AIR 1954 SC 119. see also Attorney General Of The Gambia v. Jobe [1984] 
1 AC 689, where the Privy Council held that an executive order freezing 
bank accounts would be a seizure of property and violative of property 
rights. see also the war-time decision of the English Court in Jones 
(Nachine Tools) Ltd v. Farrel [1940] 3 AER 608, which held that the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, empowering the making of 
regulations authorising taking possession or control of an undertaking, 
did not authorise the making of a regulation to "carry on" an 
undertaking. However, see criticism of the decision by the court of 
Appeal in R v. Comptroller of Patents Exparte Bayer Products [1941] 2 
AER 677 at 682. 
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company into the hands of persons nominated by the Government. The question 
was whether the taking which was done for a public purpose to safeguard 
production of an essential commodity and to avoid mass unemployment offended 
the property rights of the shareholders. The court struck down the law as in 
effect being a deprivation of property without compensation and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
on the question of compensation, it is arguable that unless the 
emergency measure prohibits the payment of compensation, the property-owner 
would be entitled under established principles of constitutional law for 
compensation for the loss of his property. Thus, the appropriating authority 
would not be entitled to take property under the prerogative power of handling 
an emergency and avoid paying compensation when a specific statute authorises 
the taking under similar circumstances but with the payment of compensation: 
see Attorney Ceneral v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel; 164 Burmah Oil Company v. Lord 
Advocate. 165 A statute that provides for appropriation of private property, 
even in times of emergency, would usually provide for the rate of 
compensation or in the least provide guidelines for its determination. In 
Attorney Ceneral for Canada v. Hallet & Carey Ltd., 166 the relevant order in 
Council expropriating wheat and barley stored in various elevators in Canada 
stated that it was compensatable at "the old maximum price". The Privy Council 
said the order was not invalid and made no adverse comment about the rate of 
compensation. The Courts would also read compensation clauses beneficiently. 
In the Irish case of Regine (Secretary of State) v. County Court Judge For 
164. (1920) AC 508. 
165. [1964] 2 AER 348. 
166. (19521 AC 427. 
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Armagh, 167 the Northern Ireland Court held that the damages suffered by the 
owner of a lorry, which was stopped by an army patrol and diverted from its 
journey, thereby missing a cargo that had to be collected, was compensatable 
under a provision of the Emergency Provisions Act 1973 that read: "Where under 
this Act any real or personal property is taken, occupied, destroyed or 
damaged or any other act is done interfering with private rights of property, 
compensation shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be payable by 
the Ministry". 
Imact On Federal-State Relations 
The pervasiveness of emergency powers may be seen in the encroachment by 
the Federal Government into the rights of the States during an emergency. The 
carefully crafted balance between the Centre and the States in legislative and 
exepUtive powers is subordinated to the overriding demands of dealing with the 
emergency. In short, the demarcation of powers under the Constitution is no 
barrier to the pervasive control that the Federal Government may exert when a 
state of emergency is declared over a State. It has happened twice in the 
constitutional history of the country. The first was in September 1966 when 
Sarawak was placed under a state of emergency. The other was in November 1977 
when an emergency was declared in the State of Kelantan. Both emergencies have 
been criticised as being motivated by political considerations and not solely 
by concerns of state security. 168 
167. (1981) N. I. 19. 
168. Eg. on Sarawak, see Yash Ghai, The Politics Of The constitution: Another 
Look At The Ninqkan Litigation (1986) 7 Sing. L. R. 147; on Kelantan, see 
Llm-117 Siang, Time Bombs In Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1978) at p. 248. 
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The only provision of Article 150 which deals directly with state rights 
is Clause (4). It reads: 
"While 
-a 
Proclamation of Emergency is in force the-executive authority 
of the Federation shall, notwithstanding anything in this constitution, 
extend to any matter within the legislative authority of a State and to 
the giving of directions to the Government of a State. or to any officer 
or authority thereof". 
The obvious purpose of the provision is to confer overriding powers on the 
Central Government to run the affairs of a State during an emergency. The mode 
of governing is also prescribed, namely, by the giving of directions. This 
method was first invoked during the 1969 emergency. on 15 May 1969, together 
with the Proclamation of Emergency by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, a Direction 
under Clause (4) was issued by His Majesty to all the States "directing" that 
their respective legislative assemblies are not to be summoned until such date 
as may be determined by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 169 The May 1969 Emergency 
was proclaimed at a time when the general elections in the East Malaysian 
states of Sabah, and Sarawak had yet to be completed. The Direction was not 
solely to await the completion of the suspended elections, but also to ensure 
that, in the interim, there is no interference with the executive power of the 
Federation by the exercise of any legislative power by the States. We have 
already examined the features of the special emergency government, in the form 
of the Director of operations and the National Operations Council, that was 
established to govern the country in the twenty-one months when Parliament 
remained prorogued. 170 In fact the continued suspension of the legislative 
power of the States by the Direction forementioned under Clause (4) was to 
facilitate the 
, 
total assumption of the government of the country by the 
169. See P. U. (A) 147 of 1969. 
170. See earlier parts of this Chapter. 
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Director of operations under Emergency Ordinance No. 2 of 1969. On 2 August 
1969, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, at the instance of the Director of 
Operations, promulgated Emergency (Essential Powers) 6rdinance No. 8 of 
1969.171 The Ordinance was declared to be made as a result of the Direction 
given under Clause (4) preventing the summoning' of the state legislative 
assemblies. By the said Ordinance, the legislative power in the States was to 
be confided to the Ruler or Governor of the state who was to assent to any 
laws passed by the State operations Council set up by Ordinance No. 2 of 1969 
(section 3(2)). By section 8, the Ordinance was expressly declared to prevail 
over the provisions of the Eighth schedule to the Federal constitution which 
outlays a uniform scheme of legislative government in all the States of the 
Federation by the insertion of certain compulsory provisions in the various 
State Constitutions. The end result was to confer total governance over the 
States by the Director of operations during the twenty-one months of rule by 
the National operations Council. 
The scope of Clause (4) is truly wide. It should be noted that except 
for the requirement that the Proclamation of Emergency must continue to be in 
force, there is, on the face of it, no other restriction or limitation to its 
application. 
It has always remained an enigma why the Federal Goverment did not 
invoke Clause (4) in September, 1966 to resolve the so-called constitutional 
impasse in Sarawak. The Sarawak crisis arose out of the moves by the Federal 
Government to oust the incumbent Chief Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, from 
office. The impasse developed over the refusal of Ningkan to call for a 
sitting of the Council Negeri, the legislative assembly, and take a vote of 
171. P. U. (A) 307B/69. 
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confidence. The State Constitution confided the power of convening a sitting 
of the Council Negri on the Chief Minister and not the Governor. The Federal 
Government which was seeking Ningkan's ouster was therefore faced with a 
constitutional hurdle. Clause (4) could have provided the answer after the 
Proclamation of Emergency over Sarawak was made on 14 September 1966. A 
directive could have been issued to the Speaker of ýthe Council Negri, who 
would fall within the category of "officer or authority" in Clause (4), 'to 
convene a sitting of the assembly and take a vote of confidence on Ningkan. 
Instead, the Federal Government took the controversial course of- forcibly 
amending the Sarawak Constitution by empowering itself to do so by a temporary 
amendment (the first of its kind) of the Federal Constitution. This was the 
Emergency (Federal Constitution and Constitution of Sarawak) Act, 1966.172 By 
section 4, the Act overrode the provisions of the State Constitution and 
empowered the Governor, of the'State to convene a sitting of the Council 
Negeri. These drastic moves were naturally looked upon with great concern by 
many Sarawakians. one Sarawak - parliamentarian argued that the legislation 
violated one of the conditions of Sarawak's entry into Malaysia, namely, the 
inviolability of the State Constitution. 173 
At the heart of the complaint over the Sarawak affair lay the failure by 
the Federal authorities to obtain the consent of the state legislature to the 
amendment of the State Constitution. However, an amendment to the State 
172. Act No. 68 of 1966. 
173. Speech by Stephen Yong, Malaysian Parliamentary Debates, 19 September 
1966, Vol. III col. 2081, recorded in Shatruddin Hashim, The 
Constitution And The Federal Idea In Peninsula Malaysia (1984) JMCL Vol. - 
11 139 at 171. on the question of whether the forcible amendment 
violated the terms of Sarawak's entry into Malaysia, the Privy council 
observed in Stephen Kalong Ningkan v. Government of Nalaysia (19681 2 
MLJ 238 at 244 that an intention to arm the Federal Parliament to amend 
or modify the Constitution of Sarawak temporarily during an emergency 
"must be imputed to the parties to the Malaysia Agreement of 9th July, 
1963" (at p. 244). 
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Constitution may be the least of the draconian measures that may be taken by 
the Federal Government over a State during an emergency. The State 
Constitution may itself be suspended or placed on a moratqrium. It happened in 
Kelantan in November, 1977. By the Emergency Powers (Kelantan) Act 1977, there 
vas a de facto suspension of the Kelantan State Constitution by the freezing 
of the powers of the Menteri Besar (section 4), the Executive Council (section 
5), and of the Legislative Assembly (section 10). A Director of Government was 
appointed by the Prime Minister who assumed the functions of both the Menteri 
Besar and the Executive Council, and was to be subject "to general or specific 
directions" from the Prime Minister with which he was obliged "to forthwith 
comply, and give effect to" (section 7). The end result was to impose Federal 
Government rule in the State through the declaration of an emergency. 174 
I Another aspect of emergency powers affecting the State is the 
distribution of legislative powers between the State legislatures and 'the 
Federal Parliament stated in Part VI of the Federal Constitution. Article 76 
permits encroachment by the Federal Parliament into the legislative arena of 
the state legislatures only in certain limited spheres eg. the implementation 
of treaty obligations and the promotion of uniformity of laws. These 
restrictions may be overriden by emergency laws which are declared to be valid 
even if they are inconsistent with the Constitution. It may be noted generally 
that state rights are not one of the subjects protected under clause (6A) of 
Article 150 from interfeience by emergency legislation. 
The end result is that a state of emergency effectively converts the 
federal structural system into a unitary one. 175 
174. Shafruddin Hashim, ibid. p. 172. 
175. See Arif f Yusof , Emergency Powers And The Rule Of Law (1983) 10 JMCL 87 
at 95. 
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rT4APTFR XTT 
C0NCLUS10N 
Introduction 
The apparent institutionalization of the state of emergency in Malaysia 
poses the greatest threat to constitutionalism in the country. The emergency 
declared on 15 May 1969, in the wake of the race-riots in Kuala Lumpur, 
continues unabated to this day. The Government has repudiated any suggestion 
that the situation warrants the discontinuance of the state of emergency. In a 
speech in Parliament, a decade after the Emergency was first proclaimed, the 
Law Minister declared: 
"Some people may claim that everything is peaceful and normal - that 
there does not appear to be a state of emergency; that there is no more 
need for the existence of the Proclamation of Emergency or the 
proclamation of the security area. That this appears to be so is not 
owing to the non-existence of the state of emergency but to the efforts 
of the government and the security forces in keeping the state of 
emergency under control. Let it be known there are still hidden dangers 
lurking around and within our midst simmering under the surface ..... The Proclamation of Emergency in 1969 has had to continue and will have to 
continue because it cannot be gainsaid that there has existed and still 
does exist a grave emergency whereby the security anj economic life of 
the country has been and continues to be threatened". 
Af ter more than twenty years of a state of emergency, it is evident that both 
politicians and the public have become desensitized to the implications of its 
continuance. The emergency has well and truly become a constitutional way of 
life in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the problem posed to constitutionalism by a 
permanent state of emergency is far-reaching. 
Speech by the Law Minister, Dato Hamzah Abu Samah, delivered in 
Parliament on 17 January 1979 in moving the second reading of the 
Emergency (Essential Powers) Bill, 1979, reproduced in (1979) 1 MLJ 1xx 
at lxxiii. 
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It is evident that the Government has come to regard the excess power 
conferred by the state of emergency as part of the normal apparatus of 
government. 2 In Malaysia, where the same political party'has been in power 
since Independence, the Government may claim a certain legitimacy to its 
decision not to revoke the state of emergency because it has successively been 
returned to office whilst holding on to the Emergency. However, the continued 
state of emergency has itself never been an issue in the several parliamentary 
general elections held since 1969 and may well throw some doubt as to the 
veracity of this claim. All of this is reflective of a surprising degree of 
2. The observation by Michael P. O'Boyle with regard to the emergency 
situation in Northern Ireland is apposite: "The frequent use of 
emergency powers to cope with crises, coupled with the success of these 
powers, acclimatises administrators to their use, and make recourse to 
them in the future, all the easier. The danger is, that succeeding 
generations of administrators inherit these powers as being efficient 
and unobjectionable, and in a particular emergency, do not give proper 
consideration to the possibility of less drastic measures being used": 
Emergency Situations And The Protection of Human Rights; A Model 
Derogation Provision For a Northern Irelan-a-RTI of Rights (1977) Vol. 
28. N. I. L. Q. 160 at 164. See also the judicial observation by 
Gajendragadkar CJ of the Indian Supreme Court in Sadanandan v. State of 
Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1925 at 1930: "In conclusion, we wish to add that 
when we come across orders of this kind by which citizens are deprived 
of their fundamental right of liberty without a trial on the ground that 
the emergency proclaimed by the President in 1962 still continues and 
the powers conferred on the appropriate authorities by the Defence of 
India Rules justify the deprivation of such liberty, we feel rudely 
disturbed by the thought that continuous exercise of the very wide 
powers conferred by the Rules on the several authorities is likely to 
make the conscience of the said authorities insensitive if not blunt, to 
the paramount requirement of the Constitution that even during 
Emergency, the freedom of Indian citizens cannot be taken away without 
the existence of the justifying necessity specified by the Rules 
themselves. The tendency to treat these matters in a somewhat casual and 
cavalier manner which may conceivably result from the continuous use of 
such unfettered powers, may ultimately post a serious threat to the 
basic values on which the democratic way of life in this country is 
founded. It is true that cases of this kind are rare, but even the 
presence of such rare cases constitutes a warning to which we think it 
is our duty to invite the attention of the appropriate authorities". 
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apathy amongst the public and politicians alike. In the absence of a critical 
pressr there is little or no public discussion of the implications of this 
state of affairs. 
Perpetual -Emergencies, constitutionalism And Future Saf eguaýds 
The complete impotence of any body or organisation other than the 
perpetrators of the emergency themselves to revoke it is a significant point 
to note. In delivering the epochal decision of the Privy council in Public 
Prosecuto. r v. Teh Cheng Poh, 3 Lord Diplock dropped a bombshell when he 
suggested quite plainly that the Cabinet should be amenable to an order of 
mandamus to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to revoke a security area 
proclamation if the occasion for its revocation had arisen. The Government 
acted swiftly to curb any judicial pronouncements along these lines. In 
January 1979, the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979 was passed seeking to 
preclude the court from, inter alia, questioning the continued operation of 
any Proclamation issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under an Act of 
Parliament. 4 A more complete ouster was achieved by the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act A514 of 1981 which, inter alia, purported to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts from questioning the proclamation of an emergency 
and/or the continuance of a state of emergency. 5 This amendment was the last 
of a series of six amendments over two decades that had steadily denuded 
Article 150 of the safeguards originally found in the provision. 6 The 
3. (1980] AC 432; (1979) 1 MLJ 52. 
4. Section 12. 
5. Article 150(8) 
6. For a detailed discussion of the various amendments, see Chapter V. 
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significant changes were in the area of parliamentary and judicial scrutiny 
and - review of ,a Proclamation of Emergency. The dimunition of the role of 
Parliament in reviewing a Proclamation was achieved by th6- amendments in 1960 
and 1981. By the 1960'amendments, 7 the provision that a Proclamation' would 
automatically lapse within two months of its issue, unless approved by a 
resolution of both Houses of Parliament, was replaced by the present provision 
(clause (3)) which-in essence, declares that the Proclamation may continue 
indefinitely unless annulled by resolutions passed by both Houses. The effect 
of the amendment, was to create Proclamations of indefinite duration. In the 
absence of any imperative under Clause (3) requiring that a Proclamation 
should be laid before Parliament within a defined period, or the time within 
which Parliament should be convened to decide on the continuance ý of a, 
Proclamation, the pathway was cleared for the executive Government to ride on 
an Emergency as' long as it wants. Any ambiguity in the subordination of 
Parliament's role in this regard was removed by the 1981 amendments8 that* 
deleted the former Clause (2) requiring the Yang di-Pertuan Agong "to summon 
Parliament as soon as may be, practicable". This set of amendments also brought 
in the judicial ouster provision for the first time in Article 150. 
The attempt at foreclosing any form of early review of a Proclamation is 
portentously debilitating'to constitutional government. The reason lies in the- 
1963 amendments to Article 150.9 By this set of amendments the law-making 
power - of Parliament during an emergency was considerably enhanced. Unlike 
previously, Parliament, was now authorised to make laws with respect to any 
7. Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 10 of 1960. 
8. Constitution (Amendment) Act A514 of 1981. 
9. Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 26 of 1963. 
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matter if it appears to Parliament that the law is required by reason of the 
emergency. Moreover, and more importantly, by the new Clause (6), all 
emergency laws, whether an ordinance promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
or an Act of, Parliament, override the Constitution and are deemed to be valid 
even if inconsistent with the Constitution. The pervasive sweep of this 
provision is limited-only by Clause (6A) that places six (6) subjects beyond 
the reach of emergency laws, namely: (i) Islamic law, (ii) the custom of the 
Malays, (iii) native law and custom in Sabah and Sarawak, (iv) religion, (v) 
citizenship, and (vi) language. The amendments left no room for doubt that, 
except in these matters, the Constitution was to be subordinate to emergency 
laws. 
In short,, Article 150 in its present form provides every opportunity for 
abuse and misuse. The dangers presented to constitutional government by the 
provision is not mitigated, by its utility in times of a real emergency. The 
fact that the executive government should be empowered to take swift action 
to deal with an exigency threatening the life of the nation does not justify 
the removal of the safeguards originally built into the provision. It was 
never intended byý the Reid Commission, in drafting the independence 
Constitution, that a state-of emergency should be a perpetual feature of 
government. As events went the advantages in governing under a perpetual state 
of emergency were too great for the Government to surrender. The advantage, in 
the main, lies in the enhanced law-making power that the Government enjoys. An 
emergency enables the Government to rule under two parallel legal regimes that 
co-exist with each other. The option lies at the hand of the Government of the 
day at any given time whether to act or legislate under the one or the other. 
In . *essence, - it is lawfully possible for the Government to ignore Parliament 
and - the Constitution and to take action, both legislative and executive, 
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entirely under its emergency powers. Under Clause (2B), the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong is empowered at his discretion to make emergency laws called Ordinances. 
This is in addition to his extant power under se ction 2 of the Emergency 
Essential Powers Act 1979 to make emergency regulations on a wide variety of 
subjects. Given that these emergency laws are virtually beyond the pale of 
judicial challenge by the fact that they enjoy a status higher than that of 
the Constitution itself, the inevitable result is the complete subordination 
of the Constitution and the civil law system to the regime of emergency laws. 
Thus Article 150 provides the means by which the Constitution and its 
processes may be scuttled or by-passed at the whim of the Executive. The only 
assurance against an abuse of Article 150 is the good sense and benevolence of 
those in office. Constitutional ists would find this of little comfort. one is 
reminded of the well-known words of Jefferson in advocating a written bill of 
rights for the American people: "In questions of power, let no more be said of 
confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the 
Constitution". 
Therefore,, is it not arguable that a provision that enables the 
Constitution and constitutional safeguards to be by-passed, and which provides 
for perpetual crisis rule, is itself inimical to the founding principles of 
the Constitution? The objection to Article 150, in its present form, is not to 
the provision of crisis powers to deal with an emergency, *but to the absence 
of any adequate safeguards against abuse. In essence, this objection may be 
articulated compendiously as follows: the ease with which an emergency may be 
proclaimed solely on the subjective opinion of the Executive government; the 
absence of any check or control on the continuance of the emergency other than 
a vote of revocation by Parliament; the vesting of unbridled power in the 
Executive government during an emergency without a proportionality between the 
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crisis and the powers' needed to deal with it; and, the loss of the 
Constitution's status as the supreme law of the land during an emergency. 
Could it be argued therefore that Article 150 as amended is destructive of the 
basic features ofhe Constitution? The "basic features" test was devised by 
the Indian Supreme Court in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State 
of KeralalO to place an implied restraint on the power of Parliament to alter 
the Constitution beyond its basic features. It was posited in that case that 
Parliament inherently lacked the capacity to amend the Constitution so as to 
interfere with its basic structure. 11 Sikri Ci identified them as: (1) the 
supremacy of the Constitution, (2) republican and democratic form of 
government, (3)' secular character of the Constitution, (4) separation of 
powers, and (5) federalism. In the subsequent case of Indira Nehru Gandhi V. 
Raj Narain, 12 the Supreme Court expanded on the theme and added the rule of 
law, equality before the law, and free and fair elections, as also being 
essential features of a democratic constitution. In Kinerva Hills v. Union of 
India, 13 the Supreme Court applied the doctrine to strike down amendments to 
the Constitution designed to overcome the limiting effect of the doctrine 
itself, and to preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of any 
amendment. In affirming the doctrine, the Supreme Court used language that is 
particularly apposite to Article 150: 
10. AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
11. The case is voluminous running into 566 pages of the All India Reporter. 
For a summary of the arguments and the judgments, see Fundamental Rights 
case: The Critics Speak Ed. Surendra Malik, (Eastern Boo k Co., Lucknow) : 
For a discussion of the case in a British legal journal, see David Gwynn 
Morgan, The Indian Essential Features' Case 1981 Vol. 30 ICLQ 307. 
12. AIR 1975 SC 2299. 
13. AIR 1980 SC 1789. 
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"Our Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power among the three 
wings of the State, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the 
Judiciary. - It is the function of the Judges, nay their duty, to 
pronounce upon the validity of laws. If Courts are totally deprived of 
that power, the fundamental rights conferred upon the people will become 
a mere adornment because rights without remedies are as writ in water. 
A controlled Constitution will then become uncontrolled. Clause (4) of 
Art. 368 totally deprives the citizens of one of the most valuable modes 
of redress which is guaranteed by Article 32. The conferment of the 
right to destroy the identity of the Constitution coupled with the 
provision that no court of law shall pronounce upon the validity of such 
destruction seems to be a transparent case of transgression of the 
limitations on the amending power. If a constitutional amendment cannot 
be pronounced to be invalid even if it destroys the basic structure of 
the Constitution, a law passed in pursuance of such an amendment will be 
beyond the pale of judicial review because it will receive the 
protection of the constitutional amendment which the courts will be 14 powerless to strike down". 
Given the judicial conservatism of the Courts, the doctrine faces an 
uncertain reception in Malaysia. In the first of the cases that referred to 
the doctrine, there was an implicit acceptance of the principle of "basic 
features". Abdoolcader J. blandly asserted that he agreed with Chandrachud J. 
in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narani that the equality provision is part of 
the basic structure of the Constitution and a basic feature thereof: see 
Public Prosecutor v. Dato Harun Hj. 1dris. 15 But the Federal Court in Loh 
Kooi Choon v. Government of Halaysia'16 gave an equally bland reason for 
rejecting the doc trine. Raja Azlan Shah FJ (as he was then) merely stated: "A 
short answer to the fallacy of this doctrine is that it concedes to the court 
a more potent power of constitutional amendment through judicial legislation 
than the organ formally and clearly chosen by the Constitution for the 
exercise of the amending power". It is apparent that there is a certain degree 
14. Ibid. 
15. [1976] 2 MLJ 116 at 120. 
16. Ibid at p. 88. 
438 
of misconception as to the effect of the doctrine. The "basic structure" 
argument is principally designed to preserve the Constitution in its essential 
form and . not to subject it to the vagaries of a passing majority in 
Parliament. 
, 
Ironically in the Loh Kooi Choon judgment itself, there was a 
recognition, that the Constitution is founded upon three basic concepts,, 
identified as being: (a) the chapter on fundamental rights, (b) federalism 
and, (c) separation of powers. In the later case of Phang Chin Hock v. Public 
Rrosecutor,, 17 Suffian LP ventured a more plausible reason for rejecting the 
Indian doctrine. He saw in the autochthonous nature of the Indian Constitution 
and in its Directive Principles of State Policy, sufficient disparity with the 
Malaysian Constitution to justify the rejection of the doctrine. Like in the 
earlier case, the reasoning exhibits more a repudiation of the theory on 
policy grounds than for any cogent reasons of principle. The Suffian argument 
that the Malaysian Constitution was the product of an Anglo-Malayan joint 
effort and therefore, presumably, not subject to any implied restraints as to 
its mutability, is assailable on first principles. The doctrine has little, if 
nothing, to do with the historicity of a constitution, but everything to do 
with its basic characteristics. If a written Constitution has a core, which 
explains the raison dletre of its existence, the question is whether a passing 
majority in Parliament- should be permitted to alter it beyond recognition? 18 
Phang Chin Hock is, nevertheless, a significant decision because it dealt 
squarely with the question, inter alia, of whether a provision like section 
2(4) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979 could possibly be valid. 
17. [1980] 1 MIJ 70. 
18. For a criticism of the Suffian judgment, see Andrew Harding, The Death 
Of A Doctrine? (1979) 21 Mal. L. R. 365. The last word on the subject haS- 
probably not been said. In the later case of Mark Koding v. Public 
Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120, the Federal Court did not reject outright 
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Academic writing has favoured the reception of the doctrine. For - example, 
there is a viewpoint that Clause (8) that purports to oust judicial review of 
a Proclamation or continuance of a state of emergency has led to "an eclipse 
of constitutional government" and has undermined the basic structure of the 
Constitution. 19 There is considerable force in this argument. The systematic 
amendment of Article 150 since 1960 has denuded it of all - safeguards. In 
particular,, both Clause (6), and section 2(4) of the 1979 Act, are repugnant 
to the basic concept of constitutional supremacy which is a cornerstone of the 
Constitution. 
The absence of the proportionality element in the emergency laws beg the 
question whether it is necessary for successfully combating an emergency that 
Government should be given carte blanche authority to override the 
Constitution willy-nilly as it pleases? The fundamental principle embodied in 
international covenants, whether Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights or Article 15(4) of the European Convention -on 
Human Rights, is derogation from constitutional obligations only to the extent 
necessary to meet the exigency. The Malaysian provision is a renunciation of 
this essential principle of proportionate derogation. It is therefore arguable 
that the Article - 150 that resulted f rom the amendments is , an af f ront to 
constitutional government and destructive of the basic structure of the 
Constitution. 
contd... 
18. the application of the doctrine but said instead that it was unnecessary 
to decide the question on the facts of the case. Meanwhile, the doctrine 
has unequivocally been rejected by the Singapore Courts: see Teo Soh 
Lung v. The Minister for Home Affairs [19891 2 MLJ 449, and Vincent 
cheng v. Minister for Home Affairs [199o] 1 MIJ 449. 
19. See Professor H. P. Lee in The Constitution of Malaysia: Further 
Perspectives and Developments (Ed. -F. A. Trindade & H. P. Lee) aF -pp. 150- 
151. 
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The question of safeguards is accordingly of paramount concern to the 
f uture of constitutionalism in Malaysia. At the heart of the problem is the 
tilted structure of Article 150 which has consigned Parliament, to a marginal 
role in the invocation and operation of a state of emergency. The judicial 
role is also denied any place in the printed scheme of the provision. It -is 
evident, from beginning to end, that Article 150 is envisaged and intended 
solely to be an occasion of executive decision - making. We have already seen 
the steady stream of amendments over two decades that has denuded Article 150 
of its original character. As it stands today it provides for executive 
absolutism which generally is the bane of third world democracies. Lord 
Finlay's assurance in Halliday's case that Parliament may confide great power 
in -'the Executive in times of public danger "feeling certain that such power 
will be reasonably exercisedn20 belongs to an alien time and clime. In , new 
democracies, it is not uncommon for tensions or an uneasy relationship to 
exist between the executive and the other organs of state, especially the 
judiciary. It cannot be taken for granted that executive power will be 
scrupulously managed without upsetting the delicate balance of power with the 
other organs of state. The experience of several of the new Commonwealth 
countries with a Westminster - style government is absolute power, in the hands 
of the Executive, -either in pretended or actual form. In several cases the 
latter is in the form of a military government. Pakistan's trysts with 
military governments is the most dominant historical feature of its 
constitutional life. 21 Bangladesh, which had a painful military gestation, is 
20. R v. Halliday Exparte Zadig [19171 AC 260 at 265. 
21. See generally TKK Iyer, Constitutional Law In Pakistan: Kelsen In the 
Courts (1973) 21 Am J of Comp Law 759. 
441 
likewise' bedevilled by a dominant military. More recently, the two military 
coups in Fiji leave little room for doubt that since 1987 the power in' that 
country has shifted, probably irrevocably, to the military. 22 The subversion 
of ' constitutionalism by a hyper-active military, like in Pakistan or 
Bangladesh, ' is only one of the several means by which constitutional 
government can be derailed. Emergencies, or crisis government, is of the more 
insidious variety; if uncontrolled, the constitution become the means for 'the 
transition from democratic to un-democratic government. The provision of 
checks and controls against the perpetuation of crisis government isý thus 
vital for the sanctity of constitutional government. 
The absence of checks in the Malaysian system at all points is patently 
obvious. On the question of declaring an emergency, two problems arise. The 
first is the absence of any check on the power of the executive - government 
in declaring an Emergency, and the second, the circumstances when an Emergency 
may be called. on the first question, the current position is that the 'Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong is constitutionally bound to proclaim an emergency on advice 
being tendered to that effect by the Cabinet. 23 It is generally accepted that 
in a cabinet-style government, the Prime Minister is not merely primus inter 
pares but the 'dominant figure in both the Executive and Parliament. The 
consequences of this in relation to an emergency was seen in India's 
experience. The dubious emergency declared by the late Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 
June 1975, acting on her own and without cabinet -consultation, brought about 
the 44th amendment to the Indian Constitution after her government was 
22. See Yash Ghai, A Coup By Another Name? The Politics Of Legality, The 
Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1990, at 11. 
23. For a discussion of whether the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could act on his 
own'in Proclaiming a State of Emergency, see Chapter VIII. 
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overwhelmingly repudiated at the polls in 1977. The amendment 'required that 
the advice -tendered to the President to proclaim an emergency should in 
future be that of the Cabinet and not that of the Prime Minister alone, and 
should be communicated in writing. The efficacy of 1 this provision as a 
safeguard ý against bogus emergencies is, however', doubtful. Whilst it may 
prevent a recurrence of a Mrs. Gandhi type of emergency, 24 it does not 'assure 
that emergencies would not-be declared for dubious reasons. It is confessedly 
impossible to provide against this event, other than the existence of a strong 
and vigilant press, and a voting public that can recognize and act against 
abuse., The presence of a combination of all these factors in a third world 
democracy is generally unlikely. 
In Malaysia, the ethno-centric nature of the society is a feature that 
generally governs all political actions in the country. The democratic 
tradition is therefore to be sought in the actions of the dominant political 
force in the country which shapes its future and destiny, namely, the Malay 
community. Hitherto, the preference among the Malays for electoral government 
and for the Constitution that entrenches and safeguards their language, 
religion and culture, is ývery evident. - However,, in the absence- of - an 
alternative Malay based, non-ideological and non-theocratic political party, 
and in that sense in the absence of a Malay based two-party 'system, 'the 
likelihood of a Government suffering repudiation at the polls merely on 
account of its having abused its emergency powers is unlikely. Thus, a 
government is not likely to be defeated and voted out of office in Malaysia on 
account only, of unreasonably perpetuating emergency rule. It follows that, 
24. See Chapter VII for an account of the Indian Emergency, and Kuldip 
Nayar's The Judgment (Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1977) for a first- 
person narrative acE-ount. 
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unlike in India in 1977, rejection at the polls as a sanction against abuse of 
emergency powers is not a likely event in Malaysia for. the reasons discussed 
above. I 
The second question presents a better opportunity for some form of 
check. - The present circumstances in which an emergency may be called are 
patently wide. - Clause (1) of Article 150 enables an emergency to be declared 
if "a grave emergency" exists which causes a threat to the "security, economic 
life or public order of the Federation". This was the result of the loosening 
in 1963 of the tighter phraseology that existed previously, namely, the 
presence of the words "whether-by war or external aggression or internal 
disturbance". Additionally, two other factors make the provision of even wider 
amplitude., The first -is the enabling of territorially localized emergencies by 
the presence of the words "or any part thereof of the Federation" in , Clause 
(1). The other, which is quite invidious, is found in Clause '(2), providing 
for emergencies to be declared for preventive reasons ie. "before the actual 
occurrence - of the event which threatens the security or economic life or 
public order of the Federationw provided there is "imminent danger of the 
occurence of the eventw. The width of the provision is truly stupendous. 
Academics who have commented on this have all called for a specific definition 
of the situations which justify an emergency. 25 However, it is submitted that 
an attempt at precision in definition by itself would not ensure against the 
possibilities of abuse. one cannot totally escape the use of words like 
7threat to public order* or "internal disturbance" as the'basis of declaring 
25. See Azmi Khalid, Emergency Powers And Constitutional Changes (1983) 
ALIRAN Quarterly .3 No. 3,5 at 7. See s-im-il-ar proposal in Dr. Chandra Muzaffar's, Freedom In Fetters (ALIRAN Publication, June 1986) 
at pp. 219-220. 
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an emergency where it is to be called on account of eg. a civil disorder. At 
best one can marginally improve against the possibilities of abuse by 
narrowing the breadth of the provision. This may be done by enumerating the 
circumstances for declaring emergencies to specific instances like natural 
disasters and calamities, civil disorder and commotion threatening supplies 
and services, war and external aggression. Article 16(l) of the Fifth French 
Republic (1958) is an example of tighter phraseology than most emergency 
provisions. It reads: "When there exists a serious and immediate threat to the 
institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of 
its territory or the fulfillment of its international obligations, and the 
regular functioning of the constitutional public authorities has been 
interrupted, the President of the Republic takes the measures required by the 
circumstances, after consulting officially the Prime Minister, the Presidents 
of the Assemblies and the Constitutional Council". 26 The provision for prior 
consultation with the Heads of the other organs of state is salutory. 
Superadded to this should be the qualification proposed by Professor 
Twining in his appraisal of the Diplock Report on Northern Ireland. 27 The 
suggestion was, inter alia, that the exercise of emergency powers should 
conform with internationally accepted standards as postulated in international 
covenants, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights And Fundamental 
26. Reproduced in (1969) 82 Harvard Law Review 1704 at 1713 (Foot-note (46)) 
under "Notes: Recent Emergency Legislation In West Germany" 
27. W. L. Twining, Emergency Powers And Criminal Process: The Diplock Report 
(1973) Crim. L. R. 406,408. See also David Bonner, Combating Terrorism 
In Great Britain: The Role Of Exclusion Orders (1982) PL 262, -To--ra 
comprehensivediscussion of How safeguards may be provided to prevent 
abuse of the Secretary of State's power to make "exclusion orders" under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1976 in the United Kingdom. 
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Freedoms, 1959. He suggested further that such powers should be invoked in 
individual cases only where the ordinary powers and procedures would be 
inadequate. For example, Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on civil 
and Political Rights speaks of a 'public emergency which threatens the life of 
a nation". It is a yardstick that is more rigorous than the phrase "grave 
emergency" found in Clause (1) of Article 150. It imports a degree of danger 
which is commensurate with the vast powers ordinarily delegated to the 
executive during an emergency. Moreover, the other proposal by Professor 
Twining that it should be a remedy of, last resort to be invoked only if the 
ordinary powers and procedures are inadequate also injects the element of 
proportionality between the problem and the remedy. This again conforms with 
the norms set in international covenants. The First Creek case28 decided that 
the civil disorder in Greece did not pass the test under Article 15(1) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights of being an emergency "threatening the 
life of the nation" and that the civil unrest was something for which police 
remedial action was sufficient. The case followed the definition given by the 
European Court on the phrase "public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation", as "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the 
whole population and constitute a threat to the organised life of the 
community". 29 
28. (1969] 12 Y. B. E. C. H. R. 75. The decision of the European Commission of 
Human Rights was described in an ICJ study on emergencies as "the high- 
water mark of international jurisprudence concerning states of 
emergency ..... because it was the only time that a 
judicial or quasi- 
judicial international tribunal applying the provisions of a human 
rights treaty has made a finding that the emergency purportedly 
justifying derogation from the treaty did not in fact exist": States of 
Emerqenýy: Their Impact On Human Rights (International Commission of 
Jurists) 1983, at p. 451. 
29. Lawless v. Ireland [1961] 1 E. H. R. R. 15. See generally discussion in 
David Bonner, Emergency Powers In Peacetime (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1985) at pp. 84--85. 
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The incorporation of a more stringent definition is unlikely in Malaysia in 
the absence of a strong public opinion on these matters. The International 
Commission of Jurists has observed that Malaysia, Thailand, Ghana and -India 
have not subscribed to any of the international human rights treaties and are 
therefore not subject to the norms prescribed by them or to evaluation bý any 
international judicial tribunal. 30. 
Equally debilitating to constitutional government is the evident lack of 
any check on the duration of an emergency. The initial provision, before the 
1960 amendment, 31 provided that a Proclamation would lapse if not approved by 
both Houses of Parliament within two months of its being made. The effect of 
the amendment was to invert the process of parliamentary check on an 
emergency. Whereas previously there was a positive obligation on the Executive 
to obtain Parliamentary approval within a limited time, there is now no 
restriction as to when approval is to be obtained. If a Proclamation is made 
when Parliament is not-in session, it is open to the Executive to wait till 
Parliament ordinarily meets to lay the Proclamation before it or to skip the 
first session altogether because there is no injunction that the, laying of the 
Proclamation should be in the -session soon after the Proclamation was made. 
This factor coupled with the insertion of Clause (8) in the 1981 amendments to 
oust judicial review of the continuance of a state of emergency makes the 
position clear, from the Executive's viewpoint, that the duration of a state 
of emergency is entirely a matter of its discretion. Judicial opinion has 
30. See ICJ Study, supra, at p. 453. 
31. See Constitution Amendment Act No. 10 of 1960. 
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confirmed this. In Johnson Tan's case, 32 the Court took the, literalist 
approach stating that a proclamation may be revoked only , by the procedure 
provided for under the, Constitution, namely, by a resolution of Parliament, 
and rejected the argument that, it could lapse by ef f luxion of time or - changed 
circumstances. In'Ooi Kee-Saik's case'33 the Court held that the summoning of 
Parliament to discuss the continuance of an emergency is a matter solely for 
the judgment of His Majesty (meaning the Cabinet) and the matter is above 
judicial review. 
In the face of this judicial abstinence, it is trite that parliamentary 
check is the only real remedy against the unwarranted continuance of a state 
of emergency. The obvious safeguard would be to revert to the ýpre-1960 
position of a positive affirmation-by Parliament within a stipulated time of 
the necessity, for an emergency. This conforms with the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand models, the latter providing for emergencies of fixed duration. 34 
These statutes mandate the Government to summon Parliament to ratify the 
emergency if Par. liament was not sitting when the emergency was declared. The 
United Kingdom provision requires that Parliament be summoned within five days 
whereas the New Zealand statute provides for seven days. The New Zealand 
provision was tightened, ironically at the same time as the Malaysian 
provision was loosened, to delete the requirement previously existing of 
32. [1977] 2 MIJ 66. In the Indian case of Bhut Nath Nate v. State of Bencal 
AIR 1974 SC 806,811, the Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a 
state of emergency is a political, not justiciable, issue and the appeal 
should be to the polls not to the courts. 
33. [1971] 2 MLJ 280. 
34. Section 1(2) of the United Kingdom Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and 
Section 2(2) of the Public Safety Conservation Act, 1932. 
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merely to communicate the Proclamation to Parliament at the next ensuing 
session. 35 It may be noticed the Malaysian law does not even carry the 
requirement of laying the Proclamation before Parliament-at the next ensuing 
session. It is left to the discretion of the Executive to bring the 
proclamation before Parliament at any session of their choosing. 
Probably the most pernicious aspect of emergency powers in Malaysia 
today, which may explain the Executive's reluctance to surrender the power, is 
the uncontrolled and uncanalised- law-making authority acquired by the 
Executive during an emergency. There is, apart from Clause (5) of Article 150, 
the Emergency Essential Powers Act, 1979, the principal emergency legislation, 
which in turn gives untramelled power to make subsidiary emergency laws. This 
Act depends upon the continued emergency for its life. Looking first at the 
Constitutional provision, a law undef Clause (5) of Article 150 may be made on 
any subject so long as it is declared by Parliament that the law is required 
by reason of the emergency. 36 The Courts will not generally sit in judgment 
of whether Parliament had rightly decided that the law was necessary forý the 
emergency. 37 In the result, a simple majority in Parliament may enact any law 
relating to the emergency which by virtue of Clause (6) overrides the 
Constitution and is valid even if it is inconsistent with the Constitution. 
35. See generally Stanley Yeo, scrutinizing Declarations And Durations of 
Emergencies (1983) 2 MLJ vi iit pp. viii - ix, and Legislative Control -of 
Emergency Powers in New Zealand and Britain: An Appraisal (19U4-T-V-OT. - V 
Sing. L. Rev. 112. 
36. The only limitation are the subjects covered by Clause (6A), namely, 
Islamic law, the custom of the Malays and the native customs of the 
Borneo states, religion, citizenship and language, which are all placed 
beyond the reach of emergency laws. 
37. Per Lord Guest in Akar v. Attorney Ceneral of Sierra Leone [1969) 3 AER 
384,395: "Emergency laws cannot be challenged on grounds that it was 
not reasonably justifiable for the situation". see also NcEldowney v. 
Forde (1971] AC 632 per Lord Pearson at p. 655. 
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This situation renders nugatory, for the duration of an emergency, the 
safeguard in the Constitution that the Constitution may not be amended except 
by a two-third majority in Parliament. When it is noted that even executive 
laws and orders made under the Emergency Essential Powers Act 1979 are 
superior to the Constitution, 38 it has to be acknowledged that the legal 
regime under an emergency is unchecked and uncontrolled governing and 
government. The absence of any requirement to maintain a proportion between 
the need to diminish democratic values and the exigencies created by the 
emergency is, to say the least, startling. 
The absolutism of emergency rule has its closest parallel to the 
absolutism under military or martial law regimes. For example, after the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria declared a Decree of the Federal Military Government 
invalid, the Military Government passed the Federal Military Government 
(Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree 1970 which nullified the decision 
of the Supreme Court, made Decrees of the Military superior to the 
Constitution and excluded altogether judicial review of Military Decrees. 39 
Thus, executive absolutism in the most distinctive feature of emergency 
government. It is characterized by rule by decree whether by executive 
orders or by the medium of emergency laws. This reality may not be apparent 
where there co-exists, as in Malaysia, alongside emergency rule, the trappings 
of democratic government like Parliament, a civil service system, and a 
judiciary each purporting to discharge its respective roles. In a 
parliamentary system where the executive dominates the legislature, the option 
38. Section 2(4). 
39. See Justice Mohammed Bello (Chief Justice of Nigeria), The Role Of The 
Judiciary In Commonwealth Africa, Vol. 9 No. 2 Dec. 1991, Commonwealth 
Judicial Journal, 9 at 11. 
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at the hand of the executive to make laws superior to the Constitution in the 
form of emergency laws or to by-pass Parliament altogether and promulgate 
executive legislation is an awesome power. This lies at the heart of the 
complaint about the pervasive nature of emergency powers. In the absence of 
any safeguard over the exercise of this law-making power, the only check would 
seem to be the democratic, spirit of the leaders themselves, or, ultimately the 
vote and sanction of the electorate. 
Again, the recommended safeguard is to adopt the norms set by 
international treaties, namely, to maintain a sense of proportion between, the 
derogation sought and the exigencies of the emergency. 40 The minimum 
derogation principle will, in the least, afford a yardstick for the judiciary 
to evaluate if the departure from establishedý constitutional rights was 
justified in the circumstances. 41 As one Commonwealth Attorney General so 
appositely observed: 
"Such review (either in Parliament or the Courts) must be available 'to 
ensure that when great powers are used, the occasion for their exercise 
is appiopriate. The people who have used them should not be the 
judge". 2 
40. See Professor W. L. Twining, supra. 
41. For eg. per Lord Diplock in his dissent in NcEldowney v. Forde (1969] 2 
AER 1039 at 1071 relied, inter alia, on the proportionality element 
contained in the Proviso to Section 1(3) of the Civil Authorities 
(special Powers) Act (Northern) Ireland) 1922, which stated: "The 
ordinary course of law and avocations of life and the enjoyment of 
property shall be interfered with as little as may be permitted by the 
exigencies of the steps required to be taken under this Act". In holding 
the ministerial regulations made under the provision invalid, Lord 
Diplock said: "A regulation which creates an offence so wide in its 
terms as to make unlawful conduct which cannot have the effect of 
endangering the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order 
is not in my view rendered valid merely because the description of the 
conduct penalised is also wide enough to embrace conduct which is 
reasonably likely to have that effect" (p. 1071). 
42. Geoffrey Palmer, later Prime Minister of New Zealand, in Unbridled 
Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution & Government (2nd 
E-d-., 1987, Auckland, OUP) at p. 179. 
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The choice between Parliament or the Courts as the appropriate forum to 
review the exercise of emergency powers is one of frequent debate. The 
preference for Parliament is almost pervasive. 43 Unlike the courts, Parliament 
is not limited to evaluating the legality of emergency action but the very 
question of whether the emergency measures were justified. The legislature's 
role in this regard is understandbly preferable because of the democratic 
principle that the people's representatives should have the ultimate say 
whether to affirm or rescind a state of emergency. There are, however, certain 
inherent weakness in Parliament's role. Under a parliamentary system, the 
reality is that the executive Government dominates Parliament. This factor 
plus the party-whip system would assure the Government a safe passage of 
approval through Parliament. This factor is doubly strong in third world 
democracies that do not generally have strong parliamentary traditions. The 
presence of a dominant leader and the absence of a two-party system would 
spell political oblivion for any politician who chooses to break party-ranks. 
The pressure for conformity is greater in a situation like in Malaysia where 
the same political party has been in power since independence and expulsion 
from the ruling party could well spell political doom for a rebel 
Parliamentarian. 
It has been suggested that parliamentary approval of a state of 
emergency should be by an enhanced majority. 44 It is doubtful, however, 
whether this would provide an additional safeguard in a country like Malaysia 
where the Government has, except for the 1969 - 1971 period, been able to 
43. Amongst local academics, see Stanley Yeo, supra, Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, 
supra, Azmi Khalid, supra. For others, see generally, inter alia, David 
Bonner, supra, at pp. 37 et seq, and W. L. Twining, supra. 
44. See Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, supra. 
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command a two-third majority in Parliament. The answer may not also lie in 
statistically increasing the approval requirement to a four-fifth vote. For 
example, the party in power in Singapore has for many years had a clean slate 
of all but one or two of the seats in Parliament. Under the Westminster 
system, where the separation between the Executive and Parliament is blurred, 
the scrutinizing role of Parliament tends to be exaggerated. The reality is 
that a vote to rescind an emergency is unlikely if it is to result in the 
downfall of the Government. 
As a former Prime Minister of New Zealand observed, the people who 
invoke emergency powers cannot be the judge of its necessity. 45 The evaluation 
has to be made by an independent body. It is preferable if the body has a 
supra-national 
- character 
like the European Commission of Human Rights or the 
European Court of Human Rights. Decisions like the First Greek case'46 which 
rejected the Greek Government's right to derogate from its human rights 
obligations on account of "an emergency", were possible because of the 
international character of the tribunal. There is presently no equivalent to 
international tribunals of this type outside Europe. In these countries the 
judicial determination has to be undertaken by the municipal courts. one 
cannot altogether be enthusiastic about this prospect. The role of national 
courts in the protection of human rights and civil rights in times of 
emergency has been generally dismal. 47 After a comprehensive look at the 
45. Geoffrey Palmer, supra n-42- 
46. See, supra, n. 28. 
47. See generally, George J. Alexander: The Illusory Protection Of Human 
Rights By National Courts During Perio'ds of EmergenSy (1984) Vol. 5 Human 
Rights Law Journal, 1; William E. Conklin: The R01P Of Third World 
Courts During Alleged Emergencies (Essays on Third world Perspectives In 
Jurisp udence Ed. Marasinghe and Conklin, Malayan Law Journal, 
Singapore, 1984) p. 69 et. seq.; NA. F. O'Neill, Human Rights In the Hands 
Of Judges: The Experience In The Pacific Isla-n-d Nations (1983) Vol. 2 
LAWASIA pp. 194 et. seq. 
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performance of the courts in the common law countries, including the United 
States, Professor Alexander opts for political persuasion as the realistic 
choice, saying: "It is better to accomplish it than to rely on the 
demonstrably unreliable courts in times of grave emergency ". 48 In his survey 
of third world courts, William Conklin observes: "In the face of government 
declarations' of emergency the judiciary have played a subservient passive 
role". 49 
crisis government, with its attendant accumulation of powers by the 
Government, creates a crisis in the judiciary itself - Nigeria presents an 
object lesson. When the Supreme Court in Lakanmi v. Attorney General (West)50 
ruled that a military edict could not confiscate- the- property of an 
individual, the Federal Military Government reacted by, promulgating a military 
Decree that nullified the decision of the Supreme Court and made a Decree 
superior to'the Constitution. It is not suprising that judicial attitudes h4ve 
become conditioned to the awesome might of the Executive to thumb its nose at 
court decisions. Faced with an all-embracing ouster clause that seemed to 
insulate military decrees in Nigeria from judicial review, Ademola C. J. 
lamented: "the law courts of Nigeria must as of now blow muted trumpets". 51 
48. George J. Alexander, ibid. 
49. William Conklin, op. cit. n. 47 p. 69- 
50. See account of the case in Justice Mohammed Bello'S, The Role Of The 
Judiciary In Commonwealth Africa, op. cit. at p. 11. See also the 
experience of Ghana in August 1962 at the trial of the persons accused 
of the attempted assasination of President Nkrumah. Their acquittal 
provoked an amendment to the relevant law to authorize the President in 
the interest of the State to declare a decision of the court to have no 
effect: B. O. Nwabueze, Judicialism In commonwealth Africa: The Role Of 
The Courts In Government (C. Hurst & Co., London, 1977) pp. 200-201 
The Chief Justice who acquitted the accused was subsequently dismisseý 
by Nkrumah: see Nwabueze at p. 277. 
51. Wang v. Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Lagos [1986) IRC (Const) 
319 at 330. 
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In Pakistan, like in Nigeria, the overbearing presence of the military is a 
perpetual menace. The remarkable jurisprudence that has emanated from that 
country's courts, alternating between Kelsen and the necessity doctrine, 52 to 
deal with the legal vacuum created by repeated military overthrow of the 
Constitution, has nevertheless been described by Professor De Smith as 
"fundamentally political judgments dressed in legal garb". 53 The Chief Justice 
who decided one of the first of these" cases54 described candidly the anguish 
of the times: "If the court had found against the Governor General there would 
be chaos ..... who could enforce a decision against the Governor General. At 
moments like these, public law is not to be found in the books; it lies 
elsewhere". 55 The reality of the position of the courts vis-a-vis a menacing 
executive, unlikely to brook "judicial interference", was well described by a 
judge of the Bangladesh supreme court: 
"For developing countries no uniform judicial role can be fashioned out. 
In some of the developing countries, the very existence of the judiciary 
as an institution is at stake. In that unenviable condition, the primary 
52. See discussion generally in TKK Iyer, Constitutional Law In Pakistan: 
Kelsen In the Courts [1973] 21 Am Tof Comp. Law 759. See also 
discussion of the-F-aMstan cases and of the principles involved, by the 
Privy Council in the Rhodesian crisis case: Nadzimbamuto, v. Lardner 
Burke [1968] 3 AER 561. 
53. S. A. De Smith, Constitutional Lawyers In Revolutionary Situations (1968) 
7 Western Ontario L Rev-1ew 93 at 98. It is not usual tor judges to 
criticise the judgments of the courts of other countries especially 
ascribing motives for the way decisions are made. An exception was the 
statement of Justice Abdur Rahman Choudhury of the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court when he criticised the leading Pakistan decision in The State v. 
Dosso PLD 1958 SC 533, dealing with revolutionary situations, as 
follows: "I would prefer to think of the judgment in Dosso's case as 
based not on the doctrine of necessity or reality but of expediency": 
ICJ Publication On Independence of Judges And Lawyers In South Asia, 
Nov. 1987 (Proceedings of the Kathmandu78eminar, Sept. 1987) at p. 36. 
54. In Re Special Reference PLD 1955 FC 435. 
55. Muhammad Munir CJ qoted in S. A. De Smith, op. cit. at 98. 
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role of' a judge will be, if he does not decide to leave his 'post, to 
hold on. If he fails to roar like a lion it is understandable. If he 
keeps a glum face and gives a withering look then that will be good 
work. For the time being the worthwhile role for him will be to do 
justice between a citizen and a citizen, so that A foundation may be 
laid for the future when a citizen will be able to expect justice 
against the mighty and the overbearing as well. In the present day world 
there are bad omens and good auguries. In some societies rays of early 
dawn are chasing'away the darkness". 56 
These observations posit the dilemma in which the judiciary in third world 
democracies are placed. Professor Conklin ventured three identifiable reasons 
for the passive judicial stance of these courts: first, the institutional 
inefficacy of the courts when compared to the legislature or the executive; 
secondly, the rule of majoritarianism that requires a passive judiciary; and 
thirdly, that the written constitutions themselves require a passive role of 
the judiciary. 57 However, none of these reasons lay emphasis, as seen in the 
passages above, on the judicial psychology of the judges themselves. The 
pervasive judicial philosophy among these judges is self-restraint. It will be 
56. Justice Muhammad Habibur Rahman, The Role Of The Judiciary In Developing 
Societies: maintaining A Balance, in Law, Justice and the Judiciary: 
Transnational Trends (Ed. Tun Salleh Abas and Profi_eýs_sorVisu Sinnadurai)' 
Professional -(La-wrT-Book Publishers, Kuala Lumpur, 1988,41 at 44. This 
book has an ironic side-tale to it. The speech by one of the Editors, 
Tun Salleh Abas, at the launching of the book was used by the Government 
of Malaysia_as one of the grounds to remove him from the Lord Presidency 
of the Supreme Court. As Professor H. P. Lee says in his review of the 
book: "The ousting of Tun Salleh highlights the fact that, despite all 
the lofty assertions of a vital role in the maintenance of the rule of 
law, the judiciary in a developing society is simply a fragile bastion": 
(1991) Vol. 2 Public Law Review (Law Book Co., Sydney) at p. 61. 
57. Conklin, supra, n. 47 af p. 81 et. seq. Limiting the role of the judiciary 
on majoritarian principles is par excellence the cry of populism. The 
best riposte is the rebuttal of the former Chief Justice of India, P. N. 
Bhagwati: "The argument has been that in a bona fide democracy, the 
majoritarian rule should prevail and that the majoritarian government 
would become a hollow shell, if a duly elected, legally constituted body 
of the people's representatives is denied the right and the ability to 
respond to the people's majoritarian wishes as expressed by their 
representatives. Why should an undemocratically constituted body of 
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inaccurate to speak of this outlook as conservatism or ideological ism. 58 It is 
generally grounded on a less estoric basis. Whether it is borne out of self - 
preservation or an appreciation of reality, it does not enure to the promotion 
contd... 
57. judges, who are not responsible to the people through the ballot box, be 
accorded an overriding power to strike down what the majority of the 
people want? Is not the legislature or executive branch of government 
, equally capable of 
judging and interpreting the constitutionality, of a 
proposed measure? Are they not equally devoted to the principle of 
government under law? The answer to this argument is obvious where there 
is a written constitution: it is not the elected representatives of the 
people who have the final voice for even the majority (of the 
representatives) are under the constitution and are bound to obey its 
mandate. It is the constitution which is supreme and not the elected 
representatives of the people in the legislature and its mandate of the 
constitution cannot be defied by the majority; Now the question as-, to 
what are the limits imposed on the power of the legislature or of the 
executive by the provisions of the Constitution cannot be left to be 
decided by the legislature or the executive. That would make the limits 
meaningless and illusory for, like Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland, 
they can say: The words mean what I say they mean": The Role Of The 
Judiciary in Developing Societies: New Challenges in Law & Just1`c_e__E_T. 
Sall-eE Abas & sinnadurai, op. cit. 25 at 35. That the _p_r-1_nc1'_pTe of 
majoritarianism continues to provide justification for self-restrain and 
may govern judicial decision-making in Malaysia is seen in the recent 
statement of the present Lord President of the Supreme Court of 
Malaysia, Tun Hamid Omar: "(I)n future related concepts like the role of 
the Executive, legislative(sic) and Judiciary, including lawyers in the 
country might have to be reviewed. In a bona fide and practical 
democratic system, rule by majority should therefore receive support 
because the Government would only be an empty shell if the lawful body 
representing the people was denied the rights and means to fulfill the 
people's aspirations. In this respect, a question may arise as to why 
the Judiciary, although free to pass judgments, is given absolute power 
to reject certain decisions of the Executive representing the majority": 
New Straits Times, January 28,1992 at p. 6. 
58. An example of a judiciary accused of being ideological is the South 
African judiciary. Its judiciary under the apartheid regime has been 
likened to the courts of Nazi Germany which stood aside and allowed 
grave injustices to be perpetrated against its Jewish citizens. In her 
study of the South African judiciary, Adrienne Van Blerk observes: "The 
critics of the judiciary lay the blame on an alleged abdication by the 
judges of their responsibility, or on temperamental disposition rooted 
in the allegation that the increase on the Bench of Afrikaans-speaking 
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of constitutionalism.,, Thrice in Malaysia's judicial history the courts let 
pass an opportunity to limit the limitless spread of emergency powers. In 
Ningkan's case, 59 the grounds were fertile for striking down the Proclamation 
of Emergency as having been made in fraudem legis for th e real reason of 
removing a recalcitrant Chief Minister. In Johnson Tan's case, 60 the wholly 
sustainable decision of Harun J. (as he was then) that emergency law-making 
powers could not be invoked in 1975 on the basis of the 1969 Emergency, was 
reversed by a Federal Court that gave worshipful -importance to the letter of 
the Constitution as to howýan emergency may be terminated. In Mahan Singh's 
case, 61 the Federal Court refused to see the distinction between delegating a 
power , and abdicating it in the context of the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
ordinances Nos. 1 and 2 of 1969 by which all the executive and legislative 
power of the Federation was reposed in the person of the Director of 
operations. It took the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh's case62 to inform the 
Malaysian judiciary that a literalist approach in interpreting , the 
constitution, as they did in Khong Teng Khen's case, 63 militated against the 
spirit of that august document which had intended that the legislative power 
contd... 
5B. judges' has rendered the Bench more conservative, and consequently pro- 
executive and politically partisan": Judge And Be Judged (Juta & Co 
Ltd., Cape Town, 1988) pp. 103-104. Dr. Van Mirk herself does not wholly 
agree with the criticism and points that pro-executive judgments had 
been handed down by so-called liberal judges even before the present 
Government acceded to power: at p. 104. 
59. (1968] 1 MLJ 119; [1970] AC 379. 
60. [1977] 2 MLJ 50. 
61. (1975] 2 MLJ 155. 
62. [1979] 2 MLJ 50; [1980) AC 458. 
63. (1976] 2 MLJ 165. 
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should, except in grave circumstances, be vested in a Parliament. Even the 
Indian Supreme Court, one of the activist courts in the Commonwealth, failed 
to acquit itself credibly during the 1975-77 emergency. - The infamous Habeas 
Corpus case'64 sanctioning the abrogation of personal liberty by presidential 
decree, was the nadir of the Indian Judiciary. Since then the Court has 
climbed back into confidence with bold innovative decisions in the socio- 
economic field ensuring that access to justice to the mass of its impoverished 
65 people is not just a dream. Its new activism may be seen in this passage 
from its judgment in the case of the Bihar Legal Support Society v. The Chief 
Justice India: 66 
11 ... that the weaker sections of Indian humanity have been deprived of justice for long, long years: they have had no access to justice on 
account of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. They are not aware 
of the rights and benefits conferred upon them by the Constitution and 
the law. on account of their socially and economically disadvantaged 
position they lack the capacity to assert their rights and they do not 
have the material resources with which to enforce their social and 
economic entitlements and combat exploitation and injustice. The 
majority of the people of our country are subjected to this denial of 
access to justice on account of their poverty, ignorance and illiteracy. 
They are not aware of the rights and benefits conferred upon them by the 
Constitution and the law-The majority of the people of our country are 
subjected to this denial of access to justice and overtaken by despair 
and helplessnessi they continue to remain victims of an exploitative 
society where economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few and 
64. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207. See the scathing 
criticism of the majority-judgment in H. M. Seervails, The Emergency, 
Future safeguards And The Habeas Corpus Case: A Critic sm (Tri'pathi, 
Bombay, 1978): "Coming at the darkest period in the history of 
independent India, it (the decision) made the darkness complete" (at 
P. vii). 
65. See N. K. F. O'Neill, How The Indian Supreme Court Survived The Emergency 
(1981) Vol. 1 LAWASIA 362; see also generally Judicial Activism And 
Social Change Ed. K. L. Bhatia (Deep & Deep Publications, New DelhiT 
-199-0-7. 
66. AIR 1987 SC 38. 
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it is used for perpetuation of domination over large masses of human 
beings. This court has always, therefore, regarded it as its duty to 
come to the rescue of those deprived or vulnerable sections of Indian 
humanity in order to help them realise their economic and social 
entitlements and to bring to an end their oppressi6n and exploitation. 
The strategy of public interest litigation has been evolved by this 
Court with a view to bringing justice within the easy reach of the poor 
and the disadvantaged sections of the community. This Court has always 
shown the greatest concern and anxiety for'the welfare of the large 
masses of people in the country who are living a life of want and 
destitution, misery and suffering and has become a symbol of the hopes 
and aspirations of millions of people in the country... ". 
The challenge facing the courts of the new democracies is to make the 
justice system relevant to the people. The Courts have to discharge the dual 
function of fulfiling this role, and performing the other, namely, its 
traditional function of acting as the arbiter between the citizen and the 
State. Their ' role in this regard is no less important than the first 
especially when individual rights and liberties are imperilled by the claim of 
State interests. The question always is can the Courts safeguard freedom or 
will they be overwhelmed by the all-embracing power of the Executive? The 
answer to this would determine whether the rule of law is allowed to operate 
in a given society. If the Courts are unable to keep the other organs of the 
State within their constitution' boundaries, or if there is scant regard for 
the opinion of the Courts, or if crucial aspects of executive power are put 
beyond the pale of judicial inquiry, as in the discharge of emergency powers, 
the pathway is cleared for government by decree and not government by laws. 
However, to inject a tone of realism, it will be unrealistic to lay too 
much emphasis on the role of the courts. Scrutiny of emergency action must 
still be the responsibility of both Parliament and the Courts. We have 
examined at some length the shortcomings in the discharge of this function by 
both institutions. In answering the question whether the courts are fitted to 
provide an effective check against the oppressive exercise of power by 
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government, an Australian judge said it depended, inter alia, on the quality 
of judges. 67 In the ultimate, it is the quality and vigilance of the people 
that determines if they are able to safeguard their freedoms. 68 The level of 
political consciousness and maturity of the people is the ultimate arbiter and 
check against state lawlessness. For no oppressive' regime, whether military or 
otherwise, can prevail against the will of the people. 
67. see Justice Brennan of the Australian High Court: "Governments, 
preoccupied with the pressing problems of the day and having little 
knowledge of and less sympathy with the judicial method, often fail to 
see that the courts are, and must be seen to be, separate from the other 
branches of government. Their independence must be respected - not for 
the sake of some foolish notion of status but in order that they may 
perform their necessarily lonely function. A free and democratic society 
could not be long maintained if governments were to seek to impose on 
the courts controls of the kind properly imposed upon the Departments of 
State. It would be a cautionary reflection for any government that was 
minded to do so that, should they come into opposition, the precedent 
that they had set might rob them of the law's protection": Courts, 
Democracy And The Law (1981) 65 ALJ 32 at 40. 
68. This is the cal; in Burma today that the people should first liberate 
themselves from their fear. In the words of the Burmese human rights 
activist and opposition leader, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi: "It is not power 
that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it 
and fear of the scourge of power those who are subject to it": Statement 
on Being Awarded the Sakharov Prize For Freedom. Reproduced in New 
straits Times Aug. 10,1991. Now published in her, Freedom From Fear 
(Penguin, 1991) p. 180. 
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
PART XI 
SPECIAL POWERS AGAINST SUBVERSION, ORGANISED 
VIOLENCE, AND ACTS AND CRIMES PREJUDICIAL 
TO THE PUBLIC AND EMERGENCY POWERS 
§149. Legislation against subversion, action 
prejudicial to public order, etc. 
If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or 
threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or 
outside the Federation: - 
(a) to cause,, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to 
fear, organised violence against persons or property; or 
(b), to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
any Government in the Federation; or 
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between 
different races or other classes of the population likely to 
cause violence; or 
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, 
of anything by law established; or 
§(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning 
of any supply or service to the public or any class of the 
public in the Federation or any part thereof; or 
§(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, 
the Federation or any part thereof, 
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action 
is 'valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the 
provisions of Article 5,9,10 or 13, or would apart from this 
Article be outside the legislative power of Parliament; and 
Article 79 shall not apply to a Bill for such an Act or any 
amendment to such a Bill. 
(2) A law containing such a recital as is mentioned in Clause (1) 
shall, if not sooner repealed, cease to have effect if resolutions 
are passed by both Houses of Parliament annulling such law, but 
without prejudice to anything previously done by virtue thereof or 
to the power of Parliament to make a new law under this Article. 
§150. Proclamation of emergency 
If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency 
exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order 
in the Federation or any part thereof is threatened, he may issue 
a Proclamation of Emergency making therein a declaration to that 
effect. 
2 
(2) A'Proclamation of Emergency under Clause (1) may be issued before 
the actual occurrence of the event which threatens the security, 
or the economic life, or public order in the Federation or any 
part thereof if the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that there 
is imminent danger of the occurrence of such event. 
(2A) The power conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by this Article 
shall include the power to issue different Proclamations on 
different grounds or in different circumstances, whether or not 
there is a Proclamation or Proclamations already issued by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause (1) and such Proclamation or 
Proclamations are in operation. 
(2B) If at any time while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 'operation, 
except when both Houses of Parliament are sitting concurrently, 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that certain circumstances 
exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, 
he may promulgate such ordinances as circumstances appear to him 
to require. 
(2C) An' ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B) shall have the same 
force and effect as an Act of Parliament, and shall continue in 
full force and effect as if it is an Act of Parliament until it is 
revoked or annulled under Clause (3) or until it lapses under 
clause (7); and the power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to 
promulgate ordinances under Clause (2B) may be exercised in 
relation to any matter with respect to which Parliament has power 
to make laws, regardless of the legislative or other procedures 
required to be followed, or the proportion of the total votes 
required to be had, in either House of Parliament. 
§(3) A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated under 
Clause (2B) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if 
not sooner revoked, shall cease to have effect if resolutions are 
passed by both Houses annulling such Proclamation or ordinance, 
but without prejudice to anything previously done by virtue 
thereof or to the power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to issue a 
new Proclamation under Clause 1) or promulgate any ordinance 
under Clause (2B). 
(4) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in force the executive 
authority of the Federation shall, notwithstanding anything in 
this constitution, extend to any matter within the legislative 
authority of a State and to the giving of directions to the 
Government of a State or to any officer or authority thereof. 
§(5) Subject to Clause (6A), while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
force, Parliament may, notwithstanding anything in this 
Constitution make laws* with respect to any matter, if it appears 
to Parliament that the law is required by. reason of the emergency; 
and 'Article 79 shallýnot apply to a Bill for such a law or an 
amendment to such a Bill, nor shall any provision of this 
* See temporary amendment vide s. 3(l)(a) Act 68/1966. 
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Constitution or of any written law which requires any consent or 
concurrence to the passing of a law or any consultation with 
respect thereto, or which restricts the coming into force of a law 
after it is passed or the presentation of a Bill to the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong for his assent. 
9(6) Subject to Clause (6A), no provision of any otdinance promulgated 
under this Article, and no provision of any Act of Parliament 
which is passed while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and 
which declares that the law appears to Parliament to be required 
by reason of the emergency, shall be'invalid on the ground of 
inconsistency with any provision of this Constitution*. 
§(6A) Clause (5) shall not extend the powers of Parliament with respect 
to any matter of Islamic law or the custom of the Malays, or with 
respect to any matter of native law or custom in the State of 
Sabah or Sarawak; nor shall Clause (6) validate any provision 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution relating to 
any such matter or relating to religion, citizenship, or language. 
(7) At the expiration of a period of six months beginning with the 
date on which a Proclamation of Emergency ceases to be in force, 
any ordinance promulgated in pursuance of the Proclamation and, to 
the extent that it could not have been validly made but for this 
Article, any law made while the Proclamation was in force, shall 
cease to have effect, except as to things done or omitted to be 
done before the expiration of that period. 
§(8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution: - 
(a) the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong mentioned in 
Clause (1) and Clause (2B) shall be final and conclusive and 
shall not be challenged or called in question in any court 
on any ground; and 
(b) no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine 
any application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, 
on any ground, regarding the validity of: - 
(i) a Proclamation under Clause (1) or of a declaration 
made in such Proclamation to the effect stated in 
Clause (1); 
(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation; 
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B); or 
(iv) the continuation in force of any such ordinance. 
§(9) For the purpose of this Article the Houses of Parliament shall be 
regarded as sitting only if the members of each House are 
respectively assembled together and carrying out the business of 
the House. 
* See temporary amendment vide s. 3(l)(a) Act 68/1966. 
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PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY 
THE FEDERAL CONST1TUTION 
By His MAJESTY THE YANG DI-PERT'UAN AGONP. BY THE GRACE OF 
GOD OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES'OF MALAYSIA. SUPREME HEAD 
(PUBLIC SEAL). 
SYED PUTR4 JAMALULLAIL. 
Yang X-Pertuan Aqunq 
WHEREAS WE are satisfied that a grave EmeqgCnCy -exists whereby tile 
security of the Federation is threatened: 
AND WHEREAS Article 150 of the Constitution provides that in the said 
c; rcumstances WE may issue a Proclamation of Emergency: 
INOW, THEREFORE, We, Tuanku Syed Putra i6ni Al-Marhurn Sycd 
Hassan Jamalullail by the Grace of God of the States and territories of 
Malaysia Yang di-Pertuan Agong in exercise of the powers aforesaid 
do hereby proclaim that a State of Emeracilcy exists, and that this 
Proclamation shall extend throughout the Federation. 
Given at Our Istana Negara in Our Federal Capital of Kuala Lumpur, 
this third day of Septenýber. 1964. 
By His Majesty's Command, 
TuNKu ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA, 
Prinic Minister 
(To he laid brfore Parliament purstiont to Article 1-50 (1) of the 
Fctleral Constitalion. ) 
VI-CHETAK DI-) %RATAK CHETAK Xrx4J%A%. KC4L4, LUMIIVX. OI. Ell TIJOX NI. NG ClioNG. A. M. M.. I-MNOIETAV. XtRUA4V 
MIME 3- 966 
S 220R-A-WIVIK 
M14 I E: PLG; I E: IST ('- W 
MALAYSIA . 
V 
Warta Kerajaan 
SERI PADUKA BAGINDA 
DI-TERBITKAN DENGAIN KUASA 
HIS MAJESTYS GOVERNAIENT GAZETTE 
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY 
fil. 10 14hb September, 1966 TAMBAHAN No. 45.4 Bil. 20 PERUNDANGAN 
P. U. 339A. 
PROCLANIATIOLN OF EMERGENCY 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
By His MAJESTY THE YANG DI-PERTUM AGONG, BY THE GRACE OF 
GOD OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES OF MALAYSIA, SUPREME HEAD 
(PUBLIC SEAL) TUANKU ISILSIAIL NASIRUDDW SHAH, 
Yang di-Pertitan Agong 
WHEREAS WE are satisEed that a agrave Emergency exists whereby the 
security of a part of the Federation, to wit ihe State of Sarawak, is 
threatened: 
AND WHEREAs Article 150 of the Constitution provides that i'n the 
said circumstances WE may issue a Proclamation. of Emergge. ncy: 
NoW, THEREFORE, WE, Tuanku Ismail Nasiruddin Shah ibni Al- 
Marhum, Al-Sultan Zainal Abidin, by the Grace of God of the States 
and territories of LNfalavsia Yanz di-Pertuan A2onz in exercise of the 
powers aforesaid do hereby proclaim that a State of Emergency exists, 
and that this Proclamation shall extend throughout the territories of 
the State of Sarawak. 
Given at Kuala Trengganu, this fourteenth day of September, one 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-six. 
By His tMajesty's Command, 
TuN Hm ABDUL RAZAK BIN DATO'HUSSAIN. 
Deputy Prime Minister 
[To be laid before Parliament pursuant to Article 150 (3) of the 
Federal Constitution. ] 
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tersebut ada-lah dengan ini menoishtiharkan E !: Vx-TjE: JL 0 45 -9 
keadaan Dzarurat se dang berlaku dan bahawz 
ishtiharan ini hendak4ah meliputi scluroh Persekut 
DI-PERBuAT di-Istana Beta di-Ibu 
* 
Kota Persekuti- 
Kuala Lumpur, pada Lima belas haribulan Mei, 1969. 
Dengan Titah Perentah Baginda, 
TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUtRA AL-HAJ, 
Perdana Menteri 
PROCLA-MATION, OF EMERGENCY 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
By His MAJESTY THE YANG DI-PERTUAN, AGON'G, BY THE 
GRACE OF ALLAH OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES OF 
THE FEDERATION, SUPREME HE-AD 
0 
TUANKU ISMAIL NASIRUDDIN SHAH, 
-Yam, di-Pertuan Agona (Public Seal) 0.00 
WHEREAS WE are satisfied that a grave Emergency exists I- whereby the security of the Federation is threatened; 
AND WHERE-ýs Article* 150 of the Constitution provides 
that in the said circumstances WE may issue a Proclamation 
of Emeraency: 
VOW, THEREFORE, WE, Tuank-u Ismail Nasiruddin Shah 
ibni Al-Marhum Al: -Sultan Zainal Abidin by th-- Grace qf 
Allah'of the States and territories of the Federation Yang 
--di-Pertuan AQong in ex%ercise of the powers aforesaid do hereby proclaim that a State of. Emergency exists', and that 
this -Proclamation shall extend thToughout the Federation. 
GIVEN at Our Istana Negara in Our Federal Capital of 
Kuala Lumpur, this Fifteenth day of May,, 1969. * 
By His Majesty's Command, 
TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ, 
Prime Minister 
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Warta K. erajaan 
SERI PADUKA * BAGINDA 
DITERBITKAN DENGAIN KUASA 
I-I I E: JL 977 
IE: 
HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNAIENT GAZ=E 
PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY 
jil. 21 Shb Noyember 1977 T, 4-'VfBAHAN NO- 73 
No. 22 PERUNDANGAN (A) 
P. U. (A) 358. 
PERISY'RH-ARAN D. A-RURAT 
PERLEMBAGAAIN PERSEKUTOAN 
OLEH DULI Y. A'.. \'G NIAI-L-k MULIA SERI PADUKA BAGINDA 
YANG DI-PERTuki Ac; o,, N'G DENGAN KURNiA ALLAH BAGI 
NEGERI-NEGERI DAN WILAYAH-NVILAYAH IVIALAYSLk, 
KUALA UTAMA NTEGARA 
(iNfohor Besar) 
TUANKU YAHYA PETRA IBNI AL-INIARHUM 
SULTANT IBRAHRvl, 
Yi2ng di-Pertuan Agong 
ýAHAWASANYA BET. k adalah berpuashati bahawa 'suatu 
Darurat besar sedang berlaku yang mengancam keselamatan 2n ZIP dan kehidupan ekonorni bagi sebahagian Persekutuan, iaitu 
Neo-eri Kelantan: 
DAN 'BAHAWASANYA Perkara 150 Perlembagaan meng- 00 
untukkan bah,,, Nva dalam keadaan yang tersebut BETA boleh 
mengeluarkan Perisytiharan Darurat: 
MAKA, OLEH YANG DEMIKIAN, BETA, Tuankil Yahya Petra 
Ibni Al-*marhurn Sultan Ibrahim dengan Kurnia Allah bagi 
Neaeri-negeri dan wilayah-wilayah Malaysia Ya6cr di- 
Pertuan Agong p4da menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang 
tersebut adalah dengan ini menctisytiharkan bahawa keadaan 
ýI 0 
MALAYSIA " 
A) J66.1624 
Darurat. sedano, berlaku dan bahawa Peris tiharan iiii 0y hendaklah meliputi seluruh -wila ah-wilayah Neg y geri Kelantan: 
DAN BETA adalah dencran ini menoakui bahawa Perisy- 
tiharan ini tidaklah dengan apa-apa cara mengurangkan 
kuasa, tetapi 
... 
hen0aklah. menjacli tambahan kepada, 
Perisytiharan ; Darurat yang dikeluarkan oleh BETA pada 
15hb Mei 1969, yahg disiarkan dalam Warta No. P. U. (A) 
145 pada tatikh yarig, sama. 
DIPERBuAT di Istana Beta di Ibu Kota Persekutuan di 
Kuala Lumpur- pada Lapan haribulan November, seribu. 
sembilan ratus tujuh puluh tujuh. 
Dencyan Titah Perintah Baginda, g 
DATUK HuSSEI. N OINN, 
Perdiana Menteri 
(Akan jibentan 
0 kan dolom Parlimen nzeniffut Perk-ora 150 (3) Perlenz- baga-an Perse u0n. ) g kitt 
PROCLAINIATION OF ENIERGENCY 
THETEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
By His MAJESTY THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGO. N, G, BY THE 
GRACE OF ALLAH OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES Oý 
. MALAYSIA,, SUPREME HEAD 
(Public Seal) 
TUANKU YAHYA PETRA IBNI AL-MARHUM - 
SULTAN IBR. -kHDLvf, 
Yang di-Pertiton AgOnOv 
WHERF-As -wE are satisfied that a grave Emergency exists Cý 
whereby the security and economic life of a part of the 
Federation, to wit, the State of Kelantan, are threatened: 
AND WHEREAs Article 150 of Ihe Cofistitution provides 
that in -the said circumstances wp, may issue a Proclamation 
of Emergency: - 
Now, THEREFORE, wE, Tuanku Yahya Petra Ibni Al- 
marhurn Sultan Ibrahim by the Grace *of Allah of the States 
and territories. of Malaysia Yang di-Pertuan A-gon-9 in 
exercise of the*powers aforesaid do hereby pro. claim that 
1625 P. U. (A) 358. 
a State of Emergency exisis, -and that 'this Proclamation 
shall extend throughout the territories of the State of 
Kelantan: 
AND WE hereby declare that this Proclamation -shall not 
in any manner. derogate from, but shall be in addition lo, I 
the Proclamation of I Emergency issued by us on the 15th'I 
. 
day of May 1969, published in the Gazette in P. U. `(A) 145: 
of the same date. il 
GIVEN AT Our Istana Negara in Our Federal Capital of 
Kuala Lumpur, this Eighth day of November, one thousand 
nine hundred and seventy seven. 
By His Majesty's Commdnd, 
D. A. TUK HussEIN OINNN, 
Prime Minister 
(To be laid before Parliament pursuant to Article 150 (3) of the 
Federal Constitution. ) 
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